Скачать презентацию Automotive Industry Requirements for NEMO Route Optimization IETF Скачать презентацию Automotive Industry Requirements for NEMO Route Optimization IETF

420c3da1ea067f78a297bf426a32b0a7.ppt

  • Количество слайдов: 9

Automotive Industry Requirements for NEMO Route Optimization IETF 71, MEXT WG 12/03/2008 draft-ietf-mext-nemo-ro-automotive-req-00 Roberto Automotive Industry Requirements for NEMO Route Optimization IETF 71, MEXT WG 12/03/2008 draft-ietf-mext-nemo-ro-automotive-req-00 Roberto Baldessari Thierry Ernst Andreas Festag Massimiliano Lenardi

Background l l Several automotive projects and consortia are looking at NEMO for deployment Background l l Several automotive projects and consortia are looking at NEMO for deployment of vehicular networks ISO CALM and ETSI TC ITS to request liasons with IETF Draft initiated by C 2 C-CC, now gathering input from ISO and ETSI too Deployments already presented in past meetings (see MEXT interim meeting 7/02/2008) l here focusing only on the requirements

RO Scenarios l l l Highest priority to non-nested NEMO RO case NEMO MR RO Scenarios l l l Highest priority to non-nested NEMO RO case NEMO MR runs on automotive On-board Units (OBU), embedded into car’s electronics CE classification: 1. Another vehicle 2. Dedicated node in the infrastructure a. On the roadside (topologically close to MR) b. In the Internet 3. Arbitrary node in the Internet

Req 1: Separability l Switching to RO is subject to policy table l l Req 1: Separability l Switching to RO is subject to policy table l l l Policies include MNP and end points addresses Policies may change dynamically (affecting establishment of new RO sessions) Rationales: l l l avoiding unnecessary RO sessions RO establishment not always worth (external information used to set the policies) privacy protection

Req 2: Security l As a minimum security feature, MNP ownership should be checked Req 2: Security l As a minimum security feature, MNP ownership should be checked against off-path attackers l l I. e. if more sophisticated protection is not applicable, a RRlike procedure is minimum req Req to be extended for better protection -> feedback is needed l l Automotive MRs likely to be equipped with certificates based on PKI (to be harmonized among different consortia) Given that, the req could include l authentication of RO signaling l verification of ownership based on the certificate

Req 3: Privacy Protection l Exposing the MNP must be limited to l l Req 3: Privacy Protection l Exposing the MNP must be limited to l l l CE (obviously) nodes on the path MR-CE Better protection desirable -> feedback is needed l If PKI in place, existing IPsec techniques should be applicable to MR-CE

Req 4: Multihoming l RO technique must not prevent different NEMO multihoming configurations from Req 4: Multihoming l RO technique must not prevent different NEMO multihoming configurations from working (RFC 4980) l l l (1, n, n): different purpose MNPs/HAs (n, 1, 1): additional MR added in later stage (n, n, n): combination of the previous

Req 5: Efficient Signaling l Signaling for establishment of RO as small as possible Req 5: Efficient Signaling l Signaling for establishment of RO as small as possible l Text in the draft outdated l l we want to remove maximum number of signaling messages and keep the req generic Criterion to choose among different RO solutions

Req 6: Switching HA l HA switch considered in ISO CALM, not in C Req 6: Switching HA l HA switch considered in ISO CALM, not in C 2 C-CC RO should not prevent it from working l Details not yet available l l To be provided in next version