Скачать презентацию FOSAS Moscow 21 -23 April 2015 Flight Operations Скачать презентацию FOSAS Moscow 21 -23 April 2015 Flight Operations

HF_and_CRM.pptx

  • Количество слайдов: 31

FOSAS Moscow, 21 -23 April 2015 Flight Operations Safety Awareness Seminar Moscow, 21 -23 FOSAS Moscow, 21 -23 April 2015 Flight Operations Safety Awareness Seminar Moscow, 21 -23 April 2015 Human Factors (HF) And Human Factors (HF) Crew Resource And Management (CRM) Crew Resource Airbus Customer Services Management (CRM)

FOSAS Moscow HF and CRM The importance of human factors Human Factors Threat and FOSAS Moscow HF and CRM The importance of human factors Human Factors Threat and Error Management and CRM © AIRBUS Operations S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document. Moscow, 21 -23 April 2015

FOSAS Moscow, 21 -23 April 2015 Importance of Human Factors One event Tenerife 1977 FOSAS Moscow, 21 -23 April 2015 Importance of Human Factors One event Tenerife 1977 Two B 747 collided on the runway, due to Take Off without clearance, and poor visibility. Communication, teamwork, leadership, decision making This accident had a huge influence on the industry, particularly in the area of communication. Emphasis was placed on using standardized phraseology in ATC communication by both controllers and pilots. The word "takeoff" was removed from general usage, and is only spoken by ATC when actually clearing an aircraft to take off. Less experienced flight crew members were encouraged to challenge their captains when they believed something was not correct, Captains were instructed to listen to their crew and evaluate all decisions in light of crew concerns. Finally, was implemented what is known today as Crew Resource Management (CRM). © AIRBUS Operations S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.

FOSAS Moscow, 21 -23 April 2015 Importance of Human Factors But every day there FOSAS Moscow, 21 -23 April 2015 Importance of Human Factors But every day there are good ones! © AIRBUS Operations S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.

FOSAS Moscow, 21 -23 April 2015 Importance of Human Factors Successive Threats: Volcanic ash FOSAS Moscow, 21 -23 April 2015 Importance of Human Factors Successive Threats: Volcanic ash – loss of 4 engines – Loss of pressurization – ATC misunderstanding – F/O oxygen mask broken – Mountainous area – Windscreen pollution – Glide slope inoperative Jakarta June 1982 B 747 © AIRBUS Operations S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document. Successive positive actions Flying: Gliding Navigating: Keeping the high terrain in mind Communicating (Distress message + A 7700) Managing remaining systems: Applying restart drills, using oxygen masks, etc… Situation awareness (terrain, loss of pressurization, oxygen mask failure…) Teamwork (3 crew members) Captain leadership Decision making (high vertical speed due to F/O oxygen mask failure, type of approach…)

FOSAS Moscow, 21 -23 April 2015 Importance of Human Factors Near Jakarta 1982… Cruising FOSAS Moscow, 21 -23 April 2015 Importance of Human Factors Near Jakarta 1982… Cruising FL 370, 4 engines failed due to volcanic ash. The flight crew quickly determined that the aircraft was capable of gliding for 23 minutes and covering 91 nautical miles (169 km) from its flight level of 37, 000 feet. Emergency was declared. The crew squawked A 7700. However, Jakarta Area Control misunderstood the message, interpreting the call as meaning that only engine number four had shut down. A Garuda Indonesia flight relayed the message to Air Traffic Control so that it was correctly understood. As pressure dropped in the cabin, F/O oxygen mask was broken; the delivery tube had detached from the rest of the mask. Captain decided to descend at 1, 800 m per minute. Reaching 13500 ft, after several engine restart procedures, the crew finally re-started 4 engines. After a while, engine number two surged again and was shut down. As Flight 9 approached Jakarta, the crew found it difficult to see anything through the windscreen. An ILS approach was planned. However, the glide slope was inoperative, so the F/O monitored the descent using DME. After landing the aircraft could not taxi by its own, due to poor visibility through the wind screen. It was towed to the gate. Source… © AIRBUS Operations S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.

FOSAS Moscow, 21 -23 April 2015 Importance of Human Factors Near Jakarta 1982… Cruising FOSAS Moscow, 21 -23 April 2015 Importance of Human Factors Near Jakarta 1982… Cruising FL 370, 4 engines failed due to volcanic ash. The flight crew quickly determined that the aircraft was capable of gliding for 23 minutes and covering 91 nautical miles (169 km) from its flight level of 37, 000 feet. Emergency was declared. The crew squawked A 7700. However, Jakarta Area Control misunderstood the message, interpreting the call as meaning that only engine number four had shut down. A Garuda Indonesia flight relayed the message to Air Traffic Control so that it was correctly understood. As pressure dropped in the cabin, F/O oxygen mask was broken; the delivery tube had detached from the rest of the mask. Captain decided to descend at 1, 800 m per minute. Reaching 13500 ft, after several engine restart procedures, the crew finally re-started 4 engines. After a while, engine number two surged again and was shut down. As Flight 9 approached Jakarta, the crew found it difficult to see anything through the windscreen. An ILS approach was planned. However, the glide slope was inoperative, so the F/O monitored the descent using DME. After landing the aircraft could not taxi by its own, due to poor visibility through the wind screen. It was towed to the gate. Source… © AIRBUS Operations S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.

FOSAS Moscow Human Factors Model What are Human Factors ? We will develop, but FOSAS Moscow Human Factors Model What are Human Factors ? We will develop, but before, let’s go for a concentration exercise © AIRBUS Operations S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document. Moscow, 21 -23 April 2015

FOSAS Moscow, 21 -23 April 2015 Human Factors Model Human Factors Are: Anything that FOSAS Moscow, 21 -23 April 2015 Human Factors Model Human Factors Are: Anything that affects a person’s performance © AIRBUS Operations S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.

FOSAS Moscow, 21 -23 April 2015 Human Factors Model Performance Good Standard Poor © FOSAS Moscow, 21 -23 April 2015 Human Factors Model Performance Good Standard Poor © AIRBUS Operations S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.

FOSAS Moscow, 21 -23 April 2015 Direct Factors The acts or omissions that directly FOSAS Moscow, 21 -23 April 2015 Direct Factors The acts or omissions that directly affect performance Decision Awareness Performance Dexterity © AIRBUS Operations S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document. Distraction

FOSAS Moscow, 21 -23 April 2015 Potential Factors Things that have the potential to FOSAS Moscow, 21 -23 April 2015 Potential Factors Things that have the potential to influence the direct factors Design Environmental Fatigue Illness Visual illusions Memory Time Ergonomic Organizational Commercial Automation Faulty equipment © AIRBUS Operations S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document. Performance Poor Performance System failures Psychological Negative attitudes Physiological Language Procedures Alert systems Emergencies Relationships Documentation Cultural Stress

FOSAS Moscow, 21 -23 April 2015 Potential Factors Interaction Interactivity between Potential Factors will FOSAS Moscow, 21 -23 April 2015 Potential Factors Interaction Interactivity between Potential Factors will increase influence ity tiv ac er ivi ct ra te In Int ty Performance In te ra ct iv ity ivity ract Inte Performance Poor © AIRBUS Operations S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.

FOSAS Moscow, 21 -23 April 2015 Managing Factors Things that manage the effect of FOSAS Moscow, 21 -23 April 2015 Managing Factors Things that manage the effect of the Potential Factors and improve Direct Factors Performance © AIRBUS Operations S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.

FOSAS Moscow, 21 -23 April 2015 Managing Factors - Organizational Performance review Training SOPs FOSAS Moscow, 21 -23 April 2015 Managing Factors - Organizational Performance review Training SOPs Checklists System review Briefings Tools Culture change Motivation … Performance © AIRBUS Operations S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.

FOSAS Moscow, 21 -23 April 2015 Managing Factors - Individual Threat & Error Management FOSAS Moscow, 21 -23 April 2015 Managing Factors - Individual Threat & Error Management Communication Teamwork Leadership Positive attitudes Behaviour Planning Problem prevention Workload management Situation awareness © AIRBUS Operations S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document. Performance Problem solving Discipline Decision making Concentration Stress management Monitoring Fitness Knowledge Technical skills

FOSAS Moscow, 21 -23 April 2015 Human Factors Model Direct Factors Potential Factors Performance FOSAS Moscow, 21 -23 April 2015 Human Factors Model Direct Factors Potential Factors Performance Managing Factors © AIRBUS Operations S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.

FOSAS Moscow CRM and Threat and Error Management • What is CRM? • We FOSAS Moscow CRM and Threat and Error Management • What is CRM? • We will develop, but before, let’s explore what is Airmanship. © AIRBUS Operations S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document. Moscow, 21 -23 April 2015

FOSAS Moscow, 21 -23 April 2015 CRM and Threat and Error Management • What FOSAS Moscow, 21 -23 April 2015 CRM and Threat and Error Management • What is Airmanship? • Airmanship is the Technical and Non technical Knowledge, Skills and Attitude that pilots need to ensure that aircraft is operated: • Safely, • Efficiently, • Effectively Airmanship Technical Knowledge Skills Attitude • Non Technical Knowledge Skills Attitude What is CRM? 4 CRM is the Non © AIRBUS Operations S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document. Technical part only

FOSAS Moscow, 21 -23 April 2015 CRM and Threat and Error Management Come to FOSAS Moscow, 21 -23 April 2015 CRM and Threat and Error Management Come to the crew ERRORS Come from the crew Not avoided, not managed, poor CRM…. © AIRBUS Operations S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document. outcome Errors come from Threats or are independent. Undesired Aircraft State THREATS

FOSAS Moscow, 21 -23 April 2015 CRM and Threat and Error Management Come to FOSAS Moscow, 21 -23 April 2015 CRM and Threat and Error Management Come to the crew ERRORS Come from the crew Not avoided, not managed, poor CRM…. © AIRBUS Operations S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document. outcome Errors come from Threats or are independent. Undesired Aircraft State THREATS

FOSAS Moscow, 21 -23 April 2015 CRM and Threat and Error Management Come to FOSAS Moscow, 21 -23 April 2015 CRM and Threat and Error Management Come to the crew ERRORS Come from the crew A V O I D ----T R A P Good CRM helps… © AIRBUS Operations S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document. outcome Errors come from Threats or are independent. Undesired Aircraft State THREATS

FOSAS Moscow, 21 -23 April 2015 CRM and Threat and Error Management Come to FOSAS Moscow, 21 -23 April 2015 CRM and Threat and Error Management Come to the crew ERRORS Come from the crew M A N A G E Good CRM helps… © AIRBUS Operations S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document. outcome Errors come from Threats or are independent. A V O I D ----T R A P Undesired Aircraft State THREATS

FOSAS Moscow, 21 -23 April 2015 CRM and Threat and Error Management Come to FOSAS Moscow, 21 -23 April 2015 CRM and Threat and Error Management Come to the crew ERRORS Come from the crew M A N A G E outcome Errors come from Threats or are independent. A V O I D ----T R A P Undesired Aircraft State THREATS Good CRM helps © AIRBUS Operations S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.

FOSAS Moscow, 21 -23 April 2015 How to recognize, avoid, trap and manage Threats FOSAS Moscow, 21 -23 April 2015 How to recognize, avoid, trap and manage Threats and Errors Communication Leadership & Teamwork Workload Management Situation Awareness Problem solving & Decision Making © AIRBUS Operations S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.

FOSAS Moscow, 21 -23 April 2015 How to recognize, avoid, trap and manage Threats FOSAS Moscow, 21 -23 April 2015 How to recognize, avoid, trap and manage Threats and Errors Communication Leadership & Teamwork Workload Management Situation Awareness Problem solving & Decision Making © AIRBUS Operations S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.

FOSAS Moscow, 21 -23 April 2015 Definitions Threat: “Event that occurs beyond the influence FOSAS Moscow, 21 -23 April 2015 Definitions Threat: “Event that occurs beyond the influence of Flight crew, that increases operational complexity. ” Error: “Are actions or inactions leading to deviations from intentions or expectations Errors are: spontaneous, linked to threats, or can be part of error chains. ” © AIRBUS Operations S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.

FOSAS Moscow, 21 -23 April 2015 Definitions Threat: “Event that occurs beyond the influence FOSAS Moscow, 21 -23 April 2015 Definitions Threat: “Event that occurs beyond the influence of Flight crew, that increases operational complexity. ” Error: “Are actions or inactions leading to deviations from intentions or expectations Errors are: spontaneous, linked to threats, or can be part of error chains. ” © AIRBUS Operations S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.

FOSAS Moscow, 21 -23 April 2015 Definitions Undesired Aircraft State: “Flight-crew induced aircraft position FOSAS Moscow, 21 -23 April 2015 Definitions Undesired Aircraft State: “Flight-crew induced aircraft position or speed deviation, misapplication of Flight Controls, or incorrect systems configuration, associated with a reduction in margin of Safety. ” Undesired aircraft State is not an outcome: • It is a transitional situation between normal situation and outcome. • Restoring margins of safety is still possible. © AIRBUS Operations S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.

FOSAS Moscow, 21 -23 April 2015 Definitions Undesired Aircraft State: “Flight-crew induced aircraft position FOSAS Moscow, 21 -23 April 2015 Definitions Undesired Aircraft State: “Flight-crew induced aircraft position or speed deviation, misapplication of Flight Controls, or incorrect systems configuration, associated with a reduction in margin of Safety. ” Undesired aircraft State is not an outcome: • It is a transitional situation between normal situation and outcome. • Restoring margins of safety is still possible. © AIRBUS Operations S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.

FOSAS Moscow © AIRBUS Operations S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document. Moscow, FOSAS Moscow © AIRBUS Operations S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document. Moscow, 21 -23 April 2015