Authoritarian Developmentalism AD in East Asia PROF MARK

Authoritarian Developmentalism (AD) in East Asia PROF. MARK R. THOMPSON MAMAS, AIS, CITYU AIS 5024: THE STATE AND ECONOMY IN EAST ASIA, LECTURE 4

Authoritarian developmentalism (AD) as… Economic strategy ◦ EOI-based industrial policy ◦ Aims upgrading/‘deepening’ (‘ships and planes’) Authoritarian political regime ◦ Founded/headed by leader (Park, LKY, Deng, etc) ◦ Dependent business, co-opted middle class ◦ Represses labour (also students) Ideology ◦ Developmentalism justifies authoritarian rule ◦ If successful delays demo, but may fail

DS vs. AD Agree it involves certain economic strategy ◦ EOI, labour repressive, etc. DS as a state form ◦ Stresses institutional aspects ◦ Technical process of running an (efficient) state AD as a political regime ◦ Focus on actual authoritarian powerholders ◦ And their ideology of powerholding

A more or less Moore-ian approach Barrington Moore, Jr. (1966) Different paths to the modern world ◦ Democratic and authoritarian Class coalitions crucial ◦ Business dependent on developmentalist state ◦ “labour repressive” regimes The stronger developmentalism, the later democratization will occur (if at all)

A “reactionary coalition” Coalition of civilian/civilianized powerholders, Technocrats for bureaucratic-rationality Close business associates (“cronies”) ◦ lead industrialization and reduce transaction costs Religious leaders provide traditionalist legitimacy With labor demobilized and business dependent ◦ who is there to oppose developmentalism? ◦ Have to “wait” for the rise of middle class ◦ But can also be co-opted by state

AD II: Changing power relations Initially involves despotic power ◦ Power over society But strives for infrastructural power ◦ power through society (Michael Mann) ◦ by sustained economic growth ◦ and political control with limited coercion

Comparison Despotic Power OVER civil society Strong in historic regimes One-way Street Distributive Infrastructural Power THROUGH society (via infrastructure) Strong in modern regimes Two-way Street Collective

AD III: Phases Phase 1: Economic Diversification ◦ Basic exports/low wages ◦ Despotic power/repression ◦ Paternalist ideology (‘father knows best’) Phase 2: ‘Deepening’, move to high tech ◦ Increasing infrastructural power ◦ Meritocracy (‘some are smarter than others’) Phase 3: ‘Widening’, service industry, rise middle class ◦ Little open repression, co-optation key ◦ Culturalist defence of authoritarianism

* Developmentalist “flying geese” Malaysia (1969 emergency, Mahathir’s PMship) Thailand (1957 -58 Sarit military regime, military rule 197688) China (1979 Deng’s reforms) "Market-Leninism" South Korea (1961, Park regime) Hong Kong (British colony until 1997) Southeast Asian “tiger cubs” Four “tigers” Vietnam (1986 “doi moi” reforms) Philippines (1972, Marcos declares martial law) Indonesia (1965 -67, Suharto regime) Singapore (1961, Lee-led PAP regime) Taiwan (1949, KMT regime) Japan (mid-19 th Meiji restoration)

Other commonalities among ADs Flying Geese ◦ With Japan at lead as successfully authoritarian developmentalism ◦ Its former colonies want to be ADs too ◦ Singapore now “model” for China’s AD regime today Cold War context ◦ U. S. support and markets key ◦ Unites leadership against common threat Common ideology and economic strategy ◦ Postpone democracy in name of development ◦ “Governed market”, EOI, labor repression, etc.

Japan (Meiji, Militarist and Postwar) First non-Western country to industrialize ◦ German developmentalism chosen as model Colonies industrialized ◦ Sets stage for S. Korea and Taiwan Japanese militarism ◦ Obscures ongoing influence Japanese model Postwar democracy ◦ But labour repressed ◦ MITI planning

South Korea I One of world’s poorest after Korean war ◦ US aid drying up Unstable authoritarian civilian rule (Rhee) ◦ And democratic interlude Park Chung-hee’s coup (1961) ◦ Former Japanese officer/model ◦ Nationalist Cold warrior, hates N Korea ◦ Determined to make S Korea strong by being rich

South Korea II AD ◦ Period dictatorship, then pseudo-democracy ◦ Strong repression labor, opposition coerced ◦ Paternalist ideology Diversification quickly yields deepening ◦ State-led capitalism ◦ Chaebols led by coopted ‘enemy’ industrialists ◦ Hard criteria limits cronyism ◦ First ‘new giant’ Asian economy after Japan

Taiwan’s developmentalism KMT loses civil war ◦ Chiang Kai-shek flees to Taiwan Establish ‘enclave’ regime ◦ But claim to rule all of China! ◦ Saved by US from mainland conquest To build strength, turn to growth ◦ Cronyism in state sector ◦ But dynamism in SMEs

Singapore Ultimate AD PAP highly cohesive and efficient ◦ Led by Lee Kuan Yew (LKY) ◦ and ‘family. LEE’ (PM Lee Hsieng Loong) ◦ Cronyism without (obvious) corruption State as entrepreneur ◦ Use foreign investment/capital ◦ State-led upgrading ◦ Local entrepreneurs long disadvantaged

Hong Kong Neither DS nor AD ◦ Authoritarian British colony ◦ with not highly interventionist colonial state No state-led strategy ◦ “Lame efforts” at upgrading/”deepening” ◦ Inertia as still rely on low cost labour until uncompetitive ◦ Relocation to Mainland as market decision China vetoes political democratization ◦ But liberal civil liberties tradition (still) largely in place

Thailand Sarit’s military dictatorship 1957 -1963 ◦ Classically AD: Strong role for technocrats ◦ ‘Despotic paternalism’ Thanom Praphat successors cronyist ◦ Student uprising 1973 (demo overthrown 1976) ‘Premocracy’ Less despotic AD, after rapid growth partial deepening ‘Oscillation’ since 1988 ◦ Asian crisis and then slow growth ◦ Periodic military coups ◦ Particularly after rise pro-poor populism

Indonesia Sukarno’s nationalist, isolationism ◦ Ends in economic crisis and political massacre Suharto seizes power 1965 (‘New Order’) ◦ AD established ◦ Despotism gradually ‘infrastructuralized’ ◦ After oil boom, increasing turn to EOI in 1980 s Three decades growth stopped cold 1997 ◦ Asian crisis hits crony-plagued Indon hard ◦ Reformasi protests call for gd gov and demo

Philippines Long democratic tradition ◦ But political infighting, insurgency, corruption ◦ Excuse for Marcos’s 1972 martial law ‘New Society’ ◦ Strong role for technocrats, econ planning ◦ EOI with electronics leading way Growing problems ◦ Falling commodity prices, economic crisis ◦ Cronyism as Marcos loses legitimacy

Malaysia Idiosyncratic case of quasi-developmentalism ◦ Racially “plural” society ◦ NEP affirmative action for Malays ◦ But ethnic Chinese and Tamils feel discriminated But AD dictatorship? ◦ DS-style strategic planning in 1970 s and 1980 s ◦ Mahathir’s authoritarian leadership ◦ EOI, labor repression, and crony industries ◦ Problems with “deepening” ◦ Pressures for democratization with growing focuse on corruption

China Dwarfs all previous AD regimes Post-totalitarian reforms after Mao’s death ◦ ‘Market’ not ‘Marxist’-Leninist Successful diversification (world’s factory) ◦ Authoritarian control ◦ Labor repression Now attempting to deepen ◦ Was also attempt to move from coercion to more subtle control ◦ Until Ji’s renewed repression

Vietnam Doi moi reforms in mid-1980 s Similar trajectory to China ◦ Post-totalitarian reforms after crisis ◦ But China model ◦ And reforms less deep (was less totalitarian) Rapid transition to EOI-led growth ◦ Spontaneous land reform and ag. Export ◦ EOI, forex, diversification, rapid growth ◦ Unclear if can ‘deepen”

Idiosyncrasies I Despite key similarities in AD regimes, also many differences Japan ◦ Some developmentalism persists under demo South Korea ◦ Repressive, highly militarized dictatorship ◦ Heavy industrial concentration (chaebols) Taiwan ◦ “Contested state” and “émigré regime” ◦ SMEs dominant; dual economy

Idiosyncrasies II Malaysia ◦ Multi-ethnic ◦ Affirmation action alongside developmentalism Singapore ◦ Small ◦ Run like a family business China ◦ Large ◦ Experiments, bottom-up pressures

Idiosyncracies III ‘Market-Leninism’ Least expected case of AD But former state socialist regimes states well suited Used to strategic planning ◦ Just shift economic strategic Already dictatorial ◦ Just shift to “softer” post-totalitarianism

Failed developmentalism All have authoritarian leadership ◦ Thailand (Sarit), Indonesia (Suharto), Phils (Marcos) All have growth ideology ◦ But was nationalism weaker? EOI and successful diversification ◦ But failed deepening Cronies over technocrats, ◦ loss business support and traditionalists revolt

Developmentalist involution Early growth sustained by agricultural and primary industrial exports Failure of industrial “deepening” Indonesian planes versus Korean ships Friends, not “foes” as cronies Lack of performance criteria Rising debt to compensate for growing inefficiency increases vulnerability to crisis

Cronies versus technocrats Marcos and particularly Suharto regime once seen as “strong” Guided by technocrats Later denounced as “cronyist” Cronyism less cause than consequence of weakening regimes Close state-business ties not unusual Economic crisis leads state-linked businesses to turn on technocrats

Development crises Growth: economic downturn ◦ cronies scramble to save conglomerates ◦ technocrats sidelined Competition: electoral manipulation ◦ popular mobilization ◦ military politicization Legitimation: “crony capitalism”/“KKN” ◦ by business or students ◦ backed by traditionalists

People powers Similarities ◦ Thailand 1976/1992 ◦ Philippines 1986 ◦ Indonesia 1998 Opposition groups ◦ Student role often key (‘vanguard in a vacuum’) ◦ Traditionalist religious groups disillusioned Popular mobilization against hardline regime ◦ Overthrown or forced to compromise

Successful deepening, but failed widening South Korea beginning in the mid-1980 s Similar timing in Taiwan Is Malaysia close to democratizing in upcoming elections?

Developmentalist evolution Business “enemies” lead industrialization ◦ South Korean chaebols ◦ native Taiwanese entrepreneurs ◦ ethnic Chinese in Malaysia Performance-linked “deepening” South Korean developmentalism survives ◦ Park’s assassination and economic crisis Unlike Suharto, ◦ Mahathir able to cope with Asian financial crisis

Post-development crises I Inequality: not sharing growth ◦ Despite growth, technocrats on defensive ◦ Labour unrest in South Korea ◦ Ethnic Taiwanese resentments ◦ Ethnic distributional conflicts in Malaysia

Post-developmental crises II Participation: electoral challenges ◦ Tangwai launches opposition party ◦ Minjung activists back oppositionists ◦ Opposition gains in 2008 Malaysian elections Identity: decolonizing lifeworlds ◦ Social justice and constitutional issues politicize professionals ◦ Reject culturalist authoritarian identities

Developmentalist crises Timing/ sphere Crisis Early Late (not yet) Economic Failure to deepen Evolution through turns cronies against deepening but technocrats inequality puts technocrats on defensive Devolution of growth benefits eases distributional conflict Political Electoral/constitutional manipulation spurs mobilization and politicization Participation gap prompts electoral challenge Stability of illiberal electoralism Ideological Personalism leads business/students and traditionalists to demand “good governance” Social injustice/ Materialism and constitutional issues culturalist politicizes collectivism professionals who reject culturalism

Three developmentalist paths (Non-developmentalist, despotic power) ◦ Stalinism in North Korea ◦ Repressive military rule in Burma (1962 -88) 1. Economic and political failure ◦ Diversification but not deepening ◦ Demobilization but not disaggregation ◦ Thailand 1973/1988/1991 ◦ Philippines 1986 ◦ Indonesia 1998 ◦ Myanmar 1988 -2010

Three developmentalist paths (cont. ) 2. Economic success, political failure ◦ ‘Deepening’ but not ‘widening’ ◦ Disaggregation but not cooptation ◦ South Korea and Taiwan mid-1980 s ◦ Malaysia after 2008 election? 3. Authoritarian modernism ◦ Requires ‘widening’ and cooptation ◦ Singapore since mid-1980 s ◦ China attempting to emulate this (tho challenged by “widening” ) ◦ Vietnam much less certain (probs with “deepening” and “widening”)

And the winner is… Singapore Paternalist diversification ◦ After Malayan Union breakup Meritocratic deepening ◦ By end of 1970 s Culturalist widening ◦ Middle class and “Asian values” Powerless opposition (until recently) ◦ repression, collaboration, co-optation

China: Having your cake and eating it too? Worries about CPP ◦ Growing corruption ◦ Anti-corruption driven and increased repression as anti-dote Singapore counterexample ◦ PAP’s unfettered power ◦ But still good governance ◦ Power monopoly and governance compatible ◦ If ruling party ‘morally good’ ◦ But ‘mis-modeling’ Singapore (Thompson/Ortmann)

AD’s relevance “Success” of developmentalism slows demo ◦ Demobilization of labour and others in civil society ◦ “Pragmatic acceptance” through rapid growth “Failure” of developmentalism speeds demo ◦ Too much cronyism makes regime unpopular ◦ Failed “deepening” contributes to economic crisis Successful developmentalist dicts “late” ◦ Have to “wait” for middle class to democratize ◦ And nationalist opposition to emerge

Non-AD regimes Maoist China (1949 -1976) ◦ ‘Great leap’ backwards ◦ Totalitarian rule and economic disaster ‘Kimist’ North Korea (1949 -present) ◦ Only still-existing totalitarian state ◦ Survives despite economic implosion Burma (1962 -1988) ◦ Highly authoritarian military rule ◦ But lacks EOI or strong technocracy

Next week Country case studies presentations begin Must APPLY 1 of 3 theories - DS, MS or AD - to a country study Do NOT use unnecessary background/historical info Week 4 ‘Classic’ E. Asin cases (Japan, SK Taiwan) Feb. 7 Week 5 The Unusual Cases of Singapore and HK Feb. 14 Week 6 ‘Failed’ SEA Cases (Philippines, Indonesia) Feb. 21 Week 7 ‘Mixed’ SEA Cases (Malaysia, Thailand) Feb. 28 Week 8 ‘Market-Leninism’ (China and Vietnam) March 7 Week 9 Non-developmental states (Myanmar, North Korea, Brunei, Cambodia, Laos) March 14