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Chapter 8 roadmap 8. 1 What is network security? 8. 2 Principles of cryptography Chapter 8 roadmap 8. 1 What is network security? 8. 2 Principles of cryptography 8. 3 Message integrity 8. 4 Securing e-mail 8. 5 Securing TCP connections: SSL 8. 6 Network layer security: IPsec 8. 7 Securing wireless LANs 8. 8 Operational security: firewalls and IDS Network Security 8 -1

SSL: Secure Sockets Layer v widely deployed security protocol § supported by almost all SSL: Secure Sockets Layer v widely deployed security protocol § supported by almost all browsers, web servers § https § billions $/year over SSL v mechanisms: [Woo 1994], implementation: Netscape v variation -TLS: transport layer security, RFC 2246 v provides § confidentiality § integrity § authentication v original goals: § Web e-commerce transactions § encryption (especially credit-card numbers) § Web-server authentication § optional client authentication § minimum hassle in doing business with new merchant v available to all TCP applications § secure socket interface Network Security 8 -2

SSL and TCP/IP Application TCP Application SSL Socket SSL TCP Socket TCP IP normal SSL and TCP/IP Application TCP Application SSL Socket SSL TCP Socket TCP IP normal application v v IP application with SSL provides application programming interface (API) to applications C and Java SSL libraries/classes readily available Network Security 8 -3

SSL and TCP/IP v. Technical challenges with SSL § want to send byte streams SSL and TCP/IP v. Technical challenges with SSL § want to send byte streams & interactive data § want set of secret keys for entire connection § want certificate exchange as part of protocol: handshake phase • i. e. , not wait until connection terminated Network Security 8 -4

Almost-SSL: a simple secure channel v v handshake: Alice and Bob use their certificates, Almost-SSL: a simple secure channel v v handshake: Alice and Bob use their certificates, private keys to authenticate each other and exchange shared secret key derivation: Alice and Bob use shared secret to derive set of keys data transfer: data to be transferred is broken up into series of records connection closure: special messages to securely close connection Network Security 8 -5

Almost-SSL: a simple handshake TCP Connection Handshake SSL hello tificate er public key c Almost-SSL: a simple handshake TCP Connection Handshake SSL hello tificate er public key c KB+(MS) = EMS MS: master secret EMS: encrypted master secret Network Security 8 -6

Almost-SSL: key derivation v considered bad to use same key for more than one Almost-SSL: key derivation v considered bad to use same key for more than one cryptographic operation § e. g. , use different keys for Message Authentication Code (MAC) and encryption v v four keys are generated from MS: § Kc = encryption key for data sent from client to server § Mc = MAC key for data sent from client to server § Ks = encryption key for data sent from server to client § Ms = MAC key for data sent from server to client keys derived from key derivation function (KDF) § takes master secret and (possibly) some additional random data and creates the keys Network Security 8 -7

Almost-SSL: data records v why not encrypt data in constant stream as we write Almost-SSL: data records v why not encrypt data in constant stream as we write it to TCP? § where would we put the MAC? If at end, no message integrity until all data processed. § e. g. , with instant messaging, how can we do integrity check over all bytes sent before displaying? v instead, break stream in series of records § each record carries a MAC § receiver can act on each record as it arrives v issue: in record, receiver needs to distinguish MAC from data § want to use variable-length records length data MAC Network Security 8 -8

Almost-SSL: sequence numbers v v problem: attacker can capture and replay record or re-order Almost-SSL: sequence numbers v v problem: attacker can capture and replay record or re-order records solution: put sequence number into MAC: § MAC = MAC(Mx, sequence||data) § note: no sequence number field v v problem: attacker could replay all records solution: use nonce Network Security 8 -9

Almost-SSL: control information v problem: truncation attack: § attacker forges TCP connection close segment Almost-SSL: control information v problem: truncation attack: § attacker forges TCP connection close segment § one or both sides thinks there is less data than there actually is. v solution: record types, with one type for closure § type 0 for data; type 1 for closure v MAC = MAC(Mx, sequence||type||data) length type data MAC Network Security 8 -10

Almost-SSL: summary hello certificate, nonce KB+(MS) = EMS type 0, seq 1, data encrypted Almost-SSL: summary hello certificate, nonce KB+(MS) = EMS type 0, seq 1, data encrypted type 0, seq 2, data , d e 0, seq 1 typ bob. com ata type 0, seq 3, data type 1, seq 4, close type 1, seq 2, Network Security 8 -11

Almost-SSL isn’t complete v v v how long are fields? which encryption protocols? want Almost-SSL isn’t complete v v v how long are fields? which encryption protocols? want negotiation? § allow client and server to support different encryption algorithms § allow client and server to choose together specific algorithm before data transfer Network Security 8 -12

SSL cipher suite v cipher suite § public-key algorithm § symmetric encryption algorithm § SSL cipher suite v cipher suite § public-key algorithm § symmetric encryption algorithm § MAC algorithm v v common SSL symmetric ciphers § DES – Data Encryption Standard: block § 3 DES – Triple strength: block § RC 2 – Rivest Cipher 2: block § RC 4 – Rivest Cipher 4: stream SSL supports several cipher suites negotiation: client, server agree on cipher suite SSL Public key encryption § client offers choice § server picks one § RSA Network Security 8 -13

Real SSL: handshake (1) Purpose 1. server authentication 2. negotiation: agree on crypto algorithms Real SSL: handshake (1) Purpose 1. server authentication 2. negotiation: agree on crypto algorithms 3. establish keys 4. client authentication (optional) Network Security 8 -14

Real SSL: handshake (2) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. client sends list of Real SSL: handshake (2) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. client sends list of algorithms it supports, along with client nonce server chooses algorithms from list; sends back: choice + certificate + server nonce client verifies certificate, extracts server’s public key, generates pre_master_secret, encrypts with server’s public key, sends to server client and server independently compute encryption and MAC keys from pre_master_secret and nonces client sends a MAC of all the handshake messages server sends a MAC of all the handshake messages. Security Network 8 -15

Real SSL: handshaking (3) last 2 steps protect handshake from tampering v client typically Real SSL: handshaking (3) last 2 steps protect handshake from tampering v client typically offers, in the clear, a range of algorithms, some strong, some weak v man-in-the middle could delete stronger algorithms from list v last 2 steps prevent this § last two messages are encrypted Network Security 8 -16

Real SSL: handshaking (4) v v v why use random nonces for each connection? Real SSL: handshaking (4) v v v why use random nonces for each connection? suppose Trudy sniffs and records all messages between Alice & Bob next day, Trudy sets up TCP connection with Bob, sends exact same sequence of records § Bob (Amazon) thinks Alice made two separate orders for the same thing § solution: Bob sends different random nonce for each connection. This causes encryption keys to be different on the two days § Trudy’s messages will fail Bob’s integrity check Network Security 8 -17

SSL record protocol data fragment record header data fragment MAC encrypted data and MAC SSL record protocol data fragment record header data fragment MAC encrypted data and MAC record header: content type; version; length MAC: includes sequence number, type, MAC key Mx fragment: each SSL fragment 214 bytes (~16 Kbytes) Network Security 8 -18

SSL record format 1 byte content type 2 bytes 3 bytes SSL version length SSL record format 1 byte content type 2 bytes 3 bytes SSL version length data MAC data and MAC encrypted (symmetric algorithm) Network Security 8 -19

Real SSL connection handshake: Client. Hello ake: Server handsh rtificate dshake: Ce han llo. Real SSL connection handshake: Client. Hello ake: Server handsh rtificate dshake: Ce han llo. Done e: Server. He handshake: Client. Key Exchange Change. Cipher. Sp ec everything henceforth is encrypted handshake: Finished r. Spec Change. Ciphe inished dshake: F han application_data application_d TCP FIN follows Alert: warning, close_no tify Network Security 8 -20

Key derivation v client nonce, server nonce, and pre-master secret input into pseudo random-number Key derivation v client nonce, server nonce, and pre-master secret input into pseudo random-number generator. § produces master secret v v master secret and new nonces input into another randomnumber generator to create “key block” key block sliced and diced: § § § client MAC key server MAC key client encryption key server encryption key client initialization vector (IV) server initialization vector (IV) Network Security 8 -21

Chapter 8 roadmap 8. 1 What is network security? 8. 2 Principles of cryptography Chapter 8 roadmap 8. 1 What is network security? 8. 2 Principles of cryptography 8. 3 Message integrity 8. 4 Securing e-mail 8. 5 Securing TCP connections: SSL 8. 6 Network layer security: IPsec 8. 7 Securing wireless LANs 8. 8 Operational security: firewalls and IDS Network Security 8 -22

What is network-layer confidentiality ? between two network entities: v sending entity encrypts datagram What is network-layer confidentiality ? between two network entities: v sending entity encrypts datagram payload, payload could be: § TCP or UDP segment, ICMP message, OSPF message …. v all data sent from one entity to other would be hidden: § web pages, e-mail, P 2 P file transfers, TCP SYN packets … v “blanket coverage” Network Security 8 -23

Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) motivation: vinstitutions often want private networks for security. § costly: Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) motivation: vinstitutions often want private networks for security. § costly: separate routers, links, DNS infrastructure. v. VPN: institution’s inter-office traffic is sent over public Internet instead § encrypted before entering public Internet § logically separate from other traffic Network Security 8 -24

Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) IP header Secure payloa d IPsec heade r r router Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) IP header Secure payloa d IPsec heade r r router w/ IPv 4 and IPsec pa IP er ad he ylo a d router w/ IPv 4 and IPsec laptop w/ IPsec salesperson in hotel e cur Se load y pa IP heade IPsec header ec IPs der ea IP r h e ad he Secur e payloa d public Internet ad ylo I he P ad er pa headquarters branch office Network Security 8 -25

IPsec services v v data integrity origin authentication replay attack prevention confidentiality Network Security IPsec services v v data integrity origin authentication replay attack prevention confidentiality Network Security 8 -26

IPsec transport mode IPsec v v v IPsec end-system hosts are IPSec aware/capable IPsec IPsec transport mode IPsec v v v IPsec end-system hosts are IPSec aware/capable IPsec datagram emitted and received by end-system protects upper level protocols Network Security 8 -27

IPsec – tunneling mode IPsec v v IPsec edge routers IPsec-aware/capable original IP datagram IPsec – tunneling mode IPsec v v IPsec edge routers IPsec-aware/capable original IP datagram from host is tunneled inside IPSec datagram Network Security 8 -28

Two IPsec protocols v Authentication Header (AH) protocol § provides source authentication & data Two IPsec protocols v Authentication Header (AH) protocol § provides source authentication & data integrity but not confidentiality v Encapsulation Security Protocol (ESP) § provides source authentication, data integrity, and confidentiality § more widely used than AH Network Security 8 -29

Four combinations are possible! Transport mode with AH Transport mode with ESP Tunnel mode Four combinations are possible! Transport mode with AH Transport mode with ESP Tunnel mode with AH Tunnel mode with ESP most common and most important Network Security 8 -30

Security associations (SAs) v before sending data, “security association (SA)” established from sending to Security associations (SAs) v before sending data, “security association (SA)” established from sending to receiving entity § SAs are simplex: for only one direction v sending and receiving entitles maintain state information about SA § recall: TCP endpoints also maintain state info § IP is connectionless; IPsec is connection-oriented! v how many SAs in VPN w/ headquarters, branch office, and n traveling salespeople? Network Security 8 -31

Example SA from R 1 to R 2 Internet headquarters 200. 168. 1. 100 Example SA from R 1 to R 2 Internet headquarters 200. 168. 1. 100 R 1 172. 16. 1/24 branch office 193. 68. 2. 23 security association R 2 172. 16. 2/24 R 1 stores for each Security Association (SA state): v v v v 32 -bit SA identifier: Security Parameter Index (SPI) origin SA interface (200. 168. 1. 100) destination SA interface (193. 68. 2. 23) type of encryption used (e. g. , 3 DES with CBC) encryption key type of integrity check used (e. g. , HMAC with MD 5) authentication key Network Security 8 -32

Security Association Database (SAD) endpoint holds SA states for many SAs in a security Security Association Database (SAD) endpoint holds SA states for many SAs in a security association database (SAD), where it can locate them during processing. v e. g. , with n salespersons, in earlier example: 2 + 2 n SAs in R 1’s SAD v when sending IPsec datagram, R 1 accesses SAD to determine how to process datagram. v when IPsec datagram arrives to R 2, R 2 examines SPI in IPsec datagram, indexes SAD with SPI, and processes datagram accordingly. v Network Security 8 -33

IPsec datagram focus for now on tunnel mode with ESP “enchilada” authenticated encrypted new IPsec datagram focus for now on tunnel mode with ESP “enchilada” authenticated encrypted new IP header ESP hdr SPI original IP hdr Seq # Original IP datagram payload padding ESP trl ESP auth pad next length header Network Security 8 -34

What happens? Internet headquarters 200. 168. 1. 100 R 1 branch office 193. 68. What happens? Internet headquarters 200. 168. 1. 100 R 1 branch office 193. 68. 2. 23 security association 172. 16. 1/24 R 2 172. 16. 2/24 “enchilada” authenticated encrypted new IP header ESP hdr SPI original IP hdr Seq # Original IP datagram payload padding ESP trl ESP auth pad next length header Network Security 8 -35

R 1: convert original datagram to IPsec datagram v v v appends to back R 1: convert original datagram to IPsec datagram v v v appends to back of original datagram (which includes original header fields!) an “ESP trailer” field. encrypts result using algorithm & key specified by SA. appends to front of this encrypted quantity the “ESP header, creating “enchilada”. creates authentication MAC over the whole enchilada, using algorithm and key specified in SA; appends MAC to back of enchilada, forming payload; creates brand new IP header, with all the classic IPv 4 header fields, which it appends before payload. Network Security 8 -36

Inside the enchilada: “enchilada” authenticated encrypted new IP header ESP hdr SPI v v Inside the enchilada: “enchilada” authenticated encrypted new IP header ESP hdr SPI v v original IP hdr Seq # Original IP datagram payload padding ESP trl ESP auth pad next length header ESP trailer: Padding for block ciphers ESP header: § SPI, so receiving entity knows what to do § Sequence number, to thwart replay attacks v MAC in ESP auth field is created with shared secret key Network Security 8 -37

IPsec sequence numbers v v for new SA, sender initializes seq. # to 0 IPsec sequence numbers v v for new SA, sender initializes seq. # to 0 each time datagram is sent on SA: § sender increments seq # counter § places value in seq # field v goal: § prevent attacker from sniffing and replaying a packet § receipt of duplicate, authenticated IP packets may disrupt service v method: § destination checks for duplicates § doesn’t keep track of all received packets; instead uses a window Network Security 8 -38

Security Policy Database (SPD) v v policy: For a given datagram, sending entity needs Security Policy Database (SPD) v v policy: For a given datagram, sending entity needs to know if it should use IPsec needs also to know which SA to use § may use: source and destination IP address; protocol number v v info in SPD indicates “what” to do with arriving datagram info in SAD indicates “how” to do it Network Security 8 -39

Summary: IPsec services v suppose Trudy sits somewhere between R 1 and R 2. Summary: IPsec services v suppose Trudy sits somewhere between R 1 and R 2. she doesn’t know the keys. § will Trudy be able to see original contents of datagram? How about source, destination IP address, transport protocol, application port? § flip bits without detection? § masquerade as R 1 using R 1’s IP address? § replay a datagram? Network Security 8 -40

IKE: Internet Key Exchange v previous examples: manual establishment of IPsec SAs in IPsec IKE: Internet Key Exchange v previous examples: manual establishment of IPsec SAs in IPsec endpoints: Example SA SPI: 12345 Source IP: 200. 168. 1. 100 Dest IP: 193. 68. 2. 23 Protocol: ESP Encryption algorithm: 3 DES-cbc HMAC algorithm: MD 5 Encryption key: 0 x 7 aeaca… HMAC key: 0 xc 0291 f… v v manual keying is impractical for VPN with 100 s of endpoints instead use IPsec IKE (Internet Key Exchange) Network Security 8 -41

IKE: PSK and PKI v authentication (prove who you are) with either § pre-shared IKE: PSK and PKI v authentication (prove who you are) with either § pre-shared secret (PSK) or § with PKI (pubic/private keys and certificates). v PSK: both sides start with secret § run IKE to authenticate each other and to generate IPsec SAs (one in each direction), including encryption, authentication keys v PKI: both sides start with public/private key pair, certificate § run IKE to authenticate each other, obtain IPsec SAs (one in each direction). § similar with handshake in SSL. Network Security 8 -42

IKE phases v IKE has two phases § phase 1: establish bi-directional IKE SA IKE phases v IKE has two phases § phase 1: establish bi-directional IKE SA • note: IKE SA different from IPsec SA • aka ISAKMP security association § phase 2: ISAKMP is used to securely negotiate IPsec pair of SAs v phase 1 has two modes: aggressive mode and main mode § aggressive mode uses fewer messages § main mode provides identity protection and is more flexible Network Security 8 -43

IPsec summary v v v IKE message exchange for algorithms, secret keys, SPI numbers IPsec summary v v v IKE message exchange for algorithms, secret keys, SPI numbers either AH or ESP protocol (or both) § AH provides integrity, source authentication § ESP protocol (with AH) additionally provides encryption IPsec peers can be two end systems, two routers/firewalls, or a router/firewall and an end system Network Security 8 -44

Chapter 8 roadmap 8. 1 What is network security? 8. 2 Principles of cryptography Chapter 8 roadmap 8. 1 What is network security? 8. 2 Principles of cryptography 8. 3 Message integrity 8. 4 Securing e-mail 8. 5 Securing TCP connections: SSL 8. 6 Network layer security: IPsec 8. 7 Securing wireless LANs 8. 8 Operational security: firewalls and IDS Network Security 8 -45

WEP design goals v symmetric key crypto § confidentiality § end host authorization § WEP design goals v symmetric key crypto § confidentiality § end host authorization § data integrity v v self-synchronizing: each packet separately encrypted § given encrypted packet and key, can decrypt; can continue to decrypt packets when preceding packet was lost (unlike Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) in block ciphers) Efficient § implementable in hardware or software Network Security 8 -46

Review: symmetric stream ciphers key v v keystream generator keystream combine each byte of Review: symmetric stream ciphers key v v keystream generator keystream combine each byte of keystream with byte of plaintext to get ciphertext: § m(i) = ith unit of message § ks(i) = ith unit of keystream § c(i) = ith unit of ciphertext § c(i) = ks(i) m(i) ( = exclusive or) § m(i) = ks(i) c(i) WEP uses RC 4 Network Security 8 -47

Stream cipher and packet independence v v v recall design goal: each packet separately Stream cipher and packet independence v v v recall design goal: each packet separately encrypted if for frame n+1, use keystream from where we left off for frame n, then each frame is not separately encrypted § need to know where we left off for packet n WEP approach: initialize keystream with key + new IV for each packet: Key+IVpacket keystream generator keystreampacket Network Security 8 -48

WEP encryption (1) v sender calculates Integrity Check Value (ICV) over data § four-byte WEP encryption (1) v sender calculates Integrity Check Value (ICV) over data § four-byte hash/CRC for data integrity v v v each side has 104 -bit shared key sender creates 24 -bit initialization vector (IV), appends to key: gives 128 -bit key sender also appends key. ID (in 8 -bit field) 128 -bit key inputted into pseudo random number generator to get keystream data in frame + ICV is encrypted with RC 4: § Bbytes of keystream are XORed with bytes of data & ICV § IV & key. ID are appended to encrypted data to create payload § payload inserted into 802. 11 frame encrypted IV Key ID data ICV MAC payload Network Security 8 -49

WEP encryption (2) new IV for each frame Network Security 8 -50 WEP encryption (2) new IV for each frame Network Security 8 -50

WEP decryption overview encrypted IV Key ID data ICV MAC payload v v receiver WEP decryption overview encrypted IV Key ID data ICV MAC payload v v receiver extracts IV inputs IV, shared secret key into pseudo random generator, gets keystream XORs keystream with encrypted data to decrypt data + ICV verifies integrity of data with ICV § note: message integrity approach used here is different from MAC (message authentication code) and signatures (using PKI). Network Security 8 -51

End-point authentication w/ nonce Nonce: number (R) used only once –in-a-lifetime How to prove End-point authentication w/ nonce Nonce: number (R) used only once –in-a-lifetime How to prove Alice “live”: Bob sends Alice nonce, R. Alice must return R, encrypted with shared secret key “I am Alice” R KA-B (R) Alice is live, and only Alice knows key to encrypt nonce, so it must be Alice! Network Security 8 -52

WEP authentication request nonce (128 bytes) nonce encrypted shared key success if decrypted value WEP authentication request nonce (128 bytes) nonce encrypted shared key success if decrypted value equals nonce Notes: v v v not all APs do it, even if WEP is being used AP indicates if authentication is necessary in beacon frame done before association Network Security 8 -53

Breaking 802. 11 WEP encryption security hole: v v 24 -bit IV, one IV Breaking 802. 11 WEP encryption security hole: v v 24 -bit IV, one IV per frame, -> IV’s eventually reused IV transmitted in plaintext -> IV reuse detected attack: § Trudy causes Alice to encrypt known plaintext d 1 d 2 d 3 d 4 … § Trudy sees: ci = di XOR ki. IV § Trudy knows ci di, so can compute ki. IV § Trudy knows encrypting key sequence k 1 IV k 2 IV k 3 IV … § Next time IV is used, Trudy can decrypt! Network Security 8 -54

802. 11 i: improved security v v v numerous (stronger) forms of encryption possible 802. 11 i: improved security v v v numerous (stronger) forms of encryption possible provides key distribution uses authentication server separate from access point Network Security 8 -55

802. 11 i: four phases of operation AP: access point STA: client station AS: 802. 11 i: four phases of operation AP: access point STA: client station AS: wired network Authentication server 1 Discovery of security capabilities 2 STA and AS mutually authenticate, together generate Master Key (MK). AP serves as “pass through” 3 STA derives Pairwise Master Key (PMK) 4 STA, AP use PMK to derive Temporal Key (TK) used for message encryption, integrity 3 AS derives same PMK, sends to AP Network Security 8 -56

EAP: extensible authentication protocol v v EAP: end-end client (mobile) to authentication server protocol EAP: extensible authentication protocol v v EAP: end-end client (mobile) to authentication server protocol EAP sent over separate “links” § mobile-to-AP (EAP over LAN) § AP to authentication server (RADIUS over UDP) wired network EAP TLS EAP over LAN (EAPo. L) IEEE 802. 11 RADIUS UDP/IP Network Security 8 -57

Chapter 8 roadmap 8. 1 What is network security? 8. 2 Principles of cryptography Chapter 8 roadmap 8. 1 What is network security? 8. 2 Principles of cryptography 8. 3 Message integrity 8. 4 Securing e-mail 8. 5 Securing TCP connections: SSL 8. 6 Network layer security: IPsec 8. 7 Securing wireless LANs 8. 8 Operational security: firewalls and IDS Network Security 8 -58

Firewalls firewall isolates organization’s internal net from larger Internet, allowing some packets to pass, Firewalls firewall isolates organization’s internal net from larger Internet, allowing some packets to pass, blocking others public Internet administered network trusted “good guys” firewall untrusted “bad guys” Network Security 8 -59

Firewalls: why prevent denial of service attacks: v SYN flooding: attacker establishes many bogus Firewalls: why prevent denial of service attacks: v SYN flooding: attacker establishes many bogus TCP connections, no resources left for “real” connections prevent illegal modification/access of internal data v e. g. , attacker replaces CIA’s homepage with something else allow only authorized access to inside network v set of authenticated users/hosts three types of firewalls: v stateless packet filters v stateful packet filters v application gateways Network Security 8 -60

Stateless packet filtering Should arriving packet be allowed in? Departing packet let out? v Stateless packet filtering Should arriving packet be allowed in? Departing packet let out? v v internal network connected to Internet via router firewall router filters packet-by-packet, decision to forward/drop packet based on: § source IP address, destination IP address § TCP/UDP source and destination port numbers § ICMP message type § TCP SYN and ACK bits Network Security 8 -61

Stateless packet filtering: example v v example 1: block incoming and outgoing datagrams with Stateless packet filtering: example v v example 1: block incoming and outgoing datagrams with IP protocol field = 17 and with either source or dest port = 23 § result: all incoming, outgoing UDP flows and telnet connections are blocked example 2: block inbound TCP segments with ACK=0. § result: prevents external clients from making TCP connections with internal clients, but allows internal clients to connect to outside. Network Security 8 -62

Stateless packet filtering: more examples Policy Firewall Setting No outside Web access. Drop all Stateless packet filtering: more examples Policy Firewall Setting No outside Web access. Drop all outgoing packets to any IP address, port 80 No incoming TCP connections, except those for institution’s public Web server only. Drop all incoming TCP SYN packets to any IP except 130. 207. 244. 203, port 80 Prevent Web-radios from eating up the available bandwidth. Drop all incoming UDP packets except DNS and router broadcasts. Prevent your network from being used for a smurf Do. S attack. Drop all ICMP packets going to a “broadcast” address (e. g. 130. 207. 255). Prevent your network from being tracerouted Drop all outgoing ICMP TTL expired traffic Network Security 8 -63

Access Control Lists v ACL: table of rules, applied top to bottom to incoming Access Control Lists v ACL: table of rules, applied top to bottom to incoming packets: (action, condition) pairs action source address dest address allow 222. 22/16 outside of 222. 22/16 allow outside of 222. 22/16 deny all protocol source port dest port flag bit TCP > 1023 80 TCP 80 > 1023 ACK UDP > 1023 53 --- UDP 53 > 1023 ---- all all any Network Security 8 -64

Stateful packet filtering v stateless packet filter: heavy handed tool § admits packets that Stateful packet filtering v stateless packet filter: heavy handed tool § admits packets that “make no sense, ” e. g. , dest port = 80, ACK bit set, even though no TCP connection established: action allow v source address dest address outside of 222. 22/16 protocol source port dest port flag bit TCP 80 > 1023 ACK stateful packet filter: track status of every TCP connection § track connection setup (SYN), teardown (FIN): determine whether incoming, outgoing packets “makes sense” § timeout inactive connections at firewall: no longer admit packets Network Security 8 -65

Stateful packet filtering v ACL augmented to indicate need to check connection state table Stateful packet filtering v ACL augmented to indicate need to check connection state table before admitting packet action source address dest address proto source port dest port allow 222. 22/16 outside of 222. 22/16 TCP > 1023 80 allow outside of 222. 22/16 TCP 80 > 1023 ACK allow 222. 22/16 UDP > 1023 53 --- allow outside of 222. 22/16 UDP 53 > 1023 ---- deny all all all 222. 22/16 outside of 222. 22/16 flag bit check conxion any x x Network Security 8 -66

Application gateways host-to-gateway telnet session v v filters packets on application data as well Application gateways host-to-gateway telnet session v v filters packets on application data as well as on IP/TCP/UDP fields. example: allow select internal users to telnet outside. application gateway-to-remote host telnet session router and filter 1. require all telnet users to telnet through gateway. 2. for authorized users, gateway sets up telnet connection to dest host. Gateway relays data between 2 connections 3. router filter blocks all telnet connections not originating from gateway. Network Security 8 -67

Application gateways v v filter packets on application data as well as on IP/TCP/UDP Application gateways v v filter packets on application data as well as on IP/TCP/UDP fields. example: allow select internal users to telnet outside host-to-gateway telnet session application gateway router and filter gateway-to-remote host telnet session 1. require all telnet users to telnet through gateway. 2. for authorized users, gateway sets up telnet connection to dest host. Gateway relays data between 2 connections 3. router filter blocks all telnet connections not originating from gateway. Network Security 8 -68

Limitations of firewalls, gateways v v v IP spoofing: router can’t know if data Limitations of firewalls, gateways v v v IP spoofing: router can’t know if data “really” comes from claimed source if multiple app’s. need special treatment, each has own app. gateway client software must know how to contact gateway. § e. g. , must set IP address of proxy in Web browser v v v filters often use all or nothing policy for UDP tradeoff: degree of communication with outside world, level of security many highly protected sites still suffer from attacks Network Security 8 -69

Intrusion detection systems v packet filtering: § operates on TCP/IP headers only § no Intrusion detection systems v packet filtering: § operates on TCP/IP headers only § no correlation check among sessions v IDS: intrusion detection system § deep packet inspection: look at packet contents (e. g. , check character strings in packet against database of known virus, attack strings) § examine correlation among multiple packets • port scanning • network mapping • Do. S attack Network Security 8 -70

Intrusion detection systems v multiple IDSs: different types of checking at different locations firewall Intrusion detection systems v multiple IDSs: different types of checking at different locations firewall internal network IDS sensors Internet Web DNS server FTP server demilitarized zone Network Security 8 -71

Network Security (summary) basic techniques…. . . § cryptography (symmetric and public) § message Network Security (summary) basic techniques…. . . § cryptography (symmetric and public) § message integrity § end-point authentication …. used in many different security scenarios § § secure email secure transport (SSL) IP sec 802. 11 operational security: firewalls and IDS Network Security 8 -72