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Ch 4: Securing Your Network Comp. TIA Security+: Get Certified Get Ahead: SY 0 Ch 4: Securing Your Network Comp. TIA Security+: Get Certified Get Ahead: SY 0 -401 Study Guide Darril Gibson Updated 2 -23 -16

Understanding IDSs and IPSs Understanding IDSs and IPSs

IDS v. IPS IDS detects attacks but does not stop them – Detective technical IDS v. IPS IDS detects attacks but does not stop them – Detective technical control – Passive IDS merely logs attacks, and/or sends alerts – Active IDS may send alerts and change environment IPS stops attacks in progress – Preventive technical control – Similar to Active IDS

HIDS v. NIDS HIDS (Host-based IDS) – Installed on a server or workstation NIDS HIDS v. NIDS HIDS (Host-based IDS) – Installed on a server or workstation NIDS (Network-based IDS) – Installed on a network device, such as a router or switch

Packet Sniffing Wireshark and other tools show packets one-by-one Useful for debugging Can steal Packet Sniffing Wireshark and other tools show packets one-by-one Useful for debugging Can steal passwords off the wire – Especially if they are sent without encryption

Wall of Sheep Displays passwords captured at Defcon Wall of Sheep Displays passwords captured at Defcon

Signatures v. Anomalies Signature-based monitoring recognizes known attack patterns – Also called definition-based Anomaly-based Signatures v. Anomalies Signature-based monitoring recognizes known attack patterns – Also called definition-based Anomaly-based monitoring detects abnormal behavior based on a baseline – Also valled behavior-based or heuristicsbased

Active IDS v. IPS Both react to an attack in some manner IPS must Active IDS v. IPS Both react to an attack in some manner IPS must be placed in line with the traffic to prevent the attack

HIDS Additional software on a workstation or server Can detect attacks on the local HIDS Additional software on a workstation or server Can detect attacks on the local system Can monitor changes to operating system files Protects only one host

SYN Flood Demo Notes On Mac OS X: – Preferences, click Sharing, turn on SYN Flood Demo Notes On Mac OS X: – Preferences, click Sharing, turn on Printer Sharing – watch "netstat -anp tcp | grep 631" On Kali Linux: – iptables -A OUTPUT -p tcp --tcp-flags RST -j DROP – scapy – send(IP(dst="192. 168. 1. 213")/TCP(dport=631, sport=(1000, 1100))

SYN Flood SYN Flood

NIDS Can only see network traffic, not OS files Unable to decrypt encrypted traffic NIDS Can only see network traffic, not OS files Unable to decrypt encrypted traffic – Unless your network performs a man-in-themiddle SSL attack – Commonly done in modern corporations

NIDS Configuration NIDS Configuration

Detection Methods Signature-based – Uses a database of predefined traffic patterns – Database requires Detection Methods Signature-based – Uses a database of predefined traffic patterns – Database requires frequent updates Anomaly-based – Needs to measure a performance baseline – Baseline must be updated if network is changed

Data Sources and Trends IDS collects data from various sources – Firewall logs – Data Sources and Trends IDS collects data from various sources – Firewall logs – System logs – Application logs – May monitor logs in real time

Reporting Alarms – Also called Alerts – Indicates that an interesting event was detected Reporting Alarms – Also called Alerts – Indicates that an interesting event was detected – Does not always indicate a real attack Goal – Set threshold low enough to detect all real attacks, but – High enough to avoid too may false positives

False Positives v. False Negatives False positive – Alert on nonthreatening events False negative False Positives v. False Negatives False positive – Alert on nonthreatening events False negative – Real attack, but no alert

IDS Threshold Number of events required to cause an alert – Example: 50 incomplete IDS Threshold Number of events required to cause an alert – Example: 50 incomplete TCP handshakes per minute from the same IP There are no established rules for thresholds – Must be "tuned" by administrators Untuned security devices tend to produce many false positives

IDS Responses Passive (Alerts personnel) – – Pop-up window Central monitor E-mail Page or IDS Responses Passive (Alerts personnel) – – Pop-up window Central monitor E-mail Page or text message Active – Alerts personnel – Modify ACL on Firewall – Divert attack to a honeypot or other safe environment

Honeypot Appears to be a server worth hacking into Has no valuable data Often Honeypot Appears to be a server worth hacking into Has no valuable data Often used to collect knowledge about attackers

Link Ch 4 a Link Ch 4 a

Link Ch 4 b Link Ch 4 b

Link Ch 4 c Link Ch 4 c

Microsoft Proposes Personal Honeypots Microsoft Proposes Personal Honeypots

Honeynet A group of virtual servers appearing to be a live network Honeynet A group of virtual servers appearing to be a live network

Counterattacks Some active IDS systems attack the attacker back Legal problems Likely that you Counterattacks Some active IDS systems attack the attacker back Legal problems Likely that you are attacking another innocent victim

Securing Wireless Networks Securing Wireless Networks

Wireless Standards Protocol 802. 11 a 802. 11 b 802. 11 g 802. 11 Wireless Standards Protocol 802. 11 a 802. 11 b 802. 11 g 802. 11 n 802. 11 ac 802. 11 ad Max. Speed 54 Mbps 11 Mbps 54 Mbps 600 Mbps 866. 7 Mbps 6. 75 GBps From Wikipedia Frequency 5 GHz 2. 4 or 5 GHz 60 GHz

Wireless Footprint High power makes a large footprint – Easier for users to connect Wireless Footprint High power makes a large footprint – Easier for users to connect – Easier for attackers to snoop on Careful antenna placement Metal in walls Directional antennas such as a Yagi increase range of reception

Site Surveys and Antenna Placement Site Survey – Examine wireless environment to identify potential Site Surveys and Antenna Placement Site Survey – Examine wireless environment to identify potential problems – Set up a WAP and measure signal strength from various locations – Also performed to detect Rogue access points Jamming Evil twins Interference

Security Protocols WEP – Broken and unsafe to use WPA – Much safer, stronger Security Protocols WEP – Broken and unsafe to use WPA – Much safer, stronger with AES than TKIP WPA 2 – Best security currently available, especially in Enterprise mode with 802. 1 x or RADIUS server

WEP (Wired Equivalent Privacy) Mathematically insecure Can be broken with no knowledge of the WEP (Wired Equivalent Privacy) Mathematically insecure Can be broken with no knowledge of the key 100% of the time Attacker needs 50, 000 packets or so

WPA (Wi-Fi Protected Access) Designed to run on hardware designed for WEP with only WPA (Wi-Fi Protected Access) Designed to run on hardware designed for WEP with only a software upgrade Weakest form of WPA uses TKIP (Temporal Key Integrity Protocol) and RC 4 encryption Stronger form of WPA uses AES encryption

WPA-2 Stronger cryptography than WEP or WPA Uses CCMP mode of AES WPA-2 Stronger cryptography than WEP or WPA Uses CCMP mode of AES

Personal and Enterprise Modes Both WPA and WPA-2 have Personal and Enterprise modes Personal Personal and Enterprise Modes Both WPA and WPA-2 have Personal and Enterprise modes Personal – Pre-Shared Key (PSK) must be entered in each device – Key is the same for all users

Personal and Enterprise Modes Enterprise mode – Each user has individual credentials Username and Personal and Enterprise Modes Enterprise mode – Each user has individual credentials Username and password Extensible protocols like LEAP and PEAP which can use certificates – Credentials stored on a RADIUS server

Attacking WPS (Wi-Fi Protected Setup) Link Ch 4 g Attacking WPS (Wi-Fi Protected Setup) Link Ch 4 g

EAP, PEAP, and LEAP (Extensible Authentication Protocol) – A framework that provides general guidance EAP, PEAP, and LEAP (Extensible Authentication Protocol) – A framework that provides general guidance for authentication PEAP (Protected EAP) – Encapsulates EAP conversation in a TLS tunnel – Requires a digital certificate for the server, but not the clients

EAP-TTLS and EAP-TLS EAP-Tunneled TLS (EAP-TTLS) – An extension of PEAP – Allows some EAP-TTLS and EAP-TLS EAP-Tunneled TLS (EAP-TTLS) – An extension of PEAP – Allows some older authentication methods, such as PAP within a TLS tunnel – Requires a certificate on the 802. 1 x server but not on the clients EAP-TLS – Most secure, widely implemented – Requires a certificate on both the server and the clients (link Ch 4 o)

LEAP (Lightweight EAP Cisco's attempt to improve WEP Uses CHAP Not secure, subject to LEAP (Lightweight EAP Cisco's attempt to improve WEP Uses CHAP Not secure, subject to offline dictionary attack Cisco recommends using PEAP instead

ASLEAP Lightweight Extensible Authentication Protocol (LEAP) – A Cisco product – Vulnerable, but Cisco ASLEAP Lightweight Extensible Authentication Protocol (LEAP) – A Cisco product – Vulnerable, but Cisco didn’t care – Joshua Wright wrote the ASLEAP hacking tool to crack LEAP, and forced Cisco to develop a better protocol See link Ch 4 f

Reaction to ASLEAP “Within months, some Reaction to ASLEAP “Within months, some "helpful" person invested their time into generating a cracker tool. Publicizing the threat was a service to everyone, but I leave it as an exercise for readers to determine what satisfaction is obtained by the authors of tools that turn threat into reality and lay waste to millions of dollars of investments. ” --"Real 802. 11 Security", William Arbaugh and Jon Edney, as quoted in link Ch 4 f

WTLS and ECC WTLS (Wireless Transport Layer Security) – Used by many smaller wireless WTLS and ECC WTLS (Wireless Transport Layer Security) – Used by many smaller wireless devices ECC (Elliptic Curve Cryptography) – A more efficient cryptography method than the RSA algorithm used on the Internet – Used on small wireless devices to save power

Free SSL for Everyone Cloudflare uses ECC This made certificates so cheap, they offer Free SSL for Everyone Cloudflare uses ECC This made certificates so cheap, they offer it free to everyone Link Ch 4 p

Captive Portal Users connect to wireless network, but then must login to a Web Captive Portal Users connect to wireless network, but then must login to a Web page to get to the Internet

Common Captive Portals Free Internet access – Users agree to Terms of Service Paid Common Captive Portals Free Internet access – Users agree to Terms of Service Paid Internet access – Users must enter a credit card number or log in to a prepaid account Alternative to 802. 1 x – Require users to authenticate – Can be simpler than configuring 802. 1 x

Hot Spots and Isolation Mode Each client is on a separate VLAN, in effect Hot Spots and Isolation Mode Each client is on a separate VLAN, in effect – Isolates clients better – Protects clients from each other – Done at Starbuck's Does not protect against – Evil twin – Sniffing unencrypted wireless traffic directly in Monitor mode

Other Security Concerns Change default administrator password MAC filtering – Allows only approved MAC Other Security Concerns Change default administrator password MAC filtering – Allows only approved MAC addresses to connect – Easily sniffed & spoofed

CCSF Wardriving Sat. , April 25, 2015, 9 am, SCIE 200 CCSF Wardriving Sat. , April 25, 2015, 9 am, SCIE 200

Wardriving Results Wardriving Results

WIGLE. NET WIGLE. NET

Wardriving Part of a wireless audit Finds Wardriving Part of a wireless audit Finds "Rogue" access points – Unauthorized routers added to network Finds "Evil Twins" – Access points spoofing the authorized ones to perform MITM attacks

Change Default SSID Conceals the real model of your router Makes attackers work harder Change Default SSID Conceals the real model of your router Makes attackers work harder

Disabling SSID (Service Set Identifier) Broadcasts SSID is the name that identifies your network, Disabling SSID (Service Set Identifier) Broadcasts SSID is the name that identifies your network, such as "Linksys" or "CCSF Wifi" Disabling it only stops sloppy attackers who use Net. Stumbler SSID is in every packet sent anyway

Rogue Access Points Unauthorized devices attached to network Can exfiltrate data to attacker Can Rogue Access Points Unauthorized devices attached to network Can exfiltrate data to attacker Can allow attacker easier access to network

Evil Twins A rogue access point with the same SSID as the real company Evil Twins A rogue access point with the same SSID as the real company WLAN – Such as "CCSF Wireless" Users will automatically connect to the evil twin if it has a stronger signal

Wi. Fi Pineapple Automates evil twin and other wireless attacks Link Ch 4 q Wi. Fi Pineapple Automates evil twin and other wireless attacks Link Ch 4 q

Cisco's Rogue Access Point Containment Sends disassociation frames to Do. S rogues (link Ch Cisco's Rogue Access Point Containment Sends disassociation frames to Do. S rogues (link Ch 4 r)

Jamming and Interference Attackers can use radio transmissions to interfere with Wi-Fi Changing channel Jamming and Interference Attackers can use radio transmissions to interfere with Wi-Fi Changing channel or power levels may help to resist the attack Disassociation Frames are the most effective Do. S attack

Near Field Communications (NFC) NFC is used to exchange information over short distances Smartphones Near Field Communications (NFC) NFC is used to exchange information over short distances Smartphones use it to exchange information Credit cards and Bart tickets contain NFC chips Google Wallet

Bluetooth Wireless Short-range connections In 'Discovery Mode Bluetooth Wireless Short-range connections In 'Discovery Mode", a Bluetooth device broadcasts its MAC address, to allow "pairing" – PINs are often set to 0000 – Turn off Discovery mode to prevent the attacks on the next slide

Bluesnarfing and Bluejacking – Unauthorized sending of text messages from a Bluetooth device Bluesnarfing Bluesnarfing and Bluejacking – Unauthorized sending of text messages from a Bluetooth device Bluesnarfing – Access to or theft of data from a Bluetooth connection Bluebugging – Take over a mobile phone – Listen to calls, send messages, and more

Exploring Remote Access Exploring Remote Access

Remote Access Allows users who are travelling to connect to internal network services Remote Remote Access Allows users who are travelling to connect to internal network services Remote Access Service – Through dial-up or VPN (Virtual Private Network)

Components Access Method – Dial-up or VPN Authentication – Require secure authentication because users Components Access Method – Dial-up or VPN Authentication – Require secure authentication because users may use insecure lines Access Control – User authorization – Client health

Telephony and Dial-Up RAS Client and sever need phone lines and modems Requires POTS Telephony and Dial-Up RAS Client and sever need phone lines and modems Requires POTS line (Plain Old Telephone Service) Requires a long-distance phone call Uses PPP (Point-to-Point Protocol)

VPN Uses the Internet Faster and cheaper than Dial-up Uses tunneling to move LAN VPN Uses the Internet Faster and cheaper than Dial-up Uses tunneling to move LAN packets over the Internet

VPN VPN

VPN Concentrator Used at large companies Includes – Strong encryption and authentication – Handles VPN Concentrator Used at large companies Includes – Strong encryption and authentication – Handles many clients

Tunneling Protocols IPSec (port UDP 500 for IKE) – Problems with NAT PPTP (port Tunneling Protocols IPSec (port UDP 500 for IKE) – Problems with NAT PPTP (port TCP 1723) – Old and vulnerable L 2 TP (port UDP 1701) – No encryption, often used with IPSec SSTP (port TCP 443) – Works through NAT For more details, see link Ch 4 i

IPsec as a Tunneling Protocol IPsec has two modes – Transport Mode Only the IPsec as a Tunneling Protocol IPsec has two modes – Transport Mode Only the payload is encrypted – Tunnel Mode The entire IP packet is encrypted Uses IKE over UDP port 500 to authenticate clients Creates Security Associations (SAs) for the VPN

AH and ESP IPsec can use – AH (Authentication Header) alone for Authentication and AH and ESP IPsec can use – AH (Authentication Header) alone for Authentication and Integrity no encryption Protocol 51 – or ESP (Encapsulating Security Payload) to encrypt the data providing Confidentiality, Integrity, and Authentication Protocol 50 Link Ch 4 j

L 2 TP and IPsec L 2 TP creates a tunnel, but without encryption L 2 TP and IPsec L 2 TP creates a tunnel, but without encryption – No confidentiality L 2 TP/IPsec used together provide – Authentication from Authentication Header on Protocol 51 – Encryption from Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) on Protocol 50

NAT and IPsec NAT changes the IP addresses of packets IPsec detects this change NAT and IPsec NAT changes the IP addresses of packets IPsec detects this change as packet damage and discards it To use IPsec through NAT, use – NAT-T (NAT Traversal) (link Ch 4 k), or – Another tunneling protocol such as SSTP

TLS and SSL Some tunneling protocols use TLS (Transport Layer Security) or SSL (Secure TLS and SSL Some tunneling protocols use TLS (Transport Layer Security) or SSL (Secure Sockets Layer) SSTP (Secure Socket Tunneling Protocol) – Uses SSL over port 443 Open. VPN and Open. Connect – Open source VPN applications that use TLS

Site-to-Site VPNs • Easier for users; just appears as a normal network connection Switch Site-to-Site VPNs • Easier for users; just appears as a normal network connection Switch VPN Server

VPN Over Open Wireless Public wireless hot spots often have little or no security VPN Over Open Wireless Public wireless hot spots often have little or no security Using a VPN protects you by adding a layer of encryption

Free VPN Link Ch 4 s Free VPN Link Ch 4 s

Network Access Control Checks health of client before allowing it to connect to the Network Access Control Checks health of client before allowing it to connect to the company LAN – Up-to-date patches and antivirus, firewall on – Health agent runs on client Authentication – NAC can deny access if clients don't provide valid credentials

Network Access Control Network Access Control