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Assured Cloud Computing Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) February Assured Cloud Computing Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) February 2012

Team Members • Sponsor: Air Force Office of Scientific Research • The University of Team Members • Sponsor: Air Force Office of Scientific Research • The University of Texas at Dallas – Faculty: Dr. Murat Kantarcioglu; Dr. Latifur Khan; Dr. Kevin Hamlen; Dr. Zhiqiang Lin, Dr. Kamil Sarac • Sub-contractors – Prof. Elisa Bertino (Purdue) – Ms. Anita Miller, Dr. Bob Johnson (North Texas Fusion Center) • Collaborators – Dr. Steve Barker, Kings College, U of London (EOARD) – Dr. Barbara Carminati; Dr. Elena Ferrari, U of Insubria (EOARD) – Prof. Peng Liu, Penn State – Prof. Ting Yu, NC State

Outline • • Objectives Layered Framework Data Security Issues for Clouds Our Research – Outline • • Objectives Layered Framework Data Security Issues for Clouds Our Research – FY 11 • • Cloud-based Assured Information Sharing Demonstration RDF-based Policy Engine on the Cloud Secure Query Processing in Hybrid Cloud. Mask: Purdue University Stream-based Malware Detection on the Cloud Hypervisor (e. g. , Xen) Integrity Issues and Forensics in the Cloud Preliminary Investigation of Identity Management – FY 10 • • • Secure Querying and Storing Relational Data with HIVE Secure Querying and Storing RDF in Hadoop with SPARQL XACML Implementation for Hadoop Amazon. com Web Services and Security Accountability and Access Control (Joint with Purdue) Acknowledgement: Research Funded by Air Force Office of Scientific Research

Objectives • Cloud computing is an example of computing in which dynamically scalable and Objectives • Cloud computing is an example of computing in which dynamically scalable and often virtualized resources are provided as a service over the Internet. Users need not have knowledge of, expertise in, or control over the technology infrastructure in the "cloud" that supports them. • Our research on Cloud Computing is based on Hadoop, Map. Reduce, Xen • Apache Hadoop is a Java software framework that supports data intensive distributed applications under a free license. It enables applications to work with thousands of nodes and petabytes of data. Hadoop was inspired by Google's Map. Reduce and Google File System (GFS) papers. • XEN is a Virtual Machine Monitor developed at the University of Cambridge, England • Our goal is to build a secure cloud infrastructure for assured information sharing applications

Information Operations Across Infospheres: Assured Information Sharing Objectives l Develop a Framework for Secure Information Operations Across Infospheres: Assured Information Sharing Objectives l Develop a Framework for Secure and Timely Data Sharing across Infospheres l Investigate Access Control and Usage Control policies for Secure Data Sharing l Develop innovative techniques for extracting information from trustworthy, semi-trustworthy and untrustworthy partners l Budget FY 06 -8: AFOSR $300 K, State Match. $150 K Scientific/Technical Approach l Conduct experiments as to how much information is lost as a result of enforcing security policies in the case of trustworthy partners l Develop more sophisticated policies based on role-based and usage control based access control models l Develop techniques based on game theoretical strategies to handle partners who are semi-trustworthy l Develop data mining techniques to carry out defensive and offensive information operations Data/Policy for Coalition Publish Data/Policy Component Data/Policy for Agency A Component Data/Policy for Agency C Component Data/Policy for Agency B Accomplishments l Developed an experimental system for determining information loss due to security policy enforcement l Developed a strategy for applying game theory for semitrustworthy partners; simulation results l Developed data mining techniques for conducting defensive operations for untrustworthy partners Challenges l Handling dynamically changing trust levels; Scalability

Incentive Issues in Assured Information Sharing Do. D MURI Project 2008 - 2013, AFOSR Incentive Issues in Assured Information Sharing Do. D MURI Project 2008 - 2013, AFOSR Motivation • Misaligned incentives could be a significant problem in Information Security – Software bugs vs. software companies’ incentives • Incentive issues in information sharing have been explored to some extent – Incentive issues in file sharing p 2 p networks • Assured information sharing creates new challenges – Security considerations vs. utility Technical Approach • Verify that the other participants do not lie about their data – If the data is revealed as it is • Trust but verify (Our initial results: DKE ’ 08 paper) – If the data is not revealed (e. g. , SMC techniques are used) • Non-cooperative computing • Mechanism design • SMC with rational adversaries

Layered Framework Policies XACML Qo. S User Interface Resource Allocation HIVE/SPARQL/Query Hadoop/Map. Reduc/Storage Risks/ Layered Framework Policies XACML Qo. S User Interface Resource Allocation HIVE/SPARQL/Query Hadoop/Map. Reduc/Storage Risks/ Costs XEN/Linux/VMM Cloud Monitors Secure Virtual Network Monitor Figure 2. Layered Framework for Assured Cloud 3/17/2018 7

Secure Query Processing with Hadoop/Map. Reduce • We have studied clouds based on Hadoop Secure Query Processing with Hadoop/Map. Reduce • We have studied clouds based on Hadoop • Query rewriting and optimization techniques designed and implemented for two types of data • (i) Relational data: Secure query processing with HIVE • (ii) RDF data: Secure query processing with SPARQL • Demonstrated with XACML policies • Joint demonstration with Kings College and University of Insubria – First demo (2011): Each party submits their data and policies – Our cloud will manage the data and policies – Second demo (2012): Multiple clouds

Fine-grained Access Control with Hive System Architecture q Table/View definition and loading, § Users Fine-grained Access Control with Hive System Architecture q Table/View definition and loading, § Users can create tables as well as load data into tables. Further, they can also upload XACML policies for the table they are creating. Users can also create XACML policies for tables/views. § Users can define views only if they have permissions for all tables specified in the query used to create the view. They can also either specify or create XACML policies for the views they are defining. § Collaborate. Com 2010

SPARQL Query Optimizer for Secure RDF Data Processing New Data Web Interface Data Preprocessor SPARQL Query Optimizer for Secure RDF Data Processing New Data Web Interface Data Preprocessor Map. Reduce Framework Parser N-Triples Converter Query Validator & Rewriter Prefix Generator Predicate Based Splitter Predicate Object Based Splitter Answer Query Server Backend XACML PDP Query Rewriter By Policy Plan Generator Plan Executor To build an efficient storage mechanism using Hadoop for large amounts of data (e. g. a billion triples); build an efficient query mechanism for data stored in Hadoop; Integrate with Jena Developed a query optimizer and query rewriting techniques for RDF Data with XACML policies and implemented on top of JENA IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data Engineering, 2011

Demonstration: Concept of Operation Agency 1 Agency 2 Agency n … User Interface Layer Demonstration: Concept of Operation Agency 1 Agency 2 Agency n … User Interface Layer Relational Data Fine-grained Access Control with Hive RDF Data SPARQL Query Optimizer for Secure RDF Data Processing

RDF-Based Policy Engine Technology By UTDallas Interface to the Semantic Web Inference Engine/ Rules RDF-Based Policy Engine Technology By UTDallas Interface to the Semantic Web Inference Engine/ Rules Processor e. g. , Pellet Policies Ontologies Rules In RDF JENA RDF Engine RDF Documents

RDF-based Policy Engine on the Cloud § § User specify policy: e. g. , RDF-based Policy Engine on the Cloud § § User specify policy: e. g. , Access Control, Redaction, Released Policy § Parse a high-level policy to a low-level representation § Support Graph operations and visualization. Policy executed as graph operations § A testbed for evaluating different policy sets over different data representation. Also supporting provenance as directed graph and viewing policy outcomes graphically Determine how access is granted to a resource as well as how a document is shared Execute policies as SPARQL queries over large RDF graphs on Hadoop § Support for policies over Traditional data and its provenance § IFIP Data and Applications Security, 2010, ACM SACMAT 2011

Integration with Assured Information Sharing: Agency 1 Agency 2 Agency n … User Interface Integration with Assured Information Sharing: Agency 1 Agency 2 Agency n … User Interface Layer SPARQL Query RDF Data and Policies Policy Translation and Transformation Layer RDF Data Preprocessor Map. Reduce Framework for Query Processing Hadoop HDFS Result

Secure Storage and Query Processing in a Hybrid Cloud: Problem Motivation • The use Secure Storage and Query Processing in a Hybrid Cloud: Problem Motivation • The use of hybrid clouds is an emerging trend in cloud computing – Ability to exploit public resources for high throughput – Yet, better able to control costs and data privacy • Several key challenges – Data Design: how to store data in a hybrid cloud? • Solution must account for data representation used (unencrypted/encrypted), public cloud monetary costs and query workload characteristics – Query Processing: how to execute a query over a hybrid cloud? • Solution must provide query rewrite rules that ensure the correctness of a generated query plan over the hybrid cloud

Research Results • Data Design: A user submits data, a query workload, monetary and Research Results • Data Design: A user submits data, a query workload, monetary and confidentiality constraints – Solve the data partitioning problem in four phases – Partition the data into several public (Ppu) and private (Ppr) components – For each partition, Ppu & Ppr, obtain their associated statistics – Estimate the execution cost of given query workload based on a user’s choice of confidentiality level as well as the statistics associated with the partition – Select the best partition as the one that minimizes query workload execution cost without violating monetary and confidentiality constraints • Query Processing: A user submits a query Q • Solve the query processing problem in four phases – Query Rearrangement: Use query rewrite rules to transform an original query Q into public (Qpu) and private (Qpr) query(ies) – Public Cloud Execution: Execute Qpu on public cloud – Private Cloud Execution: Execute Qpr on private cloud – Post-Processing: Combine the results of the execution of Qpu and Qpr into the final result

Hypervisor integrity and forensics in the Cloud Applications Linux forensics Solaris XP Mac. OS Hypervisor integrity and forensics in the Cloud Applications Linux forensics Solaris XP Mac. OS OS integrity Virtualization Layer (Xen, v. Sphere) Hardware Layer Ø Secure control flow of hypervisor code Hypervisor Cloud integrity & forensics Ø Integrity via in-lined reference monitor Ø Forensics data extraction in the cloud Ø Multiple VMs Ø De-mapping (isolate) each VM memory from physical memory

Cloud-based Malware Detection Dr. Mehedy Stream of known malware or benign executables Buffer Unknown Cloud-based Malware Detection Dr. Mehedy Stream of known malware or benign executables Buffer Unknown executable Feature extraction and selection using Cloud Feature extraction Malware Remove Training & Model update Ensemble of Classification models Classify Class Benign Keep

Cloud-based Malware Detection • ACM Transactions on Management Information Systems • Binary feature extraction Cloud-based Malware Detection • ACM Transactions on Management Information Systems • Binary feature extraction involves – Enumerating binary n-grams from the binaries and selecting the best n-grams based on information gain – For a training data with 3, 500 executables, number of distinct 6 -grams can exceed 200 millions – In a single machine, this may take hours, depending on available computing resources – not acceptable for training from a stream of binaries – We use Cloud to overcome this bottleneck • A Cloud Map-reduce framework is used – to extract and select features from each chunk – A 10 -node cloud cluster is 10 times faster than a single node – Very effective in a dynamic framework, where malware characteristics change rapidly

Key Features of Cloud. Mask System: Elisa Bertino Purdue University and Murat Kantarcioglu, UT Key Features of Cloud. Mask System: Elisa Bertino Purdue University and Murat Kantarcioglu, UT Dallas Fine-grained attribute-based privacy-preserving access control • • • Fine-grained access control: different parts of the data can be covered by different access control policies Attribute-based access control: access control policies are expressed in terms of identity attributes of subjects accessing the data Privacy-preserving: the cloud does not learn anything about the contents of the data and the values of the identity attributes of users System Developed is Cloud. Mask Joint Paper at Collobarate. Com 2011

Identity Management Considerations in a Cloud (with Penn State and NC State) • Trust Identity Management Considerations in a Cloud (with Penn State and NC State) • Trust model that handles – (i) Various trust relationships, (ii) access control policies based on roles and attributes, iii) real-time provisioning, (iv) authorization, and (v) auditing and accountability. • Several technologies have to be examined to develop the trust model – Service-oriented technologies; standards such as SAML and XACML; and identity management technologies such as Open. ID. • Does one size fit all? – Can we develop a trust model that will be applicable to all types of clouds such as private clouds, public clouds and hybrid clouds Identity architecture has to be integrated into the cloud architecture.

Directions • Secure VMM (Virtual Machine Monitor) and VNM (Virtual Network Monitor) – Exploring Directions • Secure VMM (Virtual Machine Monitor) and VNM (Virtual Network Monitor) – Exploring XEN VMM and examining security issues – Developing automated techniques for VMM introspection – Will examine VMM issues January 2012 • Integrate Secure Storage Algorithms into Hadoop (FY 2012) • Identity Management (FY 2012) • Technology Transfer through Knowledge and Security Analytics, LLC