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Executive Master Intercultural Communication Lugano 2009 Modul Fleiner Class 3: Secession Cases Executive Master Intercultural Communication Lugano 2009 Modul Fleiner Class 3: Secession Cases

Creating a new canton by secession Creating a new canton by secession

Jura CH Berne Creating a new Canton Jura out of secession and self-determination Jura CH Berne Creating a new Canton Jura out of secession and self-determination

French Along language lines? German French Along language lines? German

Catholic Or along religious lines? Protestant Catholic Or along religious lines? Protestant

Badinter Arbitration Case d) that in the case of a federal-type state, which embraces Badinter Arbitration Case d) that in the case of a federal-type state, which embraces communities that possess a degree of autonomy and, moreover, participate in the exercise of political power within the framework of institutions common to the Federation, the existence of the state implies that the federal organs represent the components of the Federation and wield effective power;

b) - The composition and workings of the essential organs of the Federation, be b) - The composition and workings of the essential organs of the Federation, be they the Federal Presidency, the Federal Council, the Council of the Republics and the Provinces, the Federal Executive Council, the Constitutional Court or the Federal Army, no longer meet the criteria of participation and representatives inherent in a federal state;

Ethiopian Constitution Article 39 The Right of Nations, Nationalities and Peoples 1. Every nation, Ethiopian Constitution Article 39 The Right of Nations, Nationalities and Peoples 1. Every nation, nationality or people 2. in Ethiopia shall have the unrestricted right to self determination up to secession.

Secession Procedure 4. The right to self determination up to secession of nation, nationality Secession Procedure 4. The right to self determination up to secession of nation, nationality and peoples may be exercised: (a)where the demand for secession is appro(b)ved by a two thirds (2/3 rds) majority of the (c)legislature of the nation, nationality or people concerned. (b) where the Federal Government within three years upon receipt of the decision of the legislature of the nation, nationality or people demanding secession, organises a referendum for the nation, nationality or people demanding secession.

(c) where the demand for secession is supported by a simple majority vote in (c) where the demand for secession is supported by a simple majority vote in the referendum. (d) where the Federal Government transfers power to the parliament of the nation, nationality or people which has opted for secession. (e) where property is partitioned in accordance with the law.

New Swiss Constitution: Art. 53 Existence and Territory of the Cantons 1 The Confederation New Swiss Constitution: Art. 53 Existence and Territory of the Cantons 1 The Confederation shall protect the Existence and the territory of the Cantons 2 Modifications of the number of the Cantons or their status are subject to the assent of the population concerned, of the Cantons concerned, and of the People and the Cantons.

Québec Secession Case Québec Secession Case

Highlights of The Decision of The Canadian Supreme Court On the Secession Of Queébec Highlights of The Decision of The Canadian Supreme Court On the Secession Of Queébec

Question 1: Under the Constitution of Canada, can the National Assembly, legislature or government Question 1: Under the Constitution of Canada, can the National Assembly, legislature or government of Quebec effect the secession of Quebec from Canada unilaterally?

No explicit regulation Of the Consitution Only procedures for Amendement No explicit regulation Of the Consitution Only procedures for Amendement

Constitutional Amendments Act 1982 Section 41 [Highly Qualified Proceedings] An amendment to the Constitution Constitutional Amendments Act 1982 Section 41 [Highly Qualified Proceedings] An amendment to the Constitution of Canada in relation to the following matters may be made by proclamation issued by the Governor General under the Great Seal of Canada only where authorized by resolutions of the Senate and House of Commons and of the legislative assemblies of each province:

The Constitution is more than a written text. It embraces the entire global system The Constitution is more than a written text. It embraces the entire global system of rules and principles which govern the exercise of constitutional authority. It is necessary to make a more profound investigation of the underlying principles animating the whole of the Constitution, including the principles of federalism, democracy, constitutionalism and the rule of law, and respect for minorities.

Arguments against unilateral secession Arguments against unilateral secession

Democracy, however, means more than simple majority rule. Constitutional jurisprudence shows that democracy exists Democracy, however, means more than simple majority rule. Constitutional jurisprudence shows that democracy exists in the larger context of other constitutional values. Since Confederation, the people of the provinces and territories have created close ties of interdependence (economic, social, political and cultural) based on shared values that include federalism, democracy, constitutionalism and the rule of law, and respect for minorities The Constitution which safes order and stability, and accordingly secession of a province "under the Constitution" could not be achieved unilaterally, that is, without principled negotiation with other participants in Confederation within the existing constitutional framework.

Arguments for Secession Procedure not provided In the Constitution Arguments for Secession Procedure not provided In the Constitution

Our democratic institutions necessarily accommodate a continuous process of discussion and evolution, which is Our democratic institutions necessarily accommodate a continuous process of discussion and evolution, which is reflected in the constitutional right of each participant in the federation to initiate constitutional change. This right implies a reciprocal duty on the other participants to engage in discussions to address any legitimate initiative to change the constitutional order.

Legitimacy A clear majority vote in Quebec on a clear question in favour of Legitimacy A clear majority vote in Quebec on a clear question in favour of secession would confer democratic legitimacy on the secession initiative which all of the other participants in Confederation would have to recognize

Effects of a clear Vote No direct legal effect Quebec could not, despite a Effects of a clear Vote No direct legal effect Quebec could not, despite a clear referendum result, purport to invoke a right of self-determination to dictate the terms of a proposed secession to the other parties to the federation. The democratic vote, by however strong a majority, would have no legal effect on its own and could not push aside the principles of federalism and the rule of law, the rights of individuals and minorities, or the operation of democracy in the other provinces or in Canada as a whole. Democratic rights under the Constitution cannot be divorced from constitutional obligations

Nor, however, can the reverse proposition be accepted: the continued existence and operation of Nor, however, can the reverse proposition be accepted: the continued existence and operation of Non legal effects the Canadian constitutional order could not be indifferent to a clear expression of a clear majority of Quebequers that they no longer wish to remain in Canada. The other provinces and the federal government would have no basis to deny the right of the government of Quebec to pursue secession should a clear majority of the people of Quebec choose that goal, so long as in doing so, Quebec respects the rights of others. The negotiations that followed such a vote would address the potential act of secession as well as its possible terms should in fact secession proceed. here would be no conclusions predetermined by law on any issue. Negotiations would need to address the interests of the other provinces, the federal government and Quebec and indeed the rights of all Canadians both within and outside Quebec, and specifically the rights of minorities.

Why Negotiations? The negotiation process would require the reconciliation of various rights and obligations Why Negotiations? The negotiation process would require the reconciliation of various rights and obligations by negotiation between two legitimate majorities, namely, the majority of the population of Quebec, and that of Canada as a whole.

The main constitutional Principles: History Constitutionalism And Rule of Law Federalism Democracy Protection of The main constitutional Principles: History Constitutionalism And Rule of Law Federalism Democracy Protection of Minorities

History: Theses: Quebec Conference These included guarantees to protect French language and 1864 culture, History: Theses: Quebec Conference These included guarantees to protect French language and 1864 culture, both directly (by making French an official language in Quebec and Canada as a whole) and indirectly (by allocating jurisdiction over education and "Property and Civil Rights in the Province" to the provinces). The protection of minorities was thus reaffirmed.

We are of different races, not so that we can wage war on one We are of different races, not so that we can wage war on one another, but in order to work together for our well-being.

Federalism: Diversity Democratic Participation Autonomy Federalism: Diversity Democratic Participation Autonomy

Democracy Procedural: Process of Government Substantive: Promotion of Self-government Dignity of Human Person Democracy Procedural: Process of Government Substantive: Promotion of Self-government Dignity of Human Person

Rule of Law and Constitutionalism that the law is supreme over the acts of Rule of Law and Constitutionalism that the law is supreme over the acts of both government and private persons. the creation and maintenance of an actual order of positive laws which preserves and embodies the more general principle of normative order" the exercise of all public power must find its ultimate source in a legal rule".

Protection of Minorities We emphasize that the protection of minority rights is itself an Protection of Minorities We emphasize that the protection of minority rights is itself an independent principle underlying our constitutional order. Consistent with this long tradition of respect for minorities, which is at least as old as Canada itself, the framers of the Constitution Act, 1982 included in s. 35 explicit protection for existing aboriginal and treaty rights, and in s. 25, a non-derogation clause in favour of the rights of aboriginal peoples

Question 2: Does international law give the National Assembly, legislature or government of Quebec Question 2: Does international law give the National Assembly, legislature or government of Quebec the right to effect the secession of Quebec from Canada unilaterally?

Right of Self-determination where Right of Self-determination where "a people" is governed as part of a colonial empire; where "a people" is subject to alien subjugation, domination or exploitation; and possibly where "a people" is denied any meaningful exercise of its right to self-determination within the state of which it forms a part.

People? While much of the Quebec population certainly shares many of the characteristics (such People? While much of the Quebec population certainly shares many of the characteristics (such as a common language and culture) that would be considered in determining whether a specific group is a "people", as do other groups within Quebec and/or Canada, it is not necessary to explore this legal characterization to resolve Question 2 appropriately.

Self-determination Internal external The recognized sources A right to external of international law estaself-determination Self-determination Internal external The recognized sources A right to external of international law estaself-determination blish that the right to (which in this case self-determination of a potentially takes the people is normally ful-filform of the assertion led through internal selfdetermination – a peo- of a right to unilateral secession) arises in ple's pursuit of its only the most extrepolitical, economic, some of cases and, cial and cultural developeven then, under ment within the carefully defined framework circumstances. of an existing state.

There is no necessary incompatibility between the maintenance of the territorial integrity of existing There is no necessary incompatibility between the maintenance of the territorial integrity of existing states, including Canada, and the right of a "people" to achieve a full measure of self-determination. A state whose government represents the whole of the people or peoples resident within its territory, on a basis of equality and without discrimination, and respects the principles of self-determination in its own internal arrangements, is entitled to the protection under international law of its territorial integrity.

Principle of Effectivity while international law may not ground a positive right to unilateral Principle of Effectivity while international law may not ground a positive right to unilateral secession in the context of Quebec, international law equally does not prohibit secession and, in fact, international recognition would be conferred on such a political reality if it emerged, for example, via effective control of the territory of what is now the province of Quebec. It is, however, quite another matter to suggest that a subsequent condonation of an initially illegal act retroactively creates a legal right to engage in the act in the first place.

First Question: 1. Has the legislature the jurisdiction 2. to rule secession procedures without First Question: 1. Has the legislature the jurisdiction 2. to rule secession procedures without 3. explicit provision of the constitution? If the answer is yes, would it then also have the competence modify substantially the procedures provided by the court in the Québec case?

Second Question: The bill provides that the secession is decided by a popular referendum. Second Question: The bill provides that the secession is decided by a popular referendum. However the question to be decided on has to be clear, and it is up to the Canadian House of Commons to decide, weather the question is clear enough in order to know weather the people wants a secession. Would the court consider that a popular referendum is indispensable? Would the decision to divi de. Tchequoslovakia in two sovereign states only by parliament be constitutional? Was the German decision to unite the country only based on a electoral vote constitutional? Is the competence of the Commons to decide, what wording of the question is clear enough constitutional?

Question 3: The bill does not determine the percentage needed in order to obtain Question 3: The bill does not determine the percentage needed in order to obtain the majority necessary to initiate negotiations for secession. This has to be decided by the Commons. Does the court consider that a bill, which conveys such a far reaching competence to the Commons is constitutional? How should the Commons decide if for instance two third of the French speaking people decide positive and two third of English speaking and two third of the aborgigins decided negative that is against secession?

Question 4: What is the constitutional status of minorities living within the seceding territory? Question 4: What is the constitutional status of minorities living within the seceding territory? Do those minorities enjoy the same rights as the majority? Do those rights have a constitutional value, is it linked to the human rights, and or to collective rights?