Advanced Buffer Overflow Technique Greg Hoglund Attack

Advanced Buffer Overflow Technique Greg Hoglund

Attack Theory • • • Formalize the Attack Method Re-Use of Attack Code Separate the Deployment from the Payloads can be chosen for desired effect Details and Restraints of both Payload and Deployment code

Exploits • A “BUG” in Software • New bugs reported every day • automated testing tools – USSR Labs • “Exploit” is code that takes advantage of a bug in order to cause an effect

What can happen? • Machine Crash • kernel exception • VIP process • • • Application Crash (most common) Recoverable Exception Mobile Code (deadly) File Access (read or write) Denial of Service

Exploits can be grouped • Some bugs are all the same • Some bugs keep coming back – improper filtering – bounds checking – bad authentication – impersonation • In other words, need better testing

Entry -vs- Effect • The attack payload is not the same as the entry point • Missle -vs- Warhead analogy • The Delivery Mechanism can be decoupled from the Payload

Exploits come in 2 parts • Injection Vector (deployment) – the actual entry-point, usually tied explicity with the bug itself • Payload (deployed) – usually not tied to bug at all - limited only by imagination. Some restraints.

Injection Vector • • • Target Dependant OS Dependant Application Version Dependant Protocol Dependant Encoding Dependant

Payload • Independent of Injection Vector • Still Depends on Machine, Processor, etc. • With some exceptions • Mobile Code, Just like a Virus • Once established, can spread by any means – trust – scanning for more bugs

Payload • Denial of Service – use as launching point (arp spoofing) • Remote Shell (common) – covert channel or ‘netcat’ like • Worm/Virus – extremely dangerous • Rootkit (common - stealth)

Injector/Payload Pairs • One injector works on ‘n qualified hosts’ • Example - IIS Injector works on ~20% of Web Hosts. • Payload – Remote Shell for control – Shutdown Machine – Shutdown ALL Machines on subnet

Types of Injection • Content Based – characters inserted into a data stream that result in the remote process doing something it shouldn’t. Process is still in control. • Buffer Overflow – poor programming practice subverts architecture of code execution. Process loses control.

Types of Injection • Trust Based – Boot virus/ Floppy/ CD (parasite process) – MACRO virus – Email Attachments (Melissa, etc) – Web Browsing (exploit user’s trust, etc) • click thru

Governments write Injector Code? • 1995 US Defense Intelligence Agency Report – Cuban Military targets US w/ custom virii • University of Havana, team of less than 20 computer experts – Russian KGB • prior to 1991 coup attempt, KGB has virii intended to shut down US computers in times of war

Mobile code in Global 2000? • 1995 E&Y report – 67% of companies hit bit virus • 1996 E&Y report – 63% of companies hit by virus • 1996 UK Information Security Breaches Survey – 51% of companies hit by virus

How hard can it hit? • NCSA 1997 report – 33% of all machines infected with virus – average cost of recovery ~$8000 US dollars • November 1988 Morris Worm – strikes ~6, 000 computers (10% of Internet at time) within hours – spreads via Buffer Overflow in fingerd – spreads via Sendmail exploit

How hard can it hit? • 1989, “WANK” Worm – Hits NASA Goddard Space Center – spreads to US DOE High Energy Physics network (HEPNET) – 2 weeks to clean all systems

Buffer Overflow Injection • Overflow the Stack • Overflow the Heap • Goal: Must control the value of the instruction pointer (processor specific) • Goal: Get the Instruction Pointer to point to a user-controlled buffer.

Challenges • Injector/Payload size restrictions – tight coding requirements • Injector and Payload in same buffer – cannot step on each other • Guessing Address Values – sometimes called ‘offsets’ • NULL characters, BAD characters – use encoding and stack tricks

Stack Injection • Stack is used for execution housekeeping as well as buffer storage. • Stack-based buffer must be filled in direction of housekeeping data. • Must overwrite the housekeeping data

Address Housekeeping • IP • A • B • C • D • SP • BP • IP • DI • SI • FLAG • code • heap • stack

Stack Overflow 00 40 20 08 00 40 20 0 C 00 40 20 10 00 40 20 14 00 40 20 18 00 40 20 1 C

The Problem with NULL 00 40 20 08 00 40 20 0 C 00 40 20 10 00 40 20 14 00 40 20 18 00 40 20 1 C • STOPS

NULL must be PAST housekeeping data 00 40 20 08 00 40 20 0 C 00 40 20 10 00 40 20 14 00 40 20 18 00 40 20 1 C • OK

Little and Big Endian • On Intel x 86 (Little Endian), Values are stored ‘backwards’ - least significant byte goes first: • 00 40 10 FF is stored as: FF 10 40 00

We store address in housekeeping data 00 40 21 04 00 40 21 00 00 40 20 0 C 00 40 20 08 00 40 20 04 00 40 20 00 CD 20 40 00 0 C 68 45 7 F Original Address New Address

Injection is Complete • We control the instruction pointer 04 21 40 00 New Address

Where to put the payload 00 40 21 04 00 40 21 00 00 40 20 0 C 00 40 20 08 00 40 20 04 00 40 20 00 04 21 40 00 New Address

Confined Payload • Byte Compression • Use only preloaded functions – Payload doesn’t need to build jumptables – Useable functions must be loaded • Use Hardcoded addresses – Payload designed for a specific process with predictable features • Data portion of payload needs to be small

Using more stack for payload 77 40 20 08 77 40 20 0 C 77 40 20 10 77 40 20 14 77 40 20 18 77 40 20 1 C 0 D 45 68 77 NO NULL in Address • OK

Much Larger Payload

When does the address contain a NULL character • Lowland Address - starts with 00 – stack is in lowland on Windows NT • usually 00 40 XX XX – limits size of payload • Highland Address - no zeros in address – stack is in highland under Linux – unlimited payload size

Large payload, Lowland address • We cannot use a lowland address directly, because it limits our payload • We can use a CPU register • We can use stack values that remain undamaged

A register points to the stack • A • B • C • D • SP • BP • IP • DI • SI • FLAG • code • heap • stack

Call thru a Register • Call eax, call ebx, etc – FF D 0 = call eax – FF D 3 = call ebx – FF D 1 = call ecx – etc, etc

Push a register then return • Push register – push eax = 50 – push ebx = 53 – etc • Then RET – RET = C 3

Guessing where to go • We jump to the wrong address – crashes software – payload doesn’t execute • Use NOP (no-op) - a single byte instruction – NOP = 90 • Fill buffer with NOP’s – “NOP Sled”

NOP Sled • End up at payload

Inject the Payload into the HEAP • When the stack is limited in size • Store part on the payload on stack, the other on the heap • Protocol Headers – HTTP headers • Recent Transactions • Open Files

Execute code on the heap • A • B • C • D • SP • BP • stack • IP • DI • SI • FLAG • code • heap

Trespassing the HEAP • Two C++ objects near one another • Any buffer that can overwrite a pointer – function pointer – string pointer (alter behavior w/o mobile code)

Overwrite the VTABLE • C++ objects have a virtual function table • Vtable pointer • Member variables grow away from vtable pointer (NT)

Overwrite VTABLE • Must have 2 C++ Objects (on heap) • Overwrite vtable ptr

Where do I make the VTABLE point?

Your own VTABLE • The VTABLE has addresses for all virtual functions in the class. This usually includes a destructor - which will be called when the object is destroyed (deallocated from memory) • Overwrite any function that works

Injection is complete • Kernel level overflows all over in NT • Off by one errors causing frame pointer overwrite • Multi-stage attacks where you must first get the target into a state before attempting overflow • The effects of URL or MIME encoding

Now for the Payload • • Using Loaded Functions Encoding our own data Loading new functions & DLL’s Making a shell

The Payload • NOP Sled • Real Code • DATA

Getting Bearings – Call RELOC: – RELOC: pop edi • EB 00 00 – edi now has our code address – we can use this as an offset to our data

Reverse Short Call • NO NULL Bytes – RELOC: jmp RELOC 2 – Call RELOC: – RELOC 2: pop edi • EB FF FF FF FE

XOR Protection • Cannot have NULL’s in data portion • XOR every BYTE

XOR again to decode • Begin decode

Hardcoded Function Calls • code

Pros/Cons to hard coding • PRO: makes code smaller • CON: what if function isn’t always in same place? – Dynamically loaded DLL’s • PRO: some DLL’s are *usually* always in the same place – KERNEL 32. DLL

Dynamic Function Loading • Use Load. Library() and Get. Proc. Address() – usually always in same place – hard coding usually works • Load New DLL’s • Find any function by ASCII name – handy

Load Function by Name • getprocaddress • Function name stored here

Build a jumptable • getprocaddress

Use Jumptable

HASH Loading (el 8) • Process already has ASCII names of all loaded functions stored in process-header • We can locate any loaded function by checking the CRC of each loaded ASCII name • We do not need to store function names in our DATA section - only CRC’s – makes payload smaller!

PE Header • PE OFFSET • Optional Header • ASCII NAME • Address

Check CRC’s • CRC

Limited Character Set means Limited Instruction Set • Payload is filtered – MIME – URL • alphanumeric only (email headers) – short jumps (difficult to maintain) – pop/push – subtract

The Bridge • Avoids jump instruction • size must be calculated exactly

Load New DLL

WININET. DLL • Use DLL functions – Internet. Open. URL() – Internet. Read. File() • • Does all the hard work Makes payload smaller Download and Execute any file, anywhere File stored anonymously - hard to trace

WS 2_32. DLL • • • Socket bind listen send recv accept

Interrupt Calls • Don’t require addresses • Small • Easy to use – Load register with call number – Load register with argument pointer – interrupt (2 bytes long) – CD 2 E (interrupt 2 E) – CD 80 (interrupt 80)

Remote Command Shell • Spawn a process – Create. Process. A (kernel 32 function) – INT 80 (linux) (execve syscall) • Pipe the output thru socket – Named pipes (~5 functions) – Connect in or out over any TCP socket

Covert Channel • If exploited process is root or SYSTEM – TDI or NDIS hook – session over ACK packets or ICMP • IIS – Patch any point where URL requests are handled – no kernel required

WORMS • Payload searches for new hosts to attack • Trust Exploitation – sniff passwords on wire – SMB sessions to other NT hosts – NT Registry Alteration – NFS/Drive Sharing • Consider survivability of Payload – what % of hosts are eligible?

Lysine Deficiency • • Worm will die if certain condition is not met Existance of File Existance of Network Entity Floppy in floppy drive (testing lab)

RECAP • Injection is not the same as payload • Payloads can perform – Denial of Service – WORM – Remote Shell – Rootkit

RECAP • Injection has many challenges – NULL characters – Stack size – Highland/Lowland address – Calling thru CPU registers

RECAP • Filters limit what we can use in a payload • Limited OP-CODE sets can still be used to build fully functional programs

RECAP • • Our payload is encoded We can build jumptables We can load new DLL’s and Functions We can hard-code addresses or load them dynamically • We can use Lysine Deficiency to keep Worms from spreading uncontrolled

Thank Your mind is your primary weapon http: //www. rootkit. com hoglund@ieway. com