Скачать презентацию 1 Briefing Contents 1 Evaluation of US Скачать презентацию 1 Briefing Contents 1 Evaluation of US

12c5dfd889c87477544b6b1429055adf.ppt

  • Количество слайдов: 24

1 1

Briefing Contents 1. Evaluation of US global missile defence area in Europe deployment plans Briefing Contents 1. Evaluation of US global missile defence area in Europe deployment plans 2. Information on current situation and development plans of missile defence in Russia 2

Missile Threat Evaluation l l Iran and North Korea possess missiles with a maximum Missile Threat Evaluation l l Iran and North Korea possess missiles with a maximum range of up to 1200 km The prospects of missile programs development until 2015 – creation of missiles with a maximum range of up to 3500 km – Cause – the lack of: l technologies – l 3 l “new” missile development is based on SCUD-type BM modernization testing grounds trajectory measurement and data processing systems

Missile threat in the Middle East 1. There is no present no long-term 2. Missile threat in the Middle East 1. There is no present no long-term 2. missile threat for USA 2. There could be a threat for Europe from small and medium range BMs. To fight them operation theater AMD measures could be used Missile weapon possessors Iran Israel Saudi Arabia India Pakistan 4 Shihab -5 3500 km (potential) Shihab -4 2000 km (potential) Shihab-3 1200 km

Ballistic Missile Testing Standard Pattern Midcourse phase target measurements Terminal phase target measurements Target Ballistic Missile Testing Standard Pattern Midcourse phase target measurements Terminal phase target measurements Target separation zone Ground-supported trajectory measurement and radiotelemetering means Warhead analysis after drop Maximum BM range testing track 5

1. Iran doesn’t potentially have BM testing tracks on its territory 2. There is 1. Iran doesn’t potentially have BM testing tracks on its territory 2. There is a lack of necessary test results registration infrastructure, including for launches toward offshore waters 2000 km 6

Russian BM possible trajectories ABM site defence zone Radar station in the Czech Republic Russian BM possible trajectories ABM site defence zone Radar station in the Czech Republic Kozelsk Tatischevo BM launch sector from the Iranian territory against Europe 7 Iran’s BM Russia’s BM The Missile Defence Area in Poland doesn’t provide equal protection for all NATO states but is capable of threatening Russia’s BM launched towards north-west

The Russian Federation Comments ABM site does not provide for the defense of all The Russian Federation Comments ABM site does not provide for the defense of all European states l The aim of providing “equal protection” for all US NATO allies will require further ABM site capabilities buildup Conclusion. Present configuration of ABM theatre is not final. Russian concern will only grow l 8

Missile Defence Area Optimal Location l Missile defence site approximation to possible BM launch Missile Defence Area Optimal Location l Missile defence site approximation to possible BM launch area will enhance system efficiency – l ABM sites location on the territories of Turkey, France, Italy would be more reasonable if an aim of countering BM from the south was pursued – 9 The choice of the area in Poland is reasonable if it is meant for countering Russian BMs In addition, such a location wouldn’t pose such evident threat for Russia’s deterrent forces

US missile defence area possible location not aimed against Russia’s deterrent potential while providing US missile defence area possible location not aimed against Russia’s deterrent potential while providing protection for Europe Kozelsk Tatischevo 10 Iran’s BM Russia’s BM

Thesis: the information support of ABM site (radar station in Czech and frontline radars) Thesis: the information support of ABM site (radar station in Czech and frontline radars) aren’t directed against Russian Federation Varde Fylingsdales Thule Shemya The Czech Republic 11 Integration of AMD radar stations in Czech with modified radar stations in Thule, Fylingsdales, Varde, Shemya

The Russian Federation Comments l l The United States have an extensive network of The Russian Federation Comments l l The United States have an extensive network of radars upgraded for missile defence tasks outside the national territory The integration of existing radars with interceptor missiles in Poland will provide early detection and interception of Russian BMs – l To provide target indication for the radar in the Czech Republic a transportable forward-deployed radar positioning is provided close to the Russian border – 12 The radar in the Czech Republic has a circle coverage area and can be rapidly reoriented from the southern to the eastern direction Forward-deployed radars will detect both short and medium-range BM launched from the Middle East and Russia’s BM

10 GBI missiles do not pose a threat for Russia’s deterrent forces Russian evaluations 10 GBI missiles do not pose a threat for Russia’s deterrent forces Russian evaluations are based not on declared intentions, but on potential possibilities of capability enhancement ABM site potential can be promptly enhanced by means of: l l l 13 Increasing the number of interceptor missiles Increasing interceptor missile velocity Using separating warheads for BM destruction

Conclusions l The real aims of creating a missile defence deployment area in Europe Conclusions l The real aims of creating a missile defence deployment area in Europe do not conform with the declared and are focused on changing the existing security system in Europe – – – l Missile defence ABM site in Europe will influence the deterrent potential – – l The deployment of the ABM site won’t have catastrophic consequences because we know how to repulse them Russia will have to take adequate measures in order to sustain defence capabilities that, in essence, will mean the transition to stalemate which we left after Cold War perid Missile defence ABM site in Europe is a global-scale destabilizing factor – 14 The US missile defence in Europe is intended to counter BMs equipped with penetration aids, neither Iran nor North Korea have them The use of silo-launchers in the ABM site is intended to increase ABM site sustainability to nuclear weapons effects in case of response strike The number of interceptor missiles is not of fundamental importance, the most important is the fact of missile defence infrastructure development (radar facilities, command control systems etc. ) Other states can be involved in seeking counter-measures l E. g. – satellite interception performed by China - Potentially long-term “ecological mine” will be created in Europe - Use of Missile Defence System will make up conditions for littering near-Earth space

Current Situation and Development Plans of Missile Defence in Russia 15 Current Situation and Development Plans of Missile Defence in Russia 15

Russia’s Missile Defence Development Outlook l Political prospects – we suppose that the ABM Russia’s Missile Defence Development Outlook l Political prospects – we suppose that the ABM Treaty principles were rational – l Technical prospects – non-strategic TMD modernization, upgrading and new systems development – – – 16 we do not have plans of rushing into a missile defence “competition” counters real threats does not disturb regional stability and the existing balance since it does not threaten strategic deterrent forces does not encourage missile arms race does not have space defence potential is significantly less expensive may be deployed in any region if necessary

TMD Systems • The S-300 air defence missile system is designed to provide highly TMD Systems • The S-300 air defence missile system is designed to provide highly efficient defence against aeroballistic, tactical and theater BM attacks (with ranges up to 1500 km) in an intense ECM environment • The S-400 air defence missile system is designed to provide protection of vital facilities from attacks of existing and prospective air weapons and BMs with a range of up to 3500 km • missiles of various types with different engagement areas are used allowing to create a multi-layered TMD S-300 17 S-400

The purpose of Russian proposal is creation of: l l l 18 l preconditions The purpose of Russian proposal is creation of: l l l 18 l preconditions for wide discussion of the issues related to the development and deployment of missile defense systems in Europe basis for revising US unilateral decisions on deployment of global missile defense system components in Europe practical mechanism to estimate missile attack risks and threats for Europe up to 2020 pool of states interested in development of concept & architecture of MD system in Europe terms for equal security of all MD participants terms for minimizing the negative ecological consequences of US strategic MD components deployment in Europe the preconditions for reducing MD programs expenses

Radar data allows 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 19 to determine the certain fact Radar data allows 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 19 to determine the certain fact of conducting the test, time and place of missile launch and estimate the time and area of missile warhead impact to identify the type of launched missile and determine whether it is a launch vehicle or a ballistic missile to identify the propulsion type (solid or liquid) and technological development level basing on indirect parameters to measure missile trajectory parameters and to record warhead or construction parts separation to conduct comparative analysis of launches and specify the accuracy of delivering the payload to the target

Combined Centre for Missile Launches Data Analysis l l l 20 Could be created Combined Centre for Missile Launches Data Analysis l l l 20 Could be created in Europe on the basis of existing NATO data processing centers (for example CJFACC, CAOC) or the new one Main purpose – acquiring and processing real-time data on detected missile launches in South and South. East (for Europe) directions The obtained data will be used for impartial monitoring of missile programs in the region to develop recommendations on adequate response

Features l l l 21 Open for all interested European states Can be operated Features l l l 21 Open for all interested European states Can be operated by combined crew Basic data source – Russian radars in Gabala and Armavir The connection of additional data sources is not excluded Interaction with Russian-US Joint Data Exchange Centre (for exchange the data from missile warning systems) is not excluded Later the use of the Centre data for information support of European MD tasks solution is possible

Operational Radar in Gabala l l l In service from c 1985 The task Operational Radar in Gabala l l l In service from c 1985 The task - detection of BM launches from Indian ocean and seas areas and medium range BMs and operational -tactic missile launches from Middle East. Main radar's performance - Operating range - up to 6000 km; - Detection area • Angle of elevation - 2 to 45 degree; • Azimuth - 104 degree. l 22 l - In service with MOD of Russia The status of the radar is determined by Russia. Azerbaijan agreement of January 25, 2002) - No controversial questions The radar is subject to upgrade and modernization - In case of making a decision on modernization

Building radar in Armavir • Started in 2006 • The radar will consist of Building radar in Armavir • Started in 2006 • The radar will consist of 2 sector stations 23 - South-West sector - directed to the Mediterranean Sea - South-East sector - directed to the Middle East • South-West sector radar station is being completed. In 2006 the radar was operating on the air • Main performance: - range - 4200 km - Angle of elevation - 1 -60 degree - Azimuth - 120 degree The radars in Gabala and Armavir can operate together. It practically gives the control over almost all the regions of the Northern hemisphere where the missile threat can appear from

24 24