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Equity: A JPMorgan core competency for more than 50 years Recognized leader in each Equity: A JPMorgan core competency for more than 50 years Recognized leader in each major asset class $847 billion in assets under management* – $403 billion in fixed income – $283 billion in equity – $86 billion in asset allocation – $74 billion in real estate and alternatives Client segments include: n n n n n 1 Defined Benefit Defined Contribution Non-ERISA qualified Endowments and foundations Cash and reserves Private wealth Sub-advisory Sovereigns and supranationals Insurance companies *Represents assets under management as of December 31, 2005

Asset & Wealth Management 2005 Proforma Operating Results ($mm) 2005 Revenue by Business Segment Asset & Wealth Management 2005 Proforma Operating Results ($mm) 2005 Revenue by Business Segment 2005 Revenue Pre- tax Margin ROE 5, 664 33% 51% Retail 27% Private Client Services 18% 1 Key Statistics (12/31/05) 1 n $1. 1 T of assets under supervision n $847 B of AUM n $377 B of mutual fund assets n 12, 127 employees 1 2 Annual comparison Institutional 25% Private Bank 30%

JPMAM – US Equity Investment styles Manager Driven Research Driven Behavioral Driven • PM JPMAM – US Equity Investment styles Manager Driven Research Driven Behavioral Driven • PM has complete discretion over all decisions in portfolio (timing, industries, stocks) • Buy/Sell decisions primarily based on dedicated industry analyst insights captured by DDR rankings • Multi-factor model designed to eliminate or minimize human interface • PM chooses valuation metrics (DDM, P/E, P/B, etc. ) • PM utilizes quantitative tools • PM accesses company research via JPMAM analysts and Wall Street consensus views • PM constructs portfolios based on rankings within risk tolerance • PM uses discretion on based on conviction and timing • Largely sector neutral U. S. Large Cap 3 • Statistical measures determine buy/sell decisions • Use optimizer to assist in portfolio construction

Investment Philosophy and Process 4 Investment Philosophy and Process 4

A clear and concise philosophy drives investing: Fair Value vs. Stock Price n Stock A clear and concise philosophy drives investing: Fair Value vs. Stock Price n Stock prices ultimately reflect future earnings and cash flows Valuation Fair value n Stocks are frequently mispriced by the market relative to their true long-term value Actual Stock Price n A disciplined investment process that exploits mispricings can deliver superior investment results Time 5

Our philosophy is implemented through a unique and robust investment process Information Advantage Systematic Our philosophy is implemented through a unique and robust investment process Information Advantage Systematic Valuation Disciplined Portfolio Construction Fundamental Research Stock Selection Focused § U. S. analyst team of buyside, sector-specialists § Proprietary earnings and cash flow estimates drive DDR § Investment decisions driven by DDR rankings and PM insights § Global network of analysts expands our information sources 6 Dividend Discount Model § Stocks ranked into quintiles based on DDRs

Our global presence creates an information advantage for our clients Global reach – 183 Our global presence creates an information advantage for our clients Global reach – 183 equity research analysts based out of 13 cities work directly with local businesses and local economies, offering a global understanding and investment insight few firms can match*. JPMorgan equity research: § Has an annual global research expenditure of approximately $100 M § Has dedicated large, mid and small cap research teams § Dedicates their time to “on the ground” research and one-on-one company visits – totaling over 5000 company visits each year The Americas New York – 48 analysts Buenos Aires – 1 analyst Columbus – 7 analysts Asia Pacific Europe London – 33 analysts Moscow – 2 analysts *As of 12/31/05. Includes dedicated analysts and combined portfolio managers/analysts 7 Bangkok – 9 analysts Hong Kong – 17 analysts Melbourne – 8 analysts Seoul – 1 analyst Shanghai – 4 analysts Singapore – 6 analysts Taipei – 18 analysts Tokyo – 29 analysts § Teams specializing in quantitative research located in Columbus and New York.

U. S. Large Cap Equity Research: a team of 22 skilled investors with an U. S. Large Cap Equity Research: a team of 22 skilled investors with an average of 14 years of experience Healthcare Helge Skibeli, MD Director of Research 19 yrs. of experience 16 yrs. with the firm Consumer Dr. Scott Braunstein, MD Pharma/Med-Tech 15 yrs. of experience 4 yrs. with the firm Technology Allison Adler, VP Health Svcs/ Bio-Tech 12 yrs. of experience 4 yrs. with the firm Edward Yoon, Assc. Eye Care/Life Sciences 4 yrs. of experience 4 yrs. with Finance, Utilities and the firm Luke Szymczak, VP Network Tech/Telecom 19 yrs. of experience 6 yrs. with the firm Robert Bowman, MD Technology 13 yrs. of experience 13 yrs. with the firm Nitin Bhambhani, VP Software and Services 12 yrs. of experience 10 yrs. with the firm Property Urmas Wompa, MD Jacqueline Flake, MD Terry Shu, MD Scott Blasdell, Kay Herr, VP Kathleen Stack, MD Bruce Williams, VP Gregory Fowlkes, VP Capital Markets Insurance/Utilities Finance MD Consumer Stable Retail REITs 23 15 28 yrs. of experience 31 yrs. of experience. REITs 11 12 12 yrs. of 20 9 25 yrs. with the firm<1 yr. with the firm 31 yrs. with the firm 12 yrs. of 11 experience 7 yrs. with the firm Media Cyclicals Anne-Marie Fink, VP Media 11 yrs. of experience 11 yrs. with the firm 8 James Brown, MD Basic Materials 22 yrs. of experience 19 yrs. with the firm Christopher Carlucci, VP Steven Lee, VP Industrial Cyclicals Autos and Transport 12 yrs. of experience 13 yrs. of experience 12 yrs. with the firm Note: MD = Managing Director; VP = Vice President, Assc = Associate As of February 28, 2006 Nishesh Kumar, VP Energy 9 yrs. of experience 8 yrs. with the firm Lisa S. Sadioglu, VP Consumer Cyclicals 6 yrs. of experience 6 yrs. with the firm Jason Ko, Assc. Specialty Finance 4 yrs. of experience 4 yrs. with the firm David Pasquale, VP Consumer Cyclicals 9 yrs. of experience <1 yr. with the firm

Our philosophy is implemented through a unique and robust investment process Information Advantage Systematic Our philosophy is implemented through a unique and robust investment process Information Advantage Systematic Valuation Disciplined Portfolio Construction Fundamental Research Dividend Discount Model Stock Selection Focused § U. S. analyst team of buy-side, sector-specialists § Proprietary earnings and cash flow estimates drive DDR § Investment decisions driven by DDR rankings and PM insights § Global network of analysts expands our information sources 9 § Stocks ranked into quintiles based on DDRs

Systematic Valuation Earnings Long term earnings power Actual near term earnings • “Normalized, ” Systematic Valuation Earnings Long term earnings power Actual near term earnings • “Normalized, ” sustainable earnings reflect true investment value Time Actual 10 Today Forecasted • Stock prices should reflect expectations of future earnings and cash flows

Our analysts’ forecasts for normalized earnings and growth drive a stock’s Dividend Discount Rate Our analysts’ forecasts for normalized earnings and growth drive a stock’s Dividend Discount Rate (DDR) ranking Analyst insights generate Dividend Discount Rates to rank stocks by sustainable earnings reflecting “normalized” revenue and cash flow. Semiconductor sector: JPMorgan’s security ranking by long-term value DDR Quintile 1 Cheap Research analysts: MARVELL TECHNOLOGY GROUP QUALCOMM 7. 64 7. 53 CYPRESS SEMICONDUCTOR MICRON TECHNOLOGY 6. 57 6. 25 n assess past and present performance n determine “normalized” long-term earnings n reflect subjective opinions Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Example: Qualcomm Market price $46. 94 Normalized earnings $2. 30 Earnings growth Quintile 4 28. 49% DDR 7. 53 Quintile 5 Expensive 11 Note: A DDR establishes relative valuations among companies only and does not represent the stock's expected actual return within any given time period. Ranking shown is of Active DDRs which represent DDRs including +/- adjustment. Quintiles are 20% by number of names, not capitalization. The information on this page is for example purposes only and does not necessarily reflect current estimates.

Our quintile rankings have demonstrated strong predictive power for two decades January 1, 1986 Our quintile rankings have demonstrated strong predictive power for two decades January 1, 1986 – December 31, 2005 Quintile performance vs. S&P 500 Source: JPMorgan Asset Management 12 Chart shows performance of quintiles (as determined by JPMorgan research universe) versus the S&P 500 Index, with quintiles rebalanced monthly. JPMorgan research quintiles are market capitalization weighted within sectors, and each sector is market weighted. Quintile performance represents the annualized returns of quintiles vs. the annual ized return of the S&P 500 over the full time period. Quintile performance results have certain inherent limitations. Unlike an actual performance record, quintile results do not represent actual trading, liquidity constraints, fee schedules and transaction costs. No representation is being made that any portfolio will or is likely to achieve profits or losses similar to those shown. Past performance is not indicative of future results.

Our philosophy is implemented through a unique and robust investment process Information Advantage Systematic Our philosophy is implemented through a unique and robust investment process Information Advantage Systematic Valuation Disciplined Portfolio Construction Fundamental Research Stock Selection Focused § U. S. analyst team of buy-side, sector-specialists § Proprietary earnings and cash flow estimates drive DDR § Global network of analysts expands our information sources 13 Dividend Discount Model § Investment decisions driven by DDR rankings and PM insights § Stocks ranked into quintiles based on DDRs

JPMorgan’s Large Cap Research Driven U. S. Equity Strategies Targeted excess return and tracking JPMorgan’s Large Cap Research Driven U. S. Equity Strategies Targeted excess return and tracking error Target excess return Large Cap Core Plus, Value Plus Large Cap Core, Value, Growth Structured strategies Active strategies Note: Targets are relative to the strategies’ respective benchmarks and are gross of fees. Expected returns are 14 estimates based upon proprietary research. There is no guarantee that target returns will be achieved.

Our focus on stock selection results in tight style consistency Manager Style January 2000 Our focus on stock selection results in tight style consistency Manager Style January 2000 – December 2005 Zephyr Style. ADVISOR Large 2 Large Cap Core* rvalue rgrowth r 2 value r 2 growth Russell Generic Corners 1 0 -1 Small -2 -2 -1 Value 15 Note: 36 -month moving windows, computed monthly. *Large Cap Core inception: January 1, 1986. 0 1 2 Growth

Tom Luddy has been able to produce positive excess returns over every 3 -year Tom Luddy has been able to produce positive excess returns over every 3 -year period in the Large Cap Core strategy Representative account performance Rolling 36 -month excess return vs. S&P 500 (Jan. 1, 1999 – December 31, 2005) Three years ending Rolling 36 -month excess return vs. S&P 500 (Jan. 1, 1986 – Mar. 31, 1995) 1 Three years ending 1 Tom 16 Luddy managed money from January 1986 through March 1995 and then became the firm’s Global Chief Investment Officer. Tom resumed managing money in January 1999. Note: Performance results are expressed gross of investment management fees. Returns less than one year are not annualized. Based on a representative account in U. S. dollars. Past performance is not a guarantee of comparable future results. See Appendix for additional information.

…and every 5 year period Representative account performance Rolling 60 -month excess return vs. …and every 5 year period Representative account performance Rolling 60 -month excess return vs. S&P 500 (Jan. 1, 1999 – December 31, 2005) Five years ending Rolling 60 -month excess return vs. S&P 500 (Jan. 1, 1986 – Mar. 31, 1995) 1 Five years ending 1 Tom 17 Luddy managed money from January 1986 through March 1995 and then became the firm’s Global Chief Investment Officer. Tom resumed managing money in January 1999. Note: Performance results are expressed gross of investment management fees. Returns less than one year are not annualized. Based on a representative account in U. S. dollars. Past performance is not a guarantee of comparable future results. See Appendix for additional information.

The DDR spread is driven by human emotion Q 1&Q 2 DDR Spread Dec. The DDR spread is driven by human emotion Q 1&Q 2 DDR Spread Dec. 05 6. 2% Year Note: 18 DDR Spread uses 50% 1 st & 50% 2 nd Quintile DDR Spread vs. JPMorgan Universe. Spread calculation is capweighted at the sector level, equal-weighted within sectors. Risk adjusted spread is adjusted using specific stock risk. Specific stock risk is represented by the equal weighted BARRA predicted specific stock risk of all stocks within the S&P 500. Source: BARRA

Equity Market Valuation • The equity risk premium (ERP) is the bottom-up aggregated DDR Equity Market Valuation • The equity risk premium (ERP) is the bottom-up aggregated DDR minus the 10 -year Treasury yield. It measures the relative attractiveness of stocks versus bonds. • Currently, the ERP of 3. 9% is above the long term average of 3. 0%. • The real DDR, an absolute rather than a relative measure of value, remains below its long term average. 19

Large Cap Core Plus 20 Large Cap Core Plus 20

With portfolio concentration, a large part of the increase in tracking error comes from With portfolio concentration, a large part of the increase in tracking error comes from potentially inadvertent bets Stock specific component 21 Assumptions: Used current weights of stocks in the S&P 500. Index weight each of the “n” names in the portfolio, then overweight each of those names by the same amount to complete the portfolio. 2, 000 trials of 36 one-month periods. For stock-specific risk only example, 25% annualized standard deviation for all stocks. For hypothetical including common factor risk, volatility added to produce a maximum of 10% TE, and a similar logarithmic increase. For demonstration purposes only. Common Factor Total tracking error

Our quintile rankings have demonstrated strong predictive power for two decades January 1, 1986 Our quintile rankings have demonstrated strong predictive power for two decades January 1, 1986 – December 31, 2005 Quintile performance vs. S&P 500 Source: JPMorgan Asset Management 22 Chart shows performance of quintiles (as determined by JPMorgan research universe) versus the S&P 500 Index, with quintiles rebalanced monthly. JPMorgan research quintiles are market capitalization weighted within sectors, and each sector is market weighted. Quintile performance represents the annualized returns of quintiles vs. the annual ized return of the S&P 500 over the full time period. Quintile performance results have certain inherent limitations. Unlike an actual performance record, quintile results do not represent actual trading, liquidity constraints, fee schedules and transaction costs. No representation is being made that any portfolio will or is likely to achieve profits or losses similar to those shown. Past performance is not indicative of future results.

But long-only investing discards almost half of the manager’s insights, and can additionally result But long-only investing discards almost half of the manager’s insights, and can additionally result in inefficient use of capital Index Weight The 16 th largest S&P 500 stock is 1% of the index 0 100 200 300 400 Nth largest stock Long-only investing fails to exploit most of the manager’s insights into potential underperformers 23 500

By expanding the opportunity set to capture insights in unattractive stocks we can generate By expanding the opportunity set to capture insights in unattractive stocks we can generate higher alpha January 1, 1986 – December 31, 2005 Quintile performance vs. S&P 500 plus Source: JPMorgan Asset Management 24 Chart shows performance of quintiles (as determined by JPMorgan research universe) versus the S&P 500 Index, with quintiles rebalanced monthly. JPMorgan research quintiles are market capitalization weighted within sectors, and each sector is market weighted. Quintile performance represents the annualized returns of quintiles vs. the annual ized return of the S&P 500 Index over the full time period. Quintile performance results have certain inherent limitations. Unlike an actual performance record, quintile results do not represent actual trading, liquidity constraints, fee schedules and transaction costs. No representation is being made that any portfolio will or is likely to achieve profits or losses similar to those shown. Past performance is not indicative of future results.

Obvious application: Using insights into overvalued stocks, a manager can add performance through shorting Obvious application: Using insights into overvalued stocks, a manager can add performance through shorting …to exploit an alpha source Example: Georgia Gulf (0. 00% of the S&P 500) Short Sources: Bloomberg, JPMorgan Asset Management 25

Less obvious application: Short-selling allows a manager to better take advantage of relative valuation Less obvious application: Short-selling allows a manager to better take advantage of relative valuation …to isolate an alpha source Example: Maxim/Linear Index Short Maxim vs. Linear Sources: Factset, JPMorgan Asset Management 26

…and hedge against uncertain macro-economic trends Example: Johnson Controls Inc. (auto parts manufacturer) S&P …and hedge against uncertain macro-economic trends Example: Johnson Controls Inc. (auto parts manufacturer) S&P 500 “Best ideas” portfolio Portfolio with relaxed short constraint -2. 8% 27 Source: JPMorgan Asset Management. There is no guarantee that the use of long and short positions will succeed in limiting the fund’s exposure to domestic stock market movements, capitalization, sector swings or other risk factors. Investment in a portfolio involved in long and short selling may have higher portfolio turnover rates. This will likely result in additional tax consequences. Short selling involves certain risks, including additional costs associated with covering short positions and a possibility of unlimited loss on certain short sale positions.

A manager can increase alpha in a way that is consistent with a “bottom-up” A manager can increase alpha in a way that is consistent with a “bottom-up” investment philosophy Common Factor Total tracking error Stock specific component Adding Shorts 28 Assumptions: Used current weights of stocks in the S&P 500. Index weight each of the “n” names in the portfolio, then overweight each of those names by the same amount to complete the portfolio. 2, 000 trials of 36 one-month periods. For stock-specific risk only example, 25% annualized standard deviation for all stocks. For hypothetical including common factor risk, volatility added to produce a maximum of 10% TE, and a similar logarithmic increase. For demonstration purposes only.

130/30 portfolio construction seeks to increase potential alpha while increasing investment efficiency Better use 130/30 portfolio construction seeks to increase potential alpha while increasing investment efficiency Better use of short information Greater diversification of stock bets Long-only JPM DDR quintile performance sinception Greater capital committed to insights 130% Long/short Number of stocks Same net market exposure 100% Long-only Long/short 100% 0% Long-only -30% Long/short Long and short stock positions 29 Net long exposure Source: JPMorgan Asset Management. There is no guarantee that the use of long and short positions will succeed in limiting the fund’s exposure to domestic stock market movements, capitalization, sector swings or other risk factors. Investment in a portfolio involved in long and short selling may have higher portfolio turnover rates. This will likely result in additional tax consequences. Short selling involves certain risks, including additional costs associated with covering short positions and a possibility of unlimited loss on certain short sale positions.

Why shorting stocks is different Assume 20% price moves Stock B price increases, so Why shorting stocks is different Assume 20% price moves Stock B price increases, so “bet” increases -2. 4% -2. 0% Valuation Short 2. 0% 1. 6% Stock A price decreases, so portfolio weight decreases Long Time 30 Assumptions are presented for illustrative purposes only. They must not be used or relied upon to make investment decisions. Short selling involves certain risks, including additional costs associated with covering short positions and a possibility of unlimited loss on certain short sale positions.

JPMorgan Asset Management This document is intended solely to report on various investment views JPMorgan Asset Management This document is intended solely to report on various investment views held by JPMorgan Asset Management. Opinions, estimates, forecasts, and statements of financial market trends that are based on current market conditions constitute our judgment and are subject to change without notice. We believe the information provided here is reliable but should not be assumed to be accurate or complete. The views and strategies described may not be suitable for all investors. References to specific securities, asset classes and financial markets are for illustrative purposes only and are not intended to be, and should not be interpreted as, recommendations. Indices do not include fees or operating expenses and are not available for actual investment. The information contained herein employs proprietary projections of expected returns as well as estimates of their future volatility. The relative relationships and forecasts contained herein are based upon proprietary research and are developed through analysis of historical data and capital markets theory. These estimates have certain inherent limitations, and unlike an actual performance record, they do not reflect actual trading, liquidity constraints, fees or other costs. References to future net returns are not promises or even estimates of actual returns a client portfolio may achieve. The forecasts contained herein are for illustrative purposes only and are not to be relied upon as advice or interpreted as a recommendation. The value of investments and the income from them may fluctuate and your investment is not guaranteed. Past performance is no guarantee of future results. Please note current performance may be higher or lower than the performance data shown. Please note that investments in foreign markets are subject to special currency, political, and economic risks. Exchange rates may cause the value of underlying overseas investments to go down or up. Investments in emerging markets may be more volatile than other markets and the risk to your capital is therefore greater. Also, the economic and political situations may be more volatile than in established economies and these may adversely influence the value of investments made. Performance results are gross of investment management fees. The deduction of an advisory fee reduces an investor’s return. Actual account performance will vary depending on individual portfolio security selection and the applicable fee schedule. Fees are available upon request. 31 The following is an example of the effect of compounded advisory fees over a period of time on the value of a client’s portfolio: A portfolio with a beginning value of $100 million, gaining an annual return of 10% per annum would grow to $259 million after 10 years, assuming no fees have been paid out. Conversely, a portfolio with a beginning value of $100 million, gaining an annual return of 10% per annum, but paying a fee of 1% per annum, would only grow to $235 million after 10 years. The annualized returns over the 10 year time period are 10. 00% (gross of fees) and 8. 91% (net of fees). If the fee in the above example was 0. 25% per annum, the portfolio would grow to $253 million after 10 years and return 9. 73% net of fees. The fees were calculated on a monthly basis, which shows the maximum effect of compounding. Illustration showing impact of investment management fees: An investment of USD $1, 000 under the management of JPMAM achieves a 10% compounded gross annual return for 10 years. If a management fee of 0. 75% of average assets under management were charged per year for the 10 -year period, the annual return would be 9. 25% and the value of assets would be USD $2, 422, 225 net of fees, compared with USD $2, 593, 742 gross of fees. Therefore, the investment management fee, and any other expenses incurred in the management of the portfolio, will reduce the client’s return. The securities mentioned throughout the presentation are shown for illustrative purposes only and should not be interpreted as recommendations to buy or sell. A full list of firm recommendations for the past year is available upon request. JPMorgan Asset Management is the marketing name for the asset management businesses of JPMorgan Chase & Co. and its affiliates worldwide. Copyright 2006 JPMorgan Chase & Co. All rights reserved.