Commercial Systems for Military Bhupendra Jasani Department of War Studies King’s College London Commercial systems for military Montreal 16 -17 March 2015: Jasani 1
Introduction Ø In 1978 unexpectedly the US ocean surveillance satellite, Seasat, carrying a SAR radar detected on the sea surface the wake of a submerged submarine illustrating yet another way to detect submarines; Ø First Gulf War in 1990 -1991 illustrated the use of commercial satellites in an armed conflict; Ø These were the beginnings of the use of commercial satellites by the military. Commercial systems for military Montreal 16 -17 March 2015: Jasani 2
Where are various space assets? Commercial systems for military Montreal 16 -17 March 2015: Jasani 3
Some major space faring states with defence and commercial programmes Country Early-warning satellites D China Communications satellites C Navigation satellites D D C Meteorological satellites C D Observation satellites C DPRK C D Indigenous launch vehicle Europe France India Iran Israel Japan Russia USA Commercial systems for military Montreal 16 -17 March 2015: Jasani 4
Some comparison between commercial and military space assets Observation satellites-spatial resolution Since the beginning of the space age in October 1957 with the launch of the Russian Sputnik 1 satellite, considerable advances have been made in the capabilities of earth orbiting spacecraft for both military and commercial uses, the latter approaching that of military Commercial systems for military Montreal 16 -17 March 2015: Jasani 5
Spectral resolution Range of electromagnetic spectrum over which observation satellites operate Commercial systems for military Montreal 16 -17 March 2015: Jasani 6
Summary of spectral resolution & band widths Commercial systems for military Montreal 16 -17 March 2015: Jasani 7
Target in visible and multispectral images 1996 image of the UK Dungeness nuclear power plant imaged by a Russian Cosmos satellite carrying a KVR-1000 sensor with 2 m resolution Landsat-5 image acquired on 3 November 1997 over Dungeness Nuclear power station; bands 6 (thermal) as red, 5 as green and 4 as blue; the warm water discharged into the sea can be detected while clearly the reactor buildings are well insulated. Source EOSAT Commercial systems for military Montreal 16 -17 March 2015: Jasani 8
Target imaged by a radar sensor Dungeness Nuclear Power Plant acquired by ERS-2 radar satellite. Commercial systems for military Montreal 16 -17 March 2015: Jasani 9
Target imaged by high resolution optical and radar sensors Helicopter base in Berlin imaged by ERS-2 radar sensor with 25 m resolution Helicopter base in Berlin imaged by Russian satellite carrying a KVR sensor with a resolution of 2 m Commercial systems for military Montreal 16 -17 March 2015: Jasani 10
A US sports centre imaged by the US Quick. Bird satellite at 0. 61 m resolution Lastly, temporal resolution meaning how frequently a satellite comes back to a particular point on the earth’s surface Commercial systems for military Montreal 16 -17 March 2015: Jasani 11
Where to now? Ø It can be seen that the quality of the commercial remote sensing satellites is converging to that of the military systems; Ø This trend continued to other application satellites such as the communications, navigation and meteorological satellites also, Ø Because of the availability of information commercially from space assets to all, it is not surprising that the international community also desires access to and the use of such satellites; Ø The two big powers verify their bi-lateral treaties by the National Technical Means (NTM) of verification largely made up of space-based assets access to which is very limited; Ø Because the inspected State is generally reluctant to make it too transparent, verification by satellites under a Multi-lateral Technical Means (MTM) was conceptualised; Ø This was possible because of the availability of commercial high resolution images and the Principle V of Remote Sensing Principles encourages such activities; Ø According to this, “States carrying out remote sensing activities shall promote international cooperation in these activities. To this end, they shall make available to other States opportunities for participation therein. ” Ø Time has come to examine how to proceed from here. Commercial systems for military Montreal 16 -17 March 2015: Jasani 12
Some of the existing relevant legal regimes There are: 3 Treaties - 1967 Outer Space Treaty, 1972 Liability Convention and 1976 Registration Convention; 4 Principles - 1963 Declaration of Legal Principles, 1986 Remote Sensing Principle, 1992 Principles on the use of Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space, 1996 Declaration on International Cooperation; 2 Resolutions – adopted by the UNGA on International Cooperation, 1961 Resolution 1721 A and B (XVI) and 2000 Resolution 55/122 concerning the GSO; Some relevant documents – 2007 Guidelines on Debris Mitigation and 2009 Safety for nuclear power source. Commercial systems for military Montreal 16 -17 March 2015: Jasani 13
Outer space “in the interest of maintaining international peace and security” Ø Arms control, disarmament and confidence-building measures are some of the important elements of security; Ø Unlike the early bi-lateral treaties between the USA and the former USSR that depended on earth-orbiting satellites for their verification under the National Technical Means (NTM) of verification provision, most multi-lateral treaties do not have such a mechanism; Ø In such cases, often on-site inspection measures are provided; Ø However, these usually are very limited because the inspected State is generally reluctant to make itself too transparent; Ø Hence the verification by satellites under a Multi-lateral Technical Means (MTM) was conceptualised since, with the availability of high resolution images commercially, this was possible and Principle V of Remote Sensing Principles allows such activities. Commercial systems for military Montreal 16 -17 March 2015: Jasani 14
Outer space Treaty Entered into force 10 October 1967 Ø The Outer Space Treaty stipulates that activities in outer space “…shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interest of all countries. . ” (Art. I) Ø Furthermore, it is stated that “States Parties to the Treaty shall carry on activities…in the interest of maintaining international peace and security…”(Art. III); Ø Many applications of such satellites as remote sensing and navigation would suggest the opposite; Ø Pin pointing a target by remote sensing satellite and delivery of a missile with very high accuracy by navigation satellites to it would be regarded as very threatening use; Ø Moreover, “The moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all States Parties to the Treaty exclusively for peaceful purposes. ” (Art. IV), while such a provision does not appear as far as artificial earth satellites are concerned; Ø The Treaty does not have any verification provisions although orbiting weapons of mass destruction are prohibited; Ø A more important issue may be the development of commercial sub-orbital flights that may have direct ascent ASAT implications; Ø Again State’s commitments in Articles I, III, V, VI. VII, VIII and IX are repeated in Paragraphs 1, 4, 9, 5, 8, 7 and 6 respectively in 1963 Declaration of Legal Principles emphasising the importance of the OST. Commercial systems for military Montreal 16 -17 March 2015: Jasani 15
International Liability Convention In Force since September 1972 Ø A State bears international responsibility for all space objects launched from its territory so that it is fully liable for damages that result from that space object; Ø If two states work together to launch a space object, then both those states are jointly liable for the damage that object may cause; Ø The term “space object” includes “component parts of a space object as well as its launch vehicle and parts thereof” (Article I), then can debris from space objects be regarded as “parts of a space object”? Ø If so, then there have been either close encounters or actual collisions with space debris causing potential damage to space objects of other parties as shown in the following two tables; Ø However, how is one to determine the ownership of a debris that may be too small to be tracked and identified that may cause damage to another state’s property? Ø More recent examples are potential damage that may be caused by debris from the Chinese 2007 ASAT test or by those caused from the destruction of a US satellite soon after the Chinese ASAT test; Ø This is particularly so when tracking of objects is carried out unilaterally by only a few. Commercial systems for military Montreal 16 -17 March 2015: Jasani 16
Hit by debris Summary of some collisions and close encounters Hit by or close encounter with Close encounter other objects Commercial systems for military Montreal 16 -17 March 2015: Jasani 17
Summary of some collisions and close encounters Hit by debris Close encounter Hit by or close encounter with other objects Commercial systems for military Montreal 16 -17 March 2015: Jasani 18
Registration Convention Entered into force 1976 Ø The convention requires states to furnish to the United Nations with details about the objects and their orbits; and these obligations are mandatory; Ø For example, name of launching State, an appropriate designator of the space object or its registration number, date and territory or location of launch, basic orbital parameters (nodal period, inclination, apogee and perigee) and general function of the space object; Ø By and large, provision IV. 1. (e) has not been fulfilled, since large number of satellites launched serve military purposes and hardly any of them have been described to the UN Secretary-General as having military uses; Ø Timely information is particularly important when a satellite is carrying a nuclear power source/reactor as often the satellite is registered much later after its launch (see 1992 Principles relevant to Nuclear Power Sources in space); Ø As a first step it is essential to strengthen the compliance with the Convention. Commercial systems for military Montreal 16 -17 March 2015: Jasani 19
Space debris Ø It can be seen from the tables that the first ever accidental in- orbit collision between two satellites occurred on 10 February 2009 at 776 km altitude; Ø A US privately own communication satellite, Iridium 33, and a Russian Strela-2 M military communications satellite, Cosmos 2251 collided; Ø While in this case the objects are known and therefore resulting debris could be identify but in a case when debris has spread over a period of time the owner of a particular piece may be known to only a few unless the objects are monitored and catalogued multilaterally; Ø Over the half century of space activities, some 6, 000 satellites have been placed in orbit of which about 800 are still operating; Ø More than 12, 000 object are tracked by the US Space Surveillance Network, 5 -10 cm in LEO and 0. 3 m-1 m in GEO; Commercial systems for military Montreal 16 -17 March 2015: Jasani 20
1986 Remote Sensing Principles Some comments Ø Could the use of remotely sensed data from space to fix prices of agricultural product against developing states be termed “. . for the benefit and in the interest of all countries. ”? (Principle II) Ø MTM concept was proposed earlier on the basis of “States carrying out remote sensing activities shall promote international cooperation in these activities. ” (Principle V) but this has not happened yet; Ø An International Data Centre (IDC) is proposed here in the hope that Principle VI would be fulfilled according to which “In order to maximize the availability of benefits from remote sensing activities, States are encouraged…to provide establishment and operation of data collecting and storage stations and processing and interpretation facilities. ” Ø “The sensed State shall also have access to the available analysed information concerning the territory under its jurisdiction in the possession of any State participating in remote sensing activities…” (Principle XII) even though the Sensed State generally is unaware of being sensed; Ø “States operating remote sensing satellites shall bear international responsibility …irrespective of whether such activities are carried out by governmental or nongovernmental entities…” (Principle XIV) and yet, it was reported, that a terrorist organization used the maps and satellite images available on the Google Earth over and in the region of Mumbai, India to coordinate and carry out its terrorist activity with devastating effect; Ø This can only happen as much of the outer space legal regime is weak. Commercial systems for military Montreal 16 -17 March 2015: Jasani 21
Usefulness of Codes of Conduct for Outer Space Activities ØIt is now generally recognised that space capabilities, including relevant ground facilities, are vital to national and international security and to maintaining global peace; ØA vital element for this is adequate notification of outer space activities such as pre-notification of launches, possible potential break -ups in orbits or premature re-entry of space objects causing potential harm to the earth’s atmosphere and on the ground; ØThus, States should have serious commitment to the outer space law such as adherence to the Registration Conventions rather than develop new codes of conduct in outer space activities; Ø Above all the codes of conduct do not have verification provisions and they are not legally binding; Ø It is essential to know how outer space is being used if the relevant treaties and Code of Conducts are to be effective; Ø This would require monitoring activities in outer space by international community under an MTM. Commercial systems for military Montreal 16 -17 March 2015: Jasani 22
What can be done? Improve space traffic control: ØA working group convened by the four leading non-governmental organizations dealing with space issues, the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, the U. N. Office on Outer Space Affairs, the Confederation of European Aerospace Societies and International Academy of Astronautics, have suggested more extensive efforts to improve space traffic control procedures; Ø Here it is suggested that as a first step, an International Data Centre (IDC) could be established , for example, in Vienna, where data provided by participating countries on space objects in orbits would be collated and compiled; the data could be, for example, the telemetry emitted by satellites, their shapes, sizes, and orbits, the launching country, and the designation of satellites; Ø Such an action would be in line with the Principle VI of the Remote Sensing Principles; Ø The second step would be that the IDC could establish some equipment necessary to track objects in space to verify the Registration Convention and also data that might be available from various states on orbital debris; Ø The latter would be to check measures that may be used on orbital debris mitigation. Commercial systems for military Montreal 16 -17 March 2015: Jasani 23
Orbital debris mitigation: Ø The Inter-Agency Debris Coordinating Committee (IADC) consisting of space agencies from China, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Russia, Ukraine, the United Kingdom and the United States, and the European Space Agency, has drawn up a set of guidelines; Ø However, these are not legally binding; Ø It might be suggested here that the COPUOS adopts a possible verifiable “Convention on Limiting and Eliminating Debris in Orbits (CLEDO)”; Ø The verification of such a convention could be carried out by the above proposed IDC. Commercial systems for military Montreal 16 -17 March 2015: Jasani 24
Some simple methods for verification of compliance with existing and new outer space related measures Ø Largely it is possible to learn about the missions of various satellites by examining their orbital characteristics and by scanning numerous technical and military journals; ØWhile monitoring communications flow would add considerably to the knowledge on the nature of the spacecraft, it may be easier to monitor the telemetry sent from the satellite to its command control centres; Ø The principal sources of unclassified information about this are groups of amateur organizations (e. g. UK Kettering School); Ø Moreover, some information on radio frequencies used by satellites is available from the International Telecommunications Union; Ø Thus, for example, IDC should start by collecting such information and equip itself with simple antenna, signal receivers that could be tuned from 550 k. Hz to 31 MHz and that would have digital frequency readout and a tunable very high frequency receiver with, for example, 55 -260 MHz frequency range and an FM demodulator; Ø A spectrum display unit, a time code generator and a reader, a tape recorder, a strip chart recorder, a frequency discriminator, a desk computer and a tracking system. Commercial systems for military Montreal 16 -17 March 2015: Jasani 25
Some simple methods for verification of compliance with existing and new outer space related measures continued Ø A number of tracking facilities would be necessary so as to be able to generate orbital elements for objects being monitored independent of NASA. Ø Baker-Nunn cameras could be used that have apertures of about 50 cm which follow a satellite as it crosses the sky with position accuracy of about 0. 001°. Ø Assuming a camera had a 50 cm aperture and recording light wavelength of 5. 5 x 10~7 m, an object of about 30 cm could be resolved from a distance of 300 km, a telescope with an aperture of 10 cm could resolve an object of about 1. 5 m; Ø The cost of setting up an independent monitoring organization is modest, some tens of thousands of dollars which would include the cost of setting up the equipment and testing the whole system. ; Ø Each station could be manned by not more than a dozen people; Ø The abovementioned is only a guide to the type needed and is only the minimum; Ø The question now is what kind of independent organization need to be considered. Commercial systems for military 26 Montreal 16 -17 March 2015: Jasani
A new method that could monitor existing and new outer space related measures Ø Continuous monitoring could best be carried out from GSO; Ø Can satellite and missile launches be monitored by weather satellites from the GSO? Ø Data produced from US and Russian defense satellites in the GSO is classified; Ø While several sensors deployed onboard such satellites are not available for civil spacecraft, electro-optical sensors sensitive in the IR region of the electromagnetic spectrum are orbited on commercial weather satellites; Ø It is proposed that current polar orbiting weather satellites and those in the GSO should be able to detect the plum from the launchers or missiles. Commercial systems for military Montreal 16 -17 March 2015: Jasani 27
. A new method that could monitor existing and new outer space related measures continued Spectrum of radiation from the plume of US Titan IIIB missileand a tactical ballistic missile with liquid propellant in boost phase (in red) calculated using NATO Infra. Red Air TArget Model (NIRATAM) is shown here when the missile has reached an altitude of 10 km. Source for the red curve: Kurt Beier and Erwin Lindermeir, 2007. Commercial systems for military Montreal 16 -17 March 2015: Jasani 28
A new method that could monitor existing and new outer space related measures continued Comparison of spectra from solid and liquid propellants when the rocket has reached 20 km altitude. Source: Forden, 2006. ØThus, if this method is proved workable, then this would give a means of verifying not only the Registration Convention but also such codes of conduct as the Hague Code of Conduct (HCOC) and other measures also; ØThe next issue is that of an institutional frame work Commercial systems for military Montreal 16 -17 March 2015: Jasani 29
An independent monitoring organisation Ø Examples of these are: (1) SALT type of Standing Consultative Commission (SSC); (2) International Cospas-Sarsat Programme; and (3) European Union Satellite Centre; Ø (1) The sensitivity of data dissemination could be reduced particularly if an SCC were to be established; • This could well be done, for example, in a regional or a multi-lateral frame work; • The main objective of a multi-lateral SCC would be not only to promote the implementation of the provisions of any multi-lateral arms control agreements that may have been reached, but also to implement outer space related measures Ø (2) Under the Cospass-Sarsat programme, several satellites pick up distress signals that are transmitted at frequencies 121. 5 and 406 MHz that saved some 2, 700 lives between January 1994 and December 2013; Ø (3) In 1993 the WEU Satellite Centre was established in Torrejon near Madrid, Spain; its mission was to develop satellite image processing methods, train image analysts in satellite image interpretation and monitor the environment; Ø Thus, the models for an independent multi-lateral or an international verification agency exists. Commercial systems for military Montreal 16 -17 March 2015: Jasani 30
Some conclusions ØIt is now generally recognised that space capabilities, including relevant ground facilities, are vital to national and international security and to maintaining global peace; ØA vital element for this is adequate notification of outer space activities such as pre-notification of launches, possible potential break-ups in orbits or premature re-entry of space objects causing potential harm to the earth’s atmosphere and on the ground; ØA serious commitment to the outer space law such as adherence to the Registration Conventions and Remote Sensing Principles is essential. Commercial systems for military Montreal 16 -17 March 2015: Jasani 31
Some conclusions continued Ø It is proposed that a Multi-lateral Technical Means (MTM) of verification should now be recognised in current outer space related measures; ØIt has also been proposed that an International Data Centre (IDC) is established in support of the MTM-with the level of technical capabilities of most space faring nations, an MTM is now possible; ØMTM and IDC should be recognised in any future measures such as the Global Space Governance; Ø There are some already existing multi-lateral organisations existing (for example, the EU Satellite Centre) that could be used as a guide to the establishment of an MTM and an IDC; ØIt is worth examining the types of sensors on board civil meteorological satellites and see whether they can be used for early warning and detection of launches of spacecraft and missile applications; ØAn important element in all of this is adequate notification of outer space activities such as pre-notification of launches, possible potential break-ups in orbits or premature re-entry of space objects causing potential harm to the earth’s atmosphere and on the ground; ØA serious commitment to the outer space law such as adherence to the Registration Conventions and Remote Sensing Principles is essential. Commercial systems for military Montreal 16 -17 March 2015: Jasani 32
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