Скачать презентацию Issues in economic governance Why does program delivery Скачать презентацию Issues in economic governance Why does program delivery

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Issues in economic governance: Why does program delivery vary across states? Regina Birner Professor Issues in economic governance: Why does program delivery vary across states? Regina Birner Professor of Social and Institutional Change in Agricultural Development, University of Hohenheim, Germany

IFPRI State-level Hunger Index IFPRI State-level Hunger Index

Why do development problems persist in spite of considerable investment by the government to Why do development problems persist in spite of considerable investment by the government to address them? What to do about it? Learning from the reform experience of different states

Overview 1. Introduction • Variation in governance across states 2. Conceptual framework 3. Insights Overview 1. Introduction • Variation in governance across states 2. Conceptual framework 3. Insights from empirical research in Bihar & Karnataka • Rural services and program delivery • Survey and case study findings 4. Policy implications

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Gender Equality Government of India (2002). National Human Development Report 2001. New Delhi: Planning Gender Equality Government of India (2002). National Human Development Report 2001. New Delhi: Planning Commission. (Composite of five indicators)

H ac ha Ke l P ra ra la de An dh G sh H ac ha Ke l P ra ra la de An dh G sh ra uja P r M ra at ah de ar sh C ash ha t tti ra sg a W Pu rh es nj t B ab en ga U tta Or l r P iss ra a de sh Ta D m elh il N i H adu a Jh rya ar na kh an As d R sa aj as m M Ka tha ad rn n ya at Pr aka ad es h J& K Bi ha r im Perceptions of Corruption Findings from a Transparency International survey 800 700 600 500 400 300 200 100 0 Transparency International India – Center for Media Studies (2005)

Absentee rates of personnel in primary schools and health care centers 70 60 50 Absentee rates of personnel in primary schools and health care centers 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 Primary schools ha r Bi ad es h r. P ra de U sh tta r. A nc ha l As sa m Pu nj ab a U tta Pr ar ya n An dh ra H aj a st h an sa R O ris la ra Ke ng al Be es t W m il N ad u a ak Ta rn at Ka G uj ar at 0 Primary health centers Source: World Development Report 2004

Access to agricultural extension Source: NSSO State of Indian Farmer Survey (2005: 6) Access to agricultural extension Source: NSSO State of Indian Farmer Survey (2005: 6)

Other types of indicators • Examples: • Actual use of funds from centrally sponsored Other types of indicators • Examples: • Actual use of funds from centrally sponsored schemes, such as the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme • For example, Bihar did not use substantial amounts due to problems to comply with implementation regulations • Access to services measured using Citizen Report Cards (Public Affairs Centers) • Targeting performance in government schemes, such as the Public Distribution System or the Integrated Child Care Services Scheme (ICDS)

Why does program implementation differ across states? Conceptual framework Why does program implementation differ across states? Conceptual framework

Conceptual Framework good fit Contextual factors • • Education levels Social structure (Inequality, exclusion) Conceptual Framework good fit Contextual factors • • Education levels Social structure (Inequality, exclusion) Political conditions Level of economic development Reforms to improve voice &accountability (e. g. , reservation rules, community empowerment) good fit Reforms to improve capacity for service delivery (e. g. , staff, qualification, incentives) good fit Characteristics of local communities Ability of citizens to demand supervise services Capacity of administration to finance and supply services Characteristics of service providers Vicious cycle Demand-side reform approaches Performance of services and programs * Priorities * Quality * Efficiency * Equity * Sustainability Supply-side reform approaches

Understanding the problems of program implementation: Example: National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGA) Case Understanding the problems of program implementation: Example: National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGA) Case study: Bihar Study team: Regina Birner, K. G. Gayatrhidevi (ISEC), Madhushree Sekher (TISS), Katharina Raabe, Neeru Sharma (ex-IFPRI), Amrita Shilphi (Institute of Dalit Studies)

Approach Study site: District Nalanda, Bihar • Village case study • Focus group: Gram Approach Study site: District Nalanda, Bihar • Village case study • Focus group: Gram Panchayat and Block Panchayat representatives, villagers, Block public official • Process Net-Map with focus group • Process of implementing NREGA is mapped step-by-step on a large sheet of paper, based on focus group information • Arrows are used to describe actions needed for implementation • Carom board pieces are used to visualize risks of leakage and other implementation problems • Follow-up discussions with different stakeholders • Workers • Gram Panchayat representatives • Public officials

3 Zilla Parishad 14 (3) 7 2 Overseer Block Dev. Officer 5 9 Block 3 Zilla Parishad 14 (3) 7 2 Overseer Block Dev. Officer 5 9 Block Panchayat 6 16 1 Block Program O. 4 8 Employment Worker 10 11 17 12 Farmers’ Committee 15 Labor Group 13 Gram Panchayat 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. Decide about NREGA activity, inform Send proposal for approval Inform about start of work Ask for estimate Goes to village, makes estimate Informs about estimate Calls, gives advance money Informs about advance 10. Inform to get people ready 11. Issue employment cards, maintain attendance sheet 12. Supervises money flow 13. Measures work (maintenance book) 14. Informs about work done 15. Provides money for work (signs checks) 16. Informs about money received 17. Distributes money (3. ) (System before hiring Block Program Officer)

3 Zilla Parishad 8 14 2 Overseer 8 7 Block Program O. 4 5 3 Zilla Parishad 8 14 2 Overseer 8 7 Block Program O. 4 5 9 Block Panchayat 6 10 Employment Worker 16 1 10 17 Labor Group Risk of leakage 13 Gram Panchayat Decide about NREGA activity, inform Send proposal for approval Inform about start of work Ask for estimate Goes to village, makes estimate Informs about estimate Calls, gives advance money Informs about advance 15 11 12 Farmers’ Committee 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 8 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. (in total, 30% of NREGA funds) Inform to get people ready Issue employment cards, maintain attendance sheet Supervises money flow Measures work (maintenance book) Informs about work done Provides money for work (signs checks) Informs about money received Distributes money Last year

Governance reforms in Bihar under Nitish Kumar (from 2005 onwards) • “Supply-side reforms” • Governance reforms in Bihar under Nitish Kumar (from 2005 onwards) • “Supply-side reforms” • Bringing back experienced IAS officers • Modernizing administrative procedures, e. g. , computerizing the treasury • “Demand-side reforms” • Far-reaching decentralization and community empowerment • Gram Panchayat (GP) councils get authority to hire and supervise primary school teachers and aganwadi workers • User groups have to sign attendance sheets prior to salary payments • Challenge: GP presidents and council members demand bribes • 50% reservation for women in Panchayati Raj institutions • Challenge: Build capacity of elected representatives • Results: Too early to judge – governance reform is a long-term process • Conclusions: Political will at the top level matters! • But need to address the challenges inherent in each reform

Complaint mechanism – Bihar (Madhubani) Effort to improve government responsiveness * Driven by the Complaint mechanism – Bihar (Madhubani) Effort to improve government responsiveness * Driven by the Chief Minister * People come to District Offices to have problems resolved on the spot * Evidence of challenges of this approach

Governance reforms in Karnataka Results from a survey with ISEC and TISS Study team: Governance reforms in Karnataka Results from a survey with ISEC and TISS Study team: Regina Birner, K. G. Gayatrhidevi, Nethra Palaniswamy, Katharina Raabe and Madhushree Sekher

Background • Karnataka: Leader in decentralization • Decentralization precedes constitutional reforms • Transfer of Background • Karnataka: Leader in decentralization • Decentralization precedes constitutional reforms • Transfer of authority for funds, functions and functionaries to local governments for all subjects • Strong emphasis on training elected Panchayati Raj members using innovative methods • Efforts to empower community-based user groups • Study approach • Case study to understand local procedures • Survey among households (ca. 1, 000), communitybased organizations, elected officials and administrative staff

Survey in five sectors in Karnataka 2008 Department Service Agriculture Field-level staff No Senior Survey in five sectors in Karnataka 2008 Department Service Agriculture Field-level staff No Senior officials No User organization No 41 Farmer Coop. 20 30 Dairy Coop. 29 Food and Civil Supplies Public Food distribution Inspectors system 34 Assistant Director of Agriculture Assistant Director, Animal Husbandry Block Food and Civil Supplies Officer Child Development Project Officer 34 Animal Husbandry Agricultural extension Extension Workers Livestock Veterinary services Assistants 26 Vigilance Committee 40 36 Women’s group 37 Assistant Executive Engineer 29 Water and Sanitation Committee 50 40 Women and Anganwadi Child (child care) Development centers Anganwadi Workers 50 Rural Drinking Development water and PR sanitation Junior Engineers 41 Total 206 155 176

Challenge of demand-side reforms: Targeting Problems of Local Public Expenditures • Analysis of fiscal Challenge of demand-side reforms: Targeting Problems of Local Public Expenditures • Analysis of fiscal grants to Gram Panchayats (by Nethra Palaniswamy and Nandini Krishnan) • Question: • Is there elite capture in the allocation of funds to Gram Panchayats and to villages within Gram Panchayats? • Allocation to Gram Panchayats: Formula • Allocation to villages within Gram Panchayats: Decision of Panchayat council without rules or formula (negotiation) • Results • Formula-bound targeting to Gram Panchayats works well • Elite capture for targeting at the village level

Allocation of expenditure across villages Allocation of expenditure across villages

How inclusive are community-based organizations? Page 25 How inclusive are community-based organizations? Page 25

Challenges on the supply side: Age profile of frontline service providers Page 26 Challenges on the supply side: Age profile of frontline service providers Page 26

Education level of service providers Only 17% in agriculture or biology Page 27 Education level of service providers Only 17% in agriculture or biology Page 27

Constraints identified by service providers (Karnataka) Junior Engineer Agric. Angan. Vet. Food Extension wadi Constraints identified by service providers (Karnataka) Junior Engineer Agric. Angan. Vet. Food Extension wadi Assistant Inspector Worker Lack of staff 39% 88% 75% 65% 4% Political interference Lack of funds 51% 40% 71% 6% 27% 7% 18% 12% Inadequate work environment 10% 5% 6% 10% 8% Complex admin. procedures 7% 7% 8% 3% 2%

Assessment of severity of constraints Severity of constraint Agricultural Extension Veterinary Worker Assistant Junior Assessment of severity of constraints Severity of constraint Agricultural Extension Veterinary Worker Assistant Junior Engineer Moderate 38% 11% Strong 63% Weak Political interference Anganwadi Worker 23% 45% 100% 89% 77% 55% 0% 0% 4% 0% Moderate 38% 67% 63% 46% 33% Strong Lack of staff Food Inspector 57% 33% 38% 50% 67% Analysis of the reports of the Second Administrative Reform Commission: • Few suggestions that address political interference

Staff perceptions on recruitment and promotion (percentage of respondents) Junior Engineer Strongly agree The Staff perceptions on recruitment and promotion (percentage of respondents) Junior Engineer Strongly agree The staff of your Agree Department is hired purely Disagree on the basis of Strongly merit. disagree Strongly The staff of agree your Agree Department is promoted Disagree purely on the basis of merit. Strongly disagree Agricultural Extension Veterinary Food Worker Assistant Inspector Anganwadi Worker 17 61 7 12 80 2 35 50 8 29 56 9 46 50 4 10 0 5 0 0 2 17 59 0 10 83 8 13 58 9 6 71 32 32 20 22 7 23 15 6 Page 30

Conclusions • Evidence that service provision and program implementation differs widely across states • Conclusions • Evidence that service provision and program implementation differs widely across states • Capacity of citizens to demand services and ability of the state to deliver services differs across states • Risk of a vicious cycle • Opportunities to break the vicious cycle • Demand-side governance reforms • Supply-side governance reforms • Insights from the research • Political incentives crucial – need to understand them better! • Both demand-side and supply side reforms are needed. • Each reform involves its own challenges! • Good governance is a matter of checks and balances!

Thank you! Thank you!

State of states ranking - methodology • • • Prosperity and budget • percentage State of states ranking - methodology • • • Prosperity and budget • percentage of population above poverty line, percentage of urban population, per capital expenditure, inflation, per capita debt, per capita GSDP, per capita revenue of SEB; Law and order • (number of policemen per lakh people, ratio of cases filed to pending cases in district and lower courts, share of murders, kidnappings, rapes and molestations to total cognisable crimes); Health • (infant mortality ratio or imr, ratio of male IMR to female IMR, percentage of births assisted by trained personnel, percentage of homes having tap water as principal source of water, registered doctors per million population, sex ratio and per capita expenditure on health and family welfare by state Government)

State of states ranking • • Education • (literacy rate, proportion of 10 -plus State of states ranking • • Education • (literacy rate, proportion of 10 -plus children having completed primary education, ratio of boys to girls in elementary school, teacher-pupil ratio and expenditure on elementary education per 6 to 14 -year-old); Consumer market • (households owning TVs, number of affluent households in urban and rural areas, per capita deposits in banks and per capita ownership of two-wheelers); Agriculture • (percentage of cultivated area under cash crops, agriculture GSDP per rural population, agriculture electricity consumption per rural population, foodgrain yield, loans extended to farmers and net irrigated area); Infrastructure • (percentage of homes with electricity, percentage of villages connected with pucca roads, per capita road length, bank branches, LPG connections, post-offices and telephones);

State of states ranking • Investment • (per capital expenditure, commercial bank credit and State of states ranking • Investment • (per capital expenditure, commercial bank credit and gross capital formation in manufacturing, ratio of factories to number of disputes, ratio of industrial workers to urban 15 -59 population, and percentage of sickness).

Actors involved are identified and marked on sheet of paper Arrows show implementation activities Actors involved are identified and marked on sheet of paper Arrows show implementation activities “Towers” of carom game pieces visualize levels of leakage in which different actors could be involved Fotos: E. Schiffer

Professional contacts of extension agents (by development level of Block) during past year Page Professional contacts of extension agents (by development level of Block) during past year Page 38

Challenges of demand-side reforms: Membership in community organizations Page 39 Challenges of demand-side reforms: Membership in community organizations Page 39