IAEA Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Current Challenges L Rockwood

IAEA Safeguards and Non-Proliferation: Current Challenges L. Rockwood Section Head, Non-Proliferation and Policy Making International Atomic Energy Agency Oak Ridge, Tennessee 26 April 11 IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency

THE NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME IAEA

CHALLENGES • Breakout from the NPT • Breakdown of the NPT • Ensuring effective IAEA safeguards IAEA

Breakout How to minimize the risk of breakout from the NPT? Ø Assurances of supply Ø Internationalizing key choke points of the nuclear fuel cycle Ø Assured response of Security Council to threats of withdrawal IAEA

Breakdown How to ensure the survival of the NPT? Ø Accelerated, visible and verified disarmament Ø Security assurances Ø Addressing over-arching security concerns ØDiplomacy and dialogue ØAddress the underlying national and regional insecurities IAEA

Ensuring Effective Safeguards How to ensure safeguards are effective? Ø Implementing existing legal authority Ø Expansion through creative interpretation? Ø Further strengthening safeguards – ‘AP Plus’? Ø Ensuring adequate resources (human, technological and financial) Ø Dealing with non-compliance Ø What about safeguards and non-State actors? IAEA

If these are ‘no-brainers’ … Then why is it so difficult to get to “yes”? IAEA

Political Fallout of Divisiveness • The failed Committee 25 • Resistance to the Additional Protocol • Response to non-compliance IAEA

The Law of Unintended Consequences • “Baby steps” can hurt • Proposal to establish a “sub-Board” • Denial of technology • The India Deal IAEA

Nothing to Lose … DPRK How does one negotiate when the other party has nothing to lose? IAEA

Hard Cases Make Bad Law Special Inspections … The Board reaffirmed the Agency’s right to undertake special inspections, when necessary and appropriate as described in [CSAs] … The Board anticipates that these special inspections should only occur on rare occasions. The Board further reaffirmed the Agency’s rights to obtain and to have access to additional information and locations in accordance with the Agency’s Statute and all [CSAs]. … IAEA 25 Feb 1992 GOV/OR/776, para 48

Lines in the Sand • Weaponization • Don’t establish unnecessary limitations of rights IAEA

There’s Nothing Like a Crisis …. Chernobyl Iraq 9/11 IAEA