CURRENT AMPHIBIOUS FORCE LEVELS
OVERSEAS DEPLOYMENT ► TWO TO THREE ARGS FORWARD DEPLOYED § ONE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN / ARABIAN GULF-INDIAN OCEAN AREA § ONE OR TWO IN THE WESTERN PACIFIC AREA. § ONE ARG/MEU IS FORWARD BASED IN SASEBO AND OKINAWA JAPAN.
Amphibious flexibility is the greatest strategic asset that a sea power possesses. HLiddell Hart
CRITICALITIES ► TRANSITION FROM SEA TO LAND, INVOLVING NAVAL, GROUND AIR FORCES MOST DIFFICULT. ► COMMANDS AND CONTROL OF MULTI- SERVICE, MULTI ENVIRONMENT ACTIVITIES COMPLEX ► CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS IN RESTRICTED WATERS INCREASES VULNERABILITY TO HOSTILE ATTACK, PARTICULARLY DURING EARLY PHASES WHEN SUPPORT OF OWN HEAVY WEAPONS NOT AVAILABLE
RECENT EMPLOYMENT ► FRENCH AND THEN US FORCES FOR OVER 25 YEARS IN INDOCHINA ► ANGLO-FRENCH ASSAULT IN SUEZ, ► FALKLANDS CONFLICT ► US LANDINGS IN GRENADA ► COALITION LANDINGS DURING GULF WAR IN 1992 ► AUSTRALIAN LANDINGS IN EAST TIMOR ► US/ALLIES OPERATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN
EARLY DEVELOPMENTS ► INTRODUCED SINCE EARLY DAYS OF INCEPTION OF INDIAN NAVY ► RECOMMENDATION TO POSSESS A SMALL EXPEDITIONARY FORCE CAPABLE OF PROTECTING INDIA’S REGIONAL INTERESTS SUGGESTED IN 1946 WHEN INDEPEDENCE ON HORIZON. ► CURRENT CAPABILITY BRIGADE MINUS
INDIAN NAVAL HISTORY ► LST INS MAGAR, OF W W II VINTAGE ACQUIRED IN 1949 ► APPROVAL ACCORDED IN 1958 TO ESTABLISH A PRESENCE IN A& N ISLANDS ► POST INDO CHINA WAR DEBACLE RESIDENT NAVAL OFFICER WAS APPOINTED IN PORT BLAIR. ► INCREASED INDONESIAN INTRUSIONS IN NICOBAR ISLANDS IN 1965
EARLY DEVELOPMENTS ► ORDER PLACED FOR TWO LST (M) FROM RUSSIA IN 1965 ► INDONESIAN THREAT AND INDONESIAN – PAK BONDING OF 1965 ► BOTCHED UP AMPHIBIOUS LANDING AT COX’S BAZAAR IN OPERATION BEAVER AS A PART OF 1971 OPERATIONS. ► LESSONS HOISTED IN IMPORTANCE OF AMPHIBIOUS ASSETS ESTABLISHED
AMPHIBIOUS OPS OF INDIAN NAVY ► SRI LANKA IN 1988, SOMALIA IN 1995, ► CYCLONE RELIEF IN SAURASHTRA IN 1998 /ORISSA IN 2000. ► AS A ‘FORCE IN BEING’ ON WEST COAST’ DURING OP PARAKARAM. ► PAKISTAN DIVERTED ONE DIVISION FROM LAND BORDERS TO MAKRAN COAST.
SCOPE ► CURRENT TRENDS IN US NAVY, ROYAL NAVY, PLA NAVY AND AUSTRALIAN NAVY ► FOCUSED ATTENTION ON ‘SHIP TO SHORE MOVEMENT’ ► TASKS OF INDIAN NAVY ► ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT FORCES ► DEFINING CREDIBLE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE FOR INDIAN NAVY
ROLES OF US NAVY ► SEA CONTROL ► MARITIME SUPREMACY ► POWER PROJECTION ► STRATEGIC DETERRENCE ► FORWARD NAVAL PRESENCE ► STRATEGIC SEALIFT
ORGANISATION ► AMPHIBIOUS TASK FORCE (ATF) ► RANGE FROM A SINGLE AMPHIBIOUS READY GROUP/MARINE EXPEDITIONARY UNIT (SPECIAL OPERATIONS CAPABLE) [ARG/MEU (SOC)], TO A LARGER ORGANIZATION CAPABLE OF EMPLOYING A MARINE EXPEDITIONARY BRIGADE (MEB) OR EVEN A MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
ROLES/ TASKS ► MAINLAND OPERATIONS § MAKRAN COAST § BANGLADESH ASSAULT LANDINGS TO RETAKE LOST TERRITORY. ► AMPHIBIOUS RAIDS ► TACTICAL DECEPTION. ►
ROLES/ TASKS ►DEFENCE OF ISLAND TERRITORIES -1197 ISLANDS § POACHING, SMUGGLING, TRAFFICKING OF WOMEN AND GUN RUNNING § PENETRATION BYOF FUNDAMENTALIST IN LAKSWADWEEP ISLANDS WITH THE PREDOMINANTLY MINORITY POPULATION § AIRPORT/ KEY FACILITY SEIZURE
OUT OF AREA CONTIGENCIES ►IN SUPPORT OF UN /COALITION OPERATIONS ►EVACUATION ►SHOW OF CIVILIANS OF FORCE/ REINFORCEMENT
OTHER TASKS ►CONDUCT LANDINGS IN SUPPORT OF WITHDRAWING TROOPS ►LIMITED OFFENSIVE ATTACK ►HOSTAGE RECOVERY. ►GAS AND OIL PLATFORM OPERATIONS. ►HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE
LIMITATIONS AMPHIBIOUS FORCES ► SHIP TO SHORE MOVEMENT § LST(L), LST(M) AND LCUs LACK SPEED § CAPACITY TO CARRY OUT VERTICAL ENVELOPMENT MINIMAL. § HARD BEACHING TO DISCHARGE ARMOUR § VULNERABLE
ARMY COMPONENT/ NEED FOR RAISING MARINES? ► MOUNTAIN BRIGADE MINUS OF THE INDIAN ARMY IS DESIGNATED AS THE AMPHIBIOUS BRIGADE. ► BASED IN PORT BLAIR UNDER ANC ► BATTALIONS CHANGED/ REPLACED EVERY TWO YEARS ON A STAGGERED BASIS ► ANOTHER BRIGADE IS KEPT STAND BY ON THE MAINLAND TO AUGMENT THE PORT BLAIR BRIGADE SHOULD THE NEED ARISE.
LIMITATIONS AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS ► LIMITED STAND OFF CAPABILTY 1 -2 NM ► LCAS/GEMINIS VULNERABLE IN SURF ZONE ► LIMITED SITES FOR HARD BEACHING BY LST(L) ► UNDERLOADING OF ENGINES
LIMITATIONS - AAV ► AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT VEHICLE-BMP AND BDR FROM MECHANIZED INFANTARY ► INADEQUATE SEA KEEPING ABILITY ► VULNERABLE IN SURF ZONE ► LIMITED OTH CAPABILTY ► GUN TOO LIGHT ► CG HOVERCRAFT – LCAC?
ARMY COMPONENT/ NEED FOR RAISING MARINES? ► STRETCHED ARMY - OP PARAKRAM, THE AMPHIBIOUS BRIGADE MOBILIZED TO THE WESTERN COMMAND. ► THE TWO YEARLY CHANGES EFFECTS TRAINING. ► TIME FOR CHANGE OVER BY THE TIME, INCOMING BATTALION GOES THROUGH THE TRAINING AND BECOMES PROFICIENT ►
AMPHIBIOUS TRAINING ► NEED YEAR-ROUND TRAINING. ► TRAINING SEASONAL- WEATHER DEPENDENT ► HIGH SKILLS- NEGOTIATION OF ‘SURF ZONE’ BY BMPS OR LCA ► MUSTERING VARIED ASSETS OF COMPONENTS DIFFICULT. ► NEED FOR DEDICATED AMPHIBIOUS SCHOOL.
INTELLIGENCE ► ► ► MOST CRITICAL AIR RECONNAISSANCE BY ARC, IAF, IN, CG RESOURCES INCLUDING UAV SATELLITE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES LIKE RAW, IB , DIA AND SBS/NAVAL LIAISON TEAMS SUBMARINE RECONNAISSANCE SIGNIT AND COMINT
COMMAND CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS ►SUCCESS DEPENDENT ON C 3 ►‘LESSONS LEARNT ‘ FILES OF AMPHEXES ►INABILITY OF INDIVIDUAL SERVICES TO EXCHANGE INFORMATION LATERALLY
OPS- MAKRAN COAST ► ► ► ► FAVORABLE SEA/ AIR SITUATION ROA OF FLEET AIR DEFENCE PAKISTANI SURVEILLANCE FALKLAND’S CAMPAIGN LOW SPEED- AMPHIBIOUS UNITS- A CONSTRAINT RAIDS, DECEPTION, OR OPENING A NEW FRONT FOR ONGOING LAND OPERATIONS HIGH WASTAGE
NAVAL GROWN MARINES ? IS IT THE ANSWER
CREDIBLE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE ► TREND- MODERN AMPHIBIOUS FORCES ► TASKS ► MARITIME INTERESTS GULF TO MALACCA. ► BRIGADE STRENGTH
CREDIBLE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE ► TWO LPD CAPABLE OF CARRYING FOUR LCACS/ LCUS ► THREE LSL (L) WITH IMPROVED SPEED AND SHIP SIDE MEXEFLOTES ► DETERMINE- LST (M) / LCUs AS PER A BRIGADE LEVEL TABLE ► MODERN MEDIUM LIFT HEPTR (10 TONS)
FOOD FOR THOUGHT ►VIRAAT- EX HERMES- HELO CARRIER ►OPERATE HEAVY/ATTACK HELOS OF IAF ►PLAN AN EXERCISE IN A&N ?
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