IAEA Safeguards and Non-Proliferation: Current Challenges L. Rockwood

IAEA Safeguards and Non-Proliferation: Current Challenges L. Rockwood Section Head, Non-Proliferation and Policy Making
SAFEGUARDS THE NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME
CHALLENGES Breakout from the NPT Breakdown of the NPT Ensuring effective IAEA safeguards
Breakout How to minimize the risk of breakout from the NPT? Assurances of supply
Breakdown How to ensure the survival of the NPT? Accelerated, visible and verified disarmament
Ensuring Effective Safeguards How to ensure safeguards are effective? Implementing existing legal authority Expansion
If these are ‘no-brainers’ … Then why is it so difficult to get to
Political Fallout of Divisiveness The failed Committee 25 Resistance to the Additional Protocol Response
The Law of Unintended Consequences “Baby steps” can hurt Proposal to establish a “sub-Board”
Nothing to Lose … DPRK How does one negotiate when the other party has
Hard Cases Make Bad Law Special Inspections … The Board reaffirmed the Agency’s right
Lines in the Sand Weaponization Don’t establish unnecessary limitations of rights
There’s Nothing Like a Crisis …. Chernobyl 9/11 Iraq
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>IAEA Safeguards and Non-Proliferation: Current Challenges L. Rockwood Section Head, Non-Proliferation and Policy Making IAEA Safeguards and Non-Proliferation: Current Challenges L. Rockwood Section Head, Non-Proliferation and Policy Making International Atomic Energy Agency Oak Ridge, Tennessee 26 April 11

>SAFEGUARDS THE NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME SAFEGUARDS THE NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME

>CHALLENGES Breakout from the NPT Breakdown of the NPT Ensuring effective IAEA safeguards CHALLENGES Breakout from the NPT Breakdown of the NPT Ensuring effective IAEA safeguards

>Breakout How to minimize the risk of breakout from the NPT? Assurances of supply Breakout How to minimize the risk of breakout from the NPT? Assurances of supply Internationalizing key choke points of the nuclear fuel cycle Assured response of Security Council to threats of withdrawal

>Breakdown How to ensure the survival of the NPT? Accelerated, visible and verified disarmament Breakdown How to ensure the survival of the NPT? Accelerated, visible and verified disarmament Security assurances Addressing over-arching security concerns Diplomacy and dialogue Address the underlying national and regional insecurities

>Ensuring Effective Safeguards How to ensure safeguards are effective? Implementing existing legal authority Expansion Ensuring Effective Safeguards How to ensure safeguards are effective? Implementing existing legal authority Expansion through creative interpretation? Further strengthening safeguards – ‘AP Plus’? Ensuring adequate resources (human, technological and financial) Dealing with non-compliance What about safeguards and non-State actors?

>If these are ‘no-brainers’ … Then why is it so difficult to get to If these are ‘no-brainers’ … Then why is it so difficult to get to “yes”?

>Political Fallout of Divisiveness The failed Committee 25 Resistance to the Additional Protocol Response Political Fallout of Divisiveness The failed Committee 25 Resistance to the Additional Protocol Response to non-compliance

>The Law of Unintended Consequences “Baby steps” can hurt Proposal to establish a “sub-Board” The Law of Unintended Consequences “Baby steps” can hurt Proposal to establish a “sub-Board” Denial of technology The India Deal

>Nothing to Lose … DPRK How does one negotiate when the other party has Nothing to Lose … DPRK How does one negotiate when the other party has nothing to lose?

>Hard Cases Make Bad Law Special Inspections … The Board reaffirmed the Agency’s right Hard Cases Make Bad Law Special Inspections … The Board reaffirmed the Agency’s right to undertake special inspections, when necessary and appropriate as described in [CSAs] … The Board anticipates that these special inspections should only occur on rare occasions. The Board further reaffirmed the Agency’s rights to obtain and to have access to additional information and locations in accordance with the Agency’s Statute and all [CSAs]. … 25 Feb 1992 GOV/OR/776, para 48

>Lines in the Sand Weaponization Don’t establish unnecessary limitations of rights Lines in the Sand Weaponization Don’t establish unnecessary limitations of rights

>There’s Nothing Like a Crisis …. Chernobyl 9/11 Iraq There’s Nothing Like a Crisis …. Chernobyl 9/11 Iraq