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Facing the Challenges of M 2 M Security and Privacy Phil Hawkes Principal Engineer Facing the Challenges of M 2 M Security and Privacy Phil Hawkes Principal Engineer at Qualcomm Inc. phawkes@qti. qualcomm. com one. M 2 M www. onem 2 m. org 14 -Nov-14 © 2014 one. M 2 M 1

Overview • one. M 2 M Architecture: a quick review • Challenges 1. Large Overview • one. M 2 M Architecture: a quick review • Challenges 1. Large variety of scenarios 2. Any device in any deployment 3. A device cannot make autonomous “judgment calls” on privacy • Solutions A. Secure communication B. Remote provisioning C. Access control policies • Future Challenges 14 -Nov-14 © 2014 one. M 2 M 2

one. M 2 M Architecture: A Quick Review • Entities CSE – Nodes (=Devices) one. M 2 M Architecture: A Quick Review • Entities CSE – Nodes (=Devices) – Common Service Entity (CSE) – Application Entity (AE) • Interactions: – Mca: AE-to-CSE – Mcc, Mcc’: CSE-to-CSE – RESTful • For more info see webinar Taking a look inside one. M 2 M 14 -Nov-14 CSE AE AE AE CSE Field Domain AE Infrastructure Domain AE © 2014 one. M 2 M AE CSE AE 3

Challenges 1. Large variety of scenarios 2. Any device in any deployment 3. A Challenges 1. Large variety of scenarios 2. Any device in any deployment 3. A device cannot make autonomous “judgment calls” on privacy 14 -Nov-14 © 2014 one. M 2 M 4

Challenges 1. Large variety of deployments – “Assets” that need protecting can be unique Challenges 1. Large variety of deployments – “Assets” that need protecting can be unique to a deployment • Content confidentiality, content integrity, anonymity, traffic efficiency – Environment can be unique to a deployment • Does wired or wireless transport layer provide adequate security? • Tamper-resistance considerations – (Continued on next slide) 2. Any device in any deployment 3. A device cannot make autonomous “judgment calls” on privacy 14 -Nov-14 © 2014 one. M 2 M 5

Challenges 1. Large variety of deployments (continued) – Variety of authentication scenarios • Pre-shared Challenges 1. Large variety of deployments (continued) – Variety of authentication scenarios • Pre-shared Key provisioned to both by end-points • PKI/Certificates (asymmetric cryptography) • Centralized authentication 2. Any device in any deployment 3. A device cannot make autonomous “judgment calls” on privacy 14 -Nov-14 © 2014 one. M 2 M 6

Challenges 1. Large variety of deployment scenarios 2. Any device in any deployment – Challenges 1. Large variety of deployment scenarios 2. Any device in any deployment – Interoperability: agree on minimal set of cipher suites – Credential management a. Provisioning at manufacture b. Human-assisted provisioning during deployment – e. g. manual entry, via USB c. Remote provisioning of fielded devices d. Derivation from pre-existing credentials (e. g. transport network) Note: a, b are enabled but not specified by one. M 2 M 3. A device cannot make autonomous “judgment calls” on privacy 14 -Nov-14 © 2014 one. M 2 M 7

Challenges 1. Large variety of scenarios 2. Any device in any deployment 3. A Challenges 1. Large variety of scenarios 2. Any device in any deployment 3. A device cannot make autonomous “judgment calls” on privacy – M 2 M/Io. T may expose information about our lives without our awareness – Privacy = who can access information about me – CSE needs to determine: “Should I allow access? ” – Can’t ask human to make case-by-case judgment call – CSE needs clear rules 14 -Nov-14 © 2014 one. M 2 M 8

Challenges & Solutions 1. Large variety of scenarios A. Secure communication 2. Any device Challenges & Solutions 1. Large variety of scenarios A. Secure communication 2. Any device in any deployment B. Remote provisioning 3. A device cannot make “judgment calls” on privacy C. Access Control Policies 14 -Nov-14 various authentication options © 2014 one. M 2 M expresses wide variety of rules 9

Secure Communication: Example Field Domain Sensor AE 1 E-Health Web-application Gateway CSE 1 AE Secure Communication: Example Field Domain Sensor AE 1 E-Health Web-application Gateway CSE 1 AE 2 CSE 2 M 2 M SP’s Server Web App Server 14 -Nov-14 © 2014 one. M 2 M Infrastructure Domain 10

Secure Communication: Example Co. AP 1. AE 1 passes sensor reading to CSE 1 Secure Communication: Example Co. AP 1. AE 1 passes sensor reading to CSE 1 Sensor UDP Field Domain Gateway AE 1 CSE 1 AE 2 CSE 2 M 2 M SP’s Server Web App Server 14 -Nov-14 © 2014 one. M 2 M Infrastructure Domain 11

Secure Communication: Example Co. AP 1. AE 1 passes sensor reading to CSE 1 Secure Communication: Example Co. AP 1. AE 1 passes sensor reading to CSE 1 2. CSE 1 forwards sensor reading to CSE 2 Sensor AE 1 Gateway CSE 1 HTTP TCP AE 2 Web App Server 14 -Nov-14 UDP Field Domain © 2014 one. M 2 M CSE 2 M 2 M SP’s Server Infrastructure Domain 12

Secure Communication: Example Co. AP 1. AE 1 passes sensor reading to CSE 1 Secure Communication: Example Co. AP 1. AE 1 passes sensor reading to CSE 1 2. CSE 1 forwards sensor reading to CSE 2 3. AE 2 retrieves sensor reading from CSE 2 14 -Nov-14 Sensor UDP AE 1 Field Domain Gateway CSE 1 HTTP TCP CSE 2 M 2 M SP’s Server AE 2 Web App Server © 2014 one. M 2 M HTTP TCP Infrastructure Domain 13

Secure Communication • Hop-by-Hop Field Domain Gateway AE 1 CSE 1 AE 2 – Secure Communication • Hop-by-Hop Field Domain Gateway AE 1 CSE 1 AE 2 – Transited CSEs see clear text – Trusted to behave Sensor CSE 2 M 2 M SP’s Server Web App Server 14 -Nov-14 © 2014 one. M 2 M Infrastructure Domain 14

Secure Communication Field Domain Co. AP • Hop-by-Hop • TLS/DTLS v 1. 2 Sensor Secure Communication Field Domain Co. AP • Hop-by-Hop • TLS/DTLS v 1. 2 Sensor DTLS UDP Gateway CSE 1 AE 2 – DTLS if UDP transport AE 1 CSE 2 M 2 M SP’s Server Web App Server 14 -Nov-14 © 2014 one. M 2 M Infrastructure Domain 15

Secure Communication Field Domain • Hop-by-Hop • TLS/DTLS v 1. 2 Sensor – DTLS Secure Communication Field Domain • Hop-by-Hop • TLS/DTLS v 1. 2 Sensor – DTLS if UDP transport – TLS if TCP transport – Sometimes write (D)TLS or just TLS for both Gateway AE 1 CSE 1 HTTP TLS TCP CSE 2 M 2 M SP’s Server AE 2 Web App Server HTTP TLS TCP 14 -Nov-14 © 2014 one. M 2 M Infrastructure Domain 16

Secure Communication • Hop-by-Hop • TLS/DTLS v 1. 2 • AE-CSE Field Domain Sensor Secure Communication • Hop-by-Hop • TLS/DTLS v 1. 2 • AE-CSE Field Domain Sensor AE 1 C S Gateway CSE 1 – AE: TLS Client (C) – CSE: TLS Server (S) AE 2 Web App Server 14 -Nov-14 © 2014 one. M 2 M CSE 2 M 2 M SP’s Server Infrastructure Domain 17

Secure Communication Field Domain • Hop-by-Hop • TLS/DTLS v 1. 2 • AE-CSE Sensor Secure Communication Field Domain • Hop-by-Hop • TLS/DTLS v 1. 2 • AE-CSE Sensor AE 1 C S CSE 1 C – AE: TLS Client (C) – CSE: TLS Server (S) • CSE-CSE – CSE 1: TLS Client (C) – CSE 2: TLS Server (S) 14 -Nov-14 Gateway AE 2 Web App Server © 2014 one. M 2 M C S S CSE 2 M 2 M SP’s Server Infrastructure Domain 18

Authentication Options • Pre-Shared Key (PSK) – TLS Client & Server provisioned with a Authentication Options • Pre-Shared Key (PSK) – TLS Client & Server provisioned with a shared key# • Certificate – TLS Client & Server both have certificates • M 2 M Authentication Function (MAF) – MAF operated by 3 rd Party or M 2 M Service Provider – TLS Client and MAF provisioned with a shared key# – MAF assists authentication of TLS Client & Server #This 14 -Nov-14 shared key can be remotely provisioned © 2014 one. M 2 M 19

Certificates • Somewhat aligned with Co. AP Security RFC 7252 • X. 509/PKIX (RFC Certificates • Somewhat aligned with Co. AP Security RFC 7252 • X. 509/PKIX (RFC 5280) • Raw. Public. Key Certificates – Contains only X. 509 Subject. Public. Key. Info element – Suits less complex deployments & debugging • Certificates chaining to a trust anchor. E. g. – Device Certificate (e. g. manufacturer issued) – M 2 M SP issued certificate identifying CSE or AE 14 -Nov-14 © 2014 one. M 2 M 20

Remote Provisioning • Process provisioning a shared key to two entities • M 2 Remote Provisioning • Process provisioning a shared key to two entities • M 2 M Enrolment Function (MEF) – Assists remote provisioning – Operated by 3 rd Party or M 2 M Service Provider • Mechanisms for establishing shared key – TLS Client & MEF perform (D)TLS, export shared key • PSK • Certificates – Derived from Network Access credentials • Network Access Provider assists in mutual authentication • Generic Bootstrapping Architecture (GBA) 3 GPP TS 33. 220 14 -Nov-14 © 2014 one. M 2 M 21

Access Control Requirements • one. M 2 M uses a RESTful architecture – API: Access Control Requirements • one. M 2 M uses a RESTful architecture – API: request to perform an operation on a resource – Operations: Create, Retrieve, Update, Delete – Webinar Taking a look inside one. M 2 M has more info • CSEs can’t make resource access judgement calls • CSE need clear rules dictating, for each resource – WHO (which CSEs and AEs) are authorized to access, – WHAT operations (see above), and under… – WHICH circumstances (e. g. time, location of entity) 14 -Nov-14 © 2014 one. M 2 M 22

Access Control Policies (ACP) Resources links Resource 1 contains ACP 1 ACP Rule 1 Access Control Policies (ACP) Resources links Resource 1 contains ACP 1 ACP Rule 1 Resource 3 ACP 2 ACP Rule 2 Resource 4 ACP 3 ACP Rule 3 Resource 2 Resource access is authorized upon satisfying at least one ACP rule in one of the linked ACPs 14 -Nov-14 © 2014 one. M 2 M 23

Access Control Policies (ACP) Resources links Resource 1 contains ACP 1 with conditions on Access Control Policies (ACP) Resources links Resource 1 contains ACP 1 with conditions on WHO: entities ACP Rule 1 CSE-ID AE-ID Resource 2 Resource 3 Resource 4 ACP 2 ACP 3 ACP Rule 2 ACP Rule 3 WHAT: operations Create, Retrieve Update Delete WHICH: circumstances Time, location, IP address ACP rule is satisfied if WHO and WHAT and WHICH are satisfied by requesting entity, requested operation and 14 -Nov-14 © 2014 one. M 2 M circumstances 24

one. M 2 M Security Documents • TR-0008 “Analysis of Security Solutions for the one. M 2 M Security Documents • TR-0008 “Analysis of Security Solutions for the one. M 2 M System” http: //onem 2 m. org/images/files/deliverables/one. M 2 M_TR-0008 -Security-V 1_0_0. doc • TS-0003 “Security Solutions” http: //onem 2 m. org/images/files/deliverables/TS-0003 -Security_Solutions-V-2014 -08. pdf • Latest versions available from ftp: //ftp. onem 2 m. org/Work%20 Programme/WI 0007/ 14 -Nov-14 © 2014 one. M 2 M 25

Limitations of initial release • A “minimum deployable solution” addressing short term needs • Limitations of initial release • A “minimum deployable solution” addressing short term needs • Focus: Vertically deployed industrial applications – Centralized client-server architectures – Most devices have limited number of static connections – Deployments are managed by skilled workforce – Nodes are trusted to behave • Our solutions meet these needs while having a place in future M 2 M/Io. T (consumer) scenarios 14 -Nov-14 © 2014 one. M 2 M 26

Future Challenges • Decentralization – Increasingly complex interactions • Sharing Information between deployments • Future Challenges • Decentralization – Increasingly complex interactions • Sharing Information between deployments • Complex authentication and authorization scenarios • Confidentiality & integrity concerns – Unskilled Consumers managing their “Things” • Technological Challenges: – End-to-End (multi-hop) message security – Many connections per device – Authentication & Authorization mechanisms 14 -Nov-14 © 2014 one. M 2 M 27

Conclusion: Challenges & Solutions 1. Large variety of scenarios A. Secure communication 2. Any Conclusion: Challenges & Solutions 1. Large variety of scenarios A. Secure communication 2. Any device in any deployment B. Remote provisioning 3. A device cannot make “judgment calls” on privacy C. Access Control Policies 14 -Nov-14 various authentication options © 2014 one. M 2 M expresses wide variety of rules 28

Join us for the next webinar “On Management, Abstraction & Semantics” by Dr. Yongjing Join us for the next webinar “On Management, Abstraction & Semantics” by Dr. Yongjing Zhang Standard Research Project Lead at Huawei Technologies Co. , Ltd 27 November 2014 at 0700 UTC http: //www. onem 2 m. org/btchannel. cfm 14 -Nov-14 © 2014 one. M 2 M 29

Check out the recorded webinars “How standardization enables the next internet evolution” by Marc Check out the recorded webinars “How standardization enables the next internet evolution” by Marc Jadoul Strategic Marketing Director, Alcatel-Lucent “Taking a look inside” by Nicolas Damour Senior Manager for Business and Innovation Development, Sierra Wireless http: //www. onem 2 m. org/btchannel. cfm 14 -Nov-14 © 2014 one. M 2 M 30

Join us at the one. M 2 M showcase event • One. M 2 Join us at the one. M 2 M showcase event • One. M 2 M project partners, rationale and goals • One. M 2 M Service Layer Specification release • Showcase demos that demonstrate one. M 2 M “live" 9 December 2014, Sophia-Antipolis, France (free of charge, but online registration is required) http: //www. onem 2 m. org/Showcase Followed by the ETSI M 2 M workshop 14 -Nov-14 © 2014 one. M 2 M 31

Q&A 14 -Nov-14 © 2014 one. M 2 M 32 Q&A 14 -Nov-14 © 2014 one. M 2 M 32

Backup Slides 14 -Nov-14 © 2014 one. M 2 M 33 Backup Slides 14 -Nov-14 © 2014 one. M 2 M 33

PSK-Based Authentication Server Client 14 -Nov-14 © 2014 one. M 2 M 34 PSK-Based Authentication Server Client 14 -Nov-14 © 2014 one. M 2 M 34

PSK 1. Provision identical PSK, PSK-ID to A, B Server Client PSK, PSK-ID 14 PSK 1. Provision identical PSK, PSK-ID to A, B Server Client PSK, PSK-ID 14 -Nov-14 © 2014 one. M 2 M 35

PSK Client PSK, PSK-ID 14 -Nov-14 2. TLS/DTLS A provides PSK-ID B identifies PSK PSK Client PSK, PSK-ID 14 -Nov-14 2. TLS/DTLS A provides PSK-ID B identifies PSK from PSK-ID © 2014 one. M 2 M Server PSK, PSK-ID 36

PSK Client PSK, PSK-ID 2. (D)TLS A provides PSK-ID B identifies PSK from PSK-ID PSK Client PSK, PSK-ID 2. (D)TLS A provides PSK-ID B identifies PSK from PSK-ID • Advantages: – Simple Concept 14 -Nov-14 Server PSK, PSK-ID • Challenges: – May need multiple keys provisioned – Doesn’t scale well © 2014 one. M 2 M 37

PKI/Certificate-Based Authentication Client 14 -Nov-14 Server © 2014 one. M 2 M 38 PKI/Certificate-Based Authentication Client 14 -Nov-14 Server © 2014 one. M 2 M 38

PKI 1. Provision certificate 1’. Provision certificate Client’s Cert Server’s Cert Client 14 -Nov-14 PKI 1. Provision certificate 1’. Provision certificate Client’s Cert Server’s Cert Client 14 -Nov-14 Server © 2014 one. M 2 M 39

PKI 2. Configure trust anchors 2’. Configure trust anchors Client’s Cert Server’s Cert Client PKI 2. Configure trust anchors 2’. Configure trust anchors Client’s Cert Server’s Cert Client Server’s Trust Anchors Client’s Trust Anchors 14 -Nov-14 © 2014 one. M 2 M 40

PKI Client’s Cert Server’s Cert Client’s Trust Anchors Server 2. (D)TLS Validate server’s cert PKI Client’s Cert Server’s Cert Client’s Trust Anchors Server 2. (D)TLS Validate server’s cert against client’s trust anchors 14 -Nov-14 Server’s Trust Anchors Validate client cert against server’s trust anchors © 2014 one. M 2 M 41

MAF Assisted (D)TLS Client 14 -Nov-14 (D)TLS Server © 2014 one. M 2 M MAF Assisted (D)TLS Client 14 -Nov-14 (D)TLS Server © 2014 one. M 2 M MAF 42

MAF Assisted 1. Provision symmetric key Km, Km. Id Km, Km. ID (D)TLS Client MAF Assisted 1. Provision symmetric key Km, Km. Id Km, Km. ID (D)TLS Client 14 -Nov-14 Km, Km. Id (D)TLS Server © 2014 one. M 2 M MAF 43

MAF Assisted 2. Generate Kc, Kc. Id from Km Km, Km. ID (D)TLS Client MAF Assisted 2. Generate Kc, Kc. Id from Km Km, Km. ID (D)TLS Client Km, Km. Id (D)TLS Server Kc, Kc. Id 14 -Nov-14 MAF Kc, Kc. Id © 2014 one. M 2 M 44

MAF Assisted (D)TLS 3 a. (D)TLS: Kc. Id (D)TLS Client Server Kc, Kc. Id MAF Assisted (D)TLS 3 a. (D)TLS: Kc. Id (D)TLS Client Server Kc, Kc. Id 14 -Nov-14 MAF Kc, Kc. Id © 2014 one. M 2 M 45

MAF Assisted (D)TLS 3 a. (D)TLS: Kc. Id 3 b. Kc. Id MAF (D)TLS MAF Assisted (D)TLS 3 a. (D)TLS: Kc. Id 3 b. Kc. Id MAF (D)TLS Client Server Kc, Kc. Id 14 -Nov-14 Kc, Kc. Id © 2014 one. M 2 M 46

MAF Assisted (D)TLS 3 a. (D)TLS: Kc. Id 3 b. Kc. Id MAF (D)TLS MAF Assisted (D)TLS 3 a. (D)TLS: Kc. Id 3 b. Kc. Id MAF (D)TLS Client Server Kc, Kc. Id 14 -Nov-14 Kc, Kc. Id © 2014 one. M 2 M 3 c. Kc Kc, Kc. Id 47

MAF Assisted (D)TLS 3 a. (D)TLS: Kc. Id 3 b. Kc. Id MAF (D)TLS MAF Assisted (D)TLS 3 a. (D)TLS: Kc. Id 3 b. Kc. Id MAF (D)TLS Client Server (D)TLS w/ Kc Kc, Kc. Id 14 -Nov-14 Kc, Kc. Id © 2014 one. M 2 M 3 b. Kc Kc, Kc. Id 48

Remote Provisioning PArticipants • Process provisions a shared key to two entities • M Remote Provisioning PArticipants • Process provisions a shared key to two entities • M 2 M Enrolment Function (MEF) – Assists remote provisioning – Operated by 3 rd Party or M 2 M Service Provider • Enrolee – Entity requesting to be provisioned • Enrolment Target – Other entity that will ends up with the shared key 14 -Nov-14 © 2014 one. M 2 M 49

Remote Provisioning M 2 M Enrolment Function Enrolee Enrolment Target 14 -Nov-14 © 2014 Remote Provisioning M 2 M Enrolment Function Enrolee Enrolment Target 14 -Nov-14 © 2014 one. M 2 M 50

Remote Provisioning M 2 M Enrolment Function Enrolee Mutual Authentication Enrolment Target 14 -Nov-14 Remote Provisioning M 2 M Enrolment Function Enrolee Mutual Authentication Enrolment Target 14 -Nov-14 © 2014 one. M 2 M 51

Remote Provisioning Ke, Ke. Id M 2 M Enrolment Function Enrolee Ke, Ke. Id Remote Provisioning Ke, Ke. Id M 2 M Enrolment Function Enrolee Ke, Ke. Id Mutual Authentication Generate Ke, Ke. Id Enrolment Target 14 -Nov-14 © 2014 one. M 2 M 52

Remote Provisioning Ke, Ke. Id M 2 M Enrolment Function Enrolee Ke. I d Remote Provisioning Ke, Ke. Id M 2 M Enrolment Function Enrolee Ke. I d in (D)T LS H and s Ke, Ke. Id hak e Enrolment Target 14 -Nov-14 © 2014 one. M 2 M 53

Remote Provisioning Ke, Ke. Id M 2 M Enrolment Function Enrolee Ke. I d Remote Provisioning Ke, Ke. Id M 2 M Enrolment Function Enrolee Ke. I d in (D)T LS H and s Ke, Ke. Id hak e Enrolment Target 14 -Nov-14 © 2014 one. M 2 M 54

Remote Provisioning Ke, Ke. Id M 2 M Enrolment Function Enrolee + Enrolment Target Remote Provisioning Ke, Ke. Id M 2 M Enrolment Function Enrolee + Enrolment Target ID Shared Key Ke, Ke. Id Ke. I d in Shared Key (D)T LS H and s Ke. Id hak e Enrolment Target 14 -Nov-14 © 2014 one. M 2 M 55

Remote Provisioning M 2 M Enrolment Function Enrolee Shared Key Ke. I d in Remote Provisioning M 2 M Enrolment Function Enrolee Shared Key Ke. I d in Shared Key (D)T LS H and s Ke. Id hak e Enrolment Target Shared Key 14 -Nov-14 © 2014 one. M 2 M 56

Remote Provisioning M 2 M Enrolment Function Enrolee Shared Key Com pl Key ete Remote Provisioning M 2 M Enrolment Function Enrolee Shared Key Com pl Key ete (D to v )TLS erif u y pr sing S ovis har e ion ing d Enrolment Target Shared Key 14 -Nov-14 © 2014 one. M 2 M 57

Network Access Credentials GBA Network Access Authentication Server (HSS, HLR, AAA) UE (hosts TLS Network Access Credentials GBA Network Access Authentication Server (HSS, HLR, AAA) UE (hosts TLS Client) 14 -Nov-14 Network Access Credentials GBA Bootstrap Server Function (plays role of MEF) TLS Server © 2014 one. M 2 M 58

Network Access Credentials GBA Network Access Authentication Server (HSS, HLR, AAA) UE (hosts TLS Network Access Credentials GBA Network Access Authentication Server (HSS, HLR, AAA) UE (hosts TLS Client) 14 -Nov-14 Network Access Credentials GBA Bootstrap Server Function (plays role of MEF) TLS Server © 2014 one. M 2 M 59

Network Access Credentials GBA Network Access Authentication Server (HSS, HLR, AAA) UE B-TID, Ks Network Access Credentials GBA Network Access Authentication Server (HSS, HLR, AAA) UE B-TID, Ks (hosts TLS Client) 14 -Nov-14 Network Access Credentials GBA Bootstrap Server Function (plays role of MEF) TLS Server © 2014 one. M 2 M 60

GBA Network Access Authentication Server (HSS, HLR, AAA) UE B-TID, Ks (hosts TLS Client) GBA Network Access Authentication Server (HSS, HLR, AAA) UE B-TID, Ks (hosts TLS Client) (D)TLS: B-TID 14 -Nov-14 GBA Bootstrap Server Function (plays role of MEF) TLS Server © 2014 one. M 2 M 61

GBA Network Access Authentication Server (HSS, HLR, AAA) UE B-TID, Ks (hosts TLS Client) GBA Network Access Authentication Server (HSS, HLR, AAA) UE B-TID, Ks (hosts TLS Client) (D)TLS: B-TID 14 -Nov-14 TLS Server B-TID © 2014 one. M 2 M GBA Bootstrap Server Function (plays role of MEF) 62

GBA Network Access Authentication Server (HSS, HLR, AAA) UE B-TID, Ks TLS Server FQDN GBA Network Access Authentication Server (HSS, HLR, AAA) UE B-TID, Ks TLS Server FQDN (hosts TLS Client) (D)TLS: B-TID TLS Server Shared Key 14 -Nov-14 GBA Bootstrap Server Function (plays role of MEF) Shared Key © 2014 one. M 2 M 63

GBA Network Access Authentication Server (HSS, HLR, AAA) UE (hosts TLS Client) (D)TLS: B-TID GBA Network Access Authentication Server (HSS, HLR, AAA) UE (hosts TLS Client) (D)TLS: B-TID Shared Key 14 -Nov-14 B-TID TLS Server Shared Key © 2014 one. M 2 M GBA Bootstrap Server Function (plays role of MEF) Shared Key 64

GBA Network Access Authentication Server (HSS, HLR, AAA) UE (hosts TLS Client) (D)TLS: B-TID GBA Network Access Authentication Server (HSS, HLR, AAA) UE (hosts TLS Client) (D)TLS: B-TID GBA Bootstrap Server Function (plays role of MEF) TLS Continue Server Shared Key 14 -Nov-14 (D)TLS Shared Key © 2014 one. M 2 M 65