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Chapter 10: Network Security Chapter goals: r understand principles of network security: m cryptography Chapter 10: Network Security Chapter goals: r understand principles of network security: m cryptography and its many uses beyond “confidentiality” m authentication m message integrity m key distribution r security in practice: m firewalls m security in application, transport, network, link layers 7 -1

What is network security? Confidentiality: only sender, intended receiver should “understand” message contents m What is network security? Confidentiality: only sender, intended receiver should “understand” message contents m sender encrypts message m receiver decrypts message Authentication: sender, receiver want to confirm identity of each other Authorization: authenticated entity belongs to proper access control list m Driver’s license 7 -2

What is network security? Message Integrity: sender, receiver want to ensure message not altered What is network security? Message Integrity: sender, receiver want to ensure message not altered (in transit, or afterwards) without detection Nonrepudiation: sender cannot deny later that messages received were indeed sent Access and Availability: services must be accessible and available to users upon demand Anonymity: identity of sender is hidden from receiver (within a group of possible senders) 7 -3

Friends and enemies: Alice, Bob, Trudy r well-known in network security world r Bob, Friends and enemies: Alice, Bob, Trudy r well-known in network security world r Bob, Alice (lovers!) want to communicate “securely” r Trudy (intruder) may intercept, delete, add messages Alice data channel secure sender Bob data, control messages secure receiver data Trudy 4

Who might Bob, Alice be? r … well, real-life Bobs and Alices! r Web Who might Bob, Alice be? r … well, real-life Bobs and Alices! r Web browser/server for electronic transactions (e. g. , on-line purchases) r on-line banking client/server r DNS servers r routers exchanging routing table updates r other examples? 7 -5

There are bad guys (and girls) out there! Q: What can a “bad guy” There are bad guys (and girls) out there! Q: What can a “bad guy” do? A: a lot! m eavesdrop: intercept messages m actively insert messages into connection m impersonation: can fake (spoof) source address in packet (or any field in packet) m hijacking: “take over” ongoing connection by removing sender or receiver, inserting himself in place m denial of service: prevent service from being used by others (e. g. , by overloading resources) more on this later …… 7 -6

The language of cryptography Alice’s K encryption A key plaintext encryption algorithm Bob’s K The language of cryptography Alice’s K encryption A key plaintext encryption algorithm Bob’s K decryption B key ciphertext decryption plaintext algorithm symmetric key crypto: sender, receiver keys identical public-key crypto: encryption key public, decryption key secret (private) 7 -7

Symmetric key cryptography substitution cipher: substituting one thing for another m monoalphabetic cipher: substitute Symmetric key cryptography substitution cipher: substituting one thing for another m monoalphabetic cipher: substitute one letter for another plaintext: abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz ciphertext: mnbvcxzasdfghjklpoiuytrewq E. g. : Plaintext: bob. i love you. alice ciphertext: nkn. s gktc wky. mgsbc Q: How hard to break this simple cipher? : q brute force (how hard? ) q other? 7 -8

Symmetric key cryptography KA-B plaintext message, m encryption ciphertext algorithm K (m) A-B decryption Symmetric key cryptography KA-B plaintext message, m encryption ciphertext algorithm K (m) A-B decryption plaintext algorithm m=K A-B ( KA-B(m) ) symmetric key crypto: Bob and Alice share know same (symmetric) key: K A-B r e. g. , key is knowing substitution pattern in mono alphabetic substitution cipher r Q: how do Bob and Alice agree on key value? 7 -9

Symmetric key crypto: DES: Data Encryption Standard r US encryption standard [NIST 1993] r Symmetric key crypto: DES: Data Encryption Standard r US encryption standard [NIST 1993] r 56 -bit symmetric key, 64 -bit plaintext input r How secure is DES? m DES Challenge: 56 -bit-key-encrypted phrase (“Strong cryptography makes the world a safer place”) decrypted (brute force) in 4 months m no known “backdoor” decryption approach r making DES more secure: m use three keys sequentially (3 -DES) on each datum m use cipher-block chaining 7 -10

Symmetric key crypto: DES operation initial permutation 16 identical “rounds” of function application, each Symmetric key crypto: DES operation initial permutation 16 identical “rounds” of function application, each using different 48 bits of key final permutation 7 -11

Public Key Cryptography symmetric key crypto r requires sender, receiver know shared secret key Public Key Cryptography symmetric key crypto r requires sender, receiver know shared secret key r Q: how to agree on key in first place (particularly if never “met”)? public key cryptography r radically different approach [Diffie. Hellman 76, RSA 78] r sender, receiver do not share secret key r public encryption key known to all r private decryption key known only to receiver 12

Public key cryptography + Bob’s public B key K K plaintext message, m encryption Public key cryptography + Bob’s public B key K K plaintext message, m encryption ciphertext algorithm + K (m) B - Bob’s private B key decryption plaintext algorithm message + m = K B(K (m)) B 7 -13

Public key encryption algorithms Requirements: 1 2 . . + need K B( ) Public key encryption algorithms Requirements: 1 2 . . + need K B( ) and K - ( ) such that B - + K (K (m)) = m B B + given public key KB , it should be impossible to compute private key K B RSA: Rivest, Shamir, Adelson algorithm 7 -14

RSA: Choosing keys 1. Choose two large prime numbers p, q. (e. g. , RSA: Choosing keys 1. Choose two large prime numbers p, q. (e. g. , 1024 bits each) 2. Compute n = pq, z = (p-1)(q-1) 3. Choose e (with e

RSA: Encryption, decryption 0. Given (n, e) and (n, d) as computed above 1. RSA: Encryption, decryption 0. Given (n, e) and (n, d) as computed above 1. To encrypt bit pattern, m, compute e mod n (i. e. , remainder when m e is divided by n) c=m 2. To decrypt received bit pattern, c, compute d m = c d mod n (i. e. , remainder when c is divided by n) Magic d m = (m e mod n) mod n happens! c 7 -16

RSA example: Bob chooses p=5, q=7. Then n=35, z=24. e=5 (so e, z relatively RSA example: Bob chooses p=5, q=7. Then n=35, z=24. e=5 (so e, z relatively prime). d=29 (so ed-1 exactly divisible by z. encrypt: decrypt: letter m me l 12 1524832 c 17 d c 48196857210675091411825223071697 c = me mod n 17 m = cd mod n letter 12 l 7 -17

RSA: m = (m e mod n) Why is that d mod n Useful RSA: m = (m e mod n) Why is that d mod n Useful number theory result: If p, q prime and n = pq, then: y y mod (p-1)(q-1) x mod n = x mod n e (m mod n) d mod n = med mod n = m ed mod (p-1)(q-1) mod n (using number theory result above) 1 = m mod n (since we chose ed to be divisible by (p-1)(q-1) with remainder 1 ) = m 7 -18

RSA: another important property The following property will be very useful later: - + RSA: another important property The following property will be very useful later: - + B B K (K (m)) + = m = K (K (m)) B B use public key first, followed by private key use private key first, followed by public key Result is the same! 7 -19

Authentication Goal: Bob wants Alice to “prove” her identity to him Protocol ap 1. Authentication Goal: Bob wants Alice to “prove” her identity to him Protocol ap 1. 0: Alice says “I am Alice” Failure scenario? ? 7 -20

Authentication Goal: Bob wants Alice to “prove” her identity to him Protocol ap 1. Authentication Goal: Bob wants Alice to “prove” her identity to him Protocol ap 1. 0: Alice says “I am Alice” in a network, Bob can not “see” Alice, so Trudy simply declares herself to be Alice 7 -21

Authentication: another try Protocol ap 2. 0: Alice says “I am Alice” in an Authentication: another try Protocol ap 2. 0: Alice says “I am Alice” in an IP packet containing her source IP address Alice’s “I am Alice” IP address Failure scenario? ? 7 -22

Authentication: another try Protocol ap 2. 0: Alice says “I am Alice” in an Authentication: another try Protocol ap 2. 0: Alice says “I am Alice” in an IP packet containing her source IP address Alice’s IP address Trudy can create a packet “spoofing” “I am Alice” Alice’s address 7 -23

Authentication: another try Protocol ap 3. 0: Alice says “I am Alice” and sends Authentication: another try Protocol ap 3. 0: Alice says “I am Alice” and sends her secret password to “prove” it. Alice’s “I’m Alice” IP addr password Alice’s IP addr OK Failure scenario? ? 7 -24

Authentication: another try Protocol ap 3. 0: Alice says “I am Alice” and sends Authentication: another try Protocol ap 3. 0: Alice says “I am Alice” and sends her secret password to “prove” it. Alice’s “I’m Alice” IP addr password Alice’s IP addr OK playback attack: Trudy records Alice’s packet and later plays it back to Bob Alice’s “I’m Alice” IP addr password 7 -25

Authentication: yet another try Protocol ap 3. 1: Alice says “I am Alice” and Authentication: yet another try Protocol ap 3. 1: Alice says “I am Alice” and sends her encrypted secret password to “prove” it. Alice’s encrypted “I’m Alice” IP addr password Alice’s IP addr OK Failure scenario? ? 7 -26

Authentication: another try Protocol ap 3. 1: Alice says “I am Alice” and sends Authentication: another try Protocol ap 3. 1: Alice says “I am Alice” and sends her encrypted secret password to “prove” it. Alice’s encryppted “I’m Alice” IP addr password Alice’s IP addr OK record and playback still works! Alice’s encrypted “I’m Alice” IP addr password 7 -27

Authentication: yet another try Goal: avoid playback attack Nonce: number (R) used only once Authentication: yet another try Goal: avoid playback attack Nonce: number (R) used only once –in-a-lifetime ap 4. 0: to prove Alice “live”, Bob sends Alice nonce, R. Alice must return R, encrypted with shared secret key “I am Alice” R KA-B(R) Failures, drawbacks? Alice is live, and only Alice knows key to encrypt nonce, so it must be Alice! 7 -28

Authentication: ap 5. 0 ap 4. 0 requires shared symmetric key r can we Authentication: ap 5. 0 ap 4. 0 requires shared symmetric key r can we authenticate using public key techniques? ap 5. 0: use nonce, public key cryptography “I am Alice” R Bob computes + - - K A (R) “send me your public key” + KA KA(KA (R)) = R and knows only Alice could have the private key, that encrypted R such that + K (K (R)) = R A A 7 -29

ap 5. 0: security hole Man (woman) in the middle attack: Trudy poses as ap 5. 0: security hole Man (woman) in the middle attack: Trudy poses as Alice (to Bob) and as Bob (to Alice) I am Alice R K (R) T K (R) A Send me your public key + K T Send me your public key + K A - + m = K (K (m)) A A + K (m) A Trudy gets - + m = K (K (m)) sends T to Alice m T + K (m) T ennrypted with Alice’s public key 7 -30

ap 5. 0: security hole Man (woman) in the middle attack: Trudy poses as ap 5. 0: security hole Man (woman) in the middle attack: Trudy poses as Alice (to Bob) and as Bob (to Alice) Difficult to detect: q Bob receives everything that Alice sends, and vice versa. (e. g. , so Bob, Alice can meet one week later and recall conversation) q problem is that Trudy receives all messages as well! 7 -31

Digital Signatures Cryptographic technique analogous to handwritten signatures. r sender (Bob) digitally signs document, Digital Signatures Cryptographic technique analogous to handwritten signatures. r sender (Bob) digitally signs document, establishing he is document owner/creator. r verifiable, nonforgeable: recipient (Alice) can prove to someone that Bob, and no one else (including Alice), must have signed document 7 -32

Digital Signatures Simple digital signature for message m: r Bob signs m by encrypting Digital Signatures Simple digital signature for message m: r Bob signs m by encrypting with his private key - KB, creating “signed” message, KB(m) Bob’s message, m Dear Alice Oh, how I have missed you. I think of you all the time! …(blah) Bob K B Bob’s private key Public key encryption algorithm K B(m) Bob’s message, m, signed (encrypted) with his private key 7 -33

Digital Signatures (more) - r Suppose Alice receives msg m, digital signature K B(m) Digital Signatures (more) - r Suppose Alice receives msg m, digital signature K B(m) r Alice verifies m signed by Bob by applying Bob’s + - public key KB to KB(m) then checks KB(KB(m) ) = m. + - r If KB(KB(m) ) = m, whoever signed m must have used Bob’s private key. Alice thus verifies that: ü Bob signed m. ü No one else signed m. ü Bob signed m and not m’. Non-repudiation: ü Alice can take m, and signature KB(m) to court and prove that Bob signed m. 7 -34

Hash Function Algorithms r MD 5 hash function widely used (RFC 1321) m computes Hash Function Algorithms r MD 5 hash function widely used (RFC 1321) m computes 128 -bit message digest in 4 -step process. m arbitrary 128 -bit string x, appears difficult to construct msg m whose MD 5 hash is equal to x. r SHA-1 is also used. m US standard [NIST, FIPS PUB 180 -1] m 160 -bit message digest 7 -35

Key Distribution Center (KDC) r Alice, Bob need shared symmetric key. r KDC: server Key Distribution Center (KDC) r Alice, Bob need shared symmetric key. r KDC: server shares different secret key with each registered user (many users) r Alice, Bob know own symmetric keys, KA-KDC KB-KDC , for communicating with KDC KA-KDC KP-KDC KB-KDC KA-KDC KX-KDC KY-KDC KB-KDC KZ-KDC 7 -36

Key Distribution Center (KDC) Q: How does KDC allow Bob, Alice to determine shared Key Distribution Center (KDC) Q: How does KDC allow Bob, Alice to determine shared symmetric secret key to communicate with each other? KDC generates R 1 KA-KDC(A, B) Alice knows R 1 KA-KDC(R 1, KB-KDC(A, R 1) ) KB-KDC(A, R 1) Bob knows to use R 1 to communicate with Alice and Bob communicate: using R 1 as session key for shared symmetric encryption 7 -37

Certification Authorities r Certification authority (CA): binds public key to particular entity, E. r Certification Authorities r Certification authority (CA): binds public key to particular entity, E. r E (person, router) registers its public key with CA. m m m E provides “proof of identity” to CA. CA creates certificate binding E to its public key. certificate containing E’s public key digitally signed by CA – CA says “this is E’s public key” Bob’s public key Bob’s identifying information + KB digital signature (encrypt) CA private key K- CA + KB certificate for Bob’s public key, signed by CA 7 -38

Certification Authorities r When Alice wants Bob’s public key: m gets Bob’s certificate (Bob Certification Authorities r When Alice wants Bob’s public key: m gets Bob’s certificate (Bob or elsewhere). m apply CA’s public key to Bob’s certificate, get Bob’s public key + KB digital signature (decrypt) CA public key Bob’s public + key KB + K CA 7 -39

A certificate contains: r Serial number (unique to issuer) r info about certificate owner, A certificate contains: r Serial number (unique to issuer) r info about certificate owner, including algorithm and key value itself (not shown) r info about certificate issuer r valid dates r digital signature by issuer 7 -40

Firewalls firewall isolates organization’s internal net from larger Internet, allowing some packets to pass, Firewalls firewall isolates organization’s internal net from larger Internet, allowing some packets to pass, blocking others. public Internet administered network firewall 7 -41

Firewalls: Why prevent denial of service attacks: m SYN flooding: attacker establishes many bogus Firewalls: Why prevent denial of service attacks: m SYN flooding: attacker establishes many bogus TCP connections, no resources left for “real” connections. prevent illegal modification/access of internal data. m e. g. , attacker replaces CIA’s homepage with something else allow only authorized access to inside network (set of authenticated users/hosts) two types of firewalls: m application-level m packet-filtering 7 -42

Packet Filtering Should arriving packet be allowed in? Departing packet let out? r internal Packet Filtering Should arriving packet be allowed in? Departing packet let out? r internal network connected to Internet via router firewall r router filters packet-by-packet, decision to forward/drop packet based on: m m source IP address, destination IP address TCP/UDP source and destination port numbers ICMP message type TCP SYN and ACK bits 7 -43

Packet Filtering r Example 1: block incoming and outgoing datagrams with IP protocol field Packet Filtering r Example 1: block incoming and outgoing datagrams with IP protocol field = 17 and with either source or dest port = 23. m All incoming and outgoing UDP flows and telnet connections are blocked. r Example 2: Block inbound TCP segments with ACK=0. m Prevents external clients from making TCP connections with internal clients, but allows internal clients to connect to outside. 7 -44

Application gateways r Filters packets on application data as well as on IP/TCP/UDP fields. Application gateways r Filters packets on application data as well as on IP/TCP/UDP fields. r Example: allow select internal users to telnet outside. host-to-gateway telnet session application gateway-to-remote host telnet session router and filter 1. Require all telnet users to telnet through gateway. 2. For authorized users, gateway sets up telnet connection to dest host. Gateway relays data between 2 connections 3. Router filter blocks all telnet connections not originating from gateway. 7 -45

Limitations of firewalls and gateways r IP spoofing: router can’t know if data “really” Limitations of firewalls and gateways r IP spoofing: router can’t know if data “really” comes from claimed source r if multiple app’s. need special treatment, each has own app. gateway. r client software must know how to contact gateway. m r filters often use all or nothing policy for UDP. r tradeoff: degree of communication with outside world, level of security r many highly protected sites still suffer from attacks. e. g. , must set IP address of proxy in Web browser 7 -46

Secure sockets layer (SSL) r transport layer security to any TCPbased app using SSL Secure sockets layer (SSL) r transport layer security to any TCPbased app using SSL services. r used between Web browsers, servers for e-commerce (shttp). r security services: m m m server authentication data encryption client authentication (optional) r server authentication: m SSL-enabled browser includes public keys for trusted CAs. m Browser requests server certificate, issued by trusted CA. m Browser uses CA’s public key to extract server’s public key from certificate. r check your browser’s security menu to see its trusted CAs. 7 -47

SSL (continued) Encrypted SSL session: r Browser generates symmetric session key, encrypts it with SSL (continued) Encrypted SSL session: r Browser generates symmetric session key, encrypts it with server’s public key, sends encrypted key to server. r Using private key, server decrypts session key. r Browser, server know session key m r SSL: basis of IETF Transport Layer Security (TLS). r SSL can be used for non-Web applications, e. g. , IMAP. r Client authentication can be done with client certificates. All data sent into TCP socket (by client or server) encrypted with session key. 7 -48