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Ratification Matters: The Domestic Fate of Bilateral Investment Treaties Yoram Z. Haftel U. of Ratification Matters: The Domestic Fate of Bilateral Investment Treaties Yoram Z. Haftel U. of Illinois-Chicago [email protected] edu Alexander Thompson Ohio State University Thompson. [email protected] edu The annual national conference of the International Political Economy Society Philadelphia, November 14 -15, 2008

Question • Why are some treaties signed and then ratified quickly, while others languish Question • Why are some treaties signed and then ratified quickly, while others languish at the domestic level or are never ratified at all? • What explains variation in the time between signature and mutual ratification of bilateral investment treaties (BITs)

Why Ratification Matters • A key but overlooked stage of cooperation • Unique strategic Why Ratification Matters • A key but overlooked stage of cooperation • Unique strategic problems at nexus of domestic and international levels • Signature and ratification perform distinct functions, legally and politically

Hypotheses • Formal Legislative Hurdles – Greater legal hurdles lengthen time to ratification • Hypotheses • Formal Legislative Hurdles – Greater legal hurdles lengthen time to ratification • Domestic Political Constraints – Greater constraints on executive lengthen time to ratification • Rational Anticipation – Ratification obstacles anticipated before or during negotiation stage – Constraints have no bearing on ratification or may even decrease time to ratification

BITs’ Entry into Force • 1, 745 BITs from 1959 to 1999 • 1, BITs’ Entry into Force • 1, 745 BITs from 1959 to 1999 • 1, 233 (70%) in force by 1999 – Mean time to mutual ratification: 1. 76 years • 512 BITs not in force by 1999 – Mean time since conclusion: 2. 53 years

Data and Research Design • Event history (Cox Proportional Hazard) • DV: spell of Data and Research Design • Event history (Cox Proportional Hazard) • DV: spell of mutual ratification • IVs: – Legislative hurdles (Hathaway 2008) – Political constraints – Democracy – Common law • Control variables (Elkins et al. 2006)

Model Legislative Hurdles 1 2 3 4 . 69*** (-7. 67) . 70*** (-7. Model Legislative Hurdles 1 2 3 4 . 69*** (-7. 67) . 70*** (-7. 39) . 70*** (-7. 38) . 69*** (-7. 66) 1. 32 (1. 38) 4. 17** (1. 95) Polcon . 22* (-1. 72) Polcon 2 Democracy 1. 02** (2. 07) 1. 02** (2. 12). 99 (-1. 15) Democracy 2 1. 06 (. 98) 1. 07 (1. 15) 1. 05 (. 85) 1. 06 (. 96) Law/Order 1. 10*** (3. 62) 1. 10*** (3. 67) 1. 10*** (3. 72) 1. 10*** (3. 62) Embassies 1. 00* (1. 73) 1. 00 (1. 47) 1. 00* (1. 69) 1. 00* (1. 71) Host FDI/GDP . 84*** (-5. 30) . 83*** (-5. 37) . 84*** (-5. 75) . 84*** (-5. 41) Home FDI/GDP 1. 0*** (2. 63) 1. 03*** (2. 99) 1. 03*** (2. 96) 1. 03*** (2. 89) Common Language 1. 35** (2. 55) 1. 35** (2. 54) 1. 35** (2. 55) 1. 36*** (2. 61) Colonial Ties . 37** (-2. 56) . 35*** (-2. 79) . 38*** (-2. 57) . 38** (-2. 56) Alliance . 85 (-1. 33) . 83 (-1. 50) . 84 (-1. 45) . 85 (-1. 35) N 1, 429 Common Law

Substantive Effect of Legislative Hurdles Substantive Effect of Legislative Hurdles

Conclusion • Formal legal hurdles clearly matter • Mixed findings on domestic political constraints; Conclusion • Formal legal hurdles clearly matter • Mixed findings on domestic political constraints; democracy may even speed ratification • Rational anticipation: Transparent countries with high capacity effectively anticipate and address ratification obstacles • Much work remains – National ratification dates – Role of treaty design (sovereignty costs, scope)

Weibull Model 5 6 7 8 Legislative Hurdles . 67*** (-5. 32) . 65*** Weibull Model 5 6 7 8 Legislative Hurdles . 67*** (-5. 32) . 65*** (-5. 52) . 67*** (-5. 28) . 65*** (-5. 68) Polcon 1. 99** (2. 04) 22. 23** (2. 22). 04** (-1. 99) Polcon 2 1. 04*** (2. 69) Democracy 1. 06*** (2. 81). 99* (-1. 87) Democracy 2. 98 (-. 10) . 97 (-. 27) . 95 (-. 38) . 96 (-. 31) Law/Order 1. 15*** (3. 06) 1. 16*** (3. 22) 1. 15*** (3. 06) Embassies 1. 00*** (3. 07) 1. 00*** (3. 44) 1. 00*** (3. 35) 1. 00*** (3. 40) . 99 (-. 10) 1. 02 (. 40) . 99 (-. 08) 1. 00 (. 13) 1. 04*** (2. 99) 1. 03** (2. 35) 1. 04*** (2. 94) 1. 04*** (3. 04) Common Language 1. 43* (1. 88) 1. 46** (2. 19) 1. 47** (2. 31) 1. 52*** (2. 61) Colonial Ties . 27*** (-2. 85) . 31** (-2. 52) . 33** (-2. 49) . 30*** (-2. 61) Alliance . 69** (-1. 87) . 75* (-1. 67) . 73* (-1. 86) . 76* (-1. 68) Ln(ρ) . 48*** (14. 44) . 49*** (14. 50) . 49*** (14. 35) . 50*** (15. 06) 1, 429 Common Law Host FDI/GDP Home FDI/GDP N

Summary Statistics Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max TIME FORCE (DV) 1745 2. Summary Statistics Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max TIME FORCE (DV) 1745 2. 98 2. 53 1 40 LHURDLES 1745 1. 6 . 61 0 4 POLCON 1742 . 45 . 16 0 . 71 POLCON 2 1742 . 23 . 12 0 . 51 COMMON LAW 1745 . 32 . 46 0 1 DEMOCRACY 1745 7. 50 4. 60 -9 10 DEMOCRACY 2 1745 77. 5 30. 4 0 100 LAW AND ORDER 1558 3. 69 1. 29 0 6 EMBASSIES 1742 54. 11 36. 75 1 151 FDI IN 1742 2. 53 1. 19 -1. 07 3. 90 FDI OUT 1603 1. 13 2. 78 -26. 06 14. 64 ALLIANCE 1742 . 08 . 27 0 1 COMLANG 1742 . 07 . 25 0 1 COMCOL 1742 . 01 . 12 0 1

Histogram of Legislative Hurdles 0 No legislative approval required (e. g. , Atingua-Barbuda, Israel, Histogram of Legislative Hurdles 0 No legislative approval required (e. g. , Atingua-Barbuda, Israel, Libya) 1 Majority in one house required (e. g. , Armenia, Greece, Panama) 2 Majority in two houses required (e. g. , Argentina, Czech R. , Malaysia) 3 Supermajority in one house required (e. g. , Algeria, Iraq, Micronesia, U. S. ) 4 Supermajority in two houses required ( Burundi)

Predicted Hazard Ratio Variable − STD / 0 + STD / 1 LHURDLES . Predicted Hazard Ratio Variable − STD / 0 + STD / 1 LHURDLES . 55 . 85 POLCON . 61 . 66 POLCON, POLCON 2 . 76 . 78 COMMON LAW . 65 . 68 DEMOCRACY . 60 . 68 DEMOCRACY, DEMOCRACY 2 . 60 LAW AND ORDER . 58 . 74 EMBASSIES . 62 . 68 FDI IN . 79 . 53 FDI OUT . 66 . 71 ALLIANCE . 65 . 56 COMLANG . 65 . 88 COMCOL . 65 . 24