CHAP I THE PROBLEM W AMERICAN DEMOCRACY A

CHAP I. THE PROBLEM W/ AMERICAN DEMOCRACY A. FAITH - KEEPING l Americans chose: - peace in ‘ 64 and got Vietnam - law & order in ‘ 68 and got Watergate - to restore an effective presidency in ‘ 76 and got a “crisis of confidence, ” gas lines and helplessness vs. a hostage-taking Iran

A. Faith - Keeping (cont) l Americans chose (cont) - bold leadership in ‘ 80 but got a secret “arms for hostages” deal - prosperity in ‘ 88 and got a slump in ‘ 99 - “the most ethical administration in history” in 92 and saw a president impeached on grounds of perjury and obstruction of justice

A. Faith - Keeping (cont) l Thus … the problem with American democracy is that it too often does not keep faith with the public B. American Democracy l Democracy divides and distributes power much more broadly than any other form of government

B. American Democracy (continued) l With no single source of control, tyranny nearly impossible in a demo. l Fragmentation and stalemated leadership and … l the consequent failure to follow through are much more typical of democracy

B. American Democracy (continued) l Fragmentation likely in the U. S. where government was divided from the start Question: Is American democracy working? l Answer: “No” or, at least, “not well enough. ” l l With weakened parties - the chief instrument of democracy - American democracy delivers less dependably on paths the American public has chosen

l Weak B. American Democracy (cont) parties reduce the practical consequences of voting l The legitimacy of American government suffers …. not because elected officials do not want to keep promises l but because they lack the means viable parties once provided

B. American Democracy (cont) With notable exceptions (? ) , today’s parties do not produce working governing majorities capable of keeping a promised public agenda l Nor do they have the power to curb special interests l As a result, victories of diverse interest groups have grab-bag effect on policy l instead of enacting a promised public agenda in recognizable form l

B. American Democracy (cont) Participation declined in last 1/3 of 20 th century l Why vote if government does not respond to “people like me” anyway? l Feelings of cynicism and inefficacy have increased l l Partisanship and the belief in the utility of voting have decreased

l B. Am. Democracy (cont. ) The impossibility of holding officials accountable = 1 consequence l 2 nd follows from the 1 st: i. e. , Democracy itself is an issue in the United States. - Democracy requires political institutions capable of proposing and insisting on public agendas and that, in turn, requires resilient electoral and governing majorities

B. Am. Democracy As coalition builders working parties: (cont) l put the pieces together to achieve majorities l are the electorate’s means of making and implementing public choices When parties are weakened as coalition builders l power of interest groups increases l … majorities do not drive policymaking - - minorities do

(cont) l l B. Am. Democracy Groups represent much narrower “publics” Governmental divisions + strong groups + weak parties = problems with American government’s : 1. Efficacy of government 2. Accountability of government 3. Legitimacy of government

B. Am. Democracy(cont) l One could argue that popular sovereignty in United States centers NOT in the public or electorate… in the organized public universe of interest group constituencies) l …but (i. e. ,

C. Democracy, Pluralism and Elitism l Democracy = making and implementation of public choices through majoritarian means Democracy may be direct or indirect (define. ) l Necessarily indirect in the United States. . . (Why? ) l

C. Democracy, Pluralism & Elitism (cont) l Indirect democracy leads readily lead to pluralism l Pluralism = the competition over policy between organized groups l Many would consider pluralism part & parcel of democracy

C. Democracy, Pluralism & Elitism (cont) l BUT … pluralism responds to the organized public l democracy responds to the general, or at least the attentive, public - especially as represented through electoral and public opinion processes l

C. Democracy, Pluralism & Elitism (cont) The organized public is a subset of the general or attentive public l BUT … the organized public is more advantaged demographically …. l … and so, advantaged psychologically and, l … and so, more involved politically l ERGO: two publics are not the same l

C. Democracy, Pluralism & Elitism (cont) l l Political associations (i. e. , groups) are a legitimate part of pluralist democracy Groups specialize in the vital function of interest articulation = expression of support, expectations, needs, interests, preferences & demands to government

C. Democracy, Pluralism & Elitism (cont) l l l BUT … the group’s leadership - usually an oligarchy - may act more on its own than out of responsiveness to the organized public or even to its own constituency In that case, the oligarchy replaces the group and pluralism moves toward elitism Political Elitism = the development of public policy by oligarchies

C. Democracy, Pluralism & Elitism (cont) l Pluralism and elitism merge as interest group oligarchies or elites articulate interests not just to and from their own members, …. l … but directly to public policy elites or oligarchies (e. g. , ? ) who make policy

C. Democracy, Pluralism & Elitism (cont) American government - like any other government - is not wholly democratic nor pluralist nor elitist l Rather … some issues are addressed by democratic process, others by pluralism, others by elitism and still others by some combinations or blends l

C. Democracy, Pluralism & Elitism (cont) l e. g. , - Who shall lead and with what agenda? resolved democratically - Policies having to do with various group stakes resolved pluralistically - Policy oligarchies (elites) determine the most specific policies …. unless …. . .

C. Democracy, Pluralism & Elitism (cont) l Unless …. (continued) - the oligarchy or elite represents a coalition - the broader the array of interest represented…the broader the oligarchy’s policy concerns - may then enact policy agendas - coalitional elites may represent a majority

C. Democracy, Pluralism & Elitism (cont) 1992 and ‘ 94 elections looked like democracy or majoritarianism in action l Public to Clinton: restore the economy l BUT public expected moderate policies l Promise re economy seemed to be kept l BUT public got liberal spending (e. g. , health care proposals) initially l

C. Democracy, Pluralism & Elitism (cont) In apparent attempt to correct Clinton’s expensive, leftward leanings, public elected opposition party to Congress in 1994 l BUT … 1994 results can just as easily be described as pluralism in action. l Republican members of Congress had convinced interests to switch contributions to Republican candidates for Congress l

C. Democracy, Pluralism & Elitism (cont) l It is difficult for a president to keep promises if pluralist and elitist elements in decision-making (d/m) supplant the majoritarian election processes organized by parties l P. S. : 2000 election was extremely partisan - but can pres keep promises?

1. Two Mandates l Compounding the difficulties that arise from pluralism and/ or elitism is that the president must respond not to one but to TWO mandates: l One DOMESTIC l the other INTERNATIONAL

1. Two Mandates (cont) It is to this double mandate - NOT to a specific promise - that the public holds presidents to account l Public will forgive breaking 1 or several promises l l BUT it will NOT forgive breaching the domestic NOR international mandate

1. Two Mandates (cont) l In the last 1/3 of the 20 th century a less partisan and more evaluative public has required a passing grade on both agenda tests for a president to be returned to office

1. Two Mandates (cont) l l Since Eisenhower (1952 - 1960) only two have earned passing marks on both tests Both unable to keep specific promises (Reagan: balanced budget, Clinton: health care reform) (JFK did not get the chance) Both RR & WJC were judged to have kept faith w/ public expectations domestically and internationally (not always the personal faith - e. g. Lewinskygate)

1. Two Mandates (cont) Today’s public can be very supportive of a president judged to keep 2 mandates l RR reelected & helped successor, Bush (R) l WJC reelected in 1996 plus his party gained 5 seats in the mid-term elections of 1998 during impeachment of him by Republican Congress l

1. Two Mandates l l l l BUT … public in last 1/3 of 20 th swift to punish for failing to keep faith with either mandate LBJ passed domestic but failed international test RMN was the other way around GF healed but pardoned domestically JC failed both Domestic & International tests GHWB passed “big I” but failed “big D” (Public classic: What have you done for me lately? ) “Dubya”? ?

2. Partisanship and Political Consumerism Weak partisanship results in “shopping”. . l. . discarding of incumbent presidents l Voter/shoppers may “buy” 1 candidate’s appeal over another whatever “brand” (i. e. , party) label l Results : change over continuity in gov. more than in more partisan eras and …. . . l

2. Partisanship & Political Consumerism (cont) in today’s “fixit, ” technocratic society, the public expects presidents to solve problems (i. e. , lead) BUT. . l without supplying structured and dependable (i. e. , partisan) support to do so l …. and (continued),

2. Partisanship & Pol. Consumerism (cont) Public mandates would be easier for pres to honor if public more inclined to stick with a party choice l BUT … w/ decline of partisanship in the last 1/3, 2 nd terms were rarer than in middle 1/3 (‘ 32 - ‘ 64: Democratic) or the first 1/3 (1900 - ‘ 32: Republican) l

2. Partisanship & Pol. Consumerism (cont) A more apartisan and evaluative public disposed to judge a president as failing either at home or abroad or both l Also less likely to empower a winning candidate as president with a partisan maj. in the leg. to enact their promises l

2. Partisanship & Pol. Consumerism (cont) Increasingly, dividing vote meant divided government l 5 of last 7 presidents (prior to Dubya) have faced opposition Congresses during all or parts of their term(s) l (i. e. , Nixon, Ford, Reagan, Bush & Clinton) Dubya may in 2004 l

2. Partisanship & Pol. Consumerism (cont) Contrast: in 1 st 2/3 of 20 th only 2 of 9 pres. s were frustrated in staying pres l Hoover was defeated in 1932 l Truman would have lost in 1952 had he chosen to run l Two presidents died prior to running a 2 nd time (Harding and Kennedy) l

2. Partisanship & Pol. Consumerism (cont) Only 3 of 9 presidents in the 1 st 2/3 of 20 th faced opposition Congresses for all or part of their term(s) l i. e. , Woodrow Wilson, Truman S Truman and Dwight David Eisenhower l

3. Weak Parties and Strong Groups Interest Groups operate in a widened sphere of influence when parties fail to organize consistent, resilient majorities l Fluidity in public support for parties leads to policy-making w/o clear pattern l … groups pursue particular and diverse goals not public mandates nor party agendas (grab bag not agenda politics) l

3. Weak Parties and Strong Groups (cont) In 1992 candidate Clinton promised the public affordable health care rates. l BUT coalition of anti’s nickeled & dimed l Every bill in Congress is time limited l Pressure groups compromised & delayed health care bill to death. l

3. Weak Parties and Strong Groups (cont) Moreover, 1 group coalition may win only to see opposing coalition win the same issue the next time. l e. g. , organized labor got a minimum wage increase in November of 1997. l Clinton tried to give them another when he needed political support (“Lewinskygate”) l

3. Weak Parties and Strong Groups (cont) A conservative coalition defeated the 2 nd attempt to raise labor’s wages l So… policy zigzagged in 1 year because of shifting fortunes & the resultant opportunism of groups coalitions l Little sign of a public or party agenda l

3. Weak Parties and Strong Groups (cont) l l In U. S. , pluralism/elitism largely supplanted majoritarianism in policy-making…. . due to party/group imbalance (mediation) Narrowly based group power fills the vaccuum left by weak parties - minoritarianism Historically parties - more than groups - have been chief link between public majorities and gov policy-making elites

4. Prospects Party/Group Redress l What are prospects for solving mediation problem (strong groups / weak parties)? One possibility: Restore Parties l That would check groups somewhat and improve majoritarianism. l But is it possible? l

4. Prospects for Party/ Group Redress (cont) Historically, parties achieve new life via new mandates stemming from realigning issues l i. e. , a “realigning” election (e. g. , 1800, 1828, 1860, 1896 & 1936) l electorate’s partisanship & voting predispositions were realigned by such elections for the next 28 – 36 yrs l

4. Prospects for Party / Group Redress (cont) l May never be another nat. realignment : - power of media in mediation - multiplication of primaries - finance reforms & individualization of candidate donor bases - candidate more than party-centered campaigns

4. Prospects for Party / Group Redress (cont) More than party cues, TV transmits candidate appeals into voter/ viewer’s home l Political consumers less loyal to a party “brand” than traditional partisan voters l Results: one-term presidencies, divided gov’ent and policy-making NOT constrained by a majority agenda l

4. Prospects for Party / Group Redress SO… democratic and majoritarian politics have lost ground to pluralism & elitism l At times, policy-making is driven by elect/gov majority w/ policy agenda. . . l l But … often the result of various groups articulating demands to responsive elites in government especially mid-term

4. Prospects for Party / Group Redress (cont) chief instrument of democracy = party l Party must regain strength if majoritar - ianism to be revitalized l Realignment less likely today than in past (why? ) l Alternative Scenaro: “New Machines” l

Machines” 5. The “New A theory: The New Machines l A set of new oligarchies in government will emerge called the - “President’s Party” - “Speaker’s Party” and … - “Majority Leader’s Party. l These would be the “new machines. ” l

5. The “New Machines” (cont) l Like old party machines, new machines would have resources to influence office seeking & so office holding How? l … By putting party and group resources (i. e. , #’s & $’s) together. l Examples ------ ? l

D. Structural/Functionalism 1. The Point is Decision Politics stresses decisionmaking government the implementation of decisions Decision-making plus decision implementation = leadership within social collectivities • • •

2. Political Functions and Structures l So pol or gov functions = activities involved in making or implementing decisions for social collectivities. l Pol or gov structure (or agency, institution, organization, etc. ) = adaptive yet patterned behavior affecting decision- making & implementation over time

2. Political Functions & Structures (cont) For every function there is structure(s) l many structures perform several functions l as society changes, structures (etc. ) evolve to ensure decision-making and implementation (i. e. , patterned yet adaptive) l

2. Political Functions & Structures (cont) Political Socialization Function : l = learning pol. relevant attitudes & behavior l = induction of individuals into citizenry l … collectively creates political culture l Socialization Structures = family, peer group, church, media, formal & informal associations, parties, etc.

2. Political Functions & Structures (cont) Recruitment Function = special form of socialization - goes beyond citizenship l … inducts people into specialized political or governmental roles l Structures = election systems, parties, groups, bureaucratic exams, appointive processes & co-option (? ) into pol/gov structures l

2. Political Functions & Structures (cont) Communication Function = dissemination of pol info or propaganda l Structures of Political Communications: e. g. formal (? ) or informal (? ) media l via primary (? ) AND secondary or reference groups (? ) l e. g. , parties or interest associations l

2. Political Functions & Structures (cont) Interest Aggregation Function = activities that combine interests into coalition that determines leaders & paths in social collectivities l Elect & gov coalitions - majorities may be formed thru interest aggregation. If so … l insures majority rule or majoritarianism l

2. Political Functions & Structures (cont) Structures: interest aggregation = central party function since 1790 s l Other institutions: temporary or “per issue” coalitions of groups. BUT … l …. latter are temporary and … l … have less behavioral constraint or pattern (little commitment to public policy agendas) l

2. Political Functions & Structures (cont) Function: Interest Articulation = act’s that express demands for policies l It is via interest articulation that leaders learn of constituent needs AND … l minority rights are protected l Structures: interest group’s primary function, other structures ____ ? ? ? l

2. Political Functions & Structures (cont) Parties share in function of interest articulation to some degree BUT … l interest aggregation & articulation are negatively related l parties have broad (inclusive) membership base SO. . . if they get too specific (articulate) about policy their coalition will divide l

2. Political Functions & Structures (cont) Groups have a narrow (exclusive) base l If groups stress aggregation more than articulation they become too broadly structured to get specific about policy l Ergo: inclusive parties specialize in interest aggregation and exclusive groups in interest aggregation l

2. Political Functions & Structures (cont) Structures & Functions of political social. , recruitment, communication, interest aggregation and interest articulation together = overarching function of political mediation l Political mediation = linkages of support, expectations and demands from society to government l

2. Political Functions & Structures (cont) Rule-Making, rule-application and rule adjudication are phases in transition from decision-making to decision-implement. l Handled respectively - but not exclusively - by leg. , exec. and jud. branches l all occur w/i broad process of converting societal inputs into governmental outputs l

2. Political Functions & Structures (cont) rule-making, -application & adjudication together = conversion function. l Gov’tal elites (oligarchies) perform the conversion function. (e. g. , __? ) l Parties are formally involved in convers. l Interest groups are informally involved l

2. Political Functions & Structures (cont) (Again, agg & art negatively related) l U. S. politics tend to move from stress on interest aggregation toward stress on interest articulation …. l …then toward a new balance that is itself redressed all over again (cycle) l

E. Mediation in Am. Politics Mediation may emphasize democracy, pluralism or elitism l Emphasis is determined by the relative powers of structures (i. e. , parties, groups and oligarchies) l

1. Democracy and the Building of Majorities l Demo= provision & implementation of public choices in leaders and paths thru majoritarian means l Electoral & governmental majorities are aggregated thru such agencies as elections, public opinion and parties

a. the Public Threat l l l Am. electorate can “fire” elected officials … by voting other majority party in power to hire and fire = the public threat Demo requisites of democracy guaranteed by public threat most fundamental democratic requisite = public choices in leaders and paths

a. the Public Threat (cont) l l l The cacophony of sound bites and kaleidoscope of photo opts along with the horse-race & hoopla created by infinite # of candidate appeals is reduced in U. S. to … …two enormous public alternatives by the Republican & Democratic Parties as … public choice-definers (i. e. , choice-givers)

a. the Public Threat (cont) l Efficacy, dependability & legitimacy of democratic gov are underwritten to extent parties effective in implementing public mandates l ERGO: working majority parties are choice-givers and faith keepers

a. the Public Threat (cont) In the process of choice-making and implementation there is the enormous gift to democracy of the peaceful resolution of conflict: e. g. , leaders vs. led &/or public v. gov. choices in paths l parties resolve such conflicts by offering alternatives in leaders and paths l

a. the Public Threat (cont) While election results are subject to much interpretation re paths, their answer to the question of “who shall lead” is determinative (except 2000!!) l Elections thereby resolve a profound and potentially violent societal question (i. e. , “who shall lead. ” ) l

a. the Public Threat (cont) The peaceful transfer of power thru competing parties guarantees majority rule as well as minority rights l Also, the means by which a minority can become a majority which, in turn, . . . l Insures political equality and individual freedoms l

a. the Public Threat (cont) (One of the most neglected lessons in all of politics is that protecting minority rights is in majority’s self-interest …. l … because the ultimate right of a minority is to become a majority and … l … if they do, they’ll remember !!) l

a. the Public Threat (cont) l Exercising public threat is popular sovereignty & limited gov. in action l Pop. consultation guaranteed when officials worry about being “fired” l Popular consultation also served by “loyal opposition” party tattling on the party in power

a. the Public Threat (cont) Pol. parties stress #’s more than $’s l In fact, modern parties originated in U. S. in 1790 s to mobilize #’s vs natural political advantages of $’s l In aggregating majorities parties provide persuasive pol communication, stimulate voting & organize gov’ment l

a. the Public Threat (cont) Pol communication of parties serves to inform and mobilize the pubic and. . . l helps insure gov’tal accountability of party in power l Once elected, the winning party organizes popular branches (i. e. , leg. & exec. ) – and, in time, … l affects jud branch (87 of first 100 judges) l

a. the Public Threat (cont) l l Theory: Jefferson’s responsible party gov. i. e. , parties offer & honor public agendas then stand for public judgement Practice: responsible party model is problematic & only sporadically successful Model is especially difficult when parties are weak and groups are strong … BUT. . .

a. the Public Threat (cont) All democratic theory insists individual liberties be guaranteed l protection of such participation rts (e. g. , __? ) insures broadest structuring of preferences in demo - e. g. , elections l Elections = the making of public choices in leaders and paths. l

a. the Public Threat (cont) Elections are democracy in action l since public choice-making (& implement. ) is what democracies do l Elections express public mandates and agendas (i. e. paths) via majoritarianism l Ironically, public agenda is subject to many interpretations (i. e. , hidden) l

a. the Public Threat (cont) l Since public alternatives in leaders and paths are the 1 st requisite of democracy, political theorists insist that l …parties must be competitive. l Party theorists also insist that party structures have to be inclusive (why? )

a. the Public Threat (cont) If parties are competitive & based on enduring socioeco. divisions (e. g. , ? ). . l … issue and ideological differences become well known over time l … ergo: public choices clearer over time l …parties will try to broaden support by extending suffrage (esp. which party? ) l

a. the Public Threat (cont) Two important American Party Theorists: Key & Schattschneider l E. E. Schattschneider favored “socialization” of conflict w/ nat issues. “privatization” dominated by haves l Parties socialize conflict since majorities or near majorities drive them - - not minorities l

a. the Public Threat (cont) Schattsneider felt political power of haves was their wealth whereas. . . l …political power of have-nots was numbers l In 2 -party systems, parties consolidate & mobilize masses of have-nots (1800) l In one-party system no countervailing power to eco & pol power of the haves l

a. the Public Threat (cont) V. O. Key illustrates E. E. Schattsneider’s point in finding $ interests stronger in 1 party areas (i. e. , old American South) l Key: The grand objective of the haves is obstruction … Organization is not always necessary to obstruct; it is essential, however, for the promotion of a sustained. . . l

a. the Public Threat (cont) Key (cont) l …. . program in behalf of the have-nots … over the long run the have-nots lose in a disorganized politics l Conservative, moneyed groups become stronger in 1 -party situations since can dominate funding of office seekers

a. the Public Threat (cont) In a competitive (e. g. , 2 -party) situation, elected officials heed #’s of have-nots if mobilized by alternative party l Key & Schattsneider both note: when parties are not competitive, it is the have-nots that suffer l

b. The Fluidity in Am. Majoritarianism l l l Have & have-not orientations = fundamental & resilient distinctions between constituencies of 2 majority parties in U. S. In addition - and often derived from - have vs. have-not distinctions are other demographic differences e. g. , regional, age, ethnic/racial, educational, religious & gender characteristics

b. Fluidity in Am. Majoritarianism (cont) In addition to demographic differences, party coalitions differ by their constellations of allied political organizations l i. e. , social movements and interest groups tend to favor either the have or have-not party coalition (why? ) l

b. Fluidity in Am. Majoritarianism (cont) Psych characteristics in party motive structure also from have/ have-not characteristics l e. g. , partisan strata w/in the public ID w/ one party over the other given their have or have-not predispositions l less partisan “leaners” favor 1 or other but not so dependably as strong partisans l

b. Fluidity in Am. Majoritarianism (cont) Non-partisan strata - i. e. , most evaluative or “pure” independents l - make party choices per vote per election (T-splitters, switchers) l Motive-structures w/in party constituencies govern the party’s predisposition towards change vs. continuity in leaders & paths l

b. Fluidity in Am. Majoritarianism (cont) If a party constituency tends toward change, assumes & insists on responsiveness in government l Continuity in support for leaders & paths across elections favors gov’tal discretion. . l …. since public support is structured, enduring and dependable (i. e. , partisan) l

b. Fluidity in Am. Majoritarianism (cont) l l l Partisans = affective toward choices …. … Independents more evaluative Evaluative support promotes change Affective support promotes continuity SO. . change in leaders/paths occurs more often with weak partisanship … … (i. e. , political consumerism goes ^)

b. Fluidity in Am. Majoritarianism (cont) l l l Demos & Repubs build temporary majorities to “throw the rascals out” - in periods of weak partisanship (consumption by voters of per election party appeals) Both also favor change over continuity in paths - during periods of weak partisanship Hypo: Changes in paths will not occur every 28 - 40 years or even in 4 year cycles in 2000’s

b. Fluidity in Am. Majoritarianism (cont) As long as American major’ism is fluid, American electorate will alter paths or instructions to officials every 2 years (i. e. , congressional sessions) l SO… party coalitions w/ evaluative public base do not endure across elections and Am majoritarianism … l …is very fluid as a result l

b. Fluidity in Am. Majoritarianism (cont) Another element in party motive structures involves material ($) and purposive (cause or ideological) incentives l Predominance of either haves or havenots w/in a party’s constituency affects the party’s orientation toward change or continuity in leaders and paths l

b. Fluidity in Am. Majoritarianism (cont) Have-nots favor change in life situation whereas haves are more status quo l “the various and unequal distribution of property” always divides societies l So have vs. have-not differences in party constituencies insure bases for 2 opposing public alternatives l

b. Fluidity in Am. Majoritarianism (cont) l l l Partisans w/ purposive incentives disposed toward change or continuity given party have or have-not predispositions Purposive voters favoring change like the havenot or moderate to liberal party Voters favoring tradition, the status quo or conservatism favor the party of the haves

b. Fluidity in Am. Majoritarianism (cont) If material divisions are enduring party bases, an individual’s SES should tie them to the have or the havenot party l It does, but not so as securely as past l Why? l

b. Fluidity in Am. Materialism (cont) SES separated voters during Depression when some Republican voters switched their vote and. . l w/ some, their allegiance, to the Democrats l Many non-voters joined the electorate to vote for the attractive alternative path offered by the New Deal l

b. Fluidity in Am. Majoritarianism (cont) BUT… the Depression was decades ago l Party allegiances stemming from the ‘ 32 realigning election have eroded as one age cohort succeeded the last since then l Another realigning election should have occurred in late 60’s or early 70’s l That almost happened. l

b. Fluidity in Am. Majoritarianism (cont) The “social issue” could have realigned but. . l … two things happened l 1. television and 2. Watergate l Squeezed between Vietnam & Watergate new voters said “a pox on both your houses. ” l

b. Fluidity in Am. Majoritarianism (cont) TV- new under political sun - transmits candidate appeals more than party cues l So voters “shopped” for candidates via TV l Parties thus lost some cue-giving power precisely when a realigning issue was due l

b. Fluidity in Am. Majoritarianism (cont) Haves and have-nots alike remained less partisan for a time and … l Majority building became fluid & constant enterprise for parties l Electoral and governing party coalitions were still tied together by partisanship (albeit weakened) l

b. Fluidity in Am. Majoritarianism (cont) l l Party activists remain bound together and to party leaders by affective or emotive ties. . . … for activists in the party organization (i. e. , PO), by solidary (? ) incentives as well So parties continue to offer have and have-not alternatives to Am. democracy BUT…who’s buying and what?

b. Fluidity in Am. Majoritarianism (cont) Independents = @ 1/3 of electorate l added only temporarily to the affective base of identifiers by independent evaluations of party appeals. l But frequently, Independents “buy” the appeals of candidates rather than investing in party agenda or long term party appeal l

b. Fluidity in Am. Majoritarianism (cont) l l Despite SES divisions, even have AND havenot voters became less partisan and … majoritarianism was more fluid as a result Parties left w/ a larger contingent who are subject to rational persuasion or dissuasion and… a smaller set of supporters who are resistant

b. Fluidity in Am. Majoritarianism (cont) l l affective partisans remain loyal across elections because emotive loyalties not subject to rational dissuasion evaluative Independents vote per office per election …. i. e. , “shop” “pure” Independents (@ 15%) are disproportionately political consumers …. means governing support is more fluid

b. Fluidity in Am. Majoritarianism (cont) l rise of pol. consumerism during the info age explains 2 yr. mandates l independency and consumerism explain the quicker and more exact adjustments in governing mandates l (every two years)

b. Fluidity in Am. Majoritarianism (cont) In sum: fluidity in political majorities increased …. l from the 1960 s until 1990 s l Majoritarianism weakened as evaluative voting (i. e. , consumerism) increased (or plateaued) l … and partisan or affective voting declined (or bottomed out) l

b. Fluidity in Am. Majoritarianism (cont) The “agenda politics” of democracy and strong parties declined as …. l … “grap-bag” pluralism increased. l Electoral and governing majorities have become less enduring and dependable l Change in paths is favored over continuity l

b. Fluidity in Am. Majoritarianism (cont) Majoritarianism has declined w/ party power in the U S l minoritarianism has increased w/ group power l ERGO: the problem with American democracy = cannot keep the public faith well enough l

b. Fluidity in Am. Majoritarianism (cont) l l All governments - whether demo. , plural, or elitist - must be responsive to some degree BUT … all governments must also exercise some autonomy or discretion, too Affective nature of partisanship strengthens government’s autonomy & discretion …. even against popular sentiment

b. Fluidity in Am. Majoritarianism (cont) l l l Affective (i. e. , partisan) voters guarantee the electorate enduring bases for public choices and gov’tal autonomy (i. e. , leadership) BUT… evaluative voters (Independents) determine which choice taken in election ERGO: evaluative voters guarantee change and governmental responsiveness

b. Fluidity in Am. Majoritarianism (cont) l l l As party power declined, affective/ evaluative balance changed > evaluative … “shopping” reduced long-term service of parties to democracy … In a majoritarian system, leadership is tricky Followers have little loyalty to leader’s majority in a majoritarian system (requires what in a president? )

b. Fluidity in Am. Majoritarianism (cont) l l l BUT… w/o some fluidity in party support the prospects for gov’tal responsiveness and policy change suffer … … also a disservice to democracy SO… affective/evaluative balance in public support governs policy change v. continuity AND governmental responsiveness vs. discretion

c. Majority Parties: Republicans & Democrats l l Majority parties = inclusive & decentralized pol structures that specialize in interest aggregation most especially but, also, in pol recruitment, communications & conversion Majority parties qualify as majority parties if they have the potential of building electoral and governing majorities

c. Maj. Parties: Repubs & Demos(cont) l l Party leaders link gov’ning coalitions to elect’al coalitions by providing, explaining and implementing public choices ERGO: Republicans and Democrats are the chief instruments of American Democracy 3 rd parties = instruments of policy change balances w/i party motive structures determine party’s stance toward. .

c. Maj. Parties: Repubs & Demos(cont) … towards policy continuity/change, governmental responsive. /discretion l have/have-not balance w/in party motive structure provides enduring bases for public choice l l Working parties are public choice-givers and faith-keepers

c. Maj. Parties: Repubs & Demos(cont) Republicans and Democrats implement public agendas - if they are working l As yet there is no substitute for parties in American Democracy. l No other structure able to pull pieces of electoral and gov’tal majorities together l

c. Maj. Parties: Repubs & Demos(cont) If parties weaken as coalition builders: fragmentation occurs l rule by groups and oligarchies occurs l minoritarianism competes w/ majoritarianism &. . . l public agendas and trust compromised l

2. Pluralism & the Threat of Minority Rule l l l Pluralist theory = conflict arises among groups as each applies resources to struggle over policy (gov a means to that end) Relative importance of different issues plus changing value & unequal distribution of political resources yields …. highly fluid and situational decision-making

2. Pluralism & Threat of Minority Rule (cont) Complexity is compounded by multicenteredness of pluralism l (no 1 source of division in government) l There are many policy fragments or oligarchies (e. g. , _? _ ) at nat. and state levels l These ally with some interests and oppose others in trying to win a policy victory l

2. Pluralism & Threat of Minority Rule (cont) Pluralism assumes activity by formal & informal groups or networks of groups (e. g. , iron triangles & policy networks) l Pluralism also assumes that groups or group networks operate both outside and inside government l - i. e. , both private (e. g. , ___? ) & public (e. g. , ___? ) groups l

2. Pluralism & Threat of Minority Rule (cont) Importance of multi-centeredness of pluralism = numerous points of access to policy makers l Importance of fluidity of pluralism = lose now, win later l In a pluralistic system everyone gets to play and nobody gets left out -- at least in theory l

a. Groups and Minoritarianism l If elections, parties and public opinion processes are majoritarian mechanisms that drive democracy, … IGs = central structures w/i pluralism l groups perform critical role of alerting & pressuring government re needs in society or - at least - organized society l

a. Groups and Minoritarianism (cont) Groups apply their resources in finances, visibility, expertise, prestige, organization & leadership and, possibly “nerve” issues toward winning policy contests l Added to these resources are constituent advantages in numbers, affluence, strategic location, time and education l

a. Groups and Minoritarianism (cont) As with any other political agency, the motive or incentive structure within groups (e. g. , ? ) explains much political behavior l For instance, material groups have a tougher time forming than purposive groups but they have much more endurance (why? ) l

a. Groups and Minoritarianism (cont) Have-not materialism w/in a group will tend to favor change while have predispositions tend > status quo l both material/purpose and affective/ evaluative motive structures in pressure groups may favor governmental responsiveness over autonomy and discretion l

a. Groups and Minoritarianism (cont) In applying their political resources, groups inform, advertise, lobby, supply or deny grass roots and/or financial support and otherwise pressure decision-makers to act favorably towards their interest l ERGO & AGAIN: they specialize in interest articulation l

a. Groups and Minoritarianism (cont) To a lesser extent than interest articulation, groups are involved in: l Political socialization - e. g. , whether government responds to “people like us” l political communications: w/i group communiqués to mobilize, public ads, or persuasion re decision-makers

a. Groups and Minoritarianism (cont) l l l Political recruitment of IGs: PACs, endorsements, “delivering” a vote, etc Political Conversion: groups are informally involved in conversion - e. g. , aid & pressure d/m’ers, recruit allies to office and to right committees, testify, lobby, etc. (parties are formally involved in conversion)

a. Groups and Minoritarianism (cont) But (and again), special function for groups is interest articulation l in fact, it is the petitioning of gov that separates interest groups from all other voluntary associations. l ERGO: membership basis must be exclusive (why? ) l

a. Groups and Minoritarianism (cont) Group leaders and activists are motivated especially by affective (and solidary) incentives and. . . l by either material or purposive goals l Group leadership tends toward oligarchy (iron law of oligarchy. R. Michelles) l Supporters may be affective or evaluative l

a. Groups and Minoritarianism (cont) IGs narrowly based … may assert minority against majority in policy dispute l SO. . IGs criticized as serving minority rule (re policy) rather than just minority rights l Why control of policy rather than government as a whole? - exclusiveness l

a. Groups and Minoritarianism (cont) Minoritarianism driven by groups refers to minority rule over policy rather than government as a whole l Pressure groups are not broadly structured enough to control government as a whole l May have a “confederacy of oligarchies” instead of a federal government l

a. Groups and Minoritarianism (cont) In sum, Am IGs described as exclusive and centralized political structures that specialize in interest articulation but also > recruitment, communication & conversion. l IGs leaders link group constituencies to gov by applying group resources toward the persuasion of policy-makers l

a. Groups and Minoritarianism (cont) Evaluative/affective & material/ purposive balances in group motive structure may favor gov’tal responsiveness over discretion and either change or continuity in policy l Briefly defined, American interest l groups = policy advocates of organized publics.

b. The Benevolent Group First of modern or “analytic” pluralists in the U. S. was Arthur F. Bentley l Bentley: The Process of Government (1908) l major break with “staatswissenschaft” l Inspired political scientists toward “group approach” l

b. The Benevolent Group (cont) Bentley’s major points re groups: l wealth main source of divisions in society l “When groups are adequately stated, everything is stated. When I say everything, I mean everything. ” l individual interests were trivial in interpreting society. BUT …. .

b. The Benevolent Group (cont) (but) … group activity was “first, last and all the time” essential to such interpretations l National interest a myth. “The balance of groups pressures is the existing state of society. ” l group pressures were the one and only determinate of government policy l

b. The Benevolent Group (cont) l l Mostly, group pressures yielded decisions = reasonably fair while class divisions were most common basis for groups, numbers were more important than wealth as a group resource Larger, more nearly general interests would defeat smaller, narrower special interests closest thing to “control by the people. ”

b. The Benevolent Group (cont) David Truman another group theorist l much influenced by Bentley l also felt that groups were benign l groups weakened and divided by greed l overlapping memberships across groups with different interests l Some members would object as a result

b. The Benevolent Group (cont) Another check on greed = “potential group” l if, for instance, a tariff was excessive, consumers would organize an opposing lobby - specter checks group’s greed l (Truman is author of the “disturbance theory” - more later) l

c. The Malevolent Group Most group theorists are less optimistic l These authors assume that majoritarian government is often frustrated by the exclusiveness of groups and that … l minority rule re policy that can result l

c. The Malevolent Group (cont) Madison: important advantage of well constructed union was “its tendency to control the violence and mischiefs of faction. ” l 1 lesson of Am rev. clear: if loyalties attached more to groups than political community as a whole, unity of action was impossible, anarchy would result l

c. The Malevolent Group (cont) Madison’s thought always included the notion of balance in government l In fact, constitutionalism was a balance between anarchy on the one hand tyranny on the other l BUT… which did Madison fear more: anarchy or tyranny (? ) l

c. The Malevolent Group (cont) Madison feared the suppression of factions more than the violence of faction l How to maintain a balance between T/A? l Madison’s answer: structuring government (1) a republican form of government and (2) a division of governmental authority l (How does that keep balance? ) l

c. The Malevolent Group (cont) l l l But Madison’s greater fear = tyranny would be thwarted by divisions and representativeness But still feared “tyranny of the majority” l ? : What of power within divisions? l Could fragmentation provide sufficient minority power to thwart majoritarianism?

c. The Malevolent Group (cont) E. E. Schattschneider: l Group greed had worsened Depression - i. e. , U. S. tariffs spawned retaliatory tariffs l Solution to group greed: broaden scope of conflict - results more nearly nat’al or maj. l Broadening conflict was better achieved by inclusive parties than exclusive groups

F. CONVERSION IN AMERICAN POLITICS l l l Parties & groups are part of mediation or the linking of society with government What happens as a result of mediation is called conversion or the translating of demands into policy Political conversion is necessarily a specialization of small groups or oligarchies or elites BECAUSE …. .

F. Conversion in Am Pols (cont) l …. . of the unweldiness of large bodies in the exact and detailer work of enacting specific and complex policies l SO …. political conversion inherently involves some form of elitism

1. Elitism & Decision Implementation elitism = public policy making by oligarchies. l Political Oligarchies are therefore the central structure in elitism l Some of the fragments in America’s fragmented political situation are elites or combinations of elites l

1. Elitism & Decision. Implementation (cont) Structure of oligarchies ranges from very narrow to representative coalitions l As the structure of elites expands so do their functions l At a minimum, oligarchies convert demands into policy or …. l …. articulate interests l

1. Elitism & Decision Implementation (cont) l l In their broadest form - i. e. , representative coalitions - elites may aggregate and articulate interests as well as convert demands into policies a. Kinds of Elites: single purpose and multifunctional elites private and public elites, and. . combinations of these

a. Kinds of Elites (cont) Example of combo: committees and subcommittees often ally with pertinent executive agencies and with private interest groups to form …. l “iron triangles” or, … l in more elaborate form, “policy networks. ” l

1) Single. Purpose Oligarchies Very exclusive, composed of only a few powerful individuals l narrowest of all political orgs would be a faction w/i a single-purpose oligarchy l In private sector, 1 purpose elites specialize in interest articulation l w/i public sector, specialize in conversion l

1) 1 Purpose Oligarchies (cont) Examples of governmental or public elites or oligarchies: l congressional subcommittees and committees, as well as l executive offices, agencies, bureaus and regulatory commissions l Federal courts are also oligarchies

1) 1 Purpose Oligarchies (cont) 1 purpose elites in private sector stress int art in relating to gov’tal oligarchies l Examples: leadership components of most interest groups, third parties, social movements, etc. l Also some of the actual fragments in America’s fragmented political situation l

2) “Per Issue Coalitions” and Iron Triangles Temporary or “per issue” coalitions are short-lived coalitions of some of these fragments in Am. Politics. Namely, interest groups l “Per issue” coalitions are not single purpose oligarchies l Are a form of multifunctional oligarchies l

2) “Per Issue” & Iron Tri’s (cont) per issue coalitions disband after an issue resolved and reformulate into other combinations to address subsequent issues l Per issue coalitions aggregate and articulate interests but they must persuade govern’tal elites to convert demands into policy l

2) “Per Issue” & Iron Tri’s (cont) Iron triangles (IT’s) and policy networks (PN’s) endure across issues. l “Iron tri’s” and “policy nets” are unlike per issue coalitions because they last across issues l IT’s and PN’s are unlike 1 purpose oligs because they are multifunctional l

2) “Per Issue” & Iron Tri’s (cont) l l Broader structure of iron tri’s & policy nets means two specializations - not one Iron tri’s and policy nets articulate interests (given private group component) Given their legis. & exec. components iron tri’s and policy networks also perform political conversion i. e. they enact and implement policy

2) “Per Issue” & Iron Tri’s (cont) Policy nets and iron tri’s are threesomes since they usually exclude the president l Exception: LBJ - particularly adept at negotiation l LBJ could make it in the trilogy’s selfinterest to become a foursome l

2)“Per Issue” & Iron Tri’s (cont) Mancur Olson felt minority factions in Congress have advantage re majorities l Iron tri’s, for instance, place group advocates within fragments that specialize in group concerns in the legislature and the executive branches of government l

2) “Per Issue” & Iron Tri’s (cont) Grant Mc. Connell felt poor farmers, conservationists and consumers hurt by iron tris operating w/in decentralized setting created by federalism l e. g. , USDA and county agents + AFBF + pertinent members of Congress destroyed Farm Security Agency l set up by New Deal to help rural poor l

2) “Per Issue” & Iron Tri’s (cont) l l l e. g. , local business interests + Army Corp of Engineers + Public Works Committee pushed for dams, etc. profited local businesses who contributed $ to pertinent congress members who appropriated $ for Corp of Engineers, etc. BUT … local environ’tal interests not part of the iron triangle

2) “Per Issue” & Iron Tri’s (cont) l l l Mc. Connell felt stronger national institutions were needed Agreed with E. E. Schattschneider on stronger parties but. . . also stronger presidency + Supreme Court Stronger national government broadened scope of conflict counter power of state and local interests

2) “Per Issue” & Iron Tri’s (cont) l l l Andrew S. Mc. Farland sees American gov. as so many interests split into various policy domains controlled by iron triangles e. g. , a “turf” conscious “confederation of oligarchies. ” had several qualifications to fed government as confederation (of oligarchies)

2) “Per Issue” & Iron Tri’s (cont) Mc. Farland’s qualifications: l Pres’tial elections l rise of public interest lobbies l social movements So majority rule does at times overcome minority rule according to Mc. Farland. But. . l need stronger institutions of aggregation

2) “Per Issue” & Iron Tri’s (cont) l l Madison worried about the “tyranny of the majority” at state and local levels. Olson, Schattschneider, Mc. Connell & Mc. Farland worry about minority factions Madison: fed’lism thwarted tyranny Modern pluralists: too many divisions fragmentation - needed majoritarian national institutions

b. Leadership Networks & the “New Machines” l l l Multipurpose oligs e. g. , party leadership networks in Congress may perform aggregation, articulation and conversion network members may informally represent organized publics or interest groups Results in a broader - more representative outlook

b. Lead. Nets & “New Machines”(cont) Examples of voting blocs or caucuses l demographic (women, blacks, Hispanics or Sunbelt) l ideological (conservative Southern Demos or right-wing Republican freshpersons) l economic (“steel” or “cotton” caucus) l may be bi-partisan

b. Lead. Nets. &“New Machines” (cont) l l l Some governmental oligarchies created by Constitution: e. g. , Supreme Court or pres. and “principle Officer(s) in each of the executive Departments” Usually occurred on their own over time: e. g. , committee system, White House entourage, various individual & allied Departments, ad hoc policy “czars”, etc.

b. Lead. Nets. &“New Machines” (cont) l l l Multipurpose oligarchies such as party leadership networks may evolve into the “new machines. ” (discuss) new machines redress balance between interest aggregation and articulation toward former If party leadership in government enacted a promised public agenda, a majority …. .

b. Lead. Nets. & “New Machines” (cont) … of the electorate could “buy” into the party that delivered on an agenda l that would realign party loyalties in the electorate for at least as long as public support lasted for furthering that agenda l

2. Elitism l l Thomas Dye in Who’s Running America Corporate Directors, the Money Elite, Governing Circles, the Media Moguls, the Civic Establishment Gov policy-makers are proximate d/m ultimate oligarchies = CFR, Trilateral Com. , Business Roundtable, Committee on Eco Development, Brookings, Am. Enterprise Institute and Heritage Foundation, etc.

2. Elitism (cont) l l Beginning place for Dye’s oligarchic decisionmaking is the corporate elite – funnel $ into? Elites in wealth, government, media and civic establishment build an agenda that is representative - even includes poor at times Policy planning oligarchies such as CFR, Business Roundtable and Brookings reduce consensus to specific policy recommenda’s. Pluralism occurs when? ?

2. Elitism (cont) So private elites are the actual decision makers in Dye’s model l Government agencies - e. g. , committees - are “proximate decision-makers” only carry out decisions made by private elites l

2. Elitism (cont) l l Difference in Dye and Davis: Dye’s proximate decision makers are actually the decision makers private elites in Dye are actually involved in interest articulation when they decide what recommendations to make to government To the extent Dye’s elites reflect broad concerns they also aggregate interests

2. Elitism (cont) l l l Dye’s elites, like other multipurp. elites, do help drive the agg/art/con cycle Dye’s private elites are oligarchies able to recommend (articulate) policies w/in an agenda given their broad societal concerns (aggregation) Dye’s governing elites are actually involved in conversion according to Davis

2. Elitsm (cont) Other oligarchies go further in completing the aggregation/ articulation/conversion cycle because they are involved in all 3 l Examples: party structures such as caucuses or conferences or leadership networks l

G. INTERPLAY OF DEMO, PLURALISM & ELITISM l l l 3 structures central to democracy (party), pluralism (group) and elitism (oligarchy) interaction of these three drives the interplay of democracy, pluralism and elites is a negative relationship between interest aggregation and articulation, both affect conversion so will affect structure and functioning of governmental elites or oligs

G. INTERPLAY OF DEMO, PLURAL & ELITISM (cont) l l l Should there be another realigning election or …the production of a promised public agenda through party leadership networks in government (i. e. , the new machines) … new life would be breathed back into parties, the aggregative function and American democracy

G. INTERPLAY OF DEMO. , PLURAL. & ELITISM (cont) Oddly enough, it is the evolution of oligarchies that may invigorate parties. l In that case, elitism will reinvigorate majoritarianism and democracy in America l