Current Scottish Police Reform Proposals Professor Jim Gallagher

Current Scottish Police Reform Proposals Professor Jim Gallagher, Nuffield College, University of Oxford

Untidy Institutional Landscape • A dominant Scottish Parliament • 32 Local Authorities • 14 Territorial Health Boards – Plus 7 national ones • 2 Enterprise Agencies • 6 Sheriffdoms • 8 Police Forces and Fire Brigades

Structural Changes ? • Some reluctance from Govt • But since devolution gradual ingathering of power – Fiscal powers effectively removed from councils – Centralisation of Agencies – Detailed involvement with NDPB’s • But wholesale reorganisation for Police and Fire

Why? • Partly a political accident: no party opposed, each bid the other up • Almost last vestige of pre-1995 local government – not obviously well-designed for policing • Resentment of independence of CC’s – Frustration at slow progress on cost reduction

Presented as saving money • Planned annual savings of £ 106 m about 10% [“reducing duplication, waste and inefficiency”] • May facilitate some of that - eg shared services • Governance and accountability an afterthought

The Present Proposals • A single Scottish Force • Run by an NDPB appointed by Ministers • Consultative relationship with individual councils • Operational independence for CC

And not… • Local councils as police authorities • Joint central-local budget control – Though councils may be able to buy more local policing • Any kind of professional consensus – One Chief Constable

Potential Advantages • Economies of scale – Rationalisation of operational capacity – Savings from sharing support services (very ambitious assumptions made) • Simplification of governance – Removal of central/local ambiguity – No need to herd 8 Chiefs

Risks and Concerns • Local responsiveness – In the absence of real accountability • Centralisation of governance – Scope to be uniformly wrong – Risks in direct political control • Questions so far unanswered – Inspection and oversight

Local Responsiveness • Managing the service to respond effectively to differing local – circumstances: geography, crime patterns, other needs – is not the same as responding to different local preferences: style, prioritisation • The latter is much less likely with no real local control

Centralisation of Governance • General post-devolution trend – The eggs are in one basket – Have to rely on effective oversight • UK policing governance was consciously decentralised and power distributed – Peelite, if you wish, but civilian and local – Met Police a partial exception, if not a model • Good reasons to distribute power over policing

Scope to address concerns: local control • Rather then an NDPB Police Authority could be composed of councillor majority • Local (ie divisional) Policing Budgets part-funded by councils so they have a real say Very much doubt Govt will do either of these

Governance: - Autonomy of Board? - Operational independence of CC • Board appointed, funded by Ministers – Must they take a power of direction too ? – Role of Ministers in appointments? • Operational independence (nowhere defined) – Use the Scotland Act definition of independence which is applied to LA – Then broad definition of what it applies to (prevention and detection of crime, maintenance of order…)

Chief Officer Appointments • Historically - local and national agreement • Ministers want the same now • Proposal - make this process statutory : – Board appoints from a short list approved by Minister – Not the other way round

Oversight and Inspection • HMIC historically discharged central function • Something of a mish mash on complaints – Cross force investigations – Fiscal for allegations of criminality – Complaints Commissioner

Oversight • Needs better thought through – What support for Board – If HMIC exist, to whom do they provide assurance? And why? • Complaints must be rigorously investigated – Should it always be by an English Force – Or should it be combined with professional oversight • What is the role for Parliament here – Oversight of a very mighty executive?