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Filling the Gaps of Id. M in Third and in Next Generation Networks Standardized Filling the Gaps of Id. M in Third and in Next Generation Networks Standardized Network-centric Id. M as an enabler for secure applications Burton Group Catalyst 2007 Conference / OASIS Identity and Trusted Infrastructure Workshop: Evolutionary Milestones Barcelona/Spain, 22 -25 October 2007 Martin Euchner Nokia Siemens Networks Gmb. H & Co KG COO RTP IE Fixed Martin. [email protected] com non-confidential 1 © Nokia Siemens Networks Burton Group Catalyst 2007/OASIS IDtrust Workshop, Barcelona/Spain, 22 -25 October 2007 / Euchner

Presentation Overview • Next Generation Networks (NGN) and Id. M • An example network/provider Presentation Overview • Next Generation Networks (NGN) and Id. M • An example network/provider centric Id. M approach – Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA) – Generic Bootstrapping Architecture (GBA) – Usage of GBA in 3 rd and in NGNs – Id. M Interworking between 3 GPP GBA and Liberty Alliance • This presentation is based on a contribution submitted to ITU-T Focus Group on Id. M for network-centric Id. M and on other related material. non-confidential 2 © Nokia Siemens Networks Burton Group Catalyst 2007/OASIS IDtrust Workshop, Barcelona/Spain, 22 -25 October 2007 / Euchner

Next Generation Network (NGN) uses various IDs User Id Data Identifiers in NACF Identifiers Next Generation Network (NGN) uses various IDs User Id Data Identifiers in NACF Identifiers in common components for applications and service support Identifiers IMS, PES, IPTV Identifier Interoperability Identifiers in RACF User and terminal identifiers Access network identifiers non-confidential 3 © Nokia Siemens Networks Burton Group Catalyst 2007/OASIS IDtrust Workshop, Barcelona/Spain, 22 -25 October 2007 / Euchner

NGN and the Need for Id. M • NGN has various identifiers defined throughout NGN and the Need for Id. M • NGN has various identifiers defined throughout the NGN architecture. – NGN identifiers are standalone, isolated within component/stratum – Difficult correlation of NGN identifiers across strata/layers • Strong identities are prerequisite for secure and trustworthy e-business in third and next generation networks. • NGNs need to leverage such identities for the purpose of – secure identification and authentication (user/device), – assisting towards establishing secure communications, – and for protection of the network infrastructure. non-confidential 4 © Nokia Siemens Networks Burton Group Catalyst 2007/OASIS IDtrust Workshop, Barcelona/Spain, 22 -25 October 2007 / Euchner

Gap Analysis • ITU-T Focus Group Id. M has compiled an extensive list of Gap Analysis • ITU-T Focus Group Id. M has compiled an extensive list of foreseen use cases and Id. M scenarios • Identified numerous gaps such as: – Integration of Id. M in NGN Architecture – Discovery of Identity Resources – Inter-Federation/Inter-Co. T Interoperability – Interoperability of Mechanisms Used to Exchange Identity Information –… • Some general ideas considered how to overcome gaps (requires further studies and refinement) non-confidential 5 © Nokia Siemens Networks Burton Group Catalyst 2007/OASIS IDtrust Workshop, Barcelona/Spain, 22 -25 October 2007 / Euchner

An NGN Id. M Approach • NGN should focus on network centric Id. M; An NGN Id. M Approach • NGN should focus on network centric Id. M; i. e. Id. M within NGN – Define external Id. M interfaces for interworking of NGN with user-centric, rd application-centric 3 party Id. P Id. M. – Network-centric Id. M is an approach where NGN providers host Id. M (or use identity services from third party identity providers) for enabling access to the NGN. – Application-centric Id. M enables applications and services when linked to network-based Id. M, yields consistent provider-centric Id. M. • A new envisioned NGN Id. M plane across all NGN strata could allow ID correlation • A new envisioned NGN Id. M bridging function could – – act as an ID gateway allow mapping of IDs/security policies into different domains, interwork with other networks, and provide discovery, link NGN IDs across strata and across layers. non-confidential 6 © Nokia Siemens Networks Burton Group Catalyst 2007/OASIS IDtrust Workshop, Barcelona/Spain, 22 -25 October 2007 / Euchner

An NGN Id. M Vision 3 rd Party Providers, Id. Ps and RPs Id. An NGN Id. M Vision 3 rd Party Providers, Id. Ps and RPs Id. M within NGN could be any Id. M solution (e. g. GBA) Internet and Web Services External NGN Id. M interface(s) Other Id. M solutions tbd ANI and NNI NGN (Id. P) Id. M (“blackbox”) within NGN provider Id. M Application Servers Service Stratum Other Id. M Bridge UNI Softswitch CSCF NGN (Id. P) NNI Id. M Plane Access User Device non-confidential 7 © Nokia Siemens Networks Transport Stratum NNI Other Networks (e. g. , PSTN) Burton Group Catalyst 2007/OASIS IDtrust Workshop, Barcelona/Spain, 22 -25 October 2007 / Euchner

What is Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA)? • GAA is the generic authentication architecture – What is Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA)? • GAA is the generic authentication architecture – based on cellular authentication (x. SIM) – designed to be used for authentication of all services. • Every new service needs authentication. • A generic authentication mechanism would ease introduction of new services. • But a generic mechanism cannot be proprietary it must be standardized. • The GAA specification work was started in 3 GPP at the end of 2001, and is now finalized for Release 6 of 3 GPP. • Work on GAA extensions is ongoing in 3 GPP for Release 7. GAA is also proposed for use in 3 GPP 2, OMA, TISPAN. non-confidential 8 © Nokia Siemens Networks Burton Group Catalyst 2007/OASIS IDtrust Workshop, Barcelona/Spain, 22 -25 October 2007 / Euchner

What problems does GAA solve? New operator services are starting to appear • WLAN What problems does GAA solve? New operator services are starting to appear • WLAN access, Presence and Messaging, multicast/broadcast services (MBMS) • All of them need authentication and key agreement. Other services need authentication, too • Typically each service sets up and manages its own username/password database. The critical step in security is securely provisioning initial credentials • Setting up username/password databases, distributing smart cards, … • Costs money and time, inconvenient to users. The GAA Solution: • Re-use the cellular authentication infrastructure – Already provisioned User credentials (smart cards) – Existing roaming agreements between operators. • Design it as a generic framework to bootstrap authentication so that new services can use it easily in a standardized manner. non-confidential 9 © Nokia Siemens Networks Burton Group Catalyst 2007/OASIS IDtrust Workshop, Barcelona/Spain, 22 -25 October 2007 / Euchner

Benefit and Relevance GAA supports convergence of cellular and non-cellular networks and services for Benefit and Relevance GAA supports convergence of cellular and non-cellular networks and services for network-centric Id. M Value to different stakeholders: • Using GAA cellular network operators can offer authentication as a service. This is a new way to utilize their subscribers’ base and roaming agreements. • GAA benefits subscribers because it provides more secure and userfriendly authentication than e. g. passwords. • GAA benefits service providers (running application servers). – No need to provision credentials to users – Stronger authentication than using passwords – Big pool of potential customers • GAA-Identity Management provides strong, two-factor authentication – Bound not only to something that the user knows, but also to something he possesses. – Smart card can support the user identity management. non-confidential 10 © Nokia Siemens Networks Burton Group Catalyst 2007/OASIS IDtrust Workshop, Barcelona/Spain, 22 -25 October 2007 / Euchner

GAA – Generic Authentication Architecture (TR 33. 919) • GAA describes a generic architecture GAA – Generic Authentication Architecture (TR 33. 919) • GAA describes a generic architecture for peer authentication that can a priori serve for any (present and future) application. • GAA is an authentication framework with authentication reference model, linking together GBA, security mechanisms (shared secret based and certificated-based) and functional entities. . Schematic illustration of GAA non-confidential 11 © Nokia Siemens Networks Illustration of mechanisms to issue authentication credentials Note: Other mechanisms for issuing authentication credentials may exist but are out of scope for this TR. GBA: Generic Bootstrapping Architecture SSC: Support for Subscriber Certificates Burton Group Catalyst 2007/OASIS IDtrust Workshop, Barcelona/Spain, 22 -25 October 2007 / Euchner

Generic Authentication Architecture • In GAA the mobile and the service provider are provisioned Generic Authentication Architecture • In GAA the mobile and the service provider are provisioned with fresh credentials – can authenticate each other. – This requires cellular authentication of the mobile terminal and is done over IP. A mobile that has those credentials can be automatically provisioned with subscriber certificate and becomes part of cellular network’s PKI • Generic Bootstrapping Architecture (GBA) offers generic authentication capability for various applications based on shared secret. Subscriber authentication in GBA is based on HTTP Digest AKA [RFC 3310]. • Support of subscriber certificates and Access to Network Application Function using HTTPS is based on GBA. • GBA, Subscriber certificates, and Access to Network Application Function using HTTPS form together Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA). non-confidential 12 © Nokia Siemens Networks Burton Group Catalyst 2007/OASIS IDtrust Workshop, Barcelona/Spain, 22 -25 October 2007 / Euchner

GBA – Generic Bootstrapping Architecture Application (TS 33. 220) • GBA is a security GBA – Generic Bootstrapping Architecture Application (TS 33. 220) • GBA is a security mechanism that is applicable to any application in need of authentication and/or access control. • GBA describes the security features and a mechanism to bootstrap authentication and key agreement for application security from the 3 GPP AKA mechanism. • GBA defines the – generic AKA bootstrapping function, – an architecture overview – and the detailed procedure how to bootstrap the credential. • Important applications as seen from the viewpoint of 3 GPP may use GBA as basis for its deployment. In particular self-administration of 3 GPP services is a candidate: – For Presence, user self-administration via Ut is defined in TS 33. 141 using and profiling Ua from TS 33. 222 – For Conferencing, Messaging, …, further TSs for self-administration may be defined. – For Multimedia Broadcast/Multicast Service (MBMS) where GBA is used for security of the broadcast encryption keys [TS 133. 246]. non-confidential 13 © Nokia Siemens Networks Burton Group Catalyst 2007/OASIS IDtrust Workshop, Barcelona/Spain, 22 -25 October 2007 / Euchner

GBA – Generic Bootstrapping Architecture Main advantages • Works over any access network, which GBA – Generic Bootstrapping Architecture Main advantages • Works over any access network, which provides IP connectivity • Dynamic generation of shared secrets/passwords (e. g. for http digest) • USIM- (and SIM-)based single sign-on to applications • Binding of application provision to MNO • MNO is root of trust • Avoids long-term subscriber certificates and the corresponding large-scale public-key infrastructure • Provides (optionally) application- and NAF-group-specific persistent user identities to the NAFs • Provides (optionally) application- and NAF-group-specific user authorization flags to the NAFs • Security on user side may be smart-card (UICC)-based (so-called GBA_U). non-confidential 14 © Nokia Siemens Networks Burton Group Catalyst 2007/OASIS IDtrust Workshop, Barcelona/Spain, 22 -25 October 2007 / Euchner

GBA Entities and Interfaces bootstrapping from cellular authentication and key agreement (AKA) User (profile) GBA Entities and Interfaces bootstrapping from cellular authentication and key agreement (AKA) User (profile) DB, Id. P GBA GAA Before bootstrapping: HSS and smart card in UE share a key for cellular authentication HSS Supports Service Discovery (optional) SLF (opt) Application Server Zh: Credential Fetching Protocol NAF library Bootstrapping Server Function Zn: Key distribution (BSF) Server Protocol (DIAMETER, SOAP) Dz: Service Discovery BSF client Network Application Function (NAF) Ub: Bootstrapping Protocol (HTTP Digest AKA) User Equipment Client (UE) non-confidential 15 © Nokia Siemens Networks Bootstrapping steps: 1. UE contacts NAF to obtain a service (Ua) 2. NAF requests authentication from UE (Ua) 3. NAF client triggers BSF client to bootstrap 4. 5. 6. 7. Ua: Application Protocol (HTTP digest over TLS, PSK TLS ) with AKA (Ub, Zh) Resulting master session key and transaction id are stored in BSF server and client NAF client sends transaction id to NAF server (Ua) NAF server gets NAF-specific session key from BSF using transaction id (Zn) NAF server and client share a key that they can use for authentication After bootstrapping: NAF and UE share a UE/NAF-specific key for service authentication Burton Group Catalyst 2007/OASIS IDtrust Workshop, Barcelona/Spain, 22 -25 October 2007 / Euchner

GBA Security Features • Mutual user/device authentication (UE, BSF) using HTTP Digest AKA. • GBA Security Features • Mutual user/device authentication (UE, BSF) using HTTP Digest AKA. • Authorization check by BSF/HSS. • Dynamic key derivation (master, session keys). • Secure key distribution and key/credential management. • Message protection (integrity, replay, confidentiality) using TLS/HTTPS. • Privacy protection of IMPI/IMPU, optional user anonymity. • Linking UID with key material (BSF, NAF) • Service discovery (SLF optional). • Proxy services to external NAFs. non-confidential 16 © Nokia Siemens Networks Burton Group Catalyst 2007/OASIS IDtrust Workshop, Barcelona/Spain, 22 -25 October 2007 / Euchner

Usage of GBA (1) GBA is a generic enabler in 3 G • 3 Usage of GBA (1) GBA is a generic enabler in 3 G • 3 GPP – User self-administration for IMS-based Presence with Presence – – List Management Mobile Broadcast Multicast Service (MBMS) to provision subscriber certificates GBA for HTTP TLS or Pre-shared Key TLS Foreseen application to 3 GPP Strategic Architecture Evolution (SAE) / Long Term Evolution (LTE) 3 GPP - Liberty Alliance Interworking • 3 GPP 2 – New services, GAA in legacy CDMA networks • OMA – OMA Presence Specification, – OMA Broadcast, OMA Location-based services, – OMA Secure User Plane Location Service (SUPL) non-confidential 17 © Nokia Siemens Networks Burton Group Catalyst 2007/OASIS IDtrust Workshop, Barcelona/Spain, 22 -25 October 2007 / Euchner

Usage of GBA (2) GBA is a generic enabler has been taken up into Usage of GBA (2) GBA is a generic enabler has been taken up into usage by many applications and standardization forums: • ETSI TISPAN Next Generation Networks (NGN) – GBA enables the usage of cellular authentication to be used for noncellular services. • ITU-T Next Generation Networks (NGN) – Part as an authentication method of draft Rec. Y. NGN-Authentication • DVB-H – GAA-enhanced service protection • IETF – Shared key TLS based on GBA non-confidential 18 © Nokia Siemens Networks Burton Group Catalyst 2007/OASIS IDtrust Workshop, Barcelona/Spain, 22 -25 October 2007 / Euchner

Flavors of GBA • “Normal” GBA for mobile equipment (GBA_ME) – shared secret leaves Flavors of GBA • “Normal” GBA for mobile equipment (GBA_ME) – shared secret leaves the UICC; – dynamic key derivation outside UICC • GBA for UICC (GBA_U) – shared secret does not leave UICC; – dynamic key derivation within UICC ▪ Ks_int_NAF remains with UICC ▪ Ks_ext_NAF leaves UICC • “Legacy GBA” for using SIM card or SIM on UICC (2 G GBA) in case ISIM or USIM not present on UICC • GBA for Cable (GBA_H): – does not require UICC ▪ uses HTTP Digest over TLS enhancement to GBA ▪ uses TLS pre-shared key • GAA for Subscriber Certificates (GAA–SSC) non-confidential 19 © Nokia Siemens Networks Burton Group Catalyst 2007/OASIS IDtrust Workshop, Barcelona/Spain, 22 -25 October 2007 / Euchner

GBA and Liberty Alliance (LAP) Interworking (TR 33. 980) • Provides guidelines on the GBA and Liberty Alliance (LAP) Interworking (TR 33. 980) • Provides guidelines on the interworking of the Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA) and the Liberty Alliance architecture. • The feasibility study investigates the details of possible interworking methods between – the Liberty Alliance Identity Federation Framework (ID-FF), – the Identity Web Services Framework (ID-WSF) and – the Generic Bootstrapping Architecture (GBA). • TR 33. 980 assumes that the architectures of Liberty Alliance and of GBA are used in combination. non-confidential 20 © Nokia Siemens Networks Burton Group Catalyst 2007/OASIS IDtrust Workshop, Barcelona/Spain, 22 -25 October 2007 / Euchner

Use case: Web Single Sign-On • User is authenticated by operator using HTTP Digest Use case: Web Single Sign-On • User is authenticated by operator using HTTP Digest and GAA. • Operator shares user identity or pseudonym with 3 rd party (SP) • Liberty ID-FF provides a mechanism for sharing identity between operator and SP Related specifications: GAA infrastructure HSS 3 GPP TR 33. 980 UE BSF client Browser NAF library HTTP Digest HTTP Liberty ID-FF Id. P Identity Server HTTP Liberty ID-FF Service Provider non-confidential 21 © Nokia Siemens Networks Burton Group Catalyst 2007/OASIS IDtrust Workshop, Barcelona/Spain, 22 -25 October 2007 / Euchner

Use case: Web Services • Liberty Enabled Device/Web Service Client authenticates to Liberty • Use case: Web Services • Liberty Enabled Device/Web Service Client authenticates to Liberty • • • authentication web service, obtains token(s) to establish identity and access Discovery Service Authentication service leverages GBA mechanism and Operator network Client accesses Discovery Service to access appropriate Service Provider Client interacts with Service Provider using web service (SOAP) Related specifications: GAA infrastructure HSS 3 GPP TR 33. 980 UE BSF client Liberty Enabled User Agent/Device (LUAD) NAF library Liberty Authentication Protocol Authentication Service Liberty ID-WSF Identity-based Discovery Service Discovery Liberty ID-WSF Identity-based SOAP request and response non-confidential 22 © Nokia Siemens Networks Burton Group Catalyst 2007/OASIS IDtrust Workshop, Barcelona/Spain, 22 -25 October 2007 / Euchner Service Provider

Analyzed Architecture Components LAP SP-Id. P SOAP-based SP Id. P LAP UE-SP Using HTTPbased Analyzed Architecture Components LAP SP-Id. P SOAP-based SP Id. P LAP UE-SP Using HTTPbased UE LAP ID-FF 3 GPP GBA LAP: SOAP-based AS Authentication (carried within SASL) LAP UE – SP Using SOAP LAP WSP-UE SOAP-based UE LUAD LAP ID-WSF LAP: UE -SSOS SP LAP: UE - SP UE LAP ID-WSF Authentication Service with Single Sign On Service non-confidential 23 © Nokia Siemens Networks SP LAP: SOAP-based SSOS LAP: UE –AS WSP Auth. Service LAP ID-WSF Authentication Service Burton Group Catalyst 2007/OASIS IDtrust Workshop, Barcelona/Spain, 22 -25 October 2007 / Euchner

GBA and Liberty Alliance (LAP) Interworking Id. P collocated with NAF Collocation of NAF GBA and Liberty Alliance (LAP) Interworking Id. P collocated with NAF Collocation of NAF and Id. P allows HSS Zh Zn BSF LAP SPNAF/Id. P • federation/de-federation of GBA credentials with LAP principal identities SP avoids: NAF Ub LAP UE-Id. P Ua UE LAP UE-SP • large impact on the generic interface to the terminal to transport Liberty related information. • Modification/extension of the interface to the service provider to support the Liberty SSO use case. • Usage of all Identity Management features as specified by LAP • Root of trust and persistent identity of user managed by Operator/provider • Strong authentication of UE for LAP Identity Provider (UICC-, SIM-based) using GBA credentials • Control of MNO over user rights at Identity Provider, general by SLA and user-specific by GBA User Security Setting (authorization in USS). • Similar interworking architectures defined for GBA-enabled Web-services, and for GBA-enabled Simplified Single Sign On (SSO). non-confidential 24 © Nokia Siemens Networks Burton Group Catalyst 2007/OASIS IDtrust Workshop, Barcelona/Spain, 22 -25 October 2007 / Euchner

GBA-LAP SAML Inter-working Mail Calendar Id. P Zn Application NAF/SAML Zh HSS BSF Zn GBA-LAP SAML Inter-working Mail Calendar Id. P Zn Application NAF/SAML Zh HSS BSF Zn Application LAP SP-NAF/Id. P Ub Id. P Application Ua NAF/Id. P LAP UE-SP non-confidential 25 © Nokia Siemens Networks Burton Group Catalyst 2007/OASIS IDtrust Workshop, Barcelona/Spain, 22 -25 October 2007 / Euchner Application

Example procedure for GBA-LAP interworking with Id. P collocated with NAF Service Provider UE Example procedure for GBA-LAP interworking with Id. P collocated with NAF Service Provider UE BSF NAF/Id. P Established TLS secure channel 1. Service access request/ HTTP request 2. HTTP re-direct to Id. P Derive fresh session key 3. Service access request/ HTTP request 4. HTTP digest authentication GBA bootstrapping (opt. ) Derive fresh session key if UE and NAF do not yet share fresh credentials UE authenticated and authorized 5. Authorization data, User name (B-TID), password (KS_NAF) GBA credentials fetch (opt) if not already in NAF 6. LAP HTTP response, (LAP data) 7. Service access request/ LAP HTTP request 8. Service access response non-confidential 26 © Nokia Siemens Networks Burton Group Catalyst 2007/OASIS IDtrust Workshop, Barcelona/Spain, 22 -25 October 2007 / Euchner

Common Security Requirements addressed by ID-FF and ID-WSF • • • Request Authentication Response Common Security Requirements addressed by ID-FF and ID-WSF • • • Request Authentication Response Authentication Request/Response Correlation Replay Protection Integrity Protection Confidentiality Protection Privacy Protections Resource Access Authorization Proxy Authorization Mitigation of denial of service attack risks non-confidential 27 © Nokia Siemens Networks Burton Group Catalyst 2007/OASIS IDtrust Workshop, Barcelona/Spain, 22 -25 October 2007 / Euchner

ID-FF Security Features • Web-based single sign on with simple federated identities • Name ID-FF Security Features • Web-based single sign on with simple federated identities • Name Registration • Exchange of opaque user handles (privacy protection) • • • no exchange of cleartext identifiers) Notifying the user of the capability to federate; soliciting consent to facilitate introductions Single log-out (Federation Termination Notification) Identity Provider Introduction HTTP basic authentication w/w. o. SSL 3. 0/TLS 1. 0 SOAP over HTTPS (SSL 3. 0/TLS 1. 0) for X. 509 -based server-side authentication and SOAP message integrity & confidentiality SAML for security assertions Name Identifier Mapping with Name. Identifier obfuscation Name Identifier Encryption with XML encryption of Name. Identifier XML signature non-confidential 28 © Nokia Siemens Networks Burton Group Catalyst 2007/OASIS IDtrust Workshop, Barcelona/Spain, 22 -25 October 2007 / Euchner

ID-WSF Security Features • ID-WSF authentication protocol using SASL (RFC 2222) profile: SASL over ID-WSF Security Features • ID-WSF authentication protocol using SASL (RFC 2222) profile: SASL over TLS/SSL for integrity & confidentiality protection of SASL messages • Discovery Service • ID-WSF Single Sign On Service based on ID-FF SSO & federation profile • Password Transformation optional service to convey password pre-processing obligations to client. non-confidential 29 © Nokia Siemens Networks Burton Group Catalyst 2007/OASIS IDtrust Workshop, Barcelona/Spain, 22 -25 October 2007 / Euchner

Summary • Next Generation Networks have to solve an Id. M problem • GAA Summary • Next Generation Networks have to solve an Id. M problem • GAA and GBA provide the foundation for network-centric Id. M in 3 G, extends to next generation networks and non-3 G environments. • GBA has many applications and serves as a key security mechanism. • Leverage deployed strong authentication solution that does not require PKI rollout. • Liberty Alliance ID-FF and ID-WSF provide Identity Management – Single Sign On (ID-FF) and privacy protecting identity web services protocols and architecture, including authentication and interaction web services. • Id. M concepts in LAP and GBA can complement each other nicely: – Re-use of GBA provides actual security mechanisms where LAP leaves room for security mechanisms – Provide authentication interworking between GBA and LAP – GBA-LAP federation of identifiers and simplified Single-Sign On supported. • Feasibility of possible LAP-GBA interworking architectures studied in TR 33. 980 – Some suitable combined architecture concepts suggested – Leverage good synergies between GBA and LAP. non-confidential 30 © Nokia Siemens Networks Burton Group Catalyst 2007/OASIS IDtrust Workshop, Barcelona/Spain, 22 -25 October 2007 / Euchner

Thank You! Acknowledgements to Silke Holtmanns, the Nokia Research Team and NSN RTP Research Thank You! Acknowledgements to Silke Holtmanns, the Nokia Research Team and NSN RTP Research non-confidential 31 © Nokia Siemens Networks Burton Group Catalyst 2007/OASIS IDtrust Workshop, Barcelona/Spain, 22 -25 October 2007 / Euchner

Nokia Siemens Networks Unified Attachment Node (UAN) • Allows operators to use SIM authentication Nokia Siemens Networks Unified Attachment Node (UAN) • Allows operators to use SIM authentication for different access technologies and services. • Provides a unified access solution to cut through the complexity of different login procedures (access, service), providing authentication for several access technologies including Wi. MAX: one SIM card, one login fits all. • Operators can use the SIM card for all these technologies, simplifying authentication challenges and leveraging their SIM assets. • Moreover, UAN re-uses the authentication data from SIM, giving consumers secure, “one-click-access” to third-party services from, for example, the Internet. This is realized by the so called “Bootstrapping” Server Function. non-confidential 32 © Nokia Siemens Networks Burton Group Catalyst 2007/OASIS IDtrust Workshop, Barcelona/Spain, 22 -25 October 2007 / Euchner

Unified Attachment Node Enables transparent authentication to services in multi-access environment Unified authentication solution Unified Attachment Node Enables transparent authentication to services in multi-access environment Unified authentication solution for multiple authentication methods Multiple Accesses Service authorization UAN Intelligent Packet Core a multi-access capable authentication server for common broadband access technologies (x. DSL, Wi. MAX, i-WLAN, …. . ) non-confidential 33 © Nokia Siemens Networks Multiple services Offers simple “one-click” service authentication based on SIM/USIM through 3 GPP GAA architecture Burton Group Catalyst 2007/OASIS IDtrust Workshop, Barcelona/Spain, 22 -25 October 2007 / Euchner

Authentication & Billing Value Center (A&BVC) High Level Concept Architecture Charging System Registers Operator Authentication & Billing Value Center (A&BVC) High Level Concept Architecture Charging System Registers Operator Services CG UCS HSS HLR NAF UAN BSF Clients NAF client BSF client non-confidential 34 © Nokia Siemens Networks Service NAF Service Internet NAF Service Burton Group Catalyst 2007/OASIS IDtrust Workshop, Barcelona/Spain, 22 -25 October 2007 / Euchner NAF Service

UAN deployment example WAP HLR MMSC Stream Operator VAS IN CG Charging IMS HSS UAN deployment example WAP HLR MMSC Stream Operator VAS IN CG Charging IMS HSS IMS & Registers 3 GPP PS Flexi ISN Wi. MAX ASN-GW WLAN AC x. DSL SP BRAS UAN Internet BMSC NAF server BAM Mobile TV NAF clieØt Reduce number of AAA infrastructure n BSF Ø Flexible tool for service authentication client Ø Solution for GAA services (i. e mobile TV) Ø NASS TISPAN integrated function Ø non-confidential 35 © Nokia Siemens Networks Online/Offline charging support Burton Group Catalyst 2007/OASIS IDtrust Workshop, Barcelona/Spain, 22 -25 October 2007 / Euchner

(3 GPP/IMS) Identities and Identifiers • 3 GPP TS 23. 003 “Numbering, addressing and (3 GPP/IMS) Identities and Identifiers • 3 GPP TS 23. 003 “Numbering, addressing and identification” Defines the identifiers for IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) • 3 GPP TS 23. 228 “IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) Stage 2” Handling of Identities in IMS Public User Identity IMS Subscription Private User Identity Service Profile • Private User Identity (IMPI) – Is a NAI ([email protected]) – IMPI can be derived from IMSI Public User Identity Relationship of the Private User Identity and Public User Identities Public User Identity – 1 if there is no ISIM application Service Profile • Public User Identity (IMPU) Service Profile – 1 – Is a SIP URI or a TEL URI Private User Identity – 1 IMS Subscription Public User Identity – 2 Private User Identity – 2 Service Profile – 2 Public User Identity – 3 The relation of a shared Public User Identity (Public-ID-2) and Private User Identities non-confidential 36 © Nokia Siemens Networks Burton Group Catalyst 2007/OASIS IDtrust Workshop, Barcelona/Spain, 22 -25 October 2007 / Euchner

GAA - Support for Subscriber Certificates (TS 33. 221) • Specifies a global and GAA - Support for Subscriber Certificates (TS 33. 221) • Specifies a global and secure authorization and charging infrastructure of mobile networks to support a local architecture for digital signatures. • Defines signalling procedures for support of issuing certificates to subscribers and the standard format of certificates and digital signatures. – procedures to issue temporary or long-term certificates to subscribers; – standard format of certificates and digital signatures, e. g. re-using OMA wireless PKI specifications. • Subscriber certificates provide a migration path towards global Public Key Infrastructure (PKI): – start from local certificate islands to migrate towards global PKI. • Usage: – subscriber certificates to authorize and account for service usage both in home and in visited networks. non-confidential 37 © Nokia Siemens Networks Burton Group Catalyst 2007/OASIS IDtrust Workshop, Barcelona/Spain, 22 -25 October 2007 / Euchner

GAA – SSC Reference Model for Certificates • PKI Portal – issues a certificate GAA – SSC Reference Model for Certificates • PKI Portal – issues a certificate for UE and delivers an operator CA certificate – is a Registration Authority (RA) that authenticates the certification request based on cellular subscription. – may also function as a SLF Certificate Authority (CA). Registration Authority (CA opt) HSS Zh Dz BSF Zn • Subscriber certificate profile is based PKI Portal (NAF) PKIaware AS Ua on OMA WAP Certificate and CRL UE Ub Profile (reusing IETF RFC 3280, X. 509 profiles) Qualified certificate profiles by IETF [RFC 3039] and ETSI may also be used Simple network model for certificate issuing and using when supported. TS 33. 221 non-confidential 38 © Nokia Siemens Networks Certificate enrolment protocol (PKCS#10 with HTTP Digest Authentication or TLS PSK) (certifying subscriber's public keys, delivery of the Operator CA certificate to the UE) Burton Group Catalyst 2007/OASIS IDtrust Workshop, Barcelona/Spain, 22 -25 October 2007 / Euchner

3 GPP “Id. M”-related specifications GAA: TR 33. 919: GAA general overview TS 24. 3 GPP “Id. M”-related specifications GAA: TR 33. 919: GAA general overview TS 24. 109: Ub and Ua interface; protocol details, includes PKI enrolment TS 29. 109: Zh and Zn interface; protocol details GBA: TS 33. 220: Generic Bootstrapping Architecture (GBA) TS 33. 221: PKI enrolment TS 33. 222: Use of HTTPS and authentication proxy TS 31. 102: GBA_U details for USIM TS 31. 103: GBA_U details for ISIM TS 31. 111: USIM Application Toolkit (GBA_U triggering) TS 33. 141: Presence security (uses GBA) TS 33. 246: MBMS security (uses GBA) TR 33. 980: GBA and Liberty Alliance (LAP) Interworking IMS: non-confidential 39 © Nokia Siemens Networks Burton Group Catalyst 2007/OASIS IDtrust Workshop, Barcelona/Spain, 22 -25 October 2007 / Euchner

Additional Information • Liberty Alliance ID-WSF 2. 0 Specifications – https: //www. projectliberty. org/resource_center/specifications/liberty_alli Additional Information • Liberty Alliance ID-WSF 2. 0 Specifications – https: //www. projectliberty. org/resource_center/specifications/liberty_alli ance_id_wsf_2_0_specifications • Liberty ID-WSF Authentication, Single Sign-On, and Identity Mapping Services Specification – https: //www. projectliberty. org/liberty/content/download/871/6189/file/lib erty-idwsf-authn-svc-v 2. 0. pdf • 3 GPP – http: //www. 3 gpp. org/ non-confidential 40 © Nokia Siemens Networks Burton Group Catalyst 2007/OASIS IDtrust Workshop, Barcelona/Spain, 22 -25 October 2007 / Euchner

Abbreviations 3 GPP: A&BVC: AKA: ANI: AP: AS: BSF: CA: Co. T: CPSF: CT: Abbreviations 3 GPP: A&BVC: AKA: ANI: AP: AS: BSF: CA: Co. T: CPSF: CT: DS: FG-Id. M: GAA: GBA: HSS: HTTPS: ID-FF: Id. M: Id. P: ID-WSF: IP: ISIM: LAP: LUAD: MNO: 3 rd Generation Partnership Project Authentication & Billing Value Center Authenticated Key Exchange Application Network Interface Authentication Proxy Authentication Service Bootstrapping Server Function Certificate Authority Circle-of-Trust Common Profile Storage Framework Core Network and Terminals Discovery Service ITU-T Focus Group Identity Management Generic Authentication Architecture Generic Bootstrapping Architecture Home Subscriber Server Hypertext Transfer Protocol Security Identity Federation Framework ID Management Identity Provider Identity Web Services Framework Internet Protocol IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) SIM Liberty Alliance Project Liberty-enabled User Agent or Device Mobile/Multiservice Network Operator non-confidential 41 © Nokia Siemens Networks NACF: NAF: NE: NGN: NNI: OMA: PKI: RA: SAML: SASL: SCTP: SIM: SLF: SOAP: SSC: SSOS: TLS: UAN: UE: UICC: UMTS: UNI: USIM: USS: WAP: WSC: WSP: Network Attachment Control Function Network Application Function Network Entity Next Generation Network-Network Interface Open Mobile Alliance Public Key Infrastructure Registration Authority Services & System Aspects Security Assertion Markup Language Simple Authentication and Security Layer Stream Control Transmission Protocol Subscriber Identity Module Subscriber Locator Function Simple Object Access Protocol Service Provider Support for Subscriber Certificates Single Sign-On Service Transport Layer Security Unified Attachment Node User Equipment Universal Integrated Circuit Card Universal Mobile Telecommunications System User Network Interface Universal Subscriber Identity Module User Security Setting Wireless Application Protocol Web Service Consumer Web Service Provider Burton Group Catalyst 2007/OASIS IDtrust Workshop, Barcelona/Spain, 22 -25 October 2007 / Euchner