Скачать презентацию Computer security authentication of principals and cryptographic protocols Скачать презентацию Computer security authentication of principals and cryptographic protocols

0a6b96f3a46ddaed120dcd005d9a5a0d.ppt

  • Количество слайдов: 11

Computer security: authentication of principals and cryptographic protocols Frans Kaashoek 6. 033 Spring 2007 Computer security: authentication of principals and cryptographic protocols Frans Kaashoek 6. 033 Spring 2007

HKN Underground Guide https: //sixweb. mit. edu/student/evaluate/6. 033 s 2007 Link posted on 6. HKN Underground Guide https: //sixweb. mit. edu/student/evaluate/6. 033 s 2007 Link posted on 6. 033 home page Deadline: May 20

 key distribution Charles 3. M = {“A’s Kapub =…”}, sign(M, KCpriv) 2. Alice? key distribution Charles 3. M = {“A’s Kapub =…”}, sign(M, KCpriv) 2. Alice? Alice Bob 1. M, Sign(M, KApriv) • 3 is a certificate for Alice’s public key • Charles is called a certificate authority • The interaction is an example of a cryptographic protocol

 Shorter notation Charles 3. {“A’s Kapub =…”}KCpriv 2. Alice? Alice Bob 1. {M}KBpub. Shorter notation Charles 3. {“A’s Kapub =…”}KCpriv 2. Alice? Alice Bob 1. {M}KBpub. KApriv • Subscript for signing • Superscript for encrypting

Denning-Sacco CA {A, B} Alice {A, KApub, T}KCApriv {A, KBpub, T}KCApriv {A, KApub, T}KCApriv+{{KAB, Denning-Sacco CA {A, B} Alice {A, KApub, T}KCApriv {A, KBpub, T}KCApriv {A, KApub, T}KCApriv+{{KAB, T}KApriv}KBpub {data, T}KAB 1. Authenticate Alice to Bob and Bob to Alice 2. Set up a shared-secret key Bob

Impersonation Attack Thinks Bob is Alice Charles {A, KApub, T}KCApriv {{KAB, T}Kapriv}KCpub Alice {A, Impersonation Attack Thinks Bob is Alice Charles {A, KApub, T}KCApriv {{KAB, T}Kapriv}KCpub Alice {A, KApub, T}KCApriv+{{KAB, T}KApriv}KBpub Bob

Denning-Sacco (fixed) CA {A, B} Alice {A, KApub, T}KCApriv {A, KBpub, T}KCApriv {A, KApub, Denning-Sacco (fixed) CA {A, B} Alice {A, KApub, T}KCApriv {A, KBpub, T}KCApriv {A, KApub, T}KCApriv{{A, B, KAB, T}KApriv}KBpub {A, B, data, T}KAB Be explicit! Bob

Example: Web (SSL simplified) • U: https: //www. amazon. com • B →W: {randomc, Example: Web (SSL simplified) • U: https: //www. amazon. com • B →W: {randomc, session-id, ciphersuites} • B ← W: {randoms, session-id, {amazon. com, Kpub-amazon}Kversign} • B: verify({amazon. com, Kpub-amazon}Kversign, Kpub-verisign)? • B →W: {pre-master-secret}Kpub-amazon • . . .

X 509 certificate • struct X 509_certificate { unsigned version; unsigned serial; signature_cipher_identifier; issuer_signature; X 509 certificate • struct X 509_certificate { unsigned version; unsigned serial; signature_cipher_identifier; issuer_signature; issuer_name; subject_public_key_cipher_identifier; subject_public_key; validity_period; };