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Critical Infrastructure and Automated Control Systems Security: A Strategy for Securing Against Cyber Attacks Critical Infrastructure and Automated Control Systems Security: A Strategy for Securing Against Cyber Attacks Dr. Thomas L. Pigg Director of the Tennessee CSEC

CSEC Mission • The Cyber Security Education Consortium is a National Science Foundation ATE CSEC Mission • The Cyber Security Education Consortium is a National Science Foundation ATE Regional Center of Excellence dedicated to building an information security workforce who will play a critical role in implementing the national strategy to secure cyberspace.

CSEC Sites CSEC Sites

Tennessee CSEC Mission • Phase 1 – Train the trainer • Phase 2 – Tennessee CSEC Mission • Phase 1 – Train the trainer • Phase 2 – Develop Student Curriculum/Courses/Concentrations • Phase 3 – Develop Partnerships with Business, Industry and Government

Core Train the Trainer Workshops • Principles of Information Assurance • Network Security • Core Train the Trainer Workshops • Principles of Information Assurance • Network Security • Enterprise Security Management • Secure E-Commerce • Digital Forensics

New CSEC Courses • Automation and Control Systems – Control Systems Architecture – Control New CSEC Courses • Automation and Control Systems – Control Systems Architecture – Control Systems Software Applications – Control Systems Security I and II • Mobile Communications Devices – Mobile Device Architecture – Mobile Device Programming – Mobile Device Hardware • Secure Coding – Secure Programming I and II – Software Testing – Software Security

What are Control Systems • SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) • DCS (Distributed What are Control Systems • SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) • DCS (Distributed Control Systems) • ICS (Industrial Control Systems) • BAS (Building Automation Systems) • PLC (Programmable Logic Controllers) • Smart Grid

Critical Infrastructures • Agriculture & Food • Banking & Finance • Chemical • Commercial Critical Infrastructures • Agriculture & Food • Banking & Finance • Chemical • Commercial Facilities • Communications • Critical Manufacturing

Critical Infrastructures • Dams • Defense Industrial Base • Emergency Services • Energy • Critical Infrastructures • Dams • Defense Industrial Base • Emergency Services • Energy • Government Facilities • Healthcare & Public Health

Critical Infrastructures • Information Technology • National Monuments & Icons • Nuclear Reactors, Materials Critical Infrastructures • Information Technology • National Monuments & Icons • Nuclear Reactors, Materials & Waste • Postal & Shipping • Transportation Systems • Water

Key Critical Infrastructures • Key Sectors for Control Systems Security • Energy (Electricity, Oil, Key Critical Infrastructures • Key Sectors for Control Systems Security • Energy (Electricity, Oil, and Natural Gas) • Water & Wastewater • Nuclear • Chemical • Dams • Transportation • Critical Manufacturing

Current Trends in Control Systems • Continued move to open protocols • Continued move Current Trends in Control Systems • Continued move to open protocols • Continued move to more COTS operating systems & applications • More remote control & management • More network access to systems • More widespread use of wireless

Current State of Security • Control Systems protocols with little or no security • Current State of Security • Control Systems protocols with little or no security • Migration to TCP/IP networks with its inherent vulnerabilities • Interconnection with enterprise networks • Old operating systems & applications with poor patching practices • Little monitoring of Control Systems for attacks being done • Vendors not securing their product offerings adequately

Current State of Security • Increased risk of insider attacks by outsourced IT services Current State of Security • Increased risk of insider attacks by outsourced IT services • Experts seeing increased interest in Control Systems by terrorists & foreign governments • Evidence that nation-states have been taking remote control of Control Systems • Denial by some companies that there is a problem • Some companies are now starting to see the need and address the issues

Real Control System Security Breaches • Diamler-Chrysler Plant Shutdown – Zotob worm – August Real Control System Security Breaches • Diamler-Chrysler Plant Shutdown – Zotob worm – August 2005 • First Energy’s Nuclear Plant Infestation – Slammer worm – January 2003 • Maroochy Shire Sewage – Release of millions of gallons of sewage January 2000 – Perpetrator accessed system 46 times

Real Control System Security Breaches • Hacking the Industrial Network – http: //www. isa. Real Control System Security Breaches • Hacking the Industrial Network – http: //www. isa. org/File. Store/Intech/White Paper/Hacking-the-industrial-network. USversion. pdf • DHS Video – Idaho National Laboratory – AURORA Test – http: //www. cnn. com/2007/US/09/26/power. at. risk/index. html#cnn. STCVideo

AURORA Test AURORA Test

Real Control System Security Breaches • Stuxnet – http: //www. tofinosecurity. com/stuxnetcentral – http: Real Control System Security Breaches • Stuxnet – http: //www. tofinosecurity. com/stuxnetcentral – http: //www. exida. com/images/uploads/The _7_Things_Every_Plant_Manager_Should _Know_About_Control_System_Security. p df

Current Threats • Internet Based Threats • Worms • Viruses • Denial of Service Current Threats • Internet Based Threats • Worms • Viruses • Denial of Service Attacks • Targeted Attacks • Terrorist • Foreign Nation • Former Insider

Current Threats • Physical Threats • Natural Disasters • Man-made Disasters (War, Riots, etc. Current Threats • Physical Threats • Natural Disasters • Man-made Disasters (War, Riots, etc. ) • Terrorist Attacks

Current Threats • Internal Threats • Disgruntled employee • On-site contractor • Unintentional attack Current Threats • Internal Threats • Disgruntled employee • On-site contractor • Unintentional attack • IT worker • Curious Employee

Current Threats • Targeted Attacks • Can use any threat & threat agent • Current Threats • Targeted Attacks • Can use any threat & threat agent • Internet • Internal • Physical • Social Engineering • Etc.

IT Security for Control Systems • CIA • Confidentiality • Integrity • Availability IT Security for Control Systems • CIA • Confidentiality • Integrity • Availability

IT Security for Control Systems • Technical Controls • Firewalls • IDS • Smart IT Security for Control Systems • Technical Controls • Firewalls • IDS • Smart Cards • Access Controls

IT Security for Control Systems • Administrative Controls • Security Policies & Procedures • IT Security for Control Systems • Administrative Controls • Security Policies & Procedures • Security Awareness • People

IT Security for Control Systems • TCP/IP • Patches & Updates • Intrusion Detection IT Security for Control Systems • TCP/IP • Patches & Updates • Intrusion Detection Systems • Control Systems Monitoring • Signatures for Control Systems • Anti-Virus Software

IT Security for Control Systems • Access Control Methods • Passwords • Multi-Factor • IT Security for Control Systems • Access Control Methods • Passwords • Multi-Factor • Smart Cards • RFID • Proximity • Biometric

IT Security for Control Systems • Authentication • Active Directory • Control Systems Integration IT Security for Control Systems • Authentication • Active Directory • Control Systems Integration • Certificates

IT Security for Control Systems • Authorization • Role Based • Area of Responsibility IT Security for Control Systems • Authorization • Role Based • Area of Responsibility • Station Access Control

Using an IDS with a Control System • Network based • Inspects all network Using an IDS with a Control System • Network based • Inspects all network traffic on that segment (incoming & outgoing) • Uses pattern based signatures • Anomaly based uses baseline • Uses network tap or mirrored port • Monitors multiple hosts

Using an IDS with a Control System • Host based • Inspects network traffic Using an IDS with a Control System • Host based • Inspects network traffic for a specific host • Better at protecting a machines specific function • Misses LAN based attacks

Using an IDS with a Control System • Commercial • Pre-configured fee based IDS Using an IDS with a Control System • Commercial • Pre-configured fee based IDS • CA e. Trust • Mc. Afee Intru. Shield & Entercept • Sonic. Wall • Still. Secure Strata Guard

Using an IDS with a Control System • Open Source • Snort • Base Using an IDS with a Control System • Open Source • Snort • Base • Sguil – Real-time GUI interface • OSSEC (Open Source Host-based Intrusion Detection System)

Using an IDS with a Control System • IPS • Intrusion Prevention System • Using an IDS with a Control System • IPS • Intrusion Prevention System • Automated Response • Dynamically change firewall ruleset • NIST IDS Guide (SP 800 -94)

Security Solutions • Network Segmentation • DMZ Design • Can use ISA S 99 Security Solutions • Network Segmentation • DMZ Design • Can use ISA S 99 standard as guide • Design to protect each segment • Allows for centralized services

Security Solutions • Network Segmentation • Centralized Services • Anti-Virus • Updates & Patches Security Solutions • Network Segmentation • Centralized Services • Anti-Virus • Updates & Patches • Active Directory Services • Data Historians • System Management

Security Solutions • Secure Remote Access • Secured VPN connections • Escorted Access for Security Solutions • Secure Remote Access • Secured VPN connections • Escorted Access for vendors • Require secured tokens • Call in by vendor with request • Issue 1 -time code for access

Security Solutions • IDS/IPS for Control Systems • Which one to use? • Where Security Solutions • IDS/IPS for Control Systems • Which one to use? • Where to use? • HIDS or Application Whitelisting? • UTM – Unified Threat Management

Security Solutions • Security Event Monitoring & Logging • Network Devices • Switches, Routers, Security Solutions • Security Event Monitoring & Logging • Network Devices • Switches, Routers, Firewalls, IDS • Computing Devices • Historians, Servers, Operator consoles • Field Devices • RTU, PLC, Telemetry Devices, Embedded Devices

Security Solutions • Security Framework • NIPP • NERC CIP • CSSP DHS • Security Solutions • Security Framework • NIPP • NERC CIP • CSSP DHS • NIST

Security Solutions • Policy & Guidance • Developing Good Policies • Track Data • Security Solutions • Policy & Guidance • Developing Good Policies • Track Data • Points of Contact • Areas of Concern • Data Risk Assessment • Evaluate the Impact of Data Loss • Available Controls • Technical, Administrative, & Compensating

Security Solutions • Policy & Guidance • Implementation • Roles & Responsibilities • Security Security Solutions • Policy & Guidance • Implementation • Roles & Responsibilities • Security Requirements • Change Management Process • Backup & Redundancy • Self Assessments

Control Systems Security Initiatives • NIPP (National Infrastructure Protection Plan) • CIPAC (Critical Infrastructure Control Systems Security Initiatives • NIPP (National Infrastructure Protection Plan) • CIPAC (Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council) • ICSJWG (Industrial Control Systems Joint Working Group) • ICS-Cert (Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team) • Strategy for Securing Control Systems

Control Systems Security Initiatives • CSSP (Control Systems Security Program) • Idaho National Laboratory Control Systems Security Initiatives • CSSP (Control Systems Security Program) • Idaho National Laboratory • National SCADA Test Bed Program • SCADA & Control Systems Procurement Project • Smart Grid Interoperability Standards Project • UK NISCC - Now CPNI (Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure) • PCSF/SCy. SAG (SCADA Cyber Self Assessment Working Group) - Historical

Control Systems Regulations • NERC (North American Electric Reliability Council) • Develop & enforce Control Systems Regulations • NERC (North American Electric Reliability Council) • Develop & enforce reliability standards • CIDX/ACC – Now Chem. ITC (American Chemistry Council) • CFATS guidance & assessment tools

Control Systems Regulations • ISA SP 99 (Industrial Automation & Control System Security) – Control Systems Regulations • ISA SP 99 (Industrial Automation & Control System Security) – International Society of Automation • Part 1 Standard: Concepts, Terminology & Models • Part 2 Standard: Establishing an Industrial Automation & Control Systems Security Program • Part 3 Standard: Technical Requirements for Industrial Control Systems (Currently in development

Control Systems Regulations • AGA 12 – Discontinued and used in IEEE 1711 Trial Control Systems Regulations • AGA 12 – Discontinued and used in IEEE 1711 Trial Standard • Encryption of Serial Communications • Serial Encrypting Transceivers now available • API Standard 1164 (American Petroleum Institute) • Standard on SCADA security for pipelines • NIST – National Institute of Standards and Technology

Control Systems Regulations • SP 800 -82 – Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Control Systems Regulations • SP 800 -82 – Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security • NIST initiative on Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) • Uses ISO 15408 Common Criteria methodology

Control System Security Takeaway • The 7 Things Every Plant Manager Should Know About Control System Security Takeaway • The 7 Things Every Plant Manager Should Know About Control System Security – John Cusimano – Director of Security Solutions for exida – http: //www. exida. com/images/uploads/The_7_Things_Every _Plant_Manager_Should_Know_About_Control_System_Sec urity. pdf

Contact Information Dr. Thomas L. Pigg Professor of Computer Information Systems Jackson State Community Contact Information Dr. Thomas L. Pigg Professor of Computer Information Systems Jackson State Community College 2046 N. Parkway Jackson, TN 38305 (731) 424 -3520 Ext. 201 tpigg@jscc. edu