DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Intelligence Security

DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (Intelligence & Security) Do. D Polygraph & Adjudication Process Study Mr. Thomas Ferguson PDUSD(I) December 28, 2011 COUNTERINTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE

DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE HERE ACTIVITY COUNTERINTELLIGENCE FIELD ACTIVITY PUT TEXT FIELD (Intelligence & Security) Study Objectives • Assess Polygraph (PG) Programs’ compliance with policy - Do. DD 5210. 48 & Do. DI 5210. 91 • Review & assess the processes used by the nine PG Programs concerning applicant, periodic, & random screening for security, human resources & adjudication • Ascertain if PG exam results are being used in compliance with Do. D policies • Assess if there is a consistent methodology in the handling of examinees who do not complete screening PG exams • Recommend PG & Security Policy COUNTERINTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE Back to front exit

DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE HERE ACTIVITY COUNTERINTELLIGENCE FIELD ACTIVITY PUT TEXT FIELD (Intelligence & Security) Scope & Methodology • Scope: 01 May 10 to 30 Apr 11 • Study Team composition & backgrounds • Site visits to all nine PG programs • Site visits to all eleven Clearance Adjudication Facilities (CAFs) • Review of Components’ PG & Adjudication files • 64 interviews/24 organizations visited COUNTERINTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE Back to front exit

DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE HERE ACTIVITY COUNTERINTELLIGENCE FIELD ACTIVITY PUT TEXT FIELD (Intelligence & Security) Background • 43, 434 polygraph exams conducted - 40, 872 Personnel Security Screenings (94. 1%) - 1, 537 Criminal Investigative Exams (3. 54%) - 840 CI Investigations/Ops/Assets (1. 93%) - 185 PSI/Adjudication (0. 43%) COUNTERINTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE Back to front exit

DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE HERE ACTIVITY COUNTERINTELLIGENCE FIELD ACTIVITY PUT TEXT FIELD (Intelligence & Security) Macro View • All nine polygraph programs are in policy compliance, with two exceptions: DIA & NRO conducted limited Extended Scope Screening (ESS) without authority • All 11 CAFs are in compliance with policies/restrictions regarding use of polygraph results • Interviews/files reviews at CAFs & Components determined no instances of adverse actions taken against those who either refused to take or failed to successfully complete a polygraph examination • Eight Observations with Eight Recommendations for Security & Four Recommendations for CI COUNTERINTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE Back to front exit

DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE HERE ACTIVITY COUNTERINTELLIGENCE FIELD ACTIVITY PUT TEXT FIELD (Intelligence & Security) Observation 1 Issue: What to do with examinees who do not complete a polygraph with out admissions but have access to classified Observation : • 94% of Counterintelligence Scope Polygraph (CSP) examinees resulted in No Significant Response (NSR) & are returned to access • Remaining small number of examinees with Significant Responses (SR) or No Opinions (NO) with no admissions are in most cases returned to work with access • These are the most difficult cases to resolve without admissions or derogatory information found during investigation Recommendation: (OPR: CI & Security Directorates) • Collaborate to form a course of action to address examinees with access & unresolved polygraphs with no admissions & no other derogatory information COUNTERINTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE Back to front exit

DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE HERE ACTIVITY COUNTERINTELLIGENCE FIELD ACTIVITY PUT TEXT FIELD (Intelligence & Security) Observation 2 Issue: Polygraph Compliance With Policy Observations: • All Do. D polygraph programs were in compliance with Do. D policy with two exceptions - DIA & NRO ran a small number of ESS examinations in support of internal programs & NSA support respectively - Neither DIA nor NRO had USD(I) authority to run ESS examinations Recommendation: (OPR: CI Directorate) • Advise DIA & NRO polygraph programs to stop conducting ESS testing until such authority is approved by their respective Directors & after staffing for USD(I) approval COUNTERINTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE Back to front exit

DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE HERE ACTIVITY COUNTERINTELLIGENCE FIELD ACTIVITY PUT TEXT FIELD (Intelligence & Security) Observation 3 Issue: Fourth Estate identified as without polygraph support Observation: • Department of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) CAF, Washington Headquarters Service (WHS) CAF, Joint Chief of Staff (JCS) CAF, & the Defense Industrial Security Clearance office (DISCO) CAF did not have dedicated polygraph support Recommendation: (OPR: CI Directorate) • Coordinate with appropriate polygraph program to provide polygraph support IAW Do. DI 5240. 10 - DOHA will be supported by AFOSI polygraph office - WHS will be supported by NCIS polygraph office - DISCO will be supported by AFOSI polygraph office - JCS will be supported by NCIS/DIA polygraph offices COUNTERINTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE Back to front exit

DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE HERE ACTIVITY COUNTERINTELLIGENCE FIELD ACTIVITY PUT TEXT FIELD (Intelligence & Security) Observation 4 Issue: Polygraph process & capabilities training for Adjudicators Observation: • Polygraph-related training is not provided in the Do. D Personnel Security Adjudicator Course • NRO & NSA polygraph & adjudicative programs have excellent in-house training programs Recommendations: (OPR: Security Directorate) • Coordinate the development of a polygraph training module for adjudicators • Coordinate the training of polygraphers on how polygraphderived information is best presented to & used by adjudicators COUNTERINTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE Back to front exit

DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE HERE ACTIVITY COUNTERINTELLIGENCE FIELD ACTIVITY PUT TEXT FIELD (Intelligence & Security) Observation 5 Issue: Polygraph & Security policy in the use of polygraph results can be better synchronized Observation: • Polygraph policy provides sufficient authority & guidance to execute the program • Personnel Security policy does not parallel guidance found in polygraph policy concerning the use of unfavorable, unresolved, or refusals to complete polygraph examinations. Recommendation: (OPR: Security Directorate) • Assure parallel guidance is contained in Do. DD 5200. 2 &/or Do. D 5200. 2 M as is in Do. DI 5210. 91 COUNTERINTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE Back to front exit

DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE HERE ACTIVITY COUNTERINTELLIGENCE FIELD ACTIVITY PUT TEXT FIELD (Intelligence & Security) Observation 6 Issue: Effective use of ESS by NSA Observation: • NSA is the only Do. D Component authorized to use ESS questions - Falsification of security questionnaires & forms - Involvement in serious criminal conduct - Illegal drug involvement • NSA acquires a 20. 7% admission rate compared to 12% rate for other polygraph screening programs • NSA attributes this result to the use of ESS • Top reason for access denials has resulted from admissions to undetected crimes • PERSEREC research shows that 38% of examinees omit reportable offenses on their SF-86 s Recommendation: (OPR: CI Directorate) • Consider the augmentation of PSS testing with ESS questions with DIA & NGA polygraph programs for initial access by applicants & contractors COUNTERINTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE Back to front exit

DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE HERE ACTIVITY COUNTERINTELLIGENCE FIELD ACTIVITY PUT TEXT FIELD (Intelligence & Security) Observation 7 Issue: To improve the use of polygraph results as an adjudicative tool Observation: • FY 10, OUSD(I) Security Directorate funded a program administered by PERSEREC that focused on assessing the quality & efficiencies of CAFs • This program is known as the “Review of Adjudication Documentation, Accuracy and Rationale (RADAR)” Recommendations: (OPR: Security Directorate) • Fund the PERSEREC executed program RADAR • Set standards refining the proper use of polygraph results, feedback to the Polygraph Programs from adjudication, & a process providing evaluation & analysis of the use of polygraph results across the adjudication community COUNTERINTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE Back to front exit

DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE HERE ACTIVITY COUNTERINTELLIGENCE FIELD ACTIVITY PUT TEXT FIELD (Intelligence & Security) Observation 8 Issue: Joint Personnel Adjudication System (JPAS) Observation: • JPAS & Scattered Castles are the first entry points for results of PSS polygraph examinations • Unanimous opinion of the 11 CAFs is that the polygraph section of JPAS was lacking data of potential benefit to an adjudicator • Specifically information regarding unresolved polygraphs. Recommendations: (OPR: Security Directorate) • Sponsor a requirements review working group of polygraph & security personnel • Identify polygraph data submission requirements, any JPAS/DISS system changes to meet those requirements, & submit the new requirements for validation COUNTERINTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE Back to front exit

DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE HERE ACTIVITY COUNTERINTELLIGENCE FIELD ACTIVITY PUT TEXT FIELD (Intelligence & Security) Summary • • • Polygraph program is compliant with Do. D policy Adjudication process is compliant with the use of polygraph results No adverse employment actions taken solely based on polygraph results Develop a methodology to consistently handle SR/NO polygraph results with employees with access Integrate polygraph results & adjudicative processes into Insider Threat methodologies Polygraph Programs identified to assist Fourth Estate organizations Improve Polygraph & Security policy synchronization Cross training awareness for both polygraphers & adjudicators. NSA & the effective use of ESS Improve JPAS usefulness for both polygraph & CAFs Develop RADAR for polygraph & adjudication evaluation & fund COUNTERINTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE Back to front exit

DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (Intelligence & Security) Questions? COUNTERINTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE