Can the Spread of Nuclear Weapons be Stopped? ◘ Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory November 1, 2006 ◘ Wolfgang K. H. Panofsky 1
During Cold War • Deter with nuclear Triad: ICBM’s, Strategic Bombers. SNBM’s • Nuclear war fighting abandoned in plan MAD Mutual Assured Destruction 2
The Cold War is over -- but… Current Doctrine • Deter, assure, dissuade, defeat • Pre-empt, with nuclear weapons if necessary • “all options” open • “capabilities based, ” not “threat based” • Nuclear weapons play “smaller role” • Adaptive planning NUTS Nuclear Use Target Selection 3
Nuclear Weapons Risks Remain • US – Russia nuclear weapons release • Regional Conflict (e. g. India and Pakistan) • Acquisition of Nuclear Weapons by Terrorists Not addressed in this talk This • Nuclear Weapons Proliferation Talk Risk = Probability x consequences increased decreased 4
Nuclear Terrorism and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation are not the same States can be deterred. Terrorists can not. No evidence that new proliferant states are greater or lesser risks for transferring nuclear weapons or the tools to make them to terrorists. 5
Nonproliferation – a nonpartisan goal Presidential Debate: September 30, 2004 Mr. Lehrer: “…so it is correct to say that if somebody’s listening to this, that you agree…the single most serious threat you believe –both of you believe is nuclear proliferation. ” Mr. Bush: “I do –in the hands of a terrorist enemy. ” Mr. Kerry: “Weapons of mass destruction, nuclear proliferation. ” …but… 6
In the History of Mankind, all newly developed technologies • have been “dual purpose” • have spread over entire globe • This precedent must be broken for nuclear weapons • Knowledge is not a bar to proliferation today 7
Cornerstone of Nonproliferation Regime is Nuclear Non. Proliferation Treaty (NPT) • Came into force 1970 • Signed and Ratified by all Nations except – Israel – India – Pakistan – North Korea withdrew • Review Conferences every 5 years • Made a Treaty of Indefinite Duration at 1995 Review Conference 8
The NPT Bargain 1. Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) and Non-nuclear Weapons States (NNWS) 2. US, Russia, UK, China and France are NWS 3. NWS do not give NW or NW tools to NNWS 4. NNWS do not receive such material 9
The NPT Bargain(continued) 5. NNWS have “inalienable right” to nuclear power. 6. NWS work in good faith toward prohibition of NWs and General Disarmament (no specified timetable; implication is to deemphasize role of NW in international relations 7. NNWS must negotiate Safeguards with IAEA 10
Number of States with Nuclear Weapons Belarus Rate of 1 new NWS every 5 yrs Kazakhstan Ukraine Pakistan South Africa India Israel North Korea Belarus, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and South Africa became NNWS China France United Kingdom Soviet Union United States NPT in force 1970 “I am haunted by the feeling that by 1970, unless we are successful, there may be 10 nuclear powers instead of 4, and by 1975, 15 or 20. ” John Kennedy, 1963 11
Historical Summary of Military Fissile Material & Nuclear Weapons Programs begun before 1970 when NPT came into force, succeeded and are still ongoing Programs ended by 1970 • • Programs ended after 1970 United States Russia United Kingdom France China Israel India • Sweden • Canada • Australia • Egypt Argentina Brazil Romania South Africa Spain South Korea Spain Switzerland Taiwan Libya Yugoslavia 12
Historical Summary (cont’d) Intentions suspected but no NW program identified Programs started after 1970 Succeeded and ongoing Pakistan Algeria Syria North Korea Are suspected to be actively seeking nuclear weapons Iran Factions within advocated for/sought NW, but ceased by 1970 Italy Germany Japan Norway Inherited NW, but now non. NW State party to NPT Belarus Kazakhstan Ukraine 13
The Bad News • The Non-Parties to NPT (Israel, India, Pakistan, North Korea) • Latency: Capability of NNWS versus Intent • NW policies of NWS – U. S. redesign efforts – Only China proclaims “No First Use. ” – U. S. pre-emptive policies The physical facts: • Uranium Isotope enrichment & Plutonium reprocessing can be part of peaceful power program --- but: • Enrichment & Reprocessing can shorten lead time to acquire NW after withdrawal from NPT 14
The Fuel Cycle Under the NPT NWS Nuclear Power Nuclear Weapons LEU HEU, PU Spent Fuel ? Reprocessing NNWS Uranium Ore Conversion Nuclear Power Enrichment LEU HEU LEU Pu Spent Fuel ? Reprocessing IAEA Safeguards 15
INTENT “L at e nc y” or lik e lih oo d of ac qu irin g nu c lea rw ea po ns IRAN BRAZIL JAPAN TECHNICAL CAPABILITY OF NNWS 16
Brazil 1951 (Dual Purpose) § Brazil establishes National Research Council § Swimming Pool Research Reactor fueled by HEU § Brazil bought 625 MWe “turnkey” reactor 17
Brazil (continued) Military 1970 § Brazil military government § Six 1. 3 GWe reactors by 1998 § Attempts to import European centrifuges 1980 § Three parallel military programs § Air Force – laser enrichment § Army – natural uranium graphite reactor § Navy – centrifuge program Pu 18
Brazil (continued) Peaceful Program 1988 Brazil approves new Constitution: no nuclear weapons ~1990 Argentina and Brazil elected civilian Presidents 1991 Argentina and Brazil terminate weapons programs and signed mutual “peaceful uses” treaty, establishing bilateral monitoring agency 19
Brazil (continued) 1994 Quadrilateral Agreement: Argentina, Brazil, bilateral agency, IAEA But centrifuge program continues. Domestic design more capable than P-1. Claimed purpose: Prestige, Independence; but large hydropower resources 20
Iran 1957 – 1979 • 1957 US-Iran Nuclear Cooperation agreement • 1968 Iran signs NPT; ratified in 1970 • Plans to construct 23 nuclear power plants by 2001! • Starts Bushehr plant with German contractor • Invests in European Nuclear Energy Consortium 21
Iran (continued) 1979 Iranian Revolution 1984 – 1988 Bushehr damaged by Iraqi bombardment 1985? or Pakistan and China signed 2 yrs later nuclear cooperation agreements with Iran. Tech transfers by Khan Organization. 1995 Iran contracts with Russia to finish Bushehr 22
Iran (continued) 2002 2003 2004 2005 April ‘ 06 Iranian dissidents reveal existence of Natanz enrichment facility and a heavy water production plant Iran suspends enrichment under pressure from EU Iran breaks centrifuge seals Iran resumes conversion Iran claims 3. 5% enrichment; running 164 centrifuges 23
IRAN (continued) Intent? • Iran not fully cooperative with IAEA Safeguards • No evidence of NW program • Fatwa by Supreme Leader forbidding NW • Inalienable right to Fuel Cycle • Need for Independence? 24
Japan • Owns about 45 tons of reactor-grade Plutonium • Only about 10% of this is stored in Japan • The designated purpose of this material is for use in Mixed Oxide Fuel (MOX) and breeder reactors. These uses have been delayed or cancelled. • Reactor-grade Plutonium is useable in NW 25
North Korea (DPRK) 1985 1991 1992 DPRK joins NPT US withdraws NW from South Korea DPRK concludes Safeguards Agreement with IAEA but IAEA detected 90 g diversion of plutonium 1993 DPRK announces intent to withdraw from NPT. IAEA demands more access to Yongbyon reactor. Many US – DPRK diplomatic contacts 26
North Korea (DPRK) cont’d October, 1994: US and DPRK sign “Agreed Framework” • DPRK stop reprocessing • Korean Energy Development Organization (KEDO) to build two LWR’s and to supply fuel oil Many follow-on diplomatic moves 27
North Korea (DPRK) cont’d 1998 South Korea “Sunshine Policy” 1998 - 2000 Extensive diplomatic bilateral contacts, including visit by Secretary of State Albright to Pyongyang 28
North Korea (DPRK) cont’d 2001 2002 Secretary of State Powell declares to “pick up where President Clinton left off, ” but retracts and diplomacy turns hostile. President Bush includes DPRK in “axis of evil” in State of Union speech. Possible use of NW against DPRK included in Nuclear Posture Review. 29
North Korea (DPRK) cont’d August 2002 KEDO groundbreaking for reactors October 2002 Asst. Secretary of State James Kelly visits Pyongyang. US claims that DPRK admitted to Kelly that it had an HEU enrichment program. DPRK denies this, stating they only claimed a right to enrichment. Translation problem? DPRK enrichment program has disappeared from media. 30
North Korea (DPRK) cont’d November 2002 KEDO suspends fuel oil shipments in response to US enrichment claims. IAEA challenges enrichment. December 2002 DPRK restarts reactor, removes IAEA seals, expels inspectors. 31
North Korea (DPRK) cont’d January 2003 DPRK withdraws from NPT 2003 DPRK tells US and China it has NW Six Nation Talks; US refuses bilateral talks 2006 DPRK tests NW 32
The CTBT and Nonproliferation • Long History: 1958 initiatives • Partial Test ban: 1963 LTBT • Reality versus Symbolism CTBT cited in all NPT Review Conferences • Reality – Cost to National Security low – Technical benefit to Nonproliferation low – Cost-Benefit Ratio is Quotient of two small quantities • The CTBT has been signed by most nations but is not in force. The US Administration opposes ratification. • The CTBT Monitoring system is in place and is supported by the US. 33
The CTBT Matrix Options NNWS Countries No CTBT Complied with by all countries CTBT all countries cheat to extent possible without detection Highly Developed Developing Least Developed • What type of NW can each country build? • Conclusion: US interest served better with CTBT, obeyed or not, than without CTBT. (NAS, 2002) 34
Remedies to Proliferation What won’t work in the long run • Discriminatory “Coalition of the Willing” • Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) • Selective enforcement • Divide world into fissile materials suppliers and receivers • Military pre-emption of nascent nuclear facilities (Israel v. OSIRAK, 1981) 35
Remedies to Proliferation (cont’d) What may work • International fuel supply and return of spent fuel to international control • Strengthen IAEA; make Additional Protocol mandatory • Broaden negative and positive security assurances • Make withdrawal from NPT subject to U. N. Security Council Action 36
Positive & Negative Security Assurances NWS give assurances to + Come to the assistance of a NNWS threatened or attacked with NW – Not to attack a NNWS with NW unless the NNWS is allied with a NWS 37
Remedies to Proliferation (cont’d) What will help • Universal No First Use acceptance by all NWS • Drastic reduction of Nuclear Weapons stockpiles by formal Treaty by NWS • Lessened reliance on military options in international relations • US leadership in all of the above …because… 38
US leadership US is strongest military power measured by conventional military strength and economic power and “You cannot preach temperance from a bar stool. ” …Rep. Ed Markey, 2006 And “Never negotiate with the United States unless you have a nuclear weapon. ” …Indian Deputy Minister of Defense 39
Ultimately Nuclear Nonproliferation Demands that every Nation concludes that its security and Well-Being are served better without nuclear weapons than with them. 40
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