CSE 565 Computer Security Lecture 23 IP Security

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CSE 565: Computer Security Lecture 23 IP Security Shambhu Upadhyaya Computer Science & Eng. CSE 565: Computer Security Lecture 23 IP Security Shambhu Upadhyaya Computer Science & Eng. University at Buffalo, New York 14260 11/14/17 UB Fall 2017 CSE 565: S. Upadhyaya Lec 23. 1

Acknowledgments § Material for some slides is drawn from Lawrie Brown’s slides 11/14/17 UB Acknowledgments § Material for some slides is drawn from Lawrie Brown’s slides 11/14/17 UB Fall 2017 CSE 565: S. Upadhyaya Lec 23. 2

Outline § § § 11/14/17 IP Security architecture Authentication Header Key Management UB Fall Outline § § § 11/14/17 IP Security architecture Authentication Header Key Management UB Fall 2017 CSE 565: S. Upadhyaya Lec 23. 3

IP Security Motivation § § § 11/14/17 Have considered some application-specific security mechanisms § IP Security Motivation § § § 11/14/17 Have considered some application-specific security mechanisms § E. g. , S/MIME, PGP, Kerberos However there are security concerns that cut across protocol layers Would like security implemented by the network for all applications UB Fall 2017 CSE 565: S. Upadhyaya Lec 23. 4

IPSec § § § 11/14/17 General IP Security mechanisms Provides § authentication § confidentiality IPSec § § § 11/14/17 General IP Security mechanisms Provides § authentication § confidentiality § key management Applicable to use over LANs, across public & private WANs, & for the Internet UB Fall 2017 CSE 565: S. Upadhyaya Lec 23. 5

IPSec Uses 11/14/17 UB Fall 2017 CSE 565: S. Upadhyaya Lec 23. 6 IPSec Uses 11/14/17 UB Fall 2017 CSE 565: S. Upadhyaya Lec 23. 6

Benefits of IPSec § § § 11/14/17 When implemented on a firewall/router, it provides Benefits of IPSec § § § 11/14/17 When implemented on a firewall/router, it provides strong security to all traffic crossing the perimeter Is resistant to bypass Is below transport layer, hence transparent to applications Can be transparent to end users Can provide security for individual users if desired UB Fall 2017 CSE 565: S. Upadhyaya Lec 23. 7

IP Security Architecture § § § 11/14/17 Specification is quite complex Defined in numerous IP Security Architecture § § § 11/14/17 Specification is quite complex Defined in numerous RFC’s § incl. RFC 4301/4302/4303/5996 § many others, grouped by category Mandatory in IPv 6, optional in IPv 4 UB Fall 2017 CSE 565: S. Upadhyaya Lec 23. 8

IPSec Services § § § 11/14/17 Access control Connectionless integrity Data origin authentication Rejection IPSec Services § § § 11/14/17 Access control Connectionless integrity Data origin authentication Rejection of replayed packets § a form of partial sequence integrity Confidentiality (encryption) Limited traffic flow confidentiality UB Fall 2017 CSE 565: S. Upadhyaya Lec 23. 9

Security Associations § § 11/14/17 A one-way relationship between sender & receiver that affords Security Associations § § 11/14/17 A one-way relationship between sender & receiver that affords security for traffic flow Defined by 3 parameters: § Security Parameters Index (SPI) § IP Destination Address § Security Protocol Identifier Has a number of other parameters § seq no. , AH & ESP info, lifetime, etc. Have a database of Security Associations UB Fall 2017 CSE 565: S. Upadhyaya Lec 23. 10

Authentication Header (AH) § § § 11/14/17 Provides support for data integrity & authentication Authentication Header (AH) § § § 11/14/17 Provides support for data integrity & authentication of IP packets § end system/router can authenticate user/app § prevents address spoofing attacks and replay attacks by tracking sequence numbers Based on use of a MAC § HMAC-MD 5 -96 or HMAC-SHA-1 -96 Parties must share a secret key UB Fall 2017 CSE 565: S. Upadhyaya Lec 23. 11

Authentication Header 11/14/17 UB Fall 2017 CSE 565: S. Upadhyaya Lec 23. 12 Authentication Header 11/14/17 UB Fall 2017 CSE 565: S. Upadhyaya Lec 23. 12

Transport & Tunnel Modes 11/14/17 UB Fall 2017 CSE 565: S. Upadhyaya Lec 23. Transport & Tunnel Modes 11/14/17 UB Fall 2017 CSE 565: S. Upadhyaya Lec 23. 13

Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) § § § 11/14/17 Provides message content confidentiality & limited Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) § § § 11/14/17 Provides message content confidentiality & limited traffic flow confidentiality Can optionally provide the same authentication services as AH Supports range of ciphers, modes, padding § incl. DES, Triple-DES, RC 5, IDEA, CAST, etc. § CBC most common § pad to meet blocksize, for traffic flow UB Fall 2017 CSE 565: S. Upadhyaya Lec 23. 14

Encapsulating Security Payload 11/14/17 UB Fall 2017 CSE 565: S. Upadhyaya Lec 23. 15 Encapsulating Security Payload 11/14/17 UB Fall 2017 CSE 565: S. Upadhyaya Lec 23. 15

Transport vs Tunnel Mode ESP § § 11/14/17 Transport mode is used to encrypt Transport vs Tunnel Mode ESP § § 11/14/17 Transport mode is used to encrypt & optionally authenticate IP data § data protected but header left in clear § can do traffic analysis but is efficient § good for ESP host to host traffic Tunnel mode encrypts entire IP packet § add new header for next hop § good for VPNs, gateway to gateway security UB Fall 2017 CSE 565: S. Upadhyaya Lec 23. 16

Combining Security Associations § § § 11/14/17 SA’s can implement either AH or ESP Combining Security Associations § § § 11/14/17 SA’s can implement either AH or ESP To implement both need to combine SA’s § form a security bundle Have 4 cases (see next) UB Fall 2017 CSE 565: S. Upadhyaya Lec 23. 17

Combining Security Associations 11/14/17 UB Fall 2017 CSE 565: S. Upadhyaya Lec 23. 18 Combining Security Associations 11/14/17 UB Fall 2017 CSE 565: S. Upadhyaya Lec 23. 18

Key Management § § 11/14/17 Handles key generation & distribution Typically need 2 pairs Key Management § § 11/14/17 Handles key generation & distribution Typically need 2 pairs of keys § 2 per direction for AH & ESP Manual key management § sysadmin manually configures every system Automated key management § automated system for on demand creation of keys for SA’s in large systems § has Oakley & ISAKMP elements UB Fall 2017 CSE 565: S. Upadhyaya Lec 23. 19

Oakley § § 11/14/17 A key exchange protocol Based on Diffie-Hellman key exchange Adds Oakley § § 11/14/17 A key exchange protocol Based on Diffie-Hellman key exchange Adds features to address weaknesses § cookies, groups (global params), nonces, DH key exchange with authentication Can use arithmetic in prime fields or elliptic curve fields UB Fall 2017 CSE 565: S. Upadhyaya Lec 23. 20

ISAKMP § § 11/14/17 Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol Provides framework for ISAKMP § § 11/14/17 Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol Provides framework for key management Defines procedures and packet formats to establish, negotiate, modify, & delete SAs Independent of key exchange protocol, encryption alg, & authentication method UB Fall 2017 CSE 565: S. Upadhyaya Lec 23. 21

ISAKMP 11/14/17 UB Fall 2017 CSE 565: S. Upadhyaya Lec 23. 22 ISAKMP 11/14/17 UB Fall 2017 CSE 565: S. Upadhyaya Lec 23. 22

Summary § 11/14/17 Have considered: § IPSec security framework § AH § ESP § Summary § 11/14/17 Have considered: § IPSec security framework § AH § ESP § Key management & Oakley/ISAKMP UB Fall 2017 CSE 565: S. Upadhyaya Lec 23. 23




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