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Slide 2 Learning Objectives l Summarize the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. l Explain Slide 2 Learning Objectives l Summarize the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. l Explain US and Japanese strategy at the opening of WWII. l Be familiar with the timeline of key events in the Pacific Theater. l Summarize the battles for Guadalcanal, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa. l Describe the decisions that led to the employment of the atomic bomb.

Slide 3 The Road to War l Japan sought to control of “East Asia” Slide 3 The Road to War l Japan sought to control of “East Asia” for additional markets and sources of raw materials – Invades China in 1931. – Invades French Indochina in 1940. “Colonial” governments begin imposing embargoes to put brakes on Japanese expansion. l Japanese armed forces argue that they must strike to relieve pressure of embargoes. l – Expect conflict, but buy time and surprise through negotiations. l US and UK focused on war in Europe.

Slide 4 Japanese Strategy l Three Phases – Phase I: Surprise attacks, then strategic Slide 4 Japanese Strategy l Three Phases – Phase I: Surprise attacks, then strategic defense. • Knock out US fleet; seize vital areas; establish defensive perimeter. – Phase II: Strengthen perimeter; make any offensive action by the US prohibitively costly. – Phase III: Defeat and destroy any forces that attempt to penetrate the perimeter. l Long US LOC and natural strength of defense should almost guarantee success.

Slide 7 Pearl Harbor l Surprise – Deception operations – First significant use of Slide 7 Pearl Harbor l Surprise – Deception operations – First significant use of carriers. – Tactical home run, but strategic foul ball…or strikeout? l Critical Vulnerability? ? – US Pacific Fleet • Destruction of battleships proved counterproductive. – US carriers proved to be “surface” that cost Japanese the war. l Fog and friction?

Slide 9 Who’s in charge? l General Mac. Arthur – SWPA • Southwestern Pacific Slide 9 Who’s in charge? l General Mac. Arthur – SWPA • Southwestern Pacific • Many large land masses – Maneuver – Retake PI – Island Hop, but larger land masses. l Admiral Nimitz – POA • North, Central, Southern Pacific • Primarily open ocean – Carrier Air – Island Hop

Slide 12 Island Hopping Campaign l Lt. Col (then Maj) “Pete” Ellis develops OPLAN Slide 12 Island Hopping Campaign l Lt. Col (then Maj) “Pete” Ellis develops OPLAN 712 “Advanced Base Operations in Micronesia” (aka “the Orange Plan”) in 1921. – Predicts that Japan will strike first. – ". . . it will be necessary for us to project our fleet and landing forces across the Pacific and wage war in Japanese waters. To effect this requires that we have sufficient bases to support the fleet, both during its projection and afterwards. To effect [an amphibious landing] in the face of enemy resistance requires careful training and preparation to say the least; and this along Marine lines. It is not enough that the troops be skilled infantrymen or artillery men of high morale; they must be skilled watermen and jungle-men who know it can be done--Marines with Marine training. "

Slide 13 Maj. Gen Lejeune circa 1923 l Slide 13 Maj. Gen Lejeune circa 1923 l ". . . on both flanks of a fleet crossing the Pacific are numerous islands suitable for utilization by an enemy for radio stations, aviation, submarine, or destroyer bases. All should be mopped up as progress is made. . . The presence of an expeditionary force with the fleet would add greatly to the striking power of the Commander-in-Chief of the fleet. . The maintenance, equipping, and training of its expeditionary force so that it will be in instant readiness to support the fleet in the event of war, I deem to be the most important Marine Corps duty in time of peace. "

Slide 15 Logistics l Logistics plays a crucial role in the Pacific. l Japanese Slide 15 Logistics l Logistics plays a crucial role in the Pacific. l Japanese have qualitative edge in military hardware at the beginning of war. – Island Hopping to seize advanced (primarily air) bases and cut Japanese reinforcements. – Choose quality over quantity (Zero, Yamato). – Unable to replace assets quickly. l US is master of mass production. l US subs operate independently and sink Japanese ships faster than Japan can produce them. – Average quality, tremendous quantity. – Implement ideas from captured equipment.

Slide 16 1941 l December 7 Pearl Harbor l Dec 8 US & GB Slide 16 1941 l December 7 Pearl Harbor l Dec 8 US & GB declare war on Japan l Dec 9 China declares war on Japan l Dec 10 Prince of Wales and Repulse sunk l Japan invades Burma, Hong Kong, Philippines, Guam, Wake, & Borneo

Slide 17 1942 The Empire Expands l February Singapore falls l March New Guinea Slide 17 1942 The Empire Expands l February Singapore falls l March New Guinea l April Bataan l May Corregidor

Slide 18 1942 l April Doolittle Raid on Tokyo – Tactical evolution with strategic Slide 18 1942 l April Doolittle Raid on Tokyo – Tactical evolution with strategic impact. – Shifts morale in both countries – Adapt and overcome… l May Coral Sea – “Stop the enemy” – Tactical victory for Japan – Strategic victory for US l June Midway l July-November Guadalcanal – Island not officially “secured” until Feb ’ 43.

Slide 20 Battle of Midway June 1942 l Original perimeter not sufficient. – Doolittle Slide 20 Battle of Midway June 1942 l Original perimeter not sufficient. – Doolittle raid concerns Japanese. – Want base to bomb Hawaii. – Deliver killing blow to US fleet. l Security l Simplicity l Yamamoto uses “operational push” tactics. – Attacks island before locating US fleet. l First naval battle fought entirely with airplanes.

Slide 21 Midway: The Tide Turns Patrol planes spot Japanese main body just as Slide 21 Midway: The Tide Turns Patrol planes spot Japanese main body just as they are about to return to their blockade. l Midway-based A/C strike Japanese TF l Japanese A/C attack Midway with little impact. l – Rearm w/ bombs or torpedoes? l US carrier-based torpedo attack has same outcome as land-based attack, but distract fighters and allow dive bombers to hit TF while planes rearm/refuel. – Aviation “combined arms”? l Japanese lose four heavy carriers, all planes, and many of their best pilots; US loses Yorktown.

Slide 23 Guadalcanal 7 August 1942 l First offensive action of the war. l Slide 23 Guadalcanal 7 August 1942 l First offensive action of the war. l Critical airfield. l – First plane makes emergency landing on 12 Aug. – 2 USMC squadrons arrive on 20 Aug. – Only one “healthy” carrier left by end of battle. Strategic offense; tactical defense l Navy bugs out, taking majority of supplies with them. l – Redeem themselves during critical 12 Nov naval battle when they turn back major Japanese force.

Slide 24 Guadalcanal l Japanese piecemeal counterattacks. – Maneuver, mass, and surprise all hampered Slide 24 Guadalcanal l Japanese piecemeal counterattacks. – Maneuver, mass, and surprise all hampered by jungle. • 8 day forced march – USMC conducts vigorous patrols as part of “active defense”. • 2 d Raider Bn conducts month-long patrol. – Japanese attempt to reinforce by sea, but suffer significant losses in the process. (7 of 11 transports) l Jungle causes significant casualties. – Over 1 k new cases of malaria per week. l Army comes in to mop up in November.

Slide 25 Results l Island “secured” in Feb ’ 43. l Japan suffers critical Slide 25 Results l Island “secured” in Feb ’ 43. l Japan suffers critical losses in all areas. – 600 a/c, 2300 aircrew – 25 k soldiers (1/2 in combat, ½ to illness) – 2 BB, 3 CV, 12 Cruisers, 25 destroyers • Roughly same number as US, but Japan unable to replace. l Institution of Commander, Amphibious Task Force – Commander, Landing Force (CATF/CLF).

1 st Marine Division Staff 23 Generals, 1 Admiral, 3 Commandants; 40 officers with 1 st Marine Division Staff 23 Generals, 1 Admiral, 3 Commandants; 40 officers with 700 yrs of combined service.

Slide 30 l 1943 l 1944 – March Bismark Sea (limited Japanese reinforcement of Slide 30 l 1943 l 1944 – March Bismark Sea (limited Japanese reinforcement of Southern Pacific) – November Tarawa and Makin (Gilberts) – February Kwajalein & Eniwetok (Marshalls) – February-June New Guinea – June-August Saipan, Tinian, Guam (Marianas) • B 29 s now able to be recovered after hitting Japan – October Leyte Gulf • Destroyed much of Japanese Navy

Slide 31 The Low Road l Mac. Aurthur leap-frogs through his AO. – Skips Slide 31 The Low Road l Mac. Aurthur leap-frogs through his AO. – Skips heavily defended islands and areas and leaves them to “wither on the vine” by taking less well defended surrounding islands and cutting off LOC. l Seizure of New Guinea puts him in a position to retake Philippines. – Works around coast of NG to take advantage of naval superiority, again bypassing and cutting off strong points. • Critical vulnerabilities?

Slide 33 Iwo Jima l l D-Day 9 Feb 1945 Airfields again the objectives. Slide 33 Iwo Jima l l D-Day 9 Feb 1945 Airfields again the objectives. 450 ships Pre-invasion bombardment shortened from 12 to 3 days. – Weather limited effectiveness of even this. l 3 rd, 4 th, 5 th MARDIVs st l Southern half of island in US hands by D+2. – 1 st wave gets ashore, but when bombardment lifts for them to move inland, all hell breaks loose. – Takes 34 more days to secure remainder of island (8 square miles total).

Slide 34 Iwo Jima l Nothing fancy; simple but costly. l 36 days, 26 Slide 34 Iwo Jima l Nothing fancy; simple but costly. l 36 days, 26 k US casualites including 6 k KIA. l 1 k of 20 k defenders survived 2400 B-29 s w/ 27 k crewmen made unscheduled landings on island by the time the war ended. 27 Medals of Honor awarded. l l – “Throwing human flesh against reinforced concrete. ” – 1 of every 3 US personnel that went ashore was wounded or killed.

"The battle of Iwo Island has been won. The United States Marines by their individual and collective courage have conquered a base which is as necessary to us in our continuing forward movement toward final victory as it was vital to the enemy in staving off ultimate defeat. By their victory, the 3 d, 4 th and 5 th Marine Divisions and other units of the 5 th Amphibious Corps have made an accounting to their country which only history will be able to value fully. Among the Americans who served on Iwo Island, uncommon valor was a common virtue. " Admiral Chester W. Nimitz

Slide 38 Okinawa D Day 1 April Last stop before the mainland. 1200 ships Slide 38 Okinawa D Day 1 April Last stop before the mainland. 1200 ships 1, 2, 6 MARDIV + 3 Army divisions USMC heads north; secures northern ½ of island by D+4. l Combined Army/USMC battle determined Japanese defenders until late June. l l l – Gen Geiger named to command Tenth Army when Buckner is KIA. l Better job of using combined-arms, but still ugly.

Slide 40 Desperation l Kamikaze = Divine Wind l 1900 planes launched against US Slide 40 Desperation l Kamikaze = Divine Wind l 1900 planes launched against US during Battle for Okinawa. – 6 April • 355 launched – 22 get through defenses » 3 US ships sunk.

Slide 41 The Costs l US – 7 k KIA – 31 k WIA Slide 41 The Costs l US – 7 k KIA – 31 k WIA l Japan – 130 k KIA – 10 k POW – Lost 700+ aircraft

Victory was never in doubt…What was in doubt, in all our minds, was whethere Victory was never in doubt…What was in doubt, in all our minds, was whethere would be any of us left to dedicate our cemetery at the end, or whether the last Marine would die knocking out the last Japanese gun and gunner. Let the world count our crosses. Maj. Gen Graves Erskine, CG 3 d Marine Division, following the Battle for Iwo Jima What platoon are you guys? Platoon, hell! We’re the 2 nd Battalion, 22 d Marines, what’s left of us anyway. Exchange between Marines following the Battle for Sugarloaf Hill on Okinawa, May 1945

Slide 43 1945 l February-March Iwo Jima l March Tokyo raids • Low level Slide 43 1945 l February-March Iwo Jima l March Tokyo raids • Low level incendiary bombing runs with much destruction. Designed to force surrender but didn’t. l April-June Okinawa l August • • • 6 th Hiroshima 9 th Nagasaki 14 th Japan surrenders. l September 2 VJ Day

Slide 45 A New Formula for Mass Japan warned, but refused to surrender. Planners Slide 45 A New Formula for Mass Japan warned, but refused to surrender. Planners estimated invasion would result in 35 x as many casualties as at Okinawa. l Hiroshima l l – – – 6 August 1945 HQ, Japanese 2 nd Army 60 -70 k killed or missing l Nagasaki l Compare l Logical outcome of “Total War”? – 9 August – 40 k killed – Dresden 35 -135 k – Tokyo 120 k KIA/WIA

Slide 48 For Further Study l l l l l At Dawn We Slept Slide 48 For Further Study l l l l l At Dawn We Slept Guadalcanal Goodbye Darkness Battle Cry With the Old Breed Iwo Jima, Legacy of Valor A Marine Named Mitch Once a Legend Hoffman Once a Marine Prange Frank Manchester Uris Sledge Ross Paige Vandergrift

Slide 49 Questions? Slide 49 Questions?