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Ford Foundation/MINDS Conference New Economic Thinking, Teaching and Policy Perspectives: A Brazilian Perspective within a Global Dialogue The BICs in the Renewed “Global” Coordinating Bodies: What has happened so far and what should be happening ? Lori Wallach [email protected] org Global Trade Watch www. tradewatch. org Rio de Janeiro, November, 8 2011
Renewed…. ? WTO Stuck in 1994: Enforcing Comprehensive Rules Implementing “Faithbased” Model of Globalization 1994: WTO global governance system replaces GATT trade rules as “Uruguay
From Actual Trade Agt. to an Expansive Int’l Governance Regime Branded as “Free Trade” The Bretton Woods Era (post-WWII to mid-1970 s) The Bretton Woods Era GATT 1947 IMF World Bank • Trade in goods • Tariffs and quotas • Gold standard • Short-term trade floats • Finance rebuilding of Europe & Japan
(early 1990 s to present day)
(early ‘ 90 s to present day) Corporate Globalization Era II WTO (binding dispute settlement) NAFTA, CAFTA, “Free Trade” Agreements BITS GATT
These pacts are not “Free Trade” • Adam Smith and David Ricardo rolling in their graves? Free trade: an appealing brand, but not what is contained in the 900 pages of non-tariff rules of the WTO or U. S. and EU Free Trade Agreements “We are writing the constitution for a single global economy. " - Candid revelation from the WTO’s 1 st Director General
Not Mainly About “Trade”, but a System of Enforceable Global Governance l WTO/FTAs REQUIRE: “Each Member shall ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations and administrative procedures with its obligations as provided in the annexed Agreements. ” –Art. XVI-4, Agt. Establishing the WTO (Annexed agreement refers to 16 major “Uruguay Round” WTO agts. Only a minority of them focus on trade per se. Went into effect in 1995 with some phase ins for developing countries) l These rules are enforced by binding dispute resolution via foreign tribunals with ruling enforced by trade indefinite sanctions; No due process; No outside appeal l Cross retaliation: goods (tariffs on Brazilian soy, beef eg) for financial service/financial stability measures
Attacks Against Domestic Laws at the WTO Almost Always Succeed All WTO Disputes United States as Plaintiff as Defendant Plaintiff Win 156 32 58 Defendant Win 16 6 6 84. 2% 90. 6% Total % WTO 90. 7% Cases Won by Plaintiffs
Free Trade Agts, EU “Economic Partnership Agts” Even More Comprehensive; Plus 2500 BITS Impose Same Investment Regime, Private Enforcement Everything in WTO, PLUS l Special rights and privileges foreign investors PREESTABLISHMENT and elevate individual private investor to equal status of nation-state: empower corporations to directly enforce by challenging domestic health, environmental laws in foreign tribunals l Expansive TRIPS-plus patent rights, data exclusivity, linkage l Expansive top-down service sector rules (financial deregulation, ‘market access’ rights that promote privatization, concentration, forbid common policies) l Top-down comprehensive procurement rules
Washington Consensus Dead? WTO, FTAs living delivery mechanisms for package of “neoliberal” policies with enforcement… l l New foreign investor rights: no approvals of foreign ownership, limits on industrial policy/ performance requirements Finance liberalization -no currency controls, radical deregulation Establish expansive IP rights Privatize public procurement sector – no domestic preferences l l Privatize, deregulate services (health, energy, water, education) Food traded like any other good, not a necessity of life Cut, weaken or harmonize to global norms domestic regulatory standards Commodify ‘commons’ – establish tradable units of natural resources, water, human genes, biodiversity
What has happened so far and what should be happening? l 1994: WTO starts. US & EU have leftover agenda, dubbed “New Issues” or “Singapore Issues” pushed by multinat’l corp. sector: more financial liberalization & deregulation; expansive foreign investor privileges; procurement sector disciplines; competition policy (right for private firms to compete w/ “monopoly” govt services); trade facilitation (prioritize govt $$ for ports, customs) l “New Issues” pushed at 1996 Singapore Ministerial, 1999 Seattle Ministerial. Then US, EU use post 9 -11 political dynamic to launch 2001 Doha Round cynically dubbed “Development Round” over “Implementation Agenda” favored by developing countries. 2003, “New Issue” largely forced off agenda – Brazil plays key role. l DESPITE GLOBAL FIN. CRISIS, SHIFTS IN THINKING: US, EU, SOME OTHERS & WTO SECRETARIAT STILL PUSHING OLD AGENDA. US & EU now blocking even review of ‘ 90 s WTO fin. service dereg rules
WTO’s Gen. Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) & FTA service sector chaps vs. Financial Regulation l 5 interlocking WTO agreements: GATS, 2 GATS Annexes on Financial Services, the 2 nd and 5 th Protocols to GATS (the 5 th Protocol established WTO Financial Services Agreement (FSA)) & the Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services l Plus countries’ GATS schedules of financial services commitments – Brazil limited, so targeted in Doha Round l Scope wide: covers govt policies of general application that ‘affect services. ” Even covers delegated authority: eg. credit rating agencies; Only services provided exclusively by the govt, not on market basis or also in private sector excluded from coverage l AGREEMENTS THAT REGULATE REGULATION…
Service Sector Privatization and Dereg: WTO GATS and FTAs Chaps 12 & 13 l WTO’s General Agreement on Trade in Services & FTA service sector chapters cover every way a service may be delivered - “Mode 4” is immigration policy: “movement of natural persons across borders to deliver a service” - “Mode 2” is consumption abroad: cannot stop capital flight if banking Mode 2 commitments - “Mode 3” is foreign investment: right to enter and operate under deregulatory trade pact rules l 100 WTO members took financial service commitments. 40 developing countries that have Mode 3 commitments. 26 developed countries took unlimited Mode 1 commitments. 22 more took significant Mode 1 commitments. Turkey, Sri Lanka, Nigeria, Aruba, Netherland Antilles and 8 transitional economies now in EU used “Understanding” l Brazil took mainly Mode 3 – foreign presence- commitments in financial services.
Problem #1: GATS conflates liberalization and deregulation… “Market Access” (GATS Art XVI-2) simply forbids countries from using a list of 5 non-discriminatory regulatory measures in financial sectors they committed to WTO liberalization: “In sectors where market-access commitments are undertaken, the measures which a Member shall not maintain or adopt either on the basis of a regional subdivision or on the basis of its entire territory, unless otherwise specified in its Schedule, are defined as…”
GATS conflates liberalization & deregulation II CANNOT BAN A SERVICE, FINANCIAL INSTRUMENT IN COMMITTED SECTOR “(a) limitations on the number of service suppliers whether in the form of numerical quotas, monopolies, exclusive service suppliers or the requirements of an economic needs test; ” - Some fin services/products so dangerous, lacking in social utility, should be banned. BUT 2004 WTO ruling In Internet Gambling case: regulatory ban is a forbidden zero quota. - SEC-proposing ban on naked short sales/flash trades; German ban on spec. short-selling: European Centre for Int’l Political Economy says Germany’s ban is a GATS violation & not defensible under prudential defense b’ while non-discriminatory it’s beyond other countries’ approach WTO Secretariat 2/ 2010 paper: “an outright prohibition to provide a certain financial service would be a trade measure subject to scheduling under the GATS” IE. if a country’s deregulation-prone gov’t did not think to schedule a ban during the ‘ 90 s (as the U. S. did with respect to securities and derivatives, but only for onions futures), imposing a ban now in a committed sector would put the country in violation of WTO -
GATS conflates liberalization & deregulation III NO LIMITS ON SIZE OR FIREWALLS “(b) limitations on the total value of service transactions or assets in the form of numerical quotas or the requirement of an economic needs test; (c) limitations on the total number of service operations or on the total quantity of service output expressed in terms of designated numerical units in the form of quotas or the requirement of an economic needs test; - Some countries (Brazil) scheduled specific exceptions to allow such measures. US committed to “reform” Glass-Steagall to make it GATS compatible - GEITHNER via FOIA: April 1990 - under-30 year-old Treasury Dept official named Timothy Geithner raised the possibility that Glass. Steagall firewalls, state level regulations, and other prudential measures could be challenged under the new global rules… - See, Markus Krajewski & Petros Mavroidis (was a lawyer at WTO Secretariat) re. problems with these rules - See http: //www. citizen. org/documents/memo-gats-conflict-with-banksize-limits-may-10 -2011. pdf for more details and how to fix problem
GATS conflates liberalization & deregulation IV CANNOT REQUIRE COMMITTED SERVICE ONLY BE OFFERED VIA SPECIFIC LEGAL FORMS (e) measures which restrict or require specific types of legal entity or joint venture through which a service supplier may supply a service; ” IF YOU LIBERALIZE UNDER GATS, CANNOT ALSO LIMIT DEGREE OF FOREIGN CONTROL “(f) limitations on the participation of foreign capital in terms of maximum percentage limit on foreign shareholding or the total value of individual or aggregate foreign investment. ” This last constraint is only “Market Access” rule that refer to degree of “access” – all of the rest are limits on nondiscriminatory regulation
Problem #2: Bans capital management techniques in committed sectors… l When a country commits to allow cross-border trade (Mode 1) in a specific sector, cannot restrict/delay current & capital inflows/outflows related to service When a country commits to allow foreign direct investment (Mode 3), it commits to allow capital inflows. (Brazil took some Mode 3 commitments in banking and securities…) GATS Art. XVI fn 8: “If a Member undertakes a market-access commitment in relation to the supply of a service through the mode of supply referred to in subparagraph 2(a) of Article I [i. e. Mode 1] and if the cross-border movement of capital is an essential part of the service itself, that Member is thereby committed to allow such movement of capital. If a Member undertakes a market-access commitment in relation to the supply of a service through the mode of supply referred to in subparagraph 2(c) of Article I [i. e. Mode 3], it is thereby committed to allow related transfers of capital into its territory. ”
Bans capital management techniques in committed sectors… l When a country commits to allow foreign direct investment (Mode 3), it commits to allow current inflows and outflows related to that service. (GATS Art. XI) GATS Article XI: Payments and Transfers “ 1. Except under the circumstances envisaged in Article XII, a Member shall not apply restrictions on international transfers and payments for current transactions relating to its specific commitments. 2. Nothing in this Agreement shall affect the rights and obligations of the members of the International Monetary Fund under the Articles of Agreement of the Fund, including the use of exchange actions which are in conformity with the Articles of Agreement, provided that a Member shall not impose restrictions on any capital transactions inconsistently with its specific commitments regarding such transactions, except under Article XII or at the request of the Fund. ”
Ban on capital management techniques in committed sectors… l These limits on capital management policy apply to all service sectors bound to GATS (and the FTAs have similar language. ) But when applied to fin servs commitments have effect of severely limiting countries’ abilities to manage their current and capital accounts l No “limitations” on these obligations can be scheduled l Only exception is in GATS Art. XXII: short term use in balance of payments crisis with IMF ok. So, cannot have in place to stop in flows of hot money l More at http: //www. citizen. org/documents/Memoon. Capital. Controls. pdf
WTO Secretariat 2/2010 Report Affirms l l “Although its main focus is on the liberalization of trade in financial services, the GATS could require individual Members to allow capital movements associated with a broad range of – primarily – financial services, depending on the level of specific commitments undertaken…” “Cross-border trade in some other services, for example, acceptance of deposits, lending, or trading in securities, is inseparable from capital movements. Hence, liberalizing such services transactions requires the liberalization of the related capital flows to make the transactions effective… “restrictions on transfers and payments for current transactions must not be maintained where a Member has made a commitment on financial services… “Members undertake not to impose restrictions on any capital transactions inconsistently with its specific commitments regarding those transactions. ”
Financial Transaction Tax as GATS Violation? Economists Call for Changes Unhappy example comes from EC staff before last G-20: “the compatibility of such a levy with Article XI of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), which provides that WTO Members cannot apply any restrictions on international transfer and payments for current transactions relating to their specific commitments, would have to be further assessed. As the EU has taken specific commitments relating to financial transactions, including lending, deposits, securities and derivatives trading and these commitments relate to transactions with third countries, a currency transactions tax could constitute a breach of the EU's GATS obligations. ” - EC staff working document, “Innovative financing at a global level, ” SEC(2010) 409 final, 4/l/10 1/2011 Letter to Geithner, Clinton, USTR Kirk: eliminate limits on capital management polices from trade agreements from 260 mainly pro-free trade economists, organized by Kevin Gallagher
Problem #3: Limits on other forms of domestic regulation (licensing, etc) l l l GATS Art VI-4: Domestic Regulations -covers qualification requirements and procedures, technical standards and licensing requirements (Brazil took exception that EU wants you to remove…) - Tribunal decides if reg was “foreseeable” and/or is “more burdensome than necessary to # ensure the quality of the service” Working Party on Domestic Regs = more disciplines Accountancy Disciplines from Arthur Anderson
Problem #4: Possible Exception for “Prudential Measures” Is Ambiguous at Best GATS Annex on Financial Services, Art. 2(a) “Notwithstanding any other provisions of the Agreement, a Member shall not be prevented from taking measures for prudential reasons, including for the protection of investors, depositors, policy holders or persons to whom a fiduciary duty is owed by a financial service supplier, or to ensure the integrity and stability of the financial system. Where such measures do not conform with the provisions of the Agreement, they shall not be used as a means of avoiding the Member’s commitments or obligations under the Agreement” [italics added]. Agreement it is unclear if/how it can be used. May be self-cancelling. Weakest of 5 versions put forth in 1990 s. And, even if it is operation would not cover nonprudential matters, like policies directing finance to development (X% of loans must be in Y sector), banning speculation in food futures to counter price crisis, etc. More at http: //www. citizen. org/Page. aspx? pid=783
Part of Financial Stability Problem not absence of a global regime of financial regulation… BUT, existence of a binding global financial governance regime via WTO and other ‘trade’ agts that explicitly constrains governments’ domestic financial regulatory space and includes strongly enforced provisions that conflict with ‘commitments’ or recommendations at G 20, UN Special Commission on Crisis, UNCTAD related to global norms and domestic reregulatory efforts
WTO Secretariat says… l Countries should have taken exceptions back in the 1990 s (using crystal ball about future “innovations” they wanted to regulate? ) l Prudential “carve out” l Countries can negotiate compensation to remove sectors – GATS Art. XXI l No challenges yet… yes, during era of deregulation, but now as countries reregulate, threats starting. l Responses at http: //www. citizen. org/documents/That%27 s. All. They. Got. pdf
UN Commission Crisis, UNCTAD on WTO- Financial Regulation Conflict Agreements that restrict a country’s ability to revise its regulatory regime – including not only domestic prudential but, crucially, capital account regulations – obviously have to be altered, in light of what has been learned about deficiencies in this crisis. In particular, there is concern that existing agreements under the WTO’s Financial Services Agreement might, were they enforced, impede countries from revising their regulatory structures in ways that would promote growth, equity, and stability. ” – Stiglitz Commission UNCTAD Trade and Development Report 2 -11 pages 100 -103 goes through problems citing provisions.
World changed, but not WTO… l Despite financial crises, current trend towards reregulation, 1990 s policies remain in place, with enforcement l Doha Round core element is more financial deregulation, both more commitments and new constraints on regulation. Brazil one of top targets. Post crisis, US and EU continue to push for more financial dereg. See www. tradewatch. org/Doha. More. Dereg l And full bore effort by WTO Secretariat and US and EU not to even discuss possible problems, review old rules…
U. S. and EU target BRICS FINANCIAL SERVICES, EC REQUEST TO BRAZIL (Leaked) Brazil has committed this sector only partially. The EC requests that it be committed as follows: GENERAL Brazil has not yet accepted the Fifth protocol. EC Request: Ratify. - EC Request: Undertake commitments in accordance with the Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services. INSURANCE - Mode 3: MA and NT- In direct insurance (life and non-life), reinsurance and insurance intermediation, direct branching, is not allowed. EC Request: Allow direct branching. -Modes 1 and 2: MA and NT – MAT insurance is only partly committed. EC Request: Take full commitments in accordance with the Understanding. -Mode 3: MA- In life and non-life insurance, requirement of enactment of a Presidential decree for the establishment of a commercial presence (i. e. case-bycase authorisation by the Executive Branch). EC Request: Eliminate requirement. -Modes 1 and 2: MA and NT - Reinsurance and retrocession are unbound. EC Request: Take full commitments.
More EC WTO Doha Round Financial Sector Demands on Brazil INSURANCE CONTINUED -Mode 3: MA and NT – State monopoly on reinsurance and retrocession services. EC Request: Open to competition and undertake full -Modes 1 and 2: MA and NT- Unbound in insuranceintermediation (agencies and brokers). EC Request: commitments for reinsurance, retrocession services. Commit intermediation of reinsurance and of MAT insurance in accordance with the Understanding. BANKING AND OTHER FINANCIAL SERVICES Various activities are not covered: credit, charge and debit cards, pension fund management, and provision and transfer of financial information. EC Request: Take full commitments in modes 1, 2 and 3 for provision and transfer of financial information, in modes 2 and 3 in other sub-sectors, and commit in mode 4 as referred to in the section “Horizontal commitments” Mode 2: MA and NT- Unbound in all sub-sectors. EC Request: Take full commitments.
More EC WTO Financial Sector Demands on Brazil BANKING AND SECURITIES CONT. Mode 3: MA- For all financial institutions, requirement of a case-by-case authorisation by Presidential decree (subject to unspecified criteria) for the establishment of a commercial presence. EC Request: Eliminate this restriction. -Mode 3: MA- Existence of discriminatory limitations on the expansion of the number of branches (including ATMs). EC Request: Remove this limitation. -Mode 3: Foreign banks’ branches and subsidiaries cannot establish as “universal banks”. EC Request: Allow establishment as universal banks. - Modes 1 and 2: MA and NT- Unbound for advisory services. EC Request: Take full commitments. -Mode 3: NT – Forbidden to maintain accounts denominated in foreign currencies in Brazil. EC Request: Open up this possibility. -Mode 3: Only Brazilian financial institutions are entitled to provide asset management services for federal and State agencies and companies. EC Request: Open these asset management services to foreign companies established in Brazil. -Mode 3: Only State-owned banks are entitled to provide commercial banking services to federal, state or municipal agencies and companies. EC Request: Open to competition these services.
More EC WTO Financial Sector Demands on Brazil PROFESSIONAL SERVICES EC REQUEST TO BRAZIL: Brazil has committed this sector only partially. The EC requests that this sector is committed as follows: B. ACCOUNTING, AUDITING AND BOOKKEEPING SERVICES (CPC 862) - Mode 1: MA and NT – This mode remains unbound. EC Request: Take full commitments, i. e. schedule “none”, under MA and NT for accounting and bookkeeping services - Mode 2: MA and NT – This mode remains unbound. EC Request: Take full commitments, i. e. schedule “none”, under MA and NT for the entire CPC 862 - Mode 3: MA – Prohibitions concerning participation of non-residents in juridical persons and use of foreign names. EC Request: Remove • - Mode 3: NT – Requirements concerning registration and use of standards. EC Request: Remove. In accordance with the Scheduling Guidelines adopted by the Council of Trade in Services (S/L/92 of March 2001), such entry does not need to be scheduled
US, EU and their large financial firms even oppose REVIEW of current rules l l 2010: Fought Brazil, Ecuador, S Africa, Argentina, India requests for review of bailouts Last week blocked Ecuador’s “Proposal for furthering work on Regulatory Measures in Financial Services, for inclusion in the Ministerial Declaration” " …In the context of the current international financial crisis, Ministers instruct the Committee on Trade in Financial Services to continue to review the WTO rules so as to promote and ensure the preservation of policy space for macro-prudential regulations and the integrity and stability of the financial system. . . " l South Africa, India, China, Argentina, Barbados, Dominican Republic, Bolivia, Cuba, Venezuela, Norway and Turkey strongly supported; Brazil, less strong; US, EU, Canada and Australia oppose
Foreign Investor Rights: WTO TRIMS and NAFTA “Chapter 11” l WTO & NAFTA: Ban common performance requirements, domestic content rules. In FTAs, this is absolute ban, not only re. investors from signatories. l Post-establishment nat’ treatment (Once established, foreign firms must get same treatment as domestics re. taxes, conditions, regulation – Brazil took horizontal natl treatment exception for research and development subsidies) “In accordance with laws and regulations governing foreign investment, all foreign capital invested in Brazil must be registered with the Central Bank of Brazil to be eligible for remittances. The Central Bank establishes procedures related to remittances and transfer of funds abroad. “ l Ban on capital transfers limits, with limited exceptions for short term IMF-ordered actions for BOP crises
FTA Investment Rules l l Pre-establishment nat’l treatment Guaranteed minimum standard of treatment Compensation for indirect “regulatory” takings (government action that diminishes values of investment, undermines expected future profit) Private investor-state enforcement - foreign investors skirt domestic courts & laws to privately enforce new “trade” pact rights via claims at World Bank and UN tribunals for taxpayer compensation over alleged violations of FTA rights
Some NAFTA and CAFTA “Investor. State” Cases Over $350 million in public funds paid to investors so far l l l Metalclad v. Mexico - toxic waste & land use Ethyl v. Canada – Chemical ban/public health Loewen v. U. S. - U. S. civil court judgment Methenex – MTBE ban (US dodges bullet and STILL pays legal fees!) Pac Rim, Renco mining cases $12 billion in pending claims under NAFTA, CAFTA and Peru FTA relating to environmental, public health & transportation policy – not trade issues. Comprehensive list of all cases, summaries at http: //www. citizen. org/documents/investor-state-chart-april-2011. pdf
Government procurement: WTO AGP, FTA Procurement Chapters l l Constraints on how govts may spend public revenues in construction projects, purchase of goods & services Creates new privately tradable units from what is otherwise a policy tool for job creation, development of domestic capacity/ know-how -Foreign firms be provided same access as domestic firms -Limits on allowable bidder conditions (cannot require they use domestically-manufactured inputs or provide training -Limits on specifications for goods & services sought; only functional descriptions. (X g. H electricity is ok, requiring ‘renewable source’ electricity is not)
It is a POLITICAL QUESTION JUST ON FINANCIAL SECTOR… l Institutional turf wars or silos/lack of coordination/ ignorance) w/in nat’l govs: e. g. regulators/Central Banks v. trade negotiators (It’s a financial crisis, do you know where your trade negotiator is…? ) l Policy incoherence: - Domestic: Industrial policy in Brazil’s dom. strategy v. WTO position - G-20 calls for conclusion of Doha Round & for financial reregulation l Threats of challenges against others while simultaneously reregulating – chilling effect l Role of extremely powerful financial firms at WTO, in US and EU ‘trade’ policymaking vs. diffuse public interest
BICs Special Role… • At Cancun 2003 Minist. , G-20 (WTO version) led by Brazil organize, exert power, get “New Issues” thrown off Doha Round agenda. Example of potential, effective use of new power - leveraging WTO consensus process. Brazil leadership, partnership w/ India, South Africa etc key. • But, then, US and EU seduction strategy to invite Brazil, China, India to be new G-5 at WTO. This group then revived anti-development Doha Round… Appeal to BIG versus developing. Example of threat of cooption via invitation to table. • Then, NAMA (industrial) 11 bloc forms to defend industrial policy space: Brazil, Arg. , Venezuela, and S. Africa, Venezuela, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Namibia, Philippines, Tunisia. Braz. IL policy: MERCOSUR b 4 WTO, unity w/ Argentina on NAMA. Example of potential of coordinated strategy. • But, July 2008: Brazil in Green Room, agrees to deal with US, EU, India, China. Based on 12/2008 texts: NAMA terms would have wiped out Brazil’s tariffs, industrial policy space. Even if trade off was for agribiz, limited US concessions on subsidies… Example of use by others of BICs for divide and conquer among developing countries (US corporate lobby insisted US double back and say no. ) • NAMA 11 never really been a cohesive force since then. Major set back developing country power on industrial policy. South Africa, Argentina still very strong, but lonely.
New IP Protections Required: WTO TRIPS and FTA TRIPS-plus l l 30 year monopoly patents covering wide range of subject matter - climate/energy technologies - manufacturing innovations - medicines (in FTAs, even testing data) Signatories required to put CRIMINAL sanctions for TRIPS/FTA IP violations in their domestic law to be in compliance with pacts
BICs Special Role… l l Because of almost-deal ok’d by BICs, December 2008 WTO development-MIA texts are operating texts since. Only stuck because US is demanding more. Now, what will BICs role be at WTO? WTO Ministerial 122011 to set future agenda. Major structural, policy issues eg. “Zombie Doha Round and New Issues” versus “Implementation Agenda Opportunity: Counterforce to US, EU bloc (and corporations their position represent) when there is unity, quais-formal blocs formed, policy silos broken, unified strategy worked out, counter initiatives created. What will future agenda of WTO be? Ministerial this December. Will it get “toxic assets” of its books? Power of BICs because they are key to WTO’s legitimacy, role…
More of same Model that Proved to be Damaging or New Economic Thinking?