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Impact of regulation and deregulation, industry structure, pay structure, and hiring practices on road Impact of regulation and deregulation, industry structure, pay structure, and hiring practices on road safety International Conference on Road Safety at Work Washington, DC February 17, 2009 Michael H. Belzer, Ph. D. Department of Economics Wayne State University - Detroit Wayne State University February 17, 2009 Trucking Industry Benchmarking Program © 2009 by Michael H. Belzer

Industrial Relations: The most powerful latent safety factor • Freight and passenger transport is Industrial Relations: The most powerful latent safety factor • Freight and passenger transport is a business activity – Inappropriate to abstract the work and business process from transport – Do not focus on the technology but rather on industrial organization – Focusing on technology and engineering ignores economic forces — and the competition — driving the work process • Competitors will do whatever they must to make a profit – Without regulatory limits, shippers will make carriers do whatever it takes to be lowest cost providers – Without regulatory limits, carriers will make operators do whatever it takes to be lowest cost providers • Risk-shifting and subcontracting to least powerful people — the drivers — will push competition to the lowest level possible Wayne State University Trucking Industry Benchmarking Program February 17, 2009 2 © 2009 by Michael H. Belzer

Original U. S. Regulation • “Cutthroat competition” in trucking began in the 1920 s Original U. S. Regulation • “Cutthroat competition” in trucking began in the 1920 s and led to serious safety problems – State and local authorities could not cope with growing safety problems created by inter-state trucking • Motor Carrier Act of 1935 limited competition and improved safety – Enforcement originally rested with Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) but shifted to U. S. Department of Transportation (DOT) in the 1960 s – Unionization grew from almost zero in the early 1930 s to 60 -90% in the 1970 s – Collective bargaining brought order to a fragmented industry and compensation to middle-class standards – Worker protections at unionized carriers spilled over to protect nonunion workers at non-union firms and in exempt sectors Wayne State University Trucking Industry Benchmarking Program February 17, 2009 3 © 2009 by Michael H. Belzer

U. S. Regulatory Liberalization • Administrative deregulation in 1977 increased market competition • Motor U. S. Regulatory Liberalization • Administrative deregulation in 1977 increased market competition • Motor Carrier Act of 1980 removed most existing economic regulation of inter-state trucking – Market entry eased; transparency ended – MCA of 1980 favored rate discrimination • Shippers gained bargaining power – Collective ratemaking ended; cutthroat pricing returns • Intra-state deregulation mandated in 1995; ICC closed • Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) of the DOT now is the major regulatory barrier to cutthroat competition – Hours of work (which limits labor market competition) – Truck and driver health and safety standards – Motor carrier safety regulation Wayne State University Trucking Industry Benchmarking Program February 17, 2009 4 © 2009 by Michael H. Belzer

Carriers Now Compete on Price • Primary determinant of freight transport pricing is cost Carriers Now Compete on Price • Primary determinant of freight transport pricing is cost • Carriers must continuously reduce cost – – Shippers view freight transport as a commodity Shippers make partial exception for high-value freight Cost caused industry to restructure completely in 3 years Lower trucking cost enabled increased trade and longer supply chains • Rapid change in cost factors changed industrial organization – Trucking rapidly segmented based on shipment size • Truckload carriers need no consolidation terminals • Truckload carriers need no local pickup and delivery networks – A few common carriers survived as less-than-truckload (LTL) carriers; the rest failed – Non-union specialized and contract carriers boomed and became truckload (TL) carriers • Probably 1/4 of cost-savings came from restructuring • Probably 3/4 of cost-savings came from lower compensation Wayne State University Trucking Industry Benchmarking Program February 17, 2009 5 © 2009 by Michael H. Belzer

Average Truckload Shipment on One Full Truck Wayne State University Trucking Industry Benchmarking Program Average Truckload Shipment on One Full Truck Wayne State University Trucking Industry Benchmarking Program February 17, 2009 6 © 2009 by Michael H. Belzer

The Same 26, 600 Pounds as 21 Less-than-Truckload Shipments of Average Weight on One The Same 26, 600 Pounds as 21 Less-than-Truckload Shipments of Average Weight on One Full Truck Wayne State University Trucking Industry Benchmarking Program February 17, 2009 7 © 2009 by Michael H. Belzer

Competition led to Structural Changes Wayne State University Trucking Industry Benchmarking Program February 17, Competition led to Structural Changes Wayne State University Trucking Industry Benchmarking Program February 17, 2009 8 © 2009 by Michael H. Belzer

Wayne State University Trucking Industry Benchmarking Program February 17, 2009 9 © 2009 by Wayne State University Trucking Industry Benchmarking Program February 17, 2009 9 © 2009 by Michael H. Belzer

Wayne State University February 17, 2009 Trucking Industry Benchmarking Program 10 © 2009 by Wayne State University February 17, 2009 Trucking Industry Benchmarking Program 10 © 2009 by Michael H. Belzer

UMTIP Driver Survey • Survey conducted in 1997 -1998 in Midwest truck stops, focusing UMTIP Driver Survey • Survey conducted in 1997 -1998 in Midwest truck stops, focusing on over -the-road (OTR) drivers • Driver average earnings $745 per week, 65 working hours/week, for average earnings of $11. 46 per straight time hour – CPS data for same period shows 21. 4% of all drivers worked more than 60 hours/week • Mean mileage rate was 28. 6¢/mile, with unionized drivers earning an average of 38. 6 ¢/mile • Only 9. 8% of OTR employee drivers unionized, and virtually no ownerdrivers are union members (not allowed to join) • At the mean, truckers drove 113, 843 miles and 25% of their working hours were unpaid non-driving time • Total annual working time about 3, 250 hours, assuming drivers had 2. 25 weeks off for vacation and holidays Wayne State University February 17, 2009 Trucking Industry Benchmarking Program 11 © 2009 by Michael H. Belzer

Other Features of This Labor Market • Pervasive subcontracting and as many as 500, Other Features of This Labor Market • Pervasive subcontracting and as many as 500, 000 carriers – Perhaps 300, 000 owner-drivers (no accurate measures exist) – 75% of owner-drivers leased to motor carriers – 25% operate on their own authority (actual owner-operators) • Common law treats all of them as independent contractors and hence they may not organize (not true in Canada or Australia) • Marginal cost pricing in transportation leads to cobweb (“cutthroat”) pricing and destructive competition – Teamster drivers earn average of about $50, 000/year, mostly in LTL – Non-union drivers average about $36, 000/year, mostly in TL – Owner-drivers on average earn one-third less; most have no health insurance and none have pensions – 2004 DOT regulations raised drive time to 11 hours/shift and allow drivers to re-set their weekly clock to allow an 84 -hour workweek Wayne State University February 17, 2009 Trucking Industry Benchmarking Program 12 © 2009 by Michael H. Belzer

National survey of owner-operators in 2003 -2004, using the Trucking Industry Benchmarking Program Wayne National survey of owner-operators in 2003 -2004, using the Trucking Industry Benchmarking Program Wayne State University February 17, 2009 Trucking Industry Benchmarking Program 13 © 2009 by Michael H. Belzer

Three Studies Show How Pay Drives Safety • Using driver level data from J. Three Studies Show How Pay Drives Safety • Using driver level data from J. B. Hunt, we determined the probability of driver crashes using 11, 540 drivers and 93, 000 driver-month observations • Using carrier level data from the National Survey of Driver Wages, we determined the extent to which compensation factors predict carrier crash rates • Using the UMTIP random survey of over-the-road drivers, we determined that driver pay predicts safety outcomes Wayne State University February 17, 2009 Trucking Industry Benchmarking Program 14 © 2009 by Michael H. Belzer

Study 1: Effect of pay level in one firm The Problem • J. B. Study 1: Effect of pay level in one firm The Problem • J. B. Hunt: The nation’s second largest truckload carrier in 1995 – 96% driver turnover – Carrier experienced driver safety and driver reliability problems The Solution • Raised wages by 38% in one major move • Closed down training schools & hired experience • Focused on driver retention Wayne State University February 17, 2009 Trucking Industry Benchmarking Program 15 © 2009 by Michael H. Belzer

Higher Pay, Lower Crash Rates Wayne State University February 17, 2009 Trucking Industry Benchmarking Higher Pay, Lower Crash Rates Wayne State University February 17, 2009 Trucking Industry Benchmarking Program 16 © 2009 by Michael H. Belzer

Pay Level Findings • At the mean, every one cent more in first observed Pay Level Findings • At the mean, every one cent more in first observed pay leads to 11. 1% reduction in crash probability • At the mean pay rate of 34 cents per mile, every 10% higher first observed pay is associated with a 34% lower crash probability (human capital? ) • A 10% pay increase is associated with a 6% lower crash probability (incentive? ) • At the mean, each year of tenure reduces crash by 16% • Hunt drivers with 7 years of tenure have the lowest risk, controlling for other factors • Higher pay reduces turnover and increases age, experience, and unmeasured characteristics Wayne State University February 17, 2009 Trucking Industry Benchmarking Program 17 © 2009 by Michael H. Belzer

Experience Matters Wayne State University February 17, 2009 Trucking Industry Benchmarking Program 18 © Experience Matters Wayne State University February 17, 2009 Trucking Industry Benchmarking Program 18 © 2009 by Michael H. Belzer

Study 2: The Effect of Compensation Level and Method for 102 Truckload Carriers Data Study 2: The Effect of Compensation Level and Method for 102 Truckload Carriers Data Sources: National Survey of Driver Wages UMTIP Survey of Carriers SAFER System Wayne State University February 17, 2009 Trucking Industry Benchmarking Program 19 © 2009 by Michael H. Belzer

Carrier Level Descriptive Statistics Wayne State University February 17, 2009 Trucking Industry Benchmarking Program Carrier Level Descriptive Statistics Wayne State University February 17, 2009 Trucking Industry Benchmarking Program 20 © 2009 by Michael H. Belzer

Negative Binomial Regression Results Log-likelihood: -454. 996 Restricted Log-likelihood: -4648. 659 Likelihood Ratio Statistic: Negative Binomial Regression Results Log-likelihood: -454. 996 Restricted Log-likelihood: -4648. 659 Likelihood Ratio Statistic: -8387. 326 Chi-Square Statistic 465. 016 Wayne State University February 17, 2009 Significance Level: 0. 000 Trucking Industry Benchmarking Program 21 © 2009 by Michael H. Belzer

Wayne State University February 17, 2009 Trucking Industry Benchmarking Program 22 © 2009 by Wayne State University February 17, 2009 Trucking Industry Benchmarking Program 22 © 2009 by Michael H. Belzer

Overall Compensation Effect • For every 10% more that they compensate drivers, carriers have Overall Compensation Effect • For every 10% more that they compensate drivers, carriers have a 9. 2% lower crash rate • Significant components include – Mileage rate for drivers with 3 years experience (5. 2%) – Drivers’ anticipated annual pay raise (0. 6%) – Amount of unpaid non-driving time per mile driven (1. 0%) – Safety bonus (1. 0%) – Amount of money driver pays for family health insurance (0. 8%) – Amortized value of life insurance provided by carrier (0. 6%) Wayne State University February 17, 2009 Trucking Industry Benchmarking Program 23 © 2009 by Michael H. Belzer

Study 3 Effect of Pay Level on Safety: Individual Driver Level Data Sloan Foundation Study 3 Effect of Pay Level on Safety: Individual Driver Level Data Sloan Foundation Trucking Industry Program UMTIP Truck Driver Survey • Based on 1, 000 drivers surveyed in 1997 -98 • Regression results based on 247 of these who are mileage employee drivers working in the for-hire trucking industry Wayne State University February 17, 2009 Trucking Industry Benchmarking Program 24 © 2009 by Michael H. Belzer

Mean Compensation Variables Wayne State University February 17, 2009 Trucking Industry Benchmarking Program 25 Mean Compensation Variables Wayne State University February 17, 2009 Trucking Industry Benchmarking Program 25 © 2009 by Michael H. Belzer

Workplace Variables Wayne State University February 17, 2009 Trucking Industry Benchmarking Program 26 © Workplace Variables Wayne State University February 17, 2009 Trucking Industry Benchmarking Program 26 © 2009 by Michael H. Belzer

Probit Regression Estimates (significant variables only) N = 247 Log-likelihood: -85. 706 Restricted Log-likelihood: Probit Regression Estimates (significant variables only) N = 247 Log-likelihood: -85. 706 Restricted Log-likelihood: 98. 967 Chi-Square Statistic: 26. 522 Significance Level: . 380 Wayne State University February 17, 2009 Trucking Industry Benchmarking Program 27 © 2009 by Michael H. Belzer

Wayne State University February 17, 2009 Trucking Industry Benchmarking Program 28 © 2009 by Wayne State University February 17, 2009 Trucking Industry Benchmarking Program 28 © 2009 by Michael H. Belzer

Driver Survey: Effect of Pay on Safety At the mean pay rate, for every Driver Survey: Effect of Pay on Safety At the mean pay rate, for every 10% more that drivers earn, their probability of having a crash is 25. 0% lower Significant components include – For every 10% higher mileage rate that driver earns, the probability of a crash is 18. 7% lower – For every 10% more paid days off, the probability of a crash is 6. 3% lower Wayne State University February 17, 2009 Trucking Industry Benchmarking Program 29 © 2009 by Michael H. Belzer

Three Studies’ Overall Effects • Mileage rate alone accounts for 4: 1 safety effect Three Studies’ Overall Effects • Mileage rate alone accounts for 4: 1 safety effect at J. B. Hunt • Compensation alone accounts for 0. 92: 1 safety effect for 102 TL carriers • Compensation alone accounts for 2. 5: 1 safety effect for surveyed drivers • Conservative conclusion: • Higher driver pay is strongly associated with reduced crashes (2: 1) • At the mean, 10% higher pay leads to 20% safety improvement Wayne State University February 17, 2009 Trucking Industry Benchmarking Program 30 © 2009 by Michael H. Belzer

Further Research: Selection or Incentives? We think most of this probably is selection • Further Research: Selection or Incentives? We think most of this probably is selection • “Selection” suggests employers hire drivers based on unobserved human capital qualities – – Employment history Deportment Stability “Character” • Research should be undertaken linking multiple Census and Unemployment Insurance data sets, using the Longitudinal Employer Household Dynamics (LEHD) survey to measure unobserved human capital contributed by workers and firms • This is the way to use economic analysis to serve safety goals • Regulators also should experiment with benchmarking partnerships with states and industry trucking associations Wayne State University February 17, 2009 Trucking Industry Benchmarking Program 31 © 2009 by Michael H. Belzer

Human capital and incentives may not be independent • Better jobs go to those Human capital and incentives may not be independent • Better jobs go to those with best overall record. • For beginning drivers, hiring depends on factors other than commercial truck driving. • Subsequent performance on the job determines future opportunities • Drivers are careful not to damage their record in order to maintain their labor market position. • Further incentives include defined-benefit pensions, which act as performance bonds. Wayne State University February 17, 2009 Trucking Industry Benchmarking Program 32 © 2009 by Michael H. Belzer

Further Resources Available by Request Michael H. Belzer, Ph. D. Department of Economics Wayne Further Resources Available by Request Michael H. Belzer, Ph. D. Department of Economics Wayne State University (313) 577 -3345 michael. h. belzer@wayne. edu Studies: http: //www. clas. wayne. edu/unit-faculty-detail. asp? Faculty. ID=595 http: //myprofile. cos. com/mbelzer Benchmarking: http: //www. ilir. umich. edu/TIBP/ Wayne State University February 17, 2009 Trucking Industry Benchmarking Program © 2009 by Michael H. Belzer