AUTOMATION SCENARIO May 10 2010 National and Local

AUTOMATION SCENARIO May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections

Background The Commission on Elections started its efforts at modernizing or automating the electoral process way back in 1992 with Operation MODEX (Modernization and Excellence), immediately after the first Synchronized National and Local Elections (NLE). 1. The first try of an automated election system using the Optical Mark Reader (OMR) technology in the 1996 Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) Elections 2. The partial implementation in the ARMM provinces of the same automated system in the 1998 National and Local Elections 3. The halted nationwide implementation of a centralized automated counting system in 2004 4. The fully automated election system in the 2008 ARMM Elections COMELEC continues to fulfill its mandate of conducting election – be it manual or automated. Source: www. comelec. gov. ph

Background For the coming 2010 elections, the COMELEC is set to conduct the country’s first nationwide fully automated elections – from counting of votes to transmission and canvassing of election results. Source: www. comelec. gov. ph

Kinds of Technologies Considered The following shows the kinds of technologies considered by the Philippine inspection team during the 15 -day inspection trip to the US in October 1993: 1. Mechanical Leverage Machine - a voting machine, wherein a voter would face or enter a cabinet-type booth to cast his vote. All the names are already presented to the voter in the booth, and the voter would just have to push a button corresponding to the name of a candidate of his choice, and pull a mechanical lever afterwards. His vote automatically gets counted. 2. Punch Card System - a voting device, wherein a voter is given a ballot, with hole slots corresponding to the candidates' names, and a puncher (similar to that used by our provincial bus conductors in ticketing their passengers). To cast his vote, the voter has to punch a hole corresponding to the name of the candidate of his choice. A separate reader machine does the counting afterwards. Source: www. comelec. gov. ph

Kinds of Technologies Considered 3. Optical Mark Reader (OMR) - a ballot counting machine: wherein a voter is given a ballot, with pre-printed candidates' names, with corresponding ovals to shade or broken arrows to connect. The votes in the shaded ballots would be scanned using an OMR. 4. Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) Machine - a voting machine wherein a voter is presented with a screen showing all the names of the candidates, much like the locator screens in the Glorietta Shopping Malls. To cast his vote, the voter has to touch the name of the candidate of his choice on the screen, and his vote automatically gets counted. Source: www. comelec. gov. ph

Electronic Voting Machines Used in other Countries

Australia (e. VACS) Type: Bar code reader authenticates ballots, which are completed with a keypad. Usage: Eight of 80 polling places voted with the Electronic Voting and Counting System, or e. VACS, in the Australia Capital Territory. Addressing distrust: The government specified that the program's code be open source. Addressing multiple votes: Voters sign in and receive a barcoded ballot that gives them one vote. Still at issue: On intellectualproperty grounds, the company that created e. VACS, Software Improvements, wants to restrict the source code. Source: http: //news. cnet. com/Global-lessons-in-e-voting/2009 -1008_3 -5387540. html

India (EVM) Type: Battery-powered electronic device has buttons next to choices. Usage: The Electronic Voting Machines, or EVMs, were used countrywide in May for the parliamentary elections by about 390 million people. Addressing distrust: The simple -to-use machines are built to address illiteracy and be tamperproof. Vote data is stored in nonremovable memory. Addressing multiple votes: Each voter's finger is marked with indelible ink. Still at issue: Questions remain about the security of the devices and the tabulator that collects votes from the devices. Source: http: //news. cnet. com/Global-lessons-in-e-voting/2009 -1008_3 -5387540. html

Venezuela (Smartmatic) Type: The integrated voting device has a small touch screen and a receipt printer. Usage: Almost the entire country voted on the device for an Aug. 15 referendum on the ouster of President Chavez. Addressing distrust: Paper receipts were kept by polling stations for random audits. Addressing multiple votes: A voter's fingerprint is transmitted to a national database, ensuring that each person votes only once. Still at issue: The voting process still lacks adequate checks on system integrity. Source: http: //news. cnet. com/Global-lessons-in-e-voting/2009 -1008_3 -5387540. html

United States (Diebold, among others) Type: System has a touch screen and, in some cases, a receipt printer. Usage: An estimated 31 percent of voters in the United States will use the system in the November presidential election. Addressing distrust: Easy-touse terminals include accessibility features for the handicapped. Addressing multiple votes: A chip card given to the voter contains a key to allow only one vote. Still at issue: Many questions remain about device security and the secrecy surrounding machine development and certification. Source: http: //news. cnet. com/Global-lessons-in-e-voting/2009 -1008_3 -5387540. html

Philippines (Smartmatic) Type: Bar code reader, scans ballots, with built-in printer Addressing distrust: Examination and Testing of Equipment or Device of the AES and Opening of the Source Code for Review Addressing multiple votes: Each voter's finger is marked with indelible ink.

Project Specifications • Component 1: PAPER-BASED AUTOMATED ELECTION SYSTEM (AES) Component 1 -A : Election Management System (EMS) Component 1 -B : Precinct-Count Optical Scan (PCOS) Component 1 -C : Counting/Consolidation System (CCS) • Component 2: PROVISION FOR ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION USING PUBLIC TELECOMMUNICATION NETWORKS • Component 3: OVERALL PROJECT MANAGEMENT

STATISTICS • Estimated 50, 723, 734 registered voters • 44, 009, 069 registered voters - as of April 20, 2009 ERB Hearing • • • 58, 327 registration records cancelled by reason of death 1, 246, 272 registration records deactivated Last ERB Hearing on November 16, 2009 • 80 Provinces • 1, 631 cities and municipalities • 320, 415 Established Precincts (estimate) • 76, 340 Clustered Precincts (estimate) • 37, 884 Polling Centers (estimate) • 82, 200 PCOS Machines • 76, 340 PCOS Machines for distribution to clustered precincts • 5, 860 Reserve PCOS Machines

Board of Election Inspectors • One (1) BEI for every clustered precinct • Three regular members – – – • Chairman – Delivers ballot to voter Poll Clerk Third Member Support Staff – – Depends on number of precincts clustered To assist Poll Clerk and Third Member in managing – List of Voters with Voting Records – Book of Voters

Board of Election Inspectors No. of Precincts No. of Support Clustered Staff 1 2 3 4 5 -7 none 1 2 3 Total no. of personnel (BEI + Support Staff) 3 3 4 5 6

Establishing Identity of Voter LIST OF VOTERS WITH VOTING RECORDS Photograph

Establishing Identity of Voter

Establishing Identity of Voter If identity cannot be established through photograph Compare signatures Use Book of Voters Contains applications for registration • Includes specimen signature of voter Other methods to challenge identity

Official Ballots Pre-printed names of candidates 600 candidates can be accommodated 300 names per side of ballot

Official Ballots Ovals opposite names of candidate Shade oval opposite name of chosen candidate

PCOS Precinct Count Optical Scan • One unit per clustered precinct • Voter personally feeds ballot into machine • Ballot can be fed at any orientation • Ballot scanned both sides simultaneously

TESTING & SEALING PROCEDURES At least three days before election day Public shall accomplish test ballots Ballots shall be manually counted and election returns accomplished Same set of ballots that was manually counted shall be fed into the counting machine Manual count shall be compared with the print-out of the election returns If public is satisfied that the manual count is the same as the automated count, the print-out and manually prepared election returns shall be signed-off by the witnesses

TESTING & SEALING PROCEDURES At least three days before election day Machines shall be sealed without any connection to transmission links Public shall be allowed to secure the polling places where the counting machines are installed The only time that the counting machines shall be opened is on election day in the presence of watchers

Voting period 7: 00 a. m. to 6: 00 p. m. Unless there are voters waiting for their turn to vote Poll Clerk lists down names voters queuing Poll Clerk calls voter to cast ballot Voter who fails to appear after being called twice shall not longer be allowed to vote Precinct set up At least 10 voters can cast ballot at any one time

Voting Before voting starts Show that ballot box is empty Transparent plastic Turn on and initialize PCOS Print “Zero Report” To show that there is no entry/vote in machine’s memory

Counting • At close of polls – – Perform close function • To prevent additional ballots from being inserted After close function, PCOS automatically • Starts counting process • Prints election returns after completion of automated count – Eight (8) copies

Counting Insert transmission cable After printing first eight (8) copies of ER To eliminate doubts that the PCOS can be manipulated remotely Perform electronic transmission function Print additional twenty-two (22) copies of ER Automatically performed by PCOS after completion of transmission

Canvassing/Consolidation • Electronically transmitted results – – Used as basis for canvassing/consolidation and proclamation of winning candidates for • City/municipal officials • Provincial officials • Members, House of Representatives • Senators and Party-list Congress will also receive electronically transmitted results • Constitution authorized the Congress to promulgate rules for canvassing of results for President and Vice -President

VERIFY Audit Log Activities Time Date

Congress COMELEC National Board of Canvassers Physical transport Prov. COC Provincial Board of Canvassers SOVM/C Physical transport Mun. /City COC Municipal/City Board of Canvassers SOVP Physical transport Election Returns Precinct Manual System of Canvassing

Congress COMELEC National Board of Canvassers Physical transport Electronic Transmission Prov. COC Provincial Board of Canvassers SOVM/C Physical transport Mun. /City COC Municipal/City Board of Canvassers SOVP Physical transport Election Returns Precinct Comelec Central Back-up Server Advance Results/ Monitoring Secured Public Website Server for Dominant Majority/ Minority Parties, Citizens Arm, KBP Advance Results

SECURITY Security measures under a manual election system still applicable Strengthen security through automation Password PIN Digital signatures Encryption

SECURITY 128 -bit encryption Ø 2 128 2 2 = 4 3 2 = 8 4 2 = 16 5 2 = 32 6 2 = 64 7 2 = 128 8 2 = 256 • • 9 2 = 512 10 2 = 1024 11 2 = 2048 12 2 = 4096 13 2 = 8192 14 2 = 16, 384 15 2 = 32, 768 • • 16 2 = 65, 536 17 2 = 131, 072 18 2 = 262, 144 19 2 = 524, 288 20 2 = 1, 048, 576 21 2 = 2, 097, 152 22 2 = 4, 194, 304

SECURITY 128 -bit encryption • • 2 = 8, 388, 608 23 2 = 16, 777, 216 24 2 = 33, 554, 432 25 2 = 67, 108, 864 26 2 = 134, 217, 728 27 2 = 268, 435, 456 28 2 = 536, 870, 912 29 • • 30 2 = 1, 073, 741, 824 31 2 = 2, 147, 483, 648 32 2 = 4, 294, 967, 296 33 2 = 8, 569, 934, 592 34 2 = 17, 179, 869, 184 35 2 = 34, 359, 738, 368 36 2 = 68, 719, 476, 736

SECURITY 128 -bit encryption 37 • 2 = 137, 438, 953, 472 38 • 2 = 274, 877, 906, 944 39 • 2 = 549, 755, 813, 888 40 • 2 = over One Trillion combinations

SECURITY 128 -bit encryption Same security system used by banks Random Encryption Temperature of machine Voltage Unique machine identity User identity No single/master decryption code

SECURITY • Time needed to decrypt one precinct result will be same amount of time needed to decrypt next precinct result • Transmission takes at most 2 minutes • Copies for distribution – 30 copies of election returns at the precinct level – 30 copies of certificate of canvass at municipal level – 14 copies of certificate of canvass at provincial level

SECURITY Paper Ballot digital image Data storage device Transmitted results Hard copies of election results

CONTINUITY PLAN Types of Systems Breakdown Fails to scan Able to scan but fails to print ER Able to print ER but fails to transmit Able to transmit but fails to consolidate

CONTINUITY PLAN Fails to scan Use spare PCOS Use PCOS of another precinct Wait for other PCOS to complete process in its precinct Get PCOS and reconfigure for next precinct Scan ballots If all PCOS fails Manual counting

CONTINUITY PLAN • Able to scan but fails to print ER – Use spare PCOS – Use PCOS of another precinct • Wait for other PCOS to complete process in its precinct • Get PCOS and reconfigure for next precinct • Use removable storage device of defective PCOS and let replacement PCOS print ER – If all PCOS fails • Manual counting

CONTINUITY PLAN • Able to print ER but fails to transmit – Go to nearest precinct or polling center which has a functioning transmission facility – Use removable storage device of defective PCOS and let the functioning facility transmit precinct results – If all transmission facilities bog down • Physically transport removable storage device to canvassing site – In the presence of watchers and security escorts

CONTINUITY PLAN • Able to transmit but fails to consolidate Use consolidation/canvassing system (CCS) of another municipality/province Use the removable storage device and let functioning CCS consolidate the results Provide back-up canvassing through the Central Server Print results and send the same to affected board of canvassers Print results and constitute special board of canvassers to take the place of the affected board

Basic Elements of Elections • People – Vote-buying – Coercion • Systems & Procedures – – Intimidation – Terrorism – – – Misreading of ballots Unreadable handwriting Error • Honest • Deliberate Fraud Manufactured election returns Tampering of election results

Successful Implementation Vigilance of citizenry Cooperation Coordination Support

THANK YOU!