ICKS Korea University North Korean Nuclear Proliferation Challenges

ICKS, Korea University North Korean Nuclear Proliferation Challenges July 19, 2005. By Han Sung-Joo

ICKS, Korea University

ICKS, Korea University What’s New? 1 North Korea agree to return to 6 -Party Talks 2 Seoul announce proposal to provide North Korea electric power 3 Kim Jong-Il reiterates willingness to “denuclearize” Korean Peninsula

ICKS, Korea University What is the problem? 1. Geneva Agreed Framework (October 1994) 2. The “covert enrichment” problem (October 2002) 3. “Six Party Talks (3 rounds, August 2003 – June 2004) 4. Declaration of possession (February 2005) 5. 8, 000 fuel rods withdrawn 6. Enrichment program unaccounted for

ICKS, Korea University Why? 1. Justify economic cooperation (fertilizer, good, etc. ) 2. Support “embrace” policy 3. Shore up China’s “face” 4. Discourage pressure policy 5. Buy time 6. See what can be gained? Ultimate Question Will North Korea give up nuclear weapons?

ICKS, Korea University At issue 1. Name Calling Axis of Evil Tyrant Outpost of Tyranny Bush Rice, Dobriansky Irresponsible Question Cheney Does North Korea Really Fear U. S. “hostile 2. Regime Change 3 Bilateral Negotiation policy” or an excuse?

ICKS, Korea University Will North Korea give up its nuclear weapons and the program? Cf. 1994 Reasons to be pessimistic Reasons to be optimistic 1. 2. 3. 4. Economic need Chinese involvement U. S. pays more attention Rice, Hill : close connection with the White House Hill also has good rapport with South Korea. 5. Mutual understanding between the R. O. K 6. and U. S. 6. South Korea offers “Significant Plan” 1. 2. 3. 4. 4. 5. 6. NK is over the threshold Deadlock in 2005 NPT review conference 3 North Korea want, “disarmament talks” North Korean brinkmanship works Japan-Korea, Japan-China relations Libya, Iraq, Iran

ICKS, Korea University Advantages and disadvantages of 6 -party talks Advantages 1. 2. More pressure burden-sharing of negotiating of economic assistance 3. Involvement of China 4. Can provide umbrella for 5. bilateral talks Disadvantages 1. Quiet diplomacy difficult 2. 3. Diversity of interests among participants 3. Bilateral disputes can affect effectiveness

ICKS, Korea University 1993 -4 and 2002 -5: A comparison 1. Bush Administration - Post-9. 11 America 2. North Korean nuclear capability 3. Inter-Korea relations 4. More visible role of China – advantage or disadvantage? 5. U. S. preoccupation with Iraq 6. Reevaluation of Agreed Framework 7. U. S. – North Korea Bilateral Negotiation / Talks

ICKS, Korea University Role of the Participants China: Changing priorities To keep North Korea afloat Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula Prevent armed conflict Is China doing enough? Can China do more? Critical and constructive role in 1993 -4 1. China’s Leverages 2. For U. S. -North Korea dialogue 3. Limits of Chinese influence 4. Necessary and possible measures 5. Linkage with other issues (E. g. , Taiwan, Unocal)

ICKS, Korea University Role of the Participants Japan 1. Threat perception 2. Abduction issue 3. 4. Relations with Korea, China over history, territorial issues Problem of coordination, U. S. leadership, NK perception 4. Interest in 6 -party meeting 5. Financial burden (LWR, Energy, Economic cooperation)

ICKS, Korea University Role of the Participants Russia 1. Energy supply 2. Diplomatic involvement – including 6 -party meeting 3. North Korean view point – balance to China 4. Keep North Korea friendly

ICKS, Korea University Role of the Participants U. S. 1. Post 9. 11 syndrome (changing priorities – from non-proliferation to antiterrorism) 2. Iraq constraints (military, diplomatic, intelligence, North Korean attitude) 3. Working with allies (South Korea, Japan) 4. The “options” issue – “carrots and sticks” 5. Human rights issue 6. Regime Change?

ICKS, Korea University Role of the Participants South Korea 1. Threat perception – prevention of war 2. Means to persuade North Korea – security, economic, diplomatic 3. 4. U. S. relations 5. 6. Importance of alliance (Iraq dispatch) Strategic flexibility Dealing with North Korea 4. Inter-Korea relations 5. 6. Uses of “sunshine policy” (Ease them out, not force them in) 7. 8. 9. change North Korea Policy change North Korea keep peace improve inter- Korea relations

ICKS, Korea University Prospects v A breakthrough? v v Gradual improvement President Bush calls him “Mr. ” Kim Jong-Il U. S. – D. P. R. K. deal? Variation of Libyan formula step by step/ freeze/ reduction/ dismantlement v Gradual deterioration As time passes, more difficult for North Korea to give up v Catastrophe is unlikely Kim Jong-Il is a rational actor No country wants catastrophe v On U. S. -Korea alliance Mutual desire/willingness to keep it strong