Flights of Fancy Who knew what when between 8: 14 and 10: 03 AM on September 11? 1
Understanding what should have happened • The flights -- destinations and times • The players -- civilian and military • The protocols -- emergency vs. hijack 2
Flight Crashes • • American Airlines 11 United Airlines 175 American Airlines 77 United Airlines 93 (Pennsylvania) North Tower 1 South Tower 2 Pentagon ? 3
11: Boston -> LA 175: Boston -> LA 77: DC -> LA 93: Newark -> SF Flight Paths per 9/11 Commission 4
Flight Times per 9/11 Commission Flight • • AA 11 UA 175 AA 77 UA 93 Takeoff Takeover 7: 59 8: 14 8: 20 8: 42 8: 14 8: 42+ 8: 51 9: 28 Crash 8: 46: 40 9: 03: 11 9: 37: 46 10: 03: 11 5
The Civilian Side: Federal Aviation Administration • Boston Air Traffic Control Center. . Nashua NH • Herndon Command Center. . . . Herndon VA (DC area) • FAA Headquarters. . . . DC 6
The Civilian Side: FAA Regions 7
The Civilian Side: People • Colin Scoggins -- military liaison to FAA in Boston • Ben Sliney -- operations manager at FAA Command Center (Herndon, VA) • Monte Belger -- Acting FAA Deputy Administrator • Terry Biggio -- operations manager at FAA Boston Air Route Traffic Control Center (Nashua, NH) • Robin Hordon -- former Boston ATC 8
The Military Side: Agencies • NORAD North Amer. Aerospace Defense Cmd (Colorado Springs, CO) – NEADS Northeast Air Defense Sector (Rome, NY) • NMCC National Military Command Center (Pentagon) 9
The Military Side: NEADS 10
The Military Side: Nearby Air Force Bases • • • Andrews AFB Bolling AFB Dover AFB Hanscom AFB Langley AFB Mc. Guire AFB 11 mi SE of DC 3 mi S of US CAPITOL 3 mi SE of Dover, DE 17 mi NW of Boston 3 mi N of Hampton, VA 18 mi SE of Trenton, NJ 11
The Military Side: People • Gen. Richard Myers -- acting chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (confirmed 2 days later, Medal of Honor 2005) • Gen. Larry Arnold -- Head of NORAD Continental US region • NMCC – Gen. Montague Winfield, Deputy Dir. of Ops – Capt. Charles Leidig -- asked by MW on 9/10 to take his place at 8: 30 am on 9/11 • Col. Robert Marr -- NEADS battle commander • Maj. Kevin Naspany -- Otis AFB fighter team commander 12
Standard Operating Procedure “in-Flight Emergency” Criteria • Loss of radio contact -- OK for few minutes • Loss of transponder transmission -- OK for few minutes • Failure to respond to radio transmission or obey a repeated ATC order -- OK for few minutes • Course deviation (15 deg or 2 mi) -- serious 13
Standard Operating Procedure Emergency Protocol: fast 1. ATC controller notifies superior 2. Superior notifies NORAD (NEADS) 3. NEADS launches fighters 14
Emergency Interception Launch within minutes • In open hangar at end of runway • Flight crews within a few minutes (“jump out of shower unrinsed”) • Planes kept mechanically fit and warmed up to start • Fly to target at top speed • Pull alongside, assess, communicate -- Robin Hordon, former ATC , p. 39 15
Emergency Interception Speed to airborne • NORAD -- command/control break-down caused 5 min instead of 2 -3 mins (2000 press release) • Otis AFB -- 24 hr/day, airborne in 5 mins (Cape Cod Times, 9/15) • USAF -- F 15’s scramble to 29 K in 2. 5 mins (website prior to 9/11) • Florida ANG --“If needed, we could be killing things in five minutes or less” (AF web: Capt. Tom Herring, full-time alert pilot) 16
Emergency Interception Speed to airborne: 9/11 • Scoggins: asked Otis and NEADS several times why no launch yet (seemed an eternity) • Otis pilots sitting in jets “straining at the reins” for 6 mins 17
Emergency Interception Quality • Most important elements: speed, efficiency, timeliness of launch and interception • Years of practice, experience • Pilots, mechanics, aircraft, airport configurations and NORAD/FAA radar procedures honed to save time in seconds -- Robin Hordon, former ATC 18
Emergency Interception Permission 1 4. 7. Requests for military assistance should be made and approved in the following ways: 4. 7. 1. Immediate Response. Requests for an immediate response (i. e. , any form of immediate action taken by a Do. D Component or military commander to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage under imminently serious conditions) may be made to any Component or Command. The Do. D Components that receive verbal requests from civil authorities for support in an exigent emergency may initiate informal planning and, if required, immediately respond as authorized in Do. D Directive 3025. 1. [see next slide] -- DOD Directive 3025. 15 2/18/97, p. 4 19
Emergency Interception Permission 2 4. 5. 1. Imminently serious conditions resulting from any civil emergency or attack may require immediate action by military commanders, or by responsible officials of other Do. D Agencies, to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage. When such conditions exist and time does not permit prior approval from higher headquarters, local military commanders and responsible officials of other Do. D Components are authorized by this Directive, subject to any supplemental direction that may be provided by their Do. D Component, to take necessary action to respond to requests of civil authorities. All such necessary action is referred to in this Directive as "Immediate Response. ” -- DOD Directive 3025. 1 1/15/93, p. 7 20
Emergency Interception Permission 3 (See “Hijacking -> Secy of Defense”) 21
Standard Operating Procedure Hijacking Protocol: slow 1. Harder to establish “hijacking” 2. ATC notifies hijack coordinator at FAA HQ -directly or thru Herndon 3. FAA HQ notifies NMCC (military) 4. NMCC forwards to Secy of Defense for approval (see next slide) 5. If approved, NMCC notifies NEADS 6. NEADS scrambles fighters 7. Fighters stay behind target, “escort” 22
Standard Operating Procedure Hijacking -> Secy of Defense? Did Rumsfeld pull a fast one on 6/1/01 by changing hijacking procedure to require that approval of FAA requests for military assistance go through the Secretary of Defense -- i. e. did NEADS need to get So. D permission (or even NMCC permission)? “The sector commander would have authority to scramble the airplanes. ” -- Air War Over America (intro for which was written by NMCC’s Genl. Arnold, yet Arnold implied (testimony) NEADS needed permit) 23
Standard Operating Procedure Hijacking -> Secy of Defense? In the event of a hijacking, the NMCC will be notified by the most expeditious means by the FAA. The NMCC will monitor the situation and forward all requests or proposals for DOD military assistance for aircraft piracy (hijacking) to the Secretary of Defense for approval. -- DOD hijacking Directive 3610. 01, 7/31/97, par 4 a In the event of a hijacking, the NMCC will be notified by the most expeditious means by the FAA. The NMCC will, with the exception of immediate responses as authorized by reference d [3025. 15], forward requests for DOD assistance to the Secretary of Defense for approval. -- DOD hijacking Directive 3610. 01 A, 6/1/01, par 4 a 24
So. . . Was it an emergency, or a hijacking? 25
What should have happened with Flight 11 • 8: 14 -- order to climb ignored, radio contact apparently lost • 8: 18 -8: 20 -- emergency protocol: supervisor contacts NEADS, scramble order given • 8: 21 -- loss of transponder signal (not vital) • 8: 25 -- sounds like hijacking (4 -11 min after emergency protocol should have started) • 8: 26 -- interceptors airborne (assume 6 min) • 8: 39 -- over NYC (153 mi @. 9 mach = 13 mins) • 8: 46 -- crash (7 min later @ 500 mph = 60 miles) 26
The three stories and their problems 27
Review: Evidence/testimony credibility Story changes • Where were you the night of the crime? – I was at theater. • The theater was closed. – Oh, that’s right, I was with my girlfriend. • She says she was with her husband. – Oh, yeah, I was home reading the Bible. -- from David Ray Griffin, 9/11 Myth and Reality 28
Story # 1 -- September 11 No planes were launched before the Pentagon was hit (9: 38) -- JCS Chief Gen. Richard Myers -- NORAD Spokesperson Mike Snyder 29
Story # 1 Problem 1: 9/12 http: //www. washingtonpost. com/wp-srv/nation/articles/timeline. html Washington Post -(citing witnesses, authorities & media reports) 8: 38 -- FAA notifies NEADS of hijacking #1 8: 43 -- FAA notifies NEADS of hijacking #2 8: 53 -- Otis jets airborne for NYC (15 mins? ) 9: 10 -- 77 heading E over WVa on radar 9: 25 -- FAA notifies NEADS 77 is heading to DC 9: 35 -- Langley jets airborne for DC 30
Story # 1 Problem 2: 9/14 http: //911 research. wtc 7. net/cache/planes/defense/cbs_otis_scramble. html ”Pentagon sources told CBS’s Bob Orr that contrary to early reports, US Air Force jets did get into the air on Tuesday while the attacks were underway. ” -- Dan Rather 8: 38 -- FAA notifies military 8: 44 -- Otis AFB F-15 s scrambled 8: 52 -- airborne (still 70 mi away @ 175 crash) 9: 30 -- Langley AFB F-16 s launched (150 mi) 10: 00 -- arrive over DC (5 mi/min? ) -- Bob Orr 31
Story # 2 -- September 18 NORAD issues timeline which implies FAA notifications were too late. 32
Speeds • Mach 1 = 761 mph ~ 12. 7 mi/min • Mach. 9 = 11. 4 mi/min • F-15 max – hi altitude = mach 2. 5 = 32 mi/min – lo altitude = mach 1. 2 = 15 mi/min • F-16 max: mach 2 = 25 mi/min 33
Story # 2 Timeline http: //911 research. wtc 7. net/cache/planes/attack/presrel. NORADTimelines. htm Flight 11 175 FAA->NEADS 8: 40 8: 43 Scramble Order 8: 46 Location Otis (MA) Equip 2 F 15 s Airborne 8: 52 Distance (mi) 153 71* Time (. 9 mach)*** (17) 8 Poss. Arrival (9: 09) 9: 00 Crash 8: 46 9: 02 * 153 vs 71? ** from DC 77 93 9: 24 n/a 9: 24 Langley (VA) 2 F 16 s 9: 30 105 100** 12 11 9: 42 -9: 37 10: 03 ***~12 mpm 34
Story # 2 Problems • Contradicts many testimonies by FAA and others • Even if true, there still would have been time for interceptions 35
Story # 3 -- July 04 according to the 9/11 Commission, based on the finally-released NORAD/FAA tapes • Focus on hijack (not emergency) protocol • Boston ATC calls Herndon CC • Herndon CC calls FAA HQ in DC • FAA HQ does NOT call NEADS • Boston ATC calls NEADS direct (8: 38) 36
Story # 3 Problems The FAA Tapes • Boston has 130 -150 positions with “hot button to NEADS, each w/dedicated tape channel -- where? • Flight 11 tape starts in middle of furniture conversation at 8: 26 – normally only record when mike keyed – if that not done, why do the tapes start midconversation instead of shift start? • Few of these tapes have been made public 37
Story # 3 Problems The NORAD Tapes: “authentic history of 9/11” DON’T INCLUDE • NMCC -- the military/FAA “focal point” – particularly Marr/Arnold • NORAD between its facilities • Communication with Secret Service • Don’t include higher-ups (JCS Myers, Rumsfeld, Cheney, Bush) 38
Hijacking vs/& Emergency? • Sliney: FAA Center reporting a hijacking always calls military, NORAD was called • Both in parallel – Hijack: Biggio called FAA Reg. Op. Ctr – Emergency: Scoggins: not my job to call NMCC, I have agreement w/NEADS to call, and I did • Hordon: Emergency situation preceded awareness of hijacking, many ATC’s know something was wrong, are suppressed* * http: //www. prisonplanet. com/articles/december 2006/141206 trafficcontroller. htm 39
Story #3 Timeline Boston • • 8: 28: Boston calls Herndon 8: 32: Herndon calls FAA HQ 8: 34: Boston calls FAA Cape Cod 8: 38: Boston calls NEADS (see next slide) – NEADS calls Marr, who orders battle stn – Marr calls Arnold (NORAD), Arnold tells Marr to scramble • 8: 46: Scramble • 8: 53: F 15 s in air, no idea of target 40
Story # 3 Problems When was NEADS notified? • 8: 38: Boston calls NEADS (9/11 Comm) • 8: 34 – Jane Garvey (FAA head) – Boston calls Otis at Cape Cod (911 C says only called FAA Cape Cod facility, Scoggins says made several calls to Otis) – Otis pilot Tim Duffy: got call “about 8: 30, 8: 35, ” gave call to commander Treacy, called NEADS • 8: 28/29 – NORAD tapes: Scoggins tells NEADS 11 is 35 mi N of JFK – Scoggins 1 st call: 11 90 mi north of that (11 min @ 500 mph) • 8: 27/28 – Scoggins: Cooper called NEADS before Scoggins arrived 41
Story # 3 Problems Otis delay: NEADS can’t find 11 • Military scopes older than FAA’s (but system was state of the art) • Naspany: “Thousands of blips” (but breakdown into sectors means only a limited number) • No transponder (dashes instead of dots) – How would military track enemy planes? – Boston provided numerous physical position points • 8: 43: Naspany orders launch anyway – better to have them in the air – but why not at 8: 38? 42
Story # 3 Problems Time to target • “I just wanted to get there. I was in fullblower all the way. ” -- Lt. Col. Tim Duffy, Otis F 15 pilot 43
Story #3 Timeline Washington • 8: 54: Indianapolis ATC loses 77, doesn’t know about WTC, thinks 77 crashed, later notifies Herndon • 9: 20: FAA teleconference set up • 9: 25: Herndon calls FAA HQ • 9: 28: Cleveland ATC hears screams on 93 • 9: 32: “when hears about bomb on 93, tells supervisor, who notifies FAA HQ • 9: 34: NEADS (on call to FAA HQ) hears that 77 was lost • 9: 36: Herndon tells Cleveland FAA superiors need to make decision on call to military about 93 • 9: 49: Herndon/FAA HQ waffling about calling military on 93 • 10: 07: NEADS notified of 93 hijack • 10: 25: Cheney gives Clarke shootdown authorization 44
Story # 3 Problems 77 notification • 8: 25 -30: FAA notifies regional centers (incl Indianapolis) of 11’s hijacking • 8: 46: goes off course for 4 minutes, then transponder lost • 8: 50: approx time of FAA phone bridge (next slide) • 9: 20: FBI notified of 77 hijack (says FBI) • 9: 24: NORAD’s initial claim of notification 45
Story # 3 Problems Laura Brown memo, 2003 http: //forums. randi. org/showthread. php? t=126363 • After WTC 1, FAA establishes phone bridges: – – FAA field facilities FAA Command Ctr FAA headquarters USAF liaison joins -> DOD Secret Service other government agencies NORAD • FAA shares real-time info on flights of interest – loss of communication – loss of transponder unauth’d course changes other info • Other agencies share their info • FAA -> NORAD about 77 – formal = 9: 24, but much earlier informally 46
Story # 3 Problems 93 notification • ? ? : Gen. Winfield: NMCC heard about 93 transponder loss and heading to DC • 9: 03+: Arnold: military notified of possible hijack shortly after WTC 2 hit • 9: 16: Military learns of 93 hijack (according to NORAD) • 9: 20: FAA phone bridge started (911 Commission version, not FAA’s 8: 50) • 9: 34: FAA knew of 77 (911 Commission) • 9: 34: 93 passenger’s wife tells FBI about hijack • 9: 35: in Clarke’s White House videoconference (which includes Rumsfeld & Myers) -- Jane Garvey notes 93 potential hijack • Above all, military liaisons present at Herndon -- Belger and Sliney (omitted from 9/11 Commission Report) 47
Story # 3 Problems Secret Service • Arrangement w/FAA to monitor FAA radar (acknowledged by Barbara Riggs, deputy director of SS) • Also Cheney: “The Secret service has an arrangement with the FAA. They had open lines after the WTC was. . . ”[stop] • 9: 30: SS notifies Clarke about errant plane heading towards DC 48
Shootdown Story 3 version • Cheney issued authorization, but didn’t get the situation room until 10: 00 • NEADS didn’t learn about 93 until 10: 07, so couldn’t have been tracking 93 • Cheney notified of 93 at 10: 02 • Cheney gave authorization 10: 10 -15 49
Shootdown Story 3 problems • Cheney was in the situation room before 9: 20 (Mineta) • Arnold (Air War Over America): tracking 93 even before off course (at 9: 36) • Myers (9/13): had a fighter close to 93 when it crashed • Pilot of an E-3 with 2 F-16 s near Pittsburgh ordered to shoot down an airliner • North Dakota National Guard General: Secret Service told his F-16 s to “protect White House at all costs, ” only the crash made this unnecessary 50
Shootdown Story 3 problems • In situation room, staffer kept providing updates on 93, shootdown decision made and passed to military (Cheney, Rice, Card) • Bolton: the military asst kept asking (and getting) shoot-down authority • Clarke: received authorization 9: 45 -55 • Marr & Arnold: we had authorization and ND F-16’s would have shot 93 down if continued to DC • Winfield (NMCC) had permission to shoot down civilian planes threatening DC, FAA informed of fighters getting “closer and closer. . . ” 51
Story # 3 Problems Phantom Flight 11 per 9/11 Commission (via NORAD/FAA tapes) • Reasons given for Langley scramble: – NORAD (2001): Flight 77 – General Arnold, (to 911 Comm, 2003): Flight 93 • But tapes say “no scramble until after Pentagon” • All flights used up, need something else: hence Phantom 11 52
Flight 93 53
Flight 93 Flight Path 54
Flight 93 Shanksville Map 55
Flight 93 Flight Path • NTSB: FDR says 93 came in from North • Some witnesses say from East • Fisherman at marina says it flew right over the Indian Lake 56
Flight 93 The hole 57
Flight 93 The hole, debris? 58
Flight 93 Debris • Mostly paper, virtually no metal • Metal parts began showing up after reached a certain level of digging • This occurred after there had been a hiatus in the digging 59
Flight 93 Debris • Debris in Indian Lake • Wind was not blowing in right direction • Debris field 8 miles away over a ridge, cordoned off by FBI, no admittance 60
Flight 93 Debris fields 61
Flight 93 Shot down? • NSA personnel: shot down by Andrews AFB jets • Charles Lewis at LAX overhears report of shoot -down on security guard’s radio • 3 AF pilots say they were given direct orders to shoot down an airliner 62
The Phone Calls Were they possible? Were they fake? 63
Phone calls mechanism in 2001 • Phone contacts tower 1 • Electronic handshake (~8 sec) • If phone moves, when it gets out of range of tower 1, call is handed off to tower 2 64
Phone calls Flight 93 parameters • Altitude: 34, 300 -> 40, 700 • Speed: ~500 mph 65
Phone calls A. K Dewdney experiments http: //www. physics 911. net/projectachilles • Canadian mathematician & computer scientist, Scientific American column • Single engine – – < 2000’: likely (75%) 2 -8000’: unlikely (13%) > 8000’: very unlikely 20, 000’: < 1% getting to ground & tower • Double engine – 2000’: 95% success – 6000’: 10% 5000’: 44% 7000’: 0% 66
Phone calls Speed issue • Marco Thompson, president of San Diego Telecom Council – Cell phones not designed for planes – Maximum speed of 60 -100 mph 67
Phone calls When was tech possible? • 7/15/2004 -- Demonstration of third generation “pico-cell network” – Plane has base station – Communicates via satellite • Commercial availability: 24 months • Why a big deal if already possible? 68
Phone calls Story changes • 2001: 9 cell phone calls from 93 • 2006: 5 cell calls (United 93 film) • 2006: 2 cell calls (Moussaoui trial) – made at 9: 58 after down to 5000’ – earlier ones, essential to details of story, included those with cell-phone caller-ID – 35 others made from air phones 69
Phone calls Voice morphing • 1999: 10 -min sample enables cloning of speech patterns, make accurate facsimile • “Gentlemen, we have called you together to inform you that we are going to overthrow the U. S. government” -- “Gen. Steiner, ” former Commander-in-Chief of US Special Operations command • NSA eavesdropping 70
Phone calls Ted & Barbara Olson 1 • Ted: solicitor general, Barbara: conservative TV commentator • 9/11: she “called him twice on cell phone” • 9/14: called Justice Dept collect, must have been using airplane phone, didn’t have credit card • 9/14: second call went dead because cell calls don’t work well on airplanes • later: collect call must have been seat phone and she didn’t have her purse 71
Phone calls Ted & Barbara Olson 2 • AA: no seatback phones on 757’s, passengers used their cell phones • FBI 9/11: interviewed Olson, said he reported two calls • FBI at Moussaoui trial: phone records indicate only one call, “unconnected, ” lasted “ 0 seconds” • Pentagon 9/11 (history by Do. D) -- insists the pilots did not give up the plane and go to the back, as Olson said he’d been told 72
Phone calls Other calls • Tom to Deena Burnett – – – Mentions her name, no others Hijackers on suicide mission, will crash into ground 10 min later: passengers must try to gain control 10 min later: Kids want to talk to him Says he’ll “talk to them later” • Honor Wainino to stepmother Esther Heyman – Remarkable calm through whole call – Couldn’t hear anyone else 73
Phone calls Other calls • Mark Bingham to mother Alice Bingham via Aunt Kathy Hoagland – KH: sounds matter-of-fact – AB: Hi Mark – MB: Hi, Mom, this is Mark Bingham • Alice Bingham still believes it was Mark 74
Phone calls Other calls 75
11 & 175 at the WTC Were the speeds practical, or even possible? Pilots for 9/11 Truth 76
11 & 175 at the WTC Speeds NTSB: Radar Data Impact Speed Study used Airport Surveillance Radar (highly accurate) Flight 11: 404 knots Flight 175: 510 knots (1 knot = 1. 15 mph) 77
11 & 175 at the WTC Speeds Maximum Operating Speeds Vmo: velocity max op speed at sea level Mmo: Mach max op speed at high altitudes 78
11 & 175 at the WTC Speeds 79
11 & 175 at the WTC Speeds For Boeing 757: Vmo: . 86 Mach Mmo: 360 knots 80
11 & 175 at the WTC Speeds • Egypt Air (only available comparison) – Suicide dive by officer – FDR: highest speed. 99 Mach at 22, 000 • . 86 M = 522 knots at 22 K’, 369 knots at sea level • . 99 M = 600 knots at 22 K, 435 knots at sea level – Indications that the plane fell apart • Loss of power • Two debris fields 81
11 & 175 at the WTC Speeds • Contradiction of this line – Australian aeronautics engineer – Claims max-op-speeds are not actually that – Ran test in state-of-art simulator (737, but close) – Got up to. 86 M at 2000’, found easy to control http: //911 blogger. com/node/20232 82
11 & 175 at the WTC Speeds • Contradiction of that: – Misrepresentation of max-op-speed – Description of test stated that the over-speed warnings were disabled so as not to be annoying – Did this disable the simulator’s crash logic ? 83
11 & 175 at the WTC Control 84
Flight Control Could the planes have been remotely controlled? http: //www. journalof 911 studies. com/volume/2008/Autopilot. Systems. Monaghan. pdf 85
Flight Control The National System • GPS – originally deliberately inaccurate (~ 100 yards) • WAAS (Wide Area Augmentation System) – designed to replace expensive ground-based navigational aids – uses ground stations to correct GPS errors – horizontal/vertical (h/v) accuracy to 1 -3 meters – FAA announced availability August 2000 • LAAS (Local Area Augmentation System) – < 1 meter h/v – was being used in 1999 86
Flight Control RNP: Required Navigation Performance “Highway of the Sky” routes • Accuracy – – – Routes vary within 60 feet WAAS v/h accuracy: 6 -9 feet Corridors: 243 feet wide Runways: 150 -200 feet wide WTCs: 300 feet wide • Waypoints at intervals: 3 -D location within the National Air Space -longitude, latitude and altitude coordinates. 87
Flight Control Final Maneuvering • RF: Radius to Fix (constant radius turn) • FAF: Final Approach Fix (beginning of landing approach) • Can be done automatic 88
Flight Control What can it do? The Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS). . . allows pilots to fly. . . approaches that cannot necessarily be flown with current instrumentation. . . Complex curved approaches, including approaches turning to a short (less than one mile) final. . . Pathways were constructed from. . . climbing, or descending constant radius arcs. . . Autopilots could use WAAS position and velocity to fly curved trajectories. ” -- Stanford U. Aeronautics & Astronautics Dept after 1998 tests of prototype WAAS (activ’d 2000) 89
Flight Control Changing routes • DARP: Dynamic airborne reroute procedure • Downloads new course via ground VHF or satellite • By May 2000: Implemented in Honeywell’s Pegasus FMS (Flight Management System) • Honeywell, Sept 1998: American and United will be installing Pegasus Flight Management System on their 757 s and 767 s (RNP capable, 150 waypoints) • June 2001: DARP available, not fully operational 90
Flight Control Satellite visibility • The accuracy of the system at any point depends on how many GPS satellites are visible from that point. • Coincidentally (? ), the WTC and Pentagon were at or near the maximum visibility at the 9/11 crash times WTC Pentagon 91
Flight Control Pilot Override • FMC: Flight management computer • EGPWS: Enhanced ground proximity warnings take control if pilot does not respond soon enough • 92
Flight Control The Equipment • Honeywell, Sept 1998: American and United will be installing Pegasus Flight Management System on their 757 s and 767 s (RNP capable, 150 waypoints) • NASA runway approach/landing tests, 1994 -2002: 757 s and 767 s WAAS+auto-land achieved routine h/v accuracy of several meters or less • FAA/Ohio. U, Oct 1994: 50 successful autopilot approach/touchdowns by 757 using WAAS in 93
Flight Control What’s the point? • The WTCs and Pentagon are waypoints in the system • 9/11 Boeings were equipped with EGPWS and database that contained the WTCs • WTC strikes were exactly at bottom edge of recently re -fireproofed areas • Flight 77’s descending 330º spiral was declared to be way too difficult for inexperienced pilot 94
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