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How is Security Handled for Individual Systems? COTS Database Legacy What if Security Never Available for Legacy/COTS/Database? Security Issues for New Clients? New Servers? Across Network? Legacy COTS NETWORK Java Client What about Distributed Security? Security Policy, Model, and Enforcement? Legacy Database COTS

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Java Client DB + SH Legacy Client Java Client DB Client L + SH Server + SH COTS Client CO+ SH Enforcement Mechanism Collection of SHs CO+ SH DB + SH Server + SH L + SH Security Components L + SH DB + SH Formal Security Model Distributed Security Policy

Secure Software Design via UML with MAC/RBAC Secure Information Exchange via XML with MAC/RBAC Secure MAC/RBAC Interactions via Middleware in Distributed Setting

Extending UML for the Design and Definition of Security Requirements Address Security in Use-Case Diagrams, Class Diagrams, Seqiemce Diagrams, etc. Bi-Directional Translation - Prove that all UML Security Definitions in UML in Logic. Based Policy Language and vice-versa Iterate, Revise Formal Security Policy Definition using Existing Approach (Logic Based Policy Language) Must Prove Generation Captures all Security Requirements Other Possibilities: Reverse Engineer Existing Policy to Logic Based Definition UML Model with Security Capture all Security Requirements! RBAC 99 GMU RBAC/MAC UConn Oracle Security

Database COTS Client Legacy Database Client Java Client Working Prototype Available using CORBA, JINI, Java, Oracle COTS Legacy Client GOTS NETWORK