European Best Practice for industrial Disaster Risk Management

European Best Practice for industrial Disaster Risk Management (i. DRM) F. Bemmerlein-Lux GIZ Senior Advisors of the cd. DRM Programme under ASEM and Dr. Christian Jochum Director of Centre, European Process Safety Centre (www. epsc. org) Chairman, German Commission on Process Safety NCDC industrial Disaster Management Programme 8. -19. Augsut 2011

Outline 1 i. DRM Approach in Europe 2 Risk Management Principles 3 Best Practice of Emergency Management 4 Conclusions 2

Ger: 357 111 km² > 81 Million Inhabitants MA: 307. 762 km² > 112 Million Inhabitants. 3

Germany Panorama Hamburg Berlin Ruhr District Frankfurt Munich Rh ine Va lle y Nuremberg Alps 4

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Instruments Environmental Education Self-Regulation Advisory Services EIA Economic Instruments Laws and Regulations 6 Environmental Research Spatial Planning

Principles Prevention Polluter pays Cooperation März, 00 Emissions and land-use should be avioided using the latest technical standards. Precausion is important for: + + + Still not known/undedrstood risks Long term efficts Combined Risks (cascading effects) The principle is most important for political and guiding decisions. 7

Principles Prevention All costs for not done environmental care and the use of environmental resources have to be paid by the one causing the alterations Polluter pays Cooperation Even while developing products and processes the use of environmental resources have to be considered – should lead to ecological honest prices. 8

Principles Prevention Wherever possible a voluntary cooperation is requested and required. Polluter pays Cooperation März, 00 Motivations based on marked economy are used to initiate and sustain innovations of environmental protection (via tax, compensations, self-obligations, fees etc. ) 9

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Example: Air Federal Emission Control Act 21 Ordinances 5 Guidelines for administration. All rules are oriented on the sources of the immissions. Areas of origin (cause) Like: • The ordinance for large boilers • • 11 The Technical Ordinance Air (TA Luft) The ordinance for small boilers

Regulations for Hazardous Substances Laws / Acts + Hazardous Chemicals + Law on Plant protection + Law on Genetic Techniques + Private Liability Law + Criminal Law Environment + …. . Ordenances: : Disasters (Störfallverordnung) : Prüfnachweisverordnung : Chemikalienverbotsverordnung : Gefahrstoffverordnung : Giftinformationsverordnung : Verordnungen des Abfallgesetzes 12 Technical Standards and Guidelines ; TA Air, TA Noise, TA Waste, TA

Regulations for Hazardous Substances Ordinances + Chemikaliengesetz zum Schutz vor gefährlichen Stoffen (Chem. G) + Gefahrstoffverordnung (Gef. Stoff. V) + Verordnung über brennbare Flüssigkeiten (Vb. F) + Verordnung über Anlagen zum Umgang mit wassergefährdenden Stoffen (VAw. S) + Gefahrgutbeauftragtenverordnung (Gb. V) + Technische Regeln brennbare Flüssigkeiten (TRb. F) + Gefahrgutverordnung Straße (GGVS) + Arbeitsstättenverordnung (Arb. Stätt. V) 13 + Störfallverordnung etc…. .

Regulations for Hazardous Substances Ordinances Beispiele: Symbols for Storage and Transport of haz. Substances (nach Gefahrstoffverordnung) Explosionsgefährlich Brennbarkeit Giftigkeit Reizend 14

The drivers for Process Safety and industrial Disaster Risk Management (i. DRM) in Europe are • Lessons learnt (Bhopal, Seveso, Toulouse, Texas City, Buncefield, . . . ) • Ethical dimension (Responsible Care ) • Seveso 2 • National Standards • Industry benchmarking (Major Hazard record of industry) • Economics (Business Continuity) 15

i. DRM basic principle Crisis management assessment should cover all parts of emergency- and crisis- management. . . • identify hazards comprehensively • avoid or control risks • communicate remaining risks • mitigate consequences • remediate damages • restore trust . . . pursuing the goal to define and train as much as possible in advance 16

Commission on Process Safety (Kommission fuer Anlagensicherheit [KAS]) • Mandated by the Federal Emission Control Act – Advises government as well as plant operators and state and local authorities on process safety – 32 members with different professional and educational background representing different stakeholders (“Round Table”) – Any group needs “allies” to win votes – Consensus intended, but majority decisions possible • About 55 guidelines issued on different topics, e. g. – Land Use Planning (Safety distances) – Risk evaluation and perception – Emergency Planning – Industrial parks – Provisions against terrorist attacks on chemical plants • All publications of the Commission are available (partly in English) at www. kas-bmu. de 17

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Outline 1 i. DRM Approach in Europe 2 Risk Management Principles 3 Best Practice of Emergency Management 4 Conclusions 20

“Farbwerke Hoechst” outside Frankfurt/Germany at about 1870

Hoechst Industrial Park (Frankfurt/M, Germany) today 22

Zoning around Industrial Sites (Off-site Emergency Plan)

Recommended separation distances for “greenfield” planning

This map is common, you will see it again Prevention Risk is a combination of HAZARD Severity and FREQUENCY or LIKELIHOOD Mitigation 25

Risk Review Requirements The risk review process has to be determined • by all relevant stakeholders/departments of the organisation • in writing (company guideline) • shared with authorities etc. • defining the risk review team (multi-disciplinary including operator level) • defining milestones for and different levels of risk review (e. g. Design phase, pre-commissioning, prestart up, changes, etc) 26

Hazard Identification All hazards have to be identified comprehensively and systematically. . . Operation hazards • eg. „classical“ EHS (Environment, Health, and Safety)-hazards, loss of production, . . . Network hazards • eg. failure of utilities, supplies, transportation. . . Environmental hazards • eg. natural hazards, adjacent plants and traffic ways, . . . Environmental vulnerability • eg. densely populated areas/buildings, natural reserves, . . . Terrorist threats • eg. plant vulnerability, neighbourhood/environment sensitivity, company image, . . . by e. g. “What if”, checklists, HAZOP, FMEA etc. 27

FMEA Failure Mode and Effects Analysis • is a procedure in product development and operations management • potential failure modes within a system for classification by the severity and likelihood of the failures 28

HAZOP Hazard and operability study • A systematic examination of a planned or existing process or operation in order to identify and evaluate problems that may represent risks to personnel or equipment, or prevent efficient operation. • developed to analyze chemical process systems • A HAZOP is a qualitative technique based on guidewords and is carried out by a multi-disciplinary team (HAZOP team) during a set of meetings. The HAZOP team determines what are the possible significant Deviations from each intention, feasible Causes and likely Consequences. It can then be decided whether existing, designed safeguards are sufficient, or whether additional actions are necessary to reduce risk to an acceptable level 29

Risk Assessment Risk is a combination of hazard Severity and Likelihood or frequency, often expressed as R=f(S, L) • Severity may be determined by • • Gas dispersion in combination with criteria for human effects such as: • ERPGs (Emergency Response Planning Guidelines) • AEGLs (Acute Exposure Guideline Levels) Explosion Overpressure & Fire radiation effects using tools such as: • estimating local overpressure as a function of explosion source strength and distance TNO- methodology • FLACS - explosion simulator • Likelihood may be estimated by • • expert opinion/experience databases for failure frequencies (semi-) quantitative assessments (risk graph, fault or event trees etc. ) Assessment of safety barriers and mitigation (e. g. “bow tie” diagram, Layer of Protection Analysis = LOPA, “Swiss cheese model”) 30

The “Swiss Cheese Model” 31

The LOPA “Onion” Community Emergency Response Plant Emergency Response Physical Protection e. g. Relief Devices Safety Instrumented System preventative action Critical Alarms and Operator intervention Basic Process Control System, Operating Discipline / Supervision Plant Design integrity Layer of Protection Analysis 32

Protection Layer Concept 33

LOPA criteria -1 Initiating events • • Control system failures Human error Piping and equipment failures Interruption of utilities (e. g. Cooling) Independent layers of protection • • • Basic Process Control System (possibly) Alarm and operator response Relief systems Safety Instrumented Systems Other qualifying Safety Related Protection Systems Need to be independent, effective, tested, audited

LOPA criteria -2 - Conditional Modifiers • • • Weather conditions Probability of ignition leading to explosion Probability that person(s) will be exposed Probability that an exposed person will suffer a particular harm May be difficult to justify and evaluate Mitigation (right hand side of bow tie) • • • Fire protection Emergency Response Water curtains Secondary and tertiary containment etc

‘Tolerable’ frequencies for events • What risk can we tolerate? – Frequency for an event of a given severity (injury, environmental insult etc. ) • Users need to specify but aim to meet or exceed (do better than) regulator requirements • The chosen tolerability becomes the target for risk management sometimes called ‘Risk Governance’ for the company (usually Individual or Societal Risk) • Data and guidance available for injury/fatality and environmental effects 36

Tolerability Data (Fatalities) (Buncefield LOPA Guidance Dec 2009, final report from U. K. HSE) Likelihood of ‘n’ fatalities from a tank explosion per tank per year Risk Tolerability 10 -4/yr - 10 -5/yr Tolerable if ALARP 10 -5/yr - 10 -6/yr Broadly acceptable Tolerable if ALARP 10 -6/yr - 10 -7/yr Broadly acceptable Tolerable if ALARP 10 -7/yr - 10 -8/yr Broadly acceptable Fatalities (n) 1 2 -10 11 -50 ALARP = As Low as Reasonably Practicable 37

Categories for Environmental Risk (U. K. Environment Agency) Catastrophic • Major airborne release with serious offsite effects • Site shutdown • Serious contamination of groundwater or watercourse with extensive loss of aquatic life Major • Evacuation of local populace • Temporary disabling and hospitalisation • Serious toxic effect on beneficial or protected species • Widespread but not persistent damage to land • Significant fish kill over 5 mile range Severe • Hospital treatment required • Public warning and off-site emergency plan invoked • Hazardous substance releases into water course with ½ mile effect Significant • Severe and sustained nuisance, e. g. strong offensive odours / noise disturbance • Major breach of Permitted emissions limits with possibility of prosecution • Numerous public complaints Noticeable • Noticeable nuisance off-site e. g. discernible odours • Minor breach of Permitted emission limits, but no environmental harm • One or two complaints from the public Minor • Nuisance on site only (no off-site effects) • No outside complaint 38 Heading and introduction from Section 3. 7 in “IPPC H 1: Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control (IPPC) and Environmental Assessment and Appraisal of BAT”, Version 6 July 20

Typical Environmental Tolerability Criteria Acceptable if frequency less than Acceptable if Reduced as Reasonably Practical and frequency between Unacceptable if frequency above 10 -6 per year 10 -4 to 10 -6 per year 10 -4 per year 5 Major 10 -6 per year 10 -4 to 10 -6 per year 10 -4 per year 4 Severe 10 -6 per year 10 -2 to 10 -6 per year 10 -2 per year 3 Significant 10 -4 per year 10 -1 to 10 -4 per year 10 -1 per year 2 Noticeable 10 -2 per year ~ 10+1 to 10 -2 per year ~10+1 per year 1 All shown as acceptable - - Category 6 Catastroph ic Minor 39

Example for Risk Calculation TOLERATED EVENT PER YEAR FREQUENCY (Target) SINGLE FATALITY (e. g. ) 10 -5 INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY PER YEAR CONTROL SYSTEM 10 -1 LOOP FAILS PROBABILITY OF IGNITION (e. g. ) PROBABILITY Quantity, M. I. E. , site factors 10 -1 PROBABILITY OF EXPOSURE PROBABILITY 100% 10 -0 INDEPENDENT LAYER OF PROTECTION 1 PROBABILITY OF FAILURE ON DEMAND Basic Process Control System 10 -1 INDEPENDENT LAYER OF PROTECTION 2 PROBABILITY OF FAILURE ON DEMAND Safety Instrumented System <10 -2 (per year) 40

Risk Assessment has to be adopted to the needs LEVEL 1: PROCESS HAZARDS ANALYSIS Should be done by plant based people They then have a better understanding of the risks and possibly how they may be reduced Level 1: LEVEL 2: RISK REVIEW Specialist help from e. g. Process Engineering or Process safety function at site – should include Plant based people in the team LEVEL 3: ENHANCED RISK REVIEW PROCESS HAZARD ANALYSIS Specialist help from e. g. Process Engineering or Process Safety function within Corporate – should include Site and Plant 4: QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT LEVEL based people in the team Specialist help from external expertise. Owner needs to define scope and data and critique the outcome. Level 2: RISK REVIEW Level 3 ENHANCED RISK REVIEW L 4: QRA 41

Outline 1 i. DRM Approach in Europe 2 Risk Management Principles 3 Best Practice of Emergency Management 4 Conclusions 42

Crisis Management Systems: can the unpredictable be planned? Define as much as possible in advance, because. . . • . . . crisis always happen at the wrong time and place • . . . your regular organisation is not sufficient to handle crisis • . . . all resources of the whole company have to be available in due time • . . . public, media and authorities expect professional handling of crisis, too 43

Management of Remaining Risks Communicate remaining risks • to staff (operating procedures, training, drills, …) • to external stakeholders (customers, neighbours, authorities – but careful regarding security risks!) Mitigate consequences • Internal emergency planning (above all organisation, equipment, drills) • Cooperation with external services (neighbouring plants, public services) Important: ability to react fast! The bigger a corporation, the higher the expectations even for small sites 44

Safety Operating Procedures • Examples for visualization of safety information • Acetone Ladders

Emergency Response The basic principle: the faster and more effective the initial response, the smaller the consequences for men, environment and economy. • Provide the infrastructure for fast response (fire brigade, emergency control room, availability of key personnel, etc. ) • Encourage immediate reporting of incidents (not to wait until own efforts failed. . . ), do not blame for false alarms • If the fire brigade is (partly) staffed by operators be aware of the risks of understaffed production • Better start with a higher level of alarm (worst case assumption) and grade it down later than vice versa • Notify and involve public fire brigades and authorities as soon as possible • Analyse every incident and the response to improve the emergency organisation without blaming anyone 46

Emergency Response Workflow: Example Industrial Park Frankfurt-Hoechst (this and following slides: courtesy of Infraserv Höchst and Sanofi-Aventis) Categorisation of the incident Emergency Manager warning procedures Notification to local and state authorities safety regulations radio announcements by police dep. Emergency response management group sirens dark page automated telephone messages

Emergency Response Workflow: Example Industrial Park Frankfurt-Hoechst (Sanofi-Aventis/Infraserv Höchst) emergency call fire alarm system incident dispatch of task forces

Integrated Command Centre Hoechst Industrial park (Frankfurt/Germany) 24 hours crewed by 5 Dispatchers 49

Mock Drills Major incidents hopefully become less frequent. This makes drills even more important. . . • . . . to train seldom used procedures • . . . to reduce mental stress during incidents • . . . to optimise emergency- and crisismanagement • . . . to make sure that necessary resources are available 50

Site Fire Brigade with 2 Fire Stations within the Industrial Park

Crisis management group Operational Structure Scene of Incident Emergency Manager Fire Brigade (site) Emergency Response Committee Site Incident Manager Emergency Manager 3 -5 Documentation Secretary Environmental control Emergency Manager 2 Company Representative (company affected by incident) Site Security Fire Brigade (site) Plant Manager Occupational Physician Environmental Protection Additional Experts Public Fire Brigade Site Security Public Fire Brigade Police Plant Safety Police Communications Toxicology

Crisis Management regulations / operating procedure 53

EHS Management System BI Germany „Integrated Handbook System“, Environmental Protection Occupational Health & Safety Emergency Management Organising Safety taking into account: • internal requirements (Corporate Centre) • external requirements (Safety Management Systems, statutory order on hazardous incidents - Störfall. V) 54

Objectives & Targets Safe management of the company`s technical risks Technical risks (examples) Business risks (examples) • Product quality • Production failure • Environmental protection • Occupational Health & Safety • Fires & Explosions • Site Protection • Market risks • Product risks • Portfolio risks • Investment risks, • Financing and taxation risks • Risks with large-scale projects 55

Management review process Customer feedback Findings of inspections and audits Annual reports by specialist officers „Betriebsbeauftragte“ Evaluation of suitability of management system Change in legislation, market, technology Annual Management review Updating of New and/or Responsible amended Care objectives/ Programme targets Status in achievement of objectives/targets and actions Events Actions to improve management system 56

Warning Procedures – Warning of Neighborhood Warning of affected areas by 17 external sirens in 4 groups Radio announcements Automated telephone messages to hospitals, day care centers or schools 57

Transport- ccident. A Information- and Emergency. Response-System Managing Transportation Emergency in Germany VCI

The TUIS-System Foundation in 1982 in Germany Voluntary Assistance Program of the Chemical Industry Association (VCI) in Germany Agreements between VCI and Minister of Interior in 11 German Countries to ensure assistance during transportation emergency TUIS Transport-Accident-Information and Technical-Support-System Part of the global Responsible Care® Initiative „The Responsibility of the Chemical Industry doesn't stop at the gateway of the plant“

TUIS Emergency Call System Scene of accident Authorized public authority (e. g. police, public fire brigade) TUIS member company as included in the list of companies, e. g. Ø a company near the site of accident Ø a manufacturer Emergency call centers Telephone exchange within Ø the Federal Republic of Germany Ø Europe Level 1 Advice given by phone Level 2 Expert Advice on the scene Level 3 Technical Assistance on the scene

Sites of TUIS member companies (130) TUIS- Emergency Centers (12) BASF SE, Ludwigshafen (NRC) BASF Schwarzheide Gmb. H Bayer Industry Services, Leverkusen Dow Deutschland, Stade Henkel KGa. A, Düsseldorf Infracor, Marl Infra. Leuna Gmb. H, Leuna Infra. Serv, Gendorf Infraserv, Frankfurt Merck KGa. A, Darmstadt Schering AG, Berlin Wacker Chemie AG, Burghausen

Level 1 - Advice given by phone Consultation in local language given by the Technical Officer of the companies fire department in case of incidents and accidents involving hazardous materials during transportation (rail, road, waterway), in production facilities or warehouses, depending on Ø Special Situation on the scene Ø Weather conditions on the scene Ø Location, Neighborhood Form of Information Ø Characteristics / Hazard / Impact Ø Address of the producer Ø Tactical advices to the Incident Commander on the scene Ø Waste disposal treatment Ø Recommended technical equipment and personal protection

Level 2 - Advice given on the scene in difficult situations e. g. Ø Unknown product or not enough information about the product Ø Unknown producer Ø Persons with less experience in managing incidents with hazardous materials Possible supporting experts: Ø Technical Officer of the companies fire department Ø Chemist Ø Master craftsman of the production plant Ø Specialists (Environment, Engineering, …)

Level 3 - Technical assistance given on the scene Situation on the scene: Ø Large accident / incident Ø No suitable technical equipment Ø Special operations necessary Form of Support: Ø Special technical equipment Ø Salvage tanks Ø Special knowledge in handling hazardous materials / managing thr incident Ø Technical Officer of the companies fire department Ø Operational Units of the company Ø Chemist / Specialist (Environment, …) Ø Master craftsman of the production plant

Costs Level 1 Free of charge Level 2 Reimburse insurance company of the party who was responsible for the incident / accident Experts Level 3 Reimburse insurance company of the party who was responsible for the incident / accident Emergency Services of the company on the scene Experts Equipment Clean-Up (Technical Equipment, Protective Equipment, etc. )

TUIS - 1990 to 2007 TUIS member companies have helped 1310 times in 2007. The advice given by phone is like the past years the most used level by authorized public authority. In 220 cases Technical Assistance given on the scene was necessary. VCI

Technical Equipment - Level 3 BASF-HAZMAT-TRUCK Extensive Special Technical Equipment 75 k. VA integrated Power Generator 360° Flood Lighting System 6 m / 9000 W 80 k. N / 60 m Winch System (Treibmatic)

Technical Equipment - Level 3 Mobile flare Capacity: ca. 250 kg/h Propane ca. 350 kg/h Ethylene Intended for use in emergency cases e. g. Pumping propylene from a derailed pressurized tank car to an empty one.

Technical Equipment - Level 3 Remote Controlled Robotic Vehicle (ROBI) – The Manipulator Step-climbing ability: Gripper closing force: Max. carrier load: 35° (70%) max. 600 N 500 kg

Technical Equipment - Level 3 ROBI in action

Technical Equipment - Level 3 Mobile Chlorine Absorption Unit Chlorine absorption: 150 kg/h Absorbency: 300 kg Cleaning it to an extent that the exhaust gas chlorine concentration is less than 10 mg/m 3 (ppm)

Technical Equipment - Level 3 Turbo-Extinguisher Chassis: MAN LX 90 Power: 198 k. W Equipment: 2 x Turbines Larzac 04 C 6 (Alphajet) each with 13. 1 k. N thrust

ICE - International Chemical Environment Ø Founded by the European Chemical Industry Council (CEFIC) in 1991 Ø Cross-border Transportation Emergency Assistance in Europe Ø Objectives: Ø To train chemical companies (Company Scheme) Ø To set up in each country a system like „TUIS“ (Country Scheme) Ø To set up in each country a National Response Center (NRC) Ø To establish Emergency Response Intervention Cards (ERICs)

ICE - Country Scheme (17) = ICE-System ready for action = ICE-System in preparation Germany Austria Italy Sweden Netherlands Norway Great Britain Finland France Spain Czech Republic Hungary Belgium Denmark Switzerland Poland Slovakia

ICE - Cross boarder Communication an m er Producer G h is gl En h s ni a Sp NRC Spain Madrid Accident NRC Germany Ludwigshafen / Rhein

BAB 478 Neunkirchen 12. August 2004

Battery factory Trepcka/Mitrovica, Kosovo 13. September 2000

The Role of Authorities The cooperation between authorities and companies at an incident depends on their cooperation before the incident. • Open communication about risks and safety measures on a regular basis (e. g. in a local or regional committee) builds up trust which is urgently needed during emergency response • Authorities need to know about the possible scenarios for major accidents to do their own preparations • Authorities should have clear rules about their responsibilities in handling major incidents to avoid conflicts between the different agencies (e. g. labour safety, environment, civil protection, police etc. ) • Mitigation of consequences should come first, legal prosecution of individuals responsible for the incident later 82

Neighbours, Journalists and Environmentalists The basic issue: Neighbours and the general public share the risks of industrial sites, but not necessarily the benefits. • Communication of relevant risks has to be done openly and in an adequate form (“not scientific”) prior to incidents (e. g. “neighbourhood councils”, brochures, . . . ) – to build up trust in the competence of the company to handle risks – to enable the neighbours to react adequately during an incident • The response of neighbours etc. to incidents is strongly influenced by the company´s response to requests and complaints prior to the incident • Fast and open information after an incident is crucial • Fears and worries of neighbours etc. have to be taken seriously even if they are based on emotions rather than science • On the long term, conflicts with neighbours etc. endangers the “licence to operate” 83

Crisis Communication Sometimes crisis communication becomes a crisis of communication! 84

Outline 1 i. DRM Approach in Europe 2 Risk Management Principles 3 Best Practice of Emergency Management 4 Conclusions 85

Conclusions 1 – Investing in safe and eco-efficient plants pays off at least on the long term – The (remaining) risks of industrial plants can be assessed and are the basis for scenarios for emergency planning – The knowledge and experience of the operators should be used by all means – Risks should be communicated as well as benefits to all stakeholders, esp. the neighbours 86

Conclusions 2 – The resources for emergency response (manpower, equipment, communications, organisation etc) have to be planned in advance and readily available in case of an incident. People usually accept the risk of a chemical/pharmaceutical plant, but not incompetence in handling it – Authorities should involve themselves actively in emergency planning, balancing this out with their law enforcement duties – Combined efforts will definitely lead to safer and more accepted plants, as the figures from Germany may show 87

Development of Accidents in Germany since 1950 Per 1000 full time workers „Arbeitsunfälle“ = occupational accidents „Wegeunfälle“ = acc. on the way to work

Benefits of implementing Risk Management § Avoid accidents avoid costs, bad publicity and image § Safe workplace environment for employees and improved social responsibility for industrial estates § Less criticism from local communities and authorities due to a safer environment § Only industrial estates complying with international safety standards are interesting foreign investors § Increased competitiveness of the industrial estate

Design, Build and Operate What the client ordered How the project mgr. understood it How it was documented How it was eventually built How it was planned by the engineer What was charged To the client How it was implemented by the technicians How the consultant interpreted it What was subject of the service agreement What the client really wanted 90

i. DRM Training Modules http: //www. hrdp-idrm. in/e 5783/e 17327/ 91

http: //www. hrdp-idrm. in/ 92

i. DRM Training Modules • • • • Confined Space Safety in Transportation of Hazardous Chemicals Hazards Identification and Control Measures in Chemical (Industrial) Workplaces First Aid in i. DRM Personal Protective Equipment Accident Causation: Models and Theories Human Factors in Accidents and prevention Organisational Commitments in Reducing Accidents Job safety analysis What should I Know as District Collector and Why? Risk Assessment and Management Consequence analysis: application in emergency planning On-site emergency plan Off-site emergency management plan Industrial Disaster Response Guide 93

Thank you for your attention!. . . and special thanks to Richard Gowland, EPSC Technical Director, who contributed a number of slides http: //www. hrdp-idrm. in/e 5783/e 17327/

PLANNING OF AN INDUSTRIAL ESTATE State level Development Programme Federal Building Code Nature Regional Conservation Planning Act Law Planning Laws Regional level Existing Planning Objectives Regional Plan ide Water Supply Act Private or Public Building Project „HARBOUR“ lin es es Gu . . . G ui de lin Local level. Master Plan Legally Binding Land-Use Plan t en Affected Public a M nt e s on C Interests Sectoral Planning Authorities em ag n Nature Conservation Organizations Training-cum-Visit Environmental Legally Binding Plan Approval De cis io n Su pp or t Regional Policy Harmonization Procedure Supplementary Environmental Planning Impact Study