Disclaimer The views expressed herein are solely the

Disclaimer: The views expressed herein are solely the views of the author and not of her employer, the Northrop Grumman Corporation, the RAND Corporation, or of the U. S. Government. Weaponizing Space: Technologies and Policy Choices Dana J. Johnson, Ph. D. Adjunct Professor, Georgetown University 20 April 2005

Agenda l Characterizing the “space weaponization” debate l National space policy and the importance of space to the U. S. l Space Control and Force Application missions l Decision-making rationale and factors for space weapons acquisition by U. S. and/or others l Policy choices and conclusions 2 04 -20 -05

Characterizing the “Space Weaponization Debate” Pro Arguments l l Just as other environments are used for offensive military purposes, so will the environment of space be used Emerging threats to our national interests and assured access to space require we develop and maintain capabilities to protect our space assets The U. S. economy and way of life depend on space systems The space weaponization debate is a red-herring. Space was weaponized long ago by the transit of ballistic missiles Con Arguments l Space should remain a sanctuary for peaceful scientific uses l Space weaponization is: Not inevitable and international agreements barring weaponization are possible and desirable l Pre-mature and the sanctuary status of space is in the interests of the United States Use of space weapons would create harmful orbital debris There is no conceivable scenario in which space weapons provide a benefit greater than their harm 3 l l l 04 -20 -05

Agenda l Characterizing the “space weaponization” debate l National space policy and the importance of space to the U. S. l Space Control and Force Application missions l Decision-making rationale and factors for space weapons acquisition by U. S. and/or others l Policy choices and conclusions 4 04 -20 -05

National Space Policy (1996) The United States is committed to the exploration and use of outer space by all nations for peaceful purposes and for the benefit of all humanity. "Peaceful purposes" allow defense and intelligencerelated activities in pursuit of national security and other goals. The United States rejects any claims to sovereignty by any nation over outer space or celestial bodies, or any portion thereof, and rejects any limitations on the fundamental right of sovereign nations to acquire data from space. The United States considers the space systems of any nation to be national property with the right of passage through and operations in space without interference. Purposeful interference with space systems shall be viewed as an infringement on sovereign rights. 5 04 -20 -05

National Space Policy (1996) (Cont. ) National security space activities shall contribute to U. S. national security by: (a) providing support for the United States' inherent right of self-defense and our defense commitments to allies and friends; (b) deterring, warning, and if necessary, defending against enemy attack; (c) assuring that hostile forces cannot prevent our own use of space; (d) countering, if necessary, space systems and services used for hostile purposes; (e) enhancing operations of U. S. and allied forces; (f) ensuring our ability to conduct military and intelligence space-related activities; (g) satisfying military and intelligence requirements during peace and crisis as well as through all levels of conflict; (h) supporting the activities of national policy makers, the intelligence community, the National Command Authorities, combatant commanders and the military services, other federal officials, and continuity of government operations. 6 04 -20 -05

Importance of Space to the U. S. l Contributed $100 billion to US economy in 2000 l Weather satellites – improved severe weather predictions l Communications – point to point and broadcast l GPS – – l Navigation—commercial and civil exceed military applications Ubiquitous timing signal—enables global Internet Environmental monitoring – – – Geodesy Mapping Terrain Characterization 7 04 -20 -05

Space: An Economic Center of Gravity and Thus, a Vital National Interest Today: l. Over 600 Active Satellites (200+ US Satellites) l. Over $100 Billion US Dollars Invested Future: Forecast 20% annual growth in space investments l. GPS-related products: $8 Billion (2001) projected to grow to $50 Billion by 2010 Precision Farming Weather Prediction Resource Management Communications 8 Surveying 04 -20 -05

Agenda l Characterizing the “space weaponization” debate l National space policy and the importance of space to the U. S. l Space Control and Force Application missions l Decision-making rationale and factors for space weapons acquisition by U. S. and/or others l Policy choices and conclusions 9 04 -20 -05

Space Missions* l l Space Force Support: launching satellites and dayto-day management of on-orbit assets Space Force Enhancement: includes all space operations aimed at increasing effectiveness of terrestrial military operations Space Control: ensuring our use of space while denying the use to our adversaries Space Force Application: combat operations in, through, and from space to influence the course and outcome of conflict *United States Strategic Command Fact File, http: //www. stratcom. mil/factsheetshtml/spacemissions. htm 10 04 -20 -05

Space Control Protect Surveil • Ensure Use of Space Assets • Enhance Survivability • Maneuver • Harden • Redundancy Prevent • Encryption • Shutter Control Disrupt, deny, degrate, deceive or destroy adversary space capabilities GROUND SEGMENT nk Prevent Adversaries From Exploiting US or Allies Space Services Negate Li • Detect, Identify and Track Man-made Space Objects • Worldwide Network • Radar • Optical Trackers • Infrared SPACE SEGMENT Assure Freedom of Action in Space and Deny Same 11 04 -20 -05

Space Control: ASAT Concepts ASAT Systems Direct Ascent (Ballistic Trajectory) l Ground-launched l Air-launched Co-orbital l Interceptor l Space mine Directed Energy Weapons l Ground-based l Air-based l Space-based Electronic Warfare l Ground-based l Space-based Types of Negation l l l Conventional explosive Nuclear warhead Pellet cloud Aerosols Hit-to-kill Induced fragmentation Component burnout Power disruption Jamming Takeover Physical tampering 12 Source: Nicholas L. Johnson, Soviet Military Strategy in Space, Jane’s, 1987, p. 138. 04 -20 -05

Legacy ASAT Development Project SAINT (SAtellite INTerceptor) (1950 s-1962) l Early Spring: conventional ASAT, Polaris launch (1960 s) l Program 505: prototype Nike Zeus DM-15 S ABM (1962 -1966) l Program 437: Thor launch, Mk 49 nuclear warhead (1964) l Program 922: Thor IRBM launch, non-nuclear suborbital ASAT in development (late 1960 s) May 1972 signing of SALT I Treaty prohibited interference with NTM l SPIKE: suborbital conventional ASAT air-launched from F-106; MHV with nonnuclear kill capability (1970 s) l Conventional ASAT: low-risk, off-the-shelf technology alternative using pellets (1970 s) l USB: platform for space-borne weapons, crewed, Proton launch (late 1970 s/early 1980 s) l Air-Launched Anti-Satellite Missile: F-15 launch, 2 -stage + MHV, successful intercept 1985 (1977 -1980 s) l Terra-3: ground-based laser, Sary Shagan (1970 s-1980 s) l RP: space-based rocket interceptor (similar to US Brilliant Pebbles) (1980 s) l US Activity USSR Activity Other Note that dates are approximate 13 04 -20 -05

Legacy ASAT Development (Cont. ) l l l l l Zenith Star: prototype space combat satellite using Alpha laser (1987) KS: space station with military free-flying autonomous modules dispensing nuclear warheads (1980 s) Polyus: combat satellite testbed using Energia launcher; launch failure in 1987 (1985 -1987) KE ASAT: Army direct ascent kinetic energy ASAT, with kinetic kill vehicle launched by rocket booster (1989 -1990 s) Gun-launched ASAT: supergun design by Gerald Bull for Iraq, for blinding Western satellites (1995) Star Lite: space laser concept, to be launched on Titan 4 (1991) HERTF: High Energy Research and Technology Facility, Kirtland AFB, NM, high-powered microwave and advanced technology weapon system development Space-Based Laser: Operational SBL Orbital Vehicle, chemical laser system, part of SDI program (1996) Space Laser Demo: concept (1996) US Activity USSR Activity Other Note that dates are approximate 14 04 -20 -05

Polyus (USSR) 15 04 -20 -05

Space Control: Protecting Space Assets Operational Needs Functional Capabilities l l Detect and report threat/attacks l Developing robust battle management l Improving system maneuverability Identify, locate, and classify l Attaining adequate force protection threats l Hardening/shielding of system components l Developing adequate defensive information operations l Threat warning and assessment reporting l Space weather sensor systems l Mobile mission processors l Diagnostics and repair technology l Quick launch recovery l Modeling and simulation l Withstand defend l Reconstitute and repair l Assess missions impact 16 04 -20 -05

Space Force Application • Currently no weapons in Space • Do. D Space Policy (1999) tasks US military to plan for Force Application from space • International law & treaties prohibit weapons of mass destruction in space • “Conventional” weapons are not prohibited Apply Force From Space 17 04 -20 -05

Space Force Application: Influencing the Terrestrial Battlespace l l Defined as: l “…things intended to cause harm that are based in space or that have an essential element based in space. The degree of harm…may range from temporary disruption to permanent destruction or death. ”* Generic alternatives: l Space-based directed-energy and kinetic-energy weapons against missile targets l Kinetic-energy weapons against ground targets l Conventional weapons against ground targets 18 *Preston, et. al. , Space Weapons Earth Wars, RAND, 2002, p. 23. 04 -20 -05

Comparison of Weapon Types and Their Operational Utility Mass-to-Target Weapons Directed Energy Laser, RF, particle beam, etc. Targets Effects Kinetic energy against surface targets Space-based conventional weapons Soft, located from the surface to space, any speed Hardened targets above 60 km moving at great speed Hardened fixed or slow-moving targets on Earth Hardened targets, either fixed or moving at moderate speeds, surface or air Range from nonlethal jamming to lethal heating; finite, inherently “thin” defense Lethal impact Vertical, limiteddepth penetrator Inherited from conventional munitions A few minutes A few hours About 10 mins plus time it takes weapon to reach target after delivery from space Several dozens for each needed to reach a particular target in desired time About 6 in reserve for each needed to reach a particular target in desired time 19 04 -20 -05 Responsiveness Seconds Number of Weapons in Constellation Kinetic energy against missile targets Several dozens Source: Preston, et. al. , Space Weapons Earth Wars, RAND, 2002.

Agenda l Characterizing the “space weaponization” debate l National space policy and the importance of space to the U. S. l Space Control and Force Application missions l Decision-making rationale and factors for space weapons acquisition by U. S. and/or others l Policy choices and conclusions 20 04 -20 -05

Emergence of Space Competitors? l l Currently, no peer in space to threaten U. S. national interests However, concern for developments in: l China l l l Russia: long-standing interests and capabilities l Nuclear proliferation and weapons delivery programs in North Korea, Iran, Libya, Pakistan l Continued transfer of ballistic missile-related technology by Russia and China Bottom line: l Technically challenging but doable l Legal constraints on WMD do not prohibit space weapons l Countermeasures are possible – asymmetric strategies by competitors, allowing competition without having to become space -faring nations 21 04 -20 -05 l l Human spaceflight Navigation, communications, remote sensing, weather, oceanography, microgravity, science and astronomy, and microsatellites KE ASAT, jammers, “parasite” satellites, ground-based lasers

Concern for Vulnerability of U. S. Space-Based Assets “If U. S. is to avoid a “Space Pearl Harbor” it needs to take seriously the possibility of an attack on U. S. space systems”* l What might be a “Space Pearl Harbor”? l Lethal actions, such as: l l Debilitating/destroying attack on U. S. and allied space assets through electromagnetic pulse (EMP) event staged by hostile forces in orbit Non-lethal actions (i. e. , for a limited period of time, for specific objectives) l Jamming, spoofing, blinding *Report of the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization (January 2001) 22 04 -20 -05

If the U. S. Were to Acquire Space Weapons, How Might It Happen? l l Under what circumstances might the U. S. decide to acquire? l Deliberately l Incidentally Once the decision is made, how might the transition occur? l Possible strategies l Possible consequences 23 04 -20 -05

Possible Circumstances Requiring Purposeful Decision-Making l Responding to threat(s) by undeterred adversaries l Responding to another nation’s decision to acquire, whether adversaries or allies l With another nation(s), to forestall, control, or influence their independent acquisition of space weapons l Unilaterally, in absence of compelling threat, to demonstrate global leadership, protect U. S. and allied economic investments, improve efficiency and effectiveness of military capabilities, etc. 24 04 -20 -05

Possible Circumstances Involving Incidental Decision-Making l Commercial or civil development of technologies with applicability to military purposes l Incremental decision – hedging strategy as way to shape security environment l Monolithic decision and implementation – reactive strategy to deal with emerging threat that may be defensive and stabilizing in nature 25 04 -20 -05

Transition Period (1) l l l Ideally, no consequences for U. S. deployment Worst case: l Adversaries take lethal action to deny U. S. ability to launch and deploy first space weapon Adversary’s options are numerous l Deterrent capability, possibly nuclear, leading to possible launch on warning/launch under attack policy l Physical attack – on launch sites l Burying targets l Developing/deploying “silver bullets, ” such as ASATs l “Seize moral high ground against U. S. hegemony” 26 04 -20 -05

Transition Period (2) l l Responses by allies l Potential political pressure l Potential fallout in other non-space-related areas (e. g. , foreign policy issue of great importance to U. S. interests) l Adversary attempt at coercive behavior to influence ally l Commercial companies’ reaction to possible orbital debris that, depending on orbits, may last forever World may view U. S. acquisition and deployment decision as risky behavior, with long term consequences for U. S. global leadership 27 04 -20 -05

Policy Context for Deciding to Acquire and Deploy Space-Based Weapons • From a narrow, operational viewpoint: – Technical feasibility – Strategic desirability – Cost l l • However, other sensitivities: – Political will – Legal restrictions and ramifications – Reactions of allies, neutrals, and adversaries Some sensitivities have underpinning them the notion of space as a sanctuary: l U. S. has most to lose because of dependence on space assets l Absence of imminent threats to U. S. freedom of space could lead to perceptions of U. S. aggressive behavior l Potentially trigger arms race in space Others argue that U. S. inhibitions against space weapons deployment do not necessarily apply to others 28 04 -20 -05 l U. S. needs to press ahead with development and deployment

What If Others Decide to Acquire Space Weapons? l l Range of “others” l Peer competitors l U. S. friends and allies l Non-peer competitors l Neither friend nor foe l Non-state coalition of entities (possibly state-assisted) Decisions will be driven by national interests l Security, e. g. : l l Regional threats requiring long-range force projection Overcoming competitor’s military strengths Economic and technological Political: l l National prestige, peer recognition Global reach and power projection Enhanced freedom to act regionally/globally Promotion of internal security 29 04 -20 -05

Agenda l Characterizing the “space weaponization” debate l National space policy and the importance of space to the U. S. l Space Control and Force Application missions l Decision-making rationale and factors for space weapons acquisition by U. S. and/or others l Policy choices and conclusions 30 04 -20 -05

Policy Choices Facing the United States l Continue to maintain consistency in long-held spacerelated principles, yet be prepared to acquire and deploy space-based weapons should circumstances change l Move now, through explicit policy, programmatic, and budgetary decisions, to deploy space-based weapons based on national interests and emerging threats l Prepare for the inevitable: pursue a deliberate, long-term hedging strategy 31 04 -20 -05

Impact of Security Challenges Facing U. S. Defense Planning in 2006 QDR Higher VULNERABILITY Irregular Catastrophic q Unconventional methods adopted and employed by non-state and state actors to counter stronger state opponents. (Erode our power) Lower q Acquisition, possession, and possible employment of WMD or methods producing WMD-like effects against vulnerable, highprofile targets by terrorists and rogue states. (Paralyze our power) Traditional Disruptive q States employing legacy and advanced military capabilities and recognizable military forces, in long-established, wellknown forms of military competition and conflict. (Challenge our power) Higher q International competitors developing and possessing breakthrough technological capabilities intended to supplant U. S. advantages in particular operational domains. (Marginalize our power) Lower LIKELIHOOD Do space weapons contribute to “filling the gaps” in capabilities to respond? 32 04 -20 -05

Conclusion l Space will become yet another environment for the full spectrum of human activities, including conflict l Not a matter of should space weapons be deployed, but when l Prudent approach to protect U. S. national interests is a proactive strategy for shaping political, technological, diplomatic, and security environment 33 04 -20 -05