Скачать презентацию DNSSec TLD is signed What next V Dolmatov Скачать презентацию DNSSec TLD is signed What next V Dolmatov

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DNSSec. TLD is signed! What next? V. Dolmatov November 2011 DNSSec. TLD is signed! What next? V. Dolmatov November 2011

Topics • DNSSec now (Nov. 2011) • Cryptography in DNSSec • DNSSec caveats and Topics • DNSSec now (Nov. 2011) • Cryptography in DNSSec • DNSSec caveats and pitfalls

DNSSec at glance (managerial view) • • 15 years of development (!) Finally, root DNSSec at glance (managerial view) • • 15 years of development (!) Finally, root zone is signed and deployed Some (84 of 310 ) TLDs are signed Some (78 of 84) of signed TLDs are linked with the root by DS-records • Some (few!) registrars are DNSSECaware, more to come

DNS at glance (Technical view) Root -. . tld • NS . domain. tld DNS at glance (Technical view) Root -. . tld • NS . domain. tld • A, MX, etc. named. r oot Root operator. TLD Registry DNS administrator . TLD Registrar Domain administrator DNS caching resolver User

DNSSec at glance (Technical view) Trust anchor Root -. • DNSKEY • RRSIG • DNSSec at glance (Technical view) Trust anchor Root -. • DNSKEY • RRSIG • DS Root operator . tld • DNSKEY • RRSIG • DS . TLD Registry . TLD Registrar . domain. tld • DNSKEY • RRSIG DNS administrator Domain administrator DNS caching resolver User

Cryptic cryptos • Cryptography is a sensitive field • Cryptography has a lot of Cryptic cryptos • Cryptography is a sensitive field • Cryptography has a lot of specifics • Cryptography is monitored and controlled by governments • There are different specific laws and rules in different countries which should be followed simultaneously

GOST cryptography • ГОСТ 28147 -89, ГОСТ Р 34. 10 -2001, ГОСТ Р 34. GOST cryptography • ГОСТ 28147 -89, ГОСТ Р 34. 10 -2001, ГОСТ Р 34. 11 -94 (open and proved to be reliable and stable) • RFCs 5830, 5831, 5832 • Open and not limited usage in the world • Certified implementations should be used for public services and/or personal data handling in Russia

GOST in DNSSEC • • RFC 5933 – Standard Track RRSIG algorithm code – GOST in DNSSEC • • RFC 5933 – Standard Track RRSIG algorithm code – 12 DS algorithm code – 3 Fully featured DNSSEC set of GOST algorithms

GOST implementation • Open. SSL 1. 0. 0 a and later (implemented by Cryptocom) GOST implementation • Open. SSL 1. 0. 0 a and later (implemented by Cryptocom) • Unbound 1. 4. 6 – included by default • Bind 9. 8. 0 – included by default

DNSSEC with GOST in the wild • . (root is RSA signed) • TLD. DNSSEC with GOST in the wild • . (root is RSA signed) • TLD. org (is RSA signed) • dnssec-with-gost. org (is GOST signed) • gost. dnssec-with-gost. org (is GOST signed) • rsa. dnssec-with-gost. org (is RSA signed)

RSA-GOST chain – OK! RSA-GOST chain – OK!

RSA-GOST-RSA chain – OK! RSA-GOST-RSA chain – OK!

How to switch it on? • Unbound 1. 4. 6 + ldns – ready How to switch it on? • Unbound 1. 4. 6 + ldns – ready now! • bind 9. 8. 0 - ready now! • Cryptography • Open version – Open. SSL 1. 0. 0 a • Certified version – “Mag. Pro DNS” by Cryptocom • Open. DNSSEC (support moved to 2. x version)

DNSSEC in Russia • All main DNSSEC services are GOSTcapable • Certified GOST DNSSEC DNSSEC in Russia • All main DNSSEC services are GOSTcapable • Certified GOST DNSSEC is also available • Waiting for DNSSEC GOST-capable support in. RU, . SU and. РФ TLDs • Usage in other TLDs is not restricted

DNSSec Caveats and pitfalls • Wrong feeling of «security» ( «using cryptography makes everything DNSSec Caveats and pitfalls • Wrong feeling of «security» ( «using cryptography makes everything secure» ) • Generating keys and switching DNSSec «on» in given zone does NOT mean automatic increase in the security of this zone • Signing TLD zone and linking it to the root does NOT mean «DNSSec implementation» in this zone • DNSSec demands a LOT of changes in DNS operations and procedures in TLD

DNSSec at glance (Operational view) Trust anchor Root -. • DNSKEY • RRSIG • DNSSec at glance (Operational view) Trust anchor Root -. • DNSKEY • RRSIG • DS Root operator . tld • DNSKEY • RRSIG • DS . TLD Registry . TLD Registrar . domain. tld • DNSKEY • RRSIG DNS administrator Domain administrator DNS caching resolver User

DNSSec Caveats and pitfalls (Cont. ) • Wrong feeling of «authenticity» ( «using DNSSec DNSSec Caveats and pitfalls (Cont. ) • Wrong feeling of «authenticity» ( «using DNSSec makes everything authentic» ) • DNSSec was designed to solve particular DNS operation problems • Signed DNS-record does NOT add any trust to the resource it points to (Hello, JANE, EFF and other «initiatives» ) • Huge problems with random data sources

Questions? v. dolmatov@hostcomm. ru Questions? v. [email protected] ru