AMEC Arctic Military Environmental Cooperation Dieter K Rudolph

AMEC Arctic Military Environmental Cooperation Dieter K. Rudolph U. S. AMEC Program Director (703) 418 -7753 Dieter. Rudolph@usamec. org October 2003

AMEC Overview • • • BACKGROUND ACCOMPLISHMENTS ADDITIONAL PROGAM BENEFITS EXPANSION THE WAY AHEAD

Background • Since 1996, AMEC has conducted technology demonstration projects. • Primary focus on protecting sensitive arctic environment from radioactive contamination from decommissioned Russian Northern Fleet nuclear submarines. • Concern about pollution (radioactive and nonradioactive) of prime fishing grounds.

Additional considerations • Security of stored radioactive material and minimizing cross border contamination (post 9 -11). • Concerns about handling, equipment procedures supporting the de-fueling process • Other (non-radiological) hazardous waste produced during nuclear submarine dismantlement.

SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL THE KEY TO SUBMARINE ELIMINATIONS RADWASTE VOLUME RADIOACTIVITY LIQUID RADWASTE SOLID RADWASTE LIQUID RADWASTE (71%) (LRW) IN A TYPICAL RUSSIAN SUB, SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL REPRESENTS : SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL 5% OF RADWASTE VOLUME BUT SOLID RADWASTE (24%) (SRW) SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL >97% OF RADIOACTIVITY

SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL DISPOSAL STEP BOTTLENECK • • SUBMARINE DEFUELING STORAGE SHIPMENT REPROCESSING ASSETS/STORAGE CAPACITY FREQUENCY ADVANCE PAYMENT

SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL HANDLING UNCLASSIFIED

SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL TRANSPORT (TK-VG-18 RAILCAR/TUK-18 (TUK-108) CASK SYSTEM) • 9 TK-VG-18 RAILCARS AVAILABLE FOR USE • 4 FUNDED BY NORWAY COMMISSIONED IN 2000 • TYPICALLY 4 RAILCARS USED PER SHIPMENT UNCLASSIFIED TK-VG-18 RAILCAR

RUSSIAN NAVAL SNF SHIPMENT ROUTES NORTHERN FLEET ~1400/1800 MILES MURMANSK SEV ERO DVI NSK MOSCOW MAYAK NUCLEAR FUEL REPROCESSING COMPLEX VLADIVOSTOK PACIFIC FLEET ~3400 MILES

Russian Nuclear Submarine Disposal Concerns Two key concerns • Changed geo- political situation and the war on terrorism • Security surrounding both submarines and Spent Nuclear Storage is questionable. Fissile material vulnerable to terrorist seizure and “ dirty bomb” scenario. • Potential for cross border contamination. • Unstable conditions of Russian submarines increases risk of criticality accident. • Resulting radiological pollutant could potentially reach the U. S. and contaminate the food chain. Most susceptible in Alaska and the Northwest U. S.

DECOMMISSIONED SUBMARINE AT DOCKSIDE

Accomplishments: • AMEC has proven to be a highly successful, practical and accountable means of assisting with the reduction in Russian Naval Nuclear forces in direct support of U. S. National security interests. • AMEC projects are key in minimizing cross- border contamination by changing Russian SNF storage technology from a “wet” system- prone to failure- to a “dry” system used by most Western Nations.

Accomplishments: • Design & production of a SNF • • transport and storage cask that can safely store SNF for 50 years. Cask used both by US and Russia. Construction of a safe, secure transport and storage pad to house approximately 19 SNF casks. This will reduce SNF shipment time. Plan to extend cask service life with dewatering technology.

Accomplishments: • • • Design and construction of a radioactive waste treatment facility to process and safely store solid and liquid waste associated with submarine disnmantlement. Improved SRW processing through use of Mobile Pretreatment Facility (MPF). Design and construction of dual use containers for improved transport and Storage of SRW.

Accomplishments: • Development of radiation and environmental monitoring systems to track releases or movement of fissile material at SNF pad and radioactive waste treatment complex. • This system will also be employed in the four Russian Emergency Monitoring Centers located in NW and Far East Russia. • Personnel safety of radioactive waste workers improved through training and use of US and Norwegian supplied dosimeters.

Other Benefits: • Regular engagement/professional dialogue with AMEC partners. • Confidence builder. • Positive success story with Russia. • Proactive (vice reactive) approach to curtailing potential environmental disasters.

Expansion • More AMEC members: • United Kingdom is now a full member. • Canada and Japan have expressed interest in participating in specific AMEC projects. • Larger Geographic area of interest: • Almost 50% of Russia’s decommissioned submarines are in the Western Pacific region – possible cross boarder contamination problems. • Congress is considering a legislative initiative to leverage success and lessons learned from Arctic specific program to permit similar collaboration among US Western Pacific allies.

AMEC FUNDING • U. S. Funding • Interagency effort with DOD in the lead and EPA, DOE participating. • Total U. S. contribution from start through FY 03 $26. 3 M • For FY 04 $1. 4 M is programmed. OSD is submitting Budget Change Request to increase this to $3 M and extend funding to FY 09. HAC has $5 M plus up for FY 04. • Funding from AMEC partner countries to address radioactive waste issues in Northwest Russia • Norwegian Nuclear Plan of Action sets aside $120 M, with • $10 M set aside for AMEC. • Russian funding has doubled from $30 M to $60 M in 2003, with $6. 5 M set aside for AMEC. • United Kingdom (UK) has over $100 M set aside, with $8 M identified for AMEC.

The Way Ahead: New Projects • Ensuring buoyancy of decommissioned nuclear submarines stored afloat • Increase efficiency and safety of Spent Nuclear Fuel handling • Develop computer based simulator for offloading Spent Nuclear Fuel • Develop Radioactive Waste Treatment Center for Russia’s Far East • Develop a Centralized AMEC Information System • Conduct an Emergency “Table Top Exercise”