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Missile Proliferation and Missile Defense in Northeast Asia Daniel A. Pinkston International Crisis Group The 8 th ROK-UN Joint Conference on Disarmament and Nonproliferation Issues Sŏgwip’o, Cheju-do, ROK, 17 November 2009
Long live the peerless commander General Kim Jong Il who has established our country as one of the world’s nuclear states!
Overview • DPRK Missile Capabilities • Nonproliferation Concerns • DPRK Space Program and Scientific Nationalism • Preemption Doctrine and Rhetoric • ROK Cruise Missile Program • MD • Policy Recommendations
DPRK Missile Capabilities • DPRK began to produce multiple rocket launchers in the 1960 s • Acquired surface-to-ship missiles and FROG rockets in late 1960 s • Produced Scud-B (火星-5; Hwasŏng-5) by mid 1980 s • Developed Scud-C (火星-6; Hwasŏng-6) by late 1980 s • Tested Nodong (光明星? ) in 1993 • Exported Scuds and Nodong to several countries
DPRK Missile Capabilities • Flight-tested Paektusan-1 (白 頭山-1; Taepodong-1) with attempted satellite launch 31 August 1998 • Missile exercise 5 July 2006, but Paektusan-2 failed • Failed Ŭnha-2 (銀河-2) SLV launch 5 April 2009 • Has tested and deployed improved anti-ship cruise missile KN-01 based on Chinese “Silkworm” • Tested and probably deployed KN-02 or “Toksa (毒蛇)” based on SS-21 “Scarab”
Ghuari, Hwasŏng, KN-01
New Missile “Musudan” • In 2003, U. S. satellite imagery detected a new ballistic missile under development that appears to be based upon the Soviet R-27 (SS-N-6) • liquid-fueled submarinelaunched ballistic missile with a range of at least 2, 500 km; land-based version has a range of 2, 500 -4, 000 km • Reportedly displayed during 25 April 2007 parade, but not on DPRK television • Ŭnha-2 second stage reportedly a modified Musudan
Inventory • About 355 -685 Scud-variants; liquid fueled and road mobile; 27 -40 TELs • About 220 -320 Nodongs; liquid fueled and road mobile; 27 -30 TELs • Musudan; no flight tests; 20 -30 deployed? 22 -27 TELs? • “Toksa” (KN-02); solid-fueled and road mobile • Paektusan-1 program terminated • Paektusan-2 not operational; launched from tower • Land attack cruise missiles?
Warheads • Hwasŏng, Nodong, Paektusan-2, and Musudan capable of delivering nukes – DPRK probably has been able to miniaturize warhead package • HE warheads, but only useful with Toksa (KN-02) • CW warheads likely for all systems, but little known about number and doctrine • BW warheads unlikely; but possible UAV delivery systems unknown
Institutional Structure • National Defense Commission ultimate authority – Warheads have not been transferred to KPA; separate authority with NDC member Chu Kyu-ch’ang probable head – Second Natural Sciences Academy (第 2自然科學院 ) responsible for applied military research – Second Economic Committee (第 2 經濟委員會 ), nominally subordinate to the KWP Central Committee Munitions Industry Department (勞動黨 中央委員會 軍需 業部 ), manages weapons production – Fourth Bureau produces rockets and missiles • Ministry of People’s Armed Forces manages training and operations during peace time • Supreme Commander issues orders to General Staff during war
Nonproliferation Concerns • DPRK views missiles exports as “normal business” • UNSCR 1874 “demands that the DPRK not conduct any further nuclear test or any launch using ballistic missile technology” • Sanctions regime under UNSCR 1695, 1718 and 1874 – – Bans all arms exports Financial sanctions Luxury goods Travel bans
DPRK Space Program and Scientific Nationalism • Building a “Strong and Powerful Country” (强盛大 國建設戰略) – Ideology/politics – Military – Economics • Missiles and SLVs have high symbolic value – Regime emphasizes S&T for economic recovery and legitimacy – Missiles serve multiple purposes for domestic politics
Modernize and “Informationize” the People’s Economy
New Space Center at Tongch’ang-ri
Preemption Doctrine and Rhetoric • Increasing rhetoric regarding the right to “preemptive selfdefense” • Increasing gap in N-S conventional balance • First strike advantages • 10 November 2009 N -S Yellow Sea battle
ROK Cruise Missile Program • ROK ballistic missile range limited to 180 km by 1979 MOU with the U. S. • ROK joined MTCR in March 2001 • ROK says no range limits with cruise missile payload under 500 kg • Began to deploy 1, 000 km-range LACMs early this year • Developing 1, 500 km-range LACM
MD and NE Asian Security • Japan has highest threat perception; response will be more MD • ROK deploying limited MD • China could respond to deployment of robust, layered MD – Weapons could target MD assets, including those in space – Possible missile build-up
Policy Recommendations • Focus on sanctions regime, but… – Negotiated walk-back or erosion through “sanctions fatigue? ” – Inter-Korean CBMs desperately needed • ROK should disclose CWC compliance • Cool down preemption rhetoric – Engage DPRK • Link economics and security • Test DPRK intentions – Begin serious discussion on peaceful space cooperation – Deploy limited MD, but realize political sensitivities and technological limits—not a substitute for arms control
References • • Crisis Group Asia Report N° 167, “North Korea’s Chemical and Biological Weapons Programs, ” 18 June 2009. Crisis Group Asia Report N° 168, “North Korea’s Nuclear and Missile Programs, ” 18 June 2009. Crisis Group Asia Report N° 169, “North Korea: Getting Back to Talks, ” 18 June 2009. Crisis Group Asia Report N° 179, “Shades of Red: China’s Debate over North Korea, ” 2 November 2009. Daniel A. Pinkston, The North Korean Ballistic Missile Program (Carlisle, February 2008). Daniel A. Pinkston, “North Korea Displays Ballistic Missiles during Military Parade, Some for First Time, ” WMD Insights, June 2007. Daniel A. Pinkston, “South Korea Tests 1, 000 Kilometer Range Cruise Missile and Develops 1, 500 Kilometer-range Version, ” WMD Insights, November 2006. Daniel A. Pinkston, “South Korean Response to North Korean July Missile Exercise Includes Unveiling of New Cruise Missile, ” WMD Insights, October 2006.